Skip to main content

Full text of "On nature and grace : a theological treatise"

See other formats 


ON 


NATUEE   AND   GRACE. 


A  THEOLOGICAL  TREATISE.     ^M1 


BOOK  I. 


BY 

WILLIAM    GEOEGE    WARD,  D.Pn. 

LATE    LECTUEER  IN   DOGMATIC   THEOLOGY  AT    ST.   EDMUND'S    SEMINARY   HERTS. 


LONDON : 

BURNS  AKD  LAMBERT,  17  PORTMAN  STREET,  PORTMAN  SQ. 

MDCCCLX. 

{The  ngM  of  Translation  is  reserved.} 

' 


LONDON: 
Printed  by  G.  BARCLAY,  Castle  St.  Leicester  Sq. 


To  His  Eminence,  Nicholas, 
Cardinal  Archbishop  of  Westminster, 


My  dear  Lord  Cardinal, 

IT  was  you  who  placed  me  in  my  position  at  St. 
Edmund's ;  and  you  were  kind  enough  to  express 
much  regret,  when  the  failure  of  health  and  other 
circumstances  of  a  private  character  necessitated 
my  abandoning  it.  To  whom  therefore  can  I  so 
suitably  dedicate  the  first  publication  which  re- 
sults from  that  position  ? 

It  might  seem  indeed  that  some  apology  is 
needed,  for  venturing  on  this  dedication,  without 
having  first  solicited  your  Eminence's  permission. 
My  only  reason  for  not  asking  it,  has  been  my 


iv  DEDICATION. 

anxiety  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  any  one 
supposing,  that  you  are  in  any  way  responsible 
for  the  contents  of  this  volume.  At  the  same 
time  I  need  hardly  add,  what  deep  gratification 
it  would  afford  me,  so  far  as  I  should  find  you  to 
approve  what  I  have  written,  and  to  approve  the 
fact  of  my  writing  it. 

I  am  most  glad  of  the  present  opportunity,  to 
give  expression,  and  so  relief,  to  my  feelings  of 
gratitude,  for  the  constant  kindnesses  which  I 
have  received  from  your  Eminence  :  kindnesses, 
which  have  continued  uninterruptedly  to  the  pre- 
sent time,  from  a  period  preceding  by  several  years 
my  reception  into  the  Church.  My  personal 
obligations  to  you  indeed,  of  which  this  very 
volume  reminds  me,  are  far  greater  than  you  are 
perhaps  at  all  aware.  To  your  kind  confidence 
I  owe,  what  I  have  ever  regarded  as  the  chief 
blessing  and  privilege  of  my  external  Catholic 
life ;  my  connection  with  the  Seminary.  To  you 
I  am  hidebted  for  seven  years,  far  happier  than 
any  which  I  ever  before  spent ;  and  far  happier 
than  any  others  are  at  all  likely  to  be,  on  this 
side  the  grave.  To  you  I  owe  it,  that  during 
those  years  I  have  been  rescued  from  the  dull 
and  wearisome  routine  of  secular  life  in  the  world; 
and  allowed  to  bear  a  part,  however  indirect,  in 


DEDICATION.  V 

one  of  the  very  noblest  works  which  can  possibly 
occupy  the  intellect  or  engage  the  affections, — the 
training  of  ecclesiastical  students  for  the  fulfilment 
of  their  high  vocation. 

Yet  at  last  the  personal  obligations  to  you 
under  which  I  lie,  are  as  nothing  compared  with 
the  obligations,  resting  on  public  grounds,  which 
I  share  in  common  with  the  whole  Catholic  Church 
in  England.  I  feel  most  deeply,  that  the  prin- 
ciples of  government  and  administration,  which 
you  have  introduced  and  maintained  amongst  us, 
are  our  one  hope,  under  God,  for  the  real  and 
solid  promotion  of  Catholicism,  in  this  our 
country.  That  it  may  be  God's  pleasure  to  re- 
establish you  in  perfect  health,  and  to  preserve 
for  His  Church  in  England  the  inestimable  benefit 
of  your  government  and  counsels, — this  is  at  the 
present  moment  the  frequent  and  earnest  prayer 
of  many  devoted  hearts. 

On  these  three  grounds,  I  trust  that  you 
will  not  consider  me  as  obtrusive  or  inoppor- 
tune, when  I  ask  to  place  this  volume  under  your 
Eminence's  patronage.  I  offer  it  to  you,  as  the 
first-fruits,  if  I  may  so  express  myself,  of  that 
vocation  to  which  you  summoned  me.  I  offer  it, 
as  an  inadequate  expression  of  gratitude,  for  per- 
sonal kindnesses  which  I  can  never  forget.  I  offer 


VI  DEDICATION. 

it  still  more  earnestly,  as  a  humble  contribution  on 
my  part  to  the  general  sum  of  grateful  acknow- 
ledgment, which  is  due  to  you  from  the  whole 
English  Church. 

In  entering  then  on  my  most  anxious  theo- 
logical enterprise,  I  entreat  your  Eminence's  bless- 
ing on  myself  and  on  my  work.  And  I  beg  to 
subscribe  myself, 

With  deep  respect, 

Your  ever  affectionate  and  grateful  Servant, 

W.  G.  WARD. 


PREFACE. 


I  AM  hoping,  if  God  enables  me,  to  publish  a  theological 
treatise  on  c  Nature  and  Grace,'  founded  on  part  of  my 
course  at  St.  Edmund's.  In  offering  then  to  the 
public  this  first  volume  of  the  intended  work,  I  shall 
reasonably  be  expected  in  the  first  place  to  explain, 
what  is  that  portion  of  Theology,  which  I  mean  to 
express  by  the  above  title.  I  will  answer  this  question 
as  briefly  as  I  can ;  for  its  full  consideration  belongs  to 
the  second  volume.  In  order  however  to  answer  it 
at  all,  it  is  necessary  to  attempt  some  general  chart  or 
map  of  theological  science  as  a  whole. 

The  recognised  model  for  a  scientific  arrangement 
of  Theology,  is  St.  Thomas's  4  Surnma.'  This  great 
work  is  divided  into  three  parts,  of  which  the  contents 
are  as  follows : — 

The  4  Pars  Prima '  begins  with  '  de  Deo/  and  pro- 
ceeds to  4  de  Trinitate.7  So  far  it  is  one  connected 
whole,  in  the  strictest  sense;  for  the  doctrine  which 
concerns  the  latter,  absolutely  and  entirely  depends  on 
that  which  concerns  the  former.  In  addition  to  these 
fundamental  doctrines,  the  4  Pars  Prima '  contains  cer- 
tain minor  matters,  on  which  we  need  not  further 


Vlli  PREFACE. 

dwell :  such  as  '  de  Angelis ; '  and  a  certain,  some- 
what miscellaneous,  assortment  of  subjects,  which  stand 
in  later  treatises  under  the  general  head  c  de  Deo 
Creatore.' 

The  '  Pars  Secunda '  makes  a  fresh  start  altogether : 
and  resting  its  foundation  on'the  observed  facts  of  human 
nature,  proceeds  to  consider  the  various  constituents  of 
human  action ;  the  rules  of  life  obligatory  on  man ;  the 
nature  of  virtue  and  vice;  and  other  matters  of  the  same 
kind :  finally  crowning  the  whole  with  the  doctrine  of 
Divine  Grace.  It  is  divided  into  two  portions,  the  la 
2ffi,  and  2a  2s6  :  the  former  of  which  proceeds  scientifi- 
cally over  the  ground  which  I  have  just  mentioned ; 
while  the  latter  considers  various  virtues  and  vices  in 
particular,  with  their  appertaining  circumstances. 

The  'Pars  Tertia'  is  on  the  Incarnation  and  the 
Sacraments.  Any  treatment  of  the  Incarnation  must 
include  two  things.  First,  it  must  include  a  treatment 
of  the  Hypostatic  Union :  and  this  must  necessarily  be 
based  on  the  doctrine  c  de  Trinitate ; '  for  it  is  only  by 
mastering  first  that  doctrine  which  concerns  the  Second 
Person  in  Himself,  that  we  can  possibly  study  the 
further  doctrine,  of  His  assuming  human  nature.  The 
other  portion,  necessarily  included  in  any  treatment  of 
the  Incarnation,  comprises  all  questions  concerning  the 
human  soul  and  body  which  have  been  thus  assumed. 
These  questions  depend  on  matters  treated  in  the 
'  Pars  Secunda.'  We  wish  to  know  for  instance,  what 
are  the  endowments  of  Christ's  soul ;  what  Grace  visits 
it ;  what  Grace  inhabits  it :  this  presupposes  the  whole 
doctrine  of  Grace  in  general.  The  doctrine  of  the 
Incarnation  then  is  a  kind  of  bridge,  uniting  the  c  Pars 


PREFACE.  IX 

Prima '  with  the  '  Pars  Secunda.'  Part  of  St.  Thomas's 
doctrine  in  the  '  Pars  Tertia '  depends  on  the  '  Pars 
Prima,'  and  part  on  the  'Pars  Secunda;'  but  the  'Pars 
Prima '  and  '  Pars  Secunda '  themselves  are  mutually 
independent. 

On  reviewing  then  the -whole  'corpus'  of  Theo- 
logy, so  far  as  S.  Thomas's  '  Summa '  may  be  taken 
as  representing  it,*  we  shall  find  its  organic  structure 
to  be  of  the  following  kind.  Its  foundation  is  composed 
of  two  independent  portions;  and  its  superstructure 
rests  upon  both.  There  are  one  or  two  doctrinal 
matters  indeed,  which  can  hardly  be  considered  as 
integral  parts  of  this  scientific  structure  at  all ;  which  can 
be  studied  as  satisfactorily,  in  one  order  as  in  another. 
But  in  regard  to  far  the  greater  number  of  doctrines, 
the  case  is  otherwise ;  and  it  is  of  very  considerable 
importance,  if  we  wish  to  master  them  at  all  thoroughly, 
that  we  study  them  in  their  due  scientific  place. 

*  A  remark  has  been  made  to  me  by  a  friend  of  mine,  a  priest,  which 
appears  true  ;  though  it  so  unconnected  with  our  immediate  subject,  that 
I  cannot  do  more  than  most  briefly  allude  to  it. 

He  considers  that  St.  Thomas's '  Summa'  is  incomplete,  in  its  theological 
plan,  as  containing  no  sufficient  treatment  of  the '  De  Ecclesia.'  '  There  are 
three  elements,'  he  observes, '  required  to  make  a  good  product  in  concreto 
from  theological  teaching  : — 

1.  Scientific  teaching  of  dogma. 

2.  Its  ascetic  correlative,  i.e.  the  personal. 

3.  The  life  of  the  citizen  of  the  Kingdom.1 

St.  Thomas's  Theology,  he  proceeds  in  effect  to  say,  does  not  include  any 
sufficient  foundation  for  the  latter  requisite.  '  Our  present  Theology,'  he 
observes,  'seems  to  be  a  stranger  to  any  scientific  handling  of  the  two 
societies,  which,  as  St.  Augustine  says,  dispute  possession  of  the  world ; 
the  Civitas  Terrena  and  the  Civitas  Ccelestis.' 

I  think  that  these  remarks  are  well  founded  ;  and  that  a  full  treatise 
'De  Ecclesia,'  succeeding,  and  based  upon,  the  treatise  'De  Incarnatione,'  is 
indispensable  for  a  complete  theological  corpus. 


X  PEEFACE. 

It  will  be  asked,  what  I  mean  by  this  phrase, 
'  independent '  portions  of  science  ;  and  a  ready  illus- 
tration is  at  hand.  Mathematics  is  one  science,  just  as 
Theology  is ;  yet  in  its  earlier  and  more  rudimental 
teaching,  it  is  made  up  of  two  ( independent'  portions, 
—  Algebra  and  Geometry.  Algebra  may  be  studied 
before  Geometry,  or  Geometry  before  Algebra ;  because 
(as  I  have  said)  they  are  'independent'  portions  of 
science.  On  the  other  hand,  in  Geometry  you  cannot 
study  the  fourth  book  of  Euclid  before  the  first ;  nor 
in  Algebra  can  you  study  equations  before  addition 
and  subtraction.  So  in  Theology.  It  is  impossible  to 
understand  the  '  de  Deo  Trino,'  till  we  have  studied  the 
4de  Deo  Uno  ;'  and  it  is  impossible  to  understand  the 
'  de  Gratia,'  till  we  have  studied  the  4  de  Actibus 
Humanis.'  But  that  portion  of  science  on  the  one 
hand,  which  contains  the  '  de  Deo  Uno  et  Trino;' — and 
that  portion,  on  the  other  hand,  which  contains  the 
'  de  Actibus  Humanis'  and  '  de  Gratia;' — these  are 
mutually  independent :  it  is  a  matter  of  indifference, 
which  is  studied  before  the  other.  Lastly,  upon  these 
two  independent  portions  is  founded  the  doctrine  of  the 
Incarnation,  and  all  which  follows. 

That  portion  of  Theology  then,  to  which  I  give 
the  title  '  On  Nature  and  Grace,'  is  the  latter  of  those 
two  independent  portions  above  mentioned.  It  includes 
all  those  revealed  truths,  which  relate  directly  to  each 
man's  moral  and  spiritual  action  or  condition :  all 
those  which  concern  his  individual  relations  with  God 
His  true  End ;  whether  he  be  tending  towards  that 
End,  or  moving  unhappily  in  the  opposite  direction. 

These   truths,   as     will  at   once   be  manifest,  are 


PREFACE.  XI 

almost  exclusively  confined  to  the  contents  of  S. 
Thomas's  'Pars  Secunda:'  yet  there  are  one  or  two 
additional  matters,  which  it  falls  within  my  plan  to 
introduce.  One  of  these  is  the  state  of  Original  Justice. 
How  can  the  doctrine  of  Grace  be  understood,  without 
considering  Original  Sin  ?  Or  how  can  the  doctrine 
of  Original  Sin  be  understood,  without  considering 
Original  Justice?  The  propriety  of  this  introduction 
then,  is  (I  hope)  most  obvious. 

There  is  another  assemblage  of  truths,  which  I  hope 
to  introduce  from  the  'Pars  Prima  ;'  viz.  those  which 
appertain  to  God's  Providence  and  Predestination.  A 
moment's  thought  will  shew,  how  completely  these 
truths  are  included  within  the  description  which  I  gave, 
as  to  that  portion  of  Theology  which  I  undertake  ;  for 
nothing  can  more  closely  concern  man's  individual 
relations  with  God  his  True  End.  The  doctrine  of 
Providence  and  Predestination,  just  as  the  doctrine  of 
Grace  itself,  considers,  on  the  one  hand,  the  effect  of 
God's  Agency  on  man's  free  acts ;  and  considers,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  reciprocal  bearing  of  man's  free  acts  on 
God's  Counsels  and  Agency.  The  connexion  between 
the  two  is  close  and  indissoluble. 

Once  more.  The  doctrine  of  Justification  is  most 
strictly  within  the  compass  of  this  treatise.  And  yet 
it  is  impossible  fully  to  discuss  it,  unless  we  carefully 
consider  the  qualities  of  that  '  attrition,'  which  suffices 
for  an  adult's  justification  in  the  sacraments  of  Baptism 
and  Penance.  Thus  we  are  led  to  some  little  encroach- 
ment on  the  '  Pars  Tertia.' 

Still  on  the  whole,  this  treatise,  as  I  have  said, 
will  not  go  beyond  the  ground  covered  by  the  'Pars 


Xli  PREFACE. 

Secunda.'     And  it  will  naturally  divide  itself  into  five 
Books,  of  very  unequal  length;   as  follows  : — 

Book  1st.  Philosophical  Introduction. 

Book  2d.  Theological  Prolegomena. 

Book  3d.  On  Man's  Moral  Action. 

Book  4th.  On  Divine  Grace. 

Book  5th.  On  God's  Providence  and  Predestination. 

The  titles  of  the  three  last  Books  sufficiently 
explain  their  intended  contents.  In  the  second  Book, 
I  hope  to  include  two  different  subjects.  Firstly,  I 
hope  to  consider  the  general  nature  and  character  of 
Theology;  with  so  much,  at  least,  of  detail  and  ex- 
plicitness,  as  may  give  us  means  of  assigning  their  true 
relative  values,  to  the  various  *  loci,'  or  sources,  from 
which  our  theological  arguments  will  be  derived.  And 
further,  I  hope  to  include  in  the  same  Book  a  theological 
treatment  (so  far  as  such  is  necessary)  of  those  various 
philosophical  principles,  which  we  shall  have  established 
in  this,  the  first  Book. 

So  much  then,  on  the  general  contents  of  the  Books 
which  are  to  follow.  I  must  now  refer,  in  somewhat 
greater  detail,  to  the  contents  of  this  first  Book,  which 
is  now  presented  to  the  public.  And  as  it  purports  to 
be  the  'philosophical  introduction'  to  a  *  theological 
treatise,'  it  will  be  necessary,  by  way  of  preliminary 
explanation,  to  say  something  on  the  relation  between 
Philosophy  and  Theology.  This  also  is  to  be  one  of 
the  matters  handled  in  the  second  Book;  and  it  will 
here  therefore  be  treated  with  the  greatest  attainable 
brevity. 


PREFACE.  Xlll 

THEOLOGY  and  Philosophy  agree  with  each  other 
in  being  sciences :  in  what  do  they  differ  ?  The 
answer  which  meets  us  on  the  surface,  is  of  the  following 
kind.  4  Theology  and  Philosophy  are  mutually  ex- 

*  elusive.    Philosophy  is  produced,  by  Reason  exercising 
'  itself  on  those  data,  which  Reason  itself  declares ; 

*  Theology,  by  Reason  exercising  itself  on  those  data, 
4  which  are  known  only  by  Revelation.     If  a  truth  can 
'  be   deduced  from  Reason   and  Experience  alone,  it 
'  appertains  to  Philosophy  ;    if  it  can  only  be  known 
'  through  Revelation,  to  Theology/ 

But  one  single  instance  will  sufficiently  shew,  that 
there  is  some  inaccuracy  in  this  statement.  All 
Catholics  agree  in  holding,  as  a  truth  which  Reason 
alone  is  able  to  establish,  that  there  exists  that  Being, 
Infinite  in  all  Perfections,  Whom  we  call  God.  From 
this  datum,  thus  given  by  Reason,  Reason  is  able 
readily  to  deduce  all  God's  principal  Attributes  :  His 
Aseity,  Simplicity,  Eternity,  Immensity,  Immutability, 
Sanctity,  Omniscience,  Omnipotence.  It  would  follow 
then,  from  the  distinction  above  attempted  between 
Theology  and  Philosophy,  that  a  consideration  of  these 
Attributes  is  totally  external  to  the  province  of  Theology. 
Yet  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  a  conclusion,  more  opposed 
to  the  Church's  universal  and  continuous  practice,  and 
more  repugnant  to  the  instinctive  feeling  of  every 
theologian,  than  such  a  statement  would  be.  And  the 
very  same  reasoning  holds,  in  regard  to  certain  other 
most  important  matters  of  doctrine,  which  shall  pre- 
sently be  mentioned.  It  is  necessary  therefore,  some- 
what to  revise  the  above  statement :  and  a  very  little 
consideration  indeed  will  enable  us  to  see  its  fallacy. 


PREFACE. 

Theology  is  produced  by  the  exercise  of  Reason  on 
those  truths,  which  the  Apostles  committed  to  the 
Church's  custody.  This  is  admitted  on  all  hands. 
Now  it  is  implied,  in  the  distinction  just  now  attempted 
between  Theology  and  Philosophy,  that  all  these  truths 
are  in  such  sense  supernatural,  that  Reason  by  itself 
would  be  wholly  unable  to  establish  them.  But  there 
cannot  be  a  greater  mistake,  than  to  suppose  that  all 
revealed  truths  are  of  this  kind  :  and  this  I  now  proceed 
to  shew. 

Certainly  no  announcement  occupied  a  more  promi- 
nent place  in  the  apostolic  teaching,  than  this ;  that 
a  Divine  Person,  clothed  in  human  nature,  had  visited 
this  earth  ;  that  He  had  died  an  atoning  death ;  that 
upon  that  death  He  had  built  an  Universal  Church. 
Now  it  was  impossible  for  the  Apostles  to  teach  this 
doctrine,  without  teaching  in  its  company  the  doctrine 
of  the  Blessed  Trinity  ;  and  it  was  impossible  for  them 
to  teach  the  Trinity,  unless  there  already  existed  a  clear 
and  full  apprehension  of  the  Divine  Unity.  But  go 
where  they  might  externally  to  Juda3a,  the  great  mass 
of  the  people  had  totally  lost  their  hold  of  this  funda- 
mental Verity.  The  revival  then,  in  all  their  purity,  of 
those  doctrines  concerning  God,  which  Reason  by  it- 
self is  able  to  establish, — this  was  among  the  very  first 
enterprises,  which  it  was  necessary  for  the  Apostles  to 
set  on  foot.  These  doctrines,  as  all  must  admit,  are  to 
the  full  as  integral  and  indispensable  a  part  of  the  Apo- 
stolic teaching,  as  are  the  Trinity  and  the  Incarnation. 

But  again.  This  Person,  as  being  the  Incarnate 
God,  was  to  be  The  One  Pattern  and  Exemplar  of 
Sanctity  in  the  Church  through  every  age.  Will  any 


PREFACE.  XV 

one  say,  that  the  ideal  of  virtuousness,  then  prevalent  in 
the  heathen  world,  approached  ever  so  distantly  to  this 
Divine  Type?  Here  then  was  another  achievement,  which 
it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  accomplish.  The  prevalent 
ideal  of  virtuousness  was  to  be  radically  reformed  ;  the 
existing  notions  of  good  and  evil  were  to  be  almost 
revolutionized ;  in  one  word,  the  Natural  Law  was  to 
be  republished.  It  was  simply  impossible,  that  our 
Lord  should  be  accepted  as  the  Model  of  Life,  unless 
this  other  task, — republishing  the  Natural  Law, — 
were  also  successfully  undertaken.  I  may  add  also,  it 
was  simply  impossible  that  the  doctrines  of  Divine  Grace 
should  be  preached,  unless  the  faithful  were  enabled  to 
understand,  what  is  the  nature  and  character  of  that  true 
and  solid  virtue,  which  Grace  is  to  generate  in  their  souls. 

But  in  truth  there  is  a  reason,  even  deeper  than  either 
of  these  two,  why  the  republication  of  true  moral  prin- 
ciples was  so  absolutely  indispensable  an  element  of 
Christian  teaching.  Why  did  God  the  Son  clothe 
Himself  in  our  nature  and  die  on  the  Cross  ?  that  He 
might  raise  men  to  salvation  hereafter,  by  raising  them  to 
sanctity  here.  Sanctity  and  salvation, — here  is  the 
very  end  for  which  Christianity  was  given.  Cer- 
tainly then  it  cannot  contain  any  more  more  vital 
or  more  integral  doctrine,  than  its  declaration  of  what 
sanctity  is. 

There  is  a  considerable  body  of  Truth  then,  which 
is  in  itself  capable  of  being  established  by  Reason  ;  but 
which  is  nevertheless  so  primary  and  prominent  a  part 
of  the  Christian  Revelation,  that  no  other  whatever  can 
possibly  be  more  so.  Theology,  it  is  true,  is  founded 
exclusively  on  '  principia  revelata  :'  I  only  say,  that  of 


XVI  PREFACE. 

these  'principia  revelata,'  there  are  some  most  impor- 
tant and  essential,  which  might  have  been  known  by 
Reason  had  there  been  no  Revelation.*  This  body  of 
Dogma  belongs  as  simply  and  absolutely  to  Theology, 
as  do  the  very  doctrines  of  the  Trinity  or  of  Habitual 
Grace  :  and  yet  in  another  very  true  sense,  it  belongs 
to  Philosophy  also.  It  is  desirable  to  give  it  a  special 
name  ;  and  I  might  be  tempted  to  call  it  '  Theological 
Philosophy,'  were  it  not  that  this  term  would  be  so 
often  understood  in  a  totally  different  sense,  as  express- 
ing the  philosophy,  or  rationale,  of  Theology.  I  will 
call  this  body  of  Truth,  then,  the  '  Higher  Philosophy ;' 
using  this  term  in  a  somewhat  technical  sense. 

This  Higher  Philosophy  will  be  found  to  consist  of 
three  principal  divisions:  (1)  the  doctrines  '  de  Deo 
Uno;'  (2)  the  truths  of  Morality ;  (3)  various  portions 
of  Ethical  Psychology.  On  the  two  former  divisions 
we  have  already  spoken.  In  regard  to  Ethical  Psy- 
chology, the  term  is  explained  in  the  present  volume, 
p.  193.  And  in  support  of  my  statement,  that  various 
parts  of  this  science  belong  in  the  strictest  sense  to 
Theology,  let  such  questions  as  the  following  be  duly 
considered.  How  far  is  it  possible,  without  prayer, 
to  resist  grave  temptation,  or  keep  the  sum  of  God's 
Commandments?  How  far  is  it  possible  to  preserve 
the  remembrance  of  God  throughout  the  day,  amidst 
the  jar  and  tumult  of  every-day  life  ?  How  far  is  it 
true,  that,  in  our  fallen  state,  our  will  is  weaker  in  the 
good  than  in  the  evil  direction?  How  far  are  we 
necessitated  to  aim  at  our  own  felicity  ?  These  and 

*  See  St.  Thomas,  2*  2ae,  q.  2,  a.  4. 


PREFACE.  XV 11 

many  other  questions  of  the  same  kind,  it  is  manifest, 
are  most  strictly  theological ;  they  are  such  as  the 
Apostles  must  certainly  have  answered  one  way  or 
other,  when  delivering  that  body  of  doctrine,  which  is 
to  raise  us  towards  sanctity.  On  the  other  hand, 
these  same  questions  are  no  less  strictly  psychological ; 
and  are  amenable  to  the  tribunal  of  consciousness  and 
experience.  Then  consider  the  great  stress,  laid  by 
St.  Paul-  and  by  the  whole  Church  after  him,  on 
Concupiscence.  Does  not  this  shew,  how  strictly  theo- 
logical is  the  discussion  of  its  phenomena  ?  Yet  what 
is  such  discussion,  except  a  psychological  analysis  ? 

How  large  a  portion  of  Theology  is  constituted  by 
this  Higher  Philosophy,  one  single  consideration  will 
sufficiently  shew.  St.  Thomas's  4  Summa '  is  a  '  Summa 
Theologice : '  yet  how  large  a  portion  of  it  is  occupied, 
with  matters  which  are  within  the  region  of  Philo- 
sophy ?  In  the  '  Pars  Prima,'  at  least  35  questions 
out  of  119;  in  the  'Prima  Secundse,'  at  least  82  out 
of  114;  in  the  '  Secunda  Secundse,'  not  very  far  from 
170  out  of  189.*  Again, '  Moral  Theology,'  as  its  name 
denotes,  is  part  of  '  Theology ; '  yet,  in  at  least  two- 
thirds  of  its  extent,  it  is  occupied  with  truths,  which 
are  in  themselves  within  the  province  of  Reason.  See 
the  remarks  made  in  p.  151,  2  of  this  volume.  See 
however  p.  117,  8  and  p.  149-151. 

The  whole  of  my  present  volume,  it  will  be  seen, 

*  Pars  la  q.  2-22,  and  75-88.  Prima  Secundae,  q.  1-66  ;  71-79  ;  90-97.  I 
include  q.  3  with  its  n.  8,  because  St.  Thomas  professes  (though  I  venture  to 
think  most  unsatisfactorily)  to  prove  by  Reason,  that  Beatitude  must  consist 
in  the  Vision  of  God's  Essence.  Secunda  Secundee,  q.  1-170.  Since  God's 
Existence  is  demonstrable  by  Reason,  so  also  must  be  the  larger  part  of 
those  main  doctrines,  which  relate  to  the  three  theological  virtues. 

b 


XV111  PREFACE. 

(with  the  most  insignificant  exception  of  four  pages, 
424-428)  appertains  to  this  part  of  Philosophy.  The 
first  Chapter  purports  to  be  'on  the  Principles  of 
*  Morality  ;'  and  the  second,  'on  Ethical  Psychology  :' 
while  of  the  third  Chapter,  its  first  Section  belongs  to 
the  latter,  and  its  second  to  the  former.  It  will  be 
desirable  then  to  add  a  few  words,  on  the  spirit  of 
deference  to  the  Church,  with  which  every  Catholic 
philosopher  is  bound  to  approach  such  subjects. 

Undoubtedly,  whatever  part  of  Philosophy  be  in- 
vestigated by  the  Catholic,  he  owes  implicit  obedience 
to  the  voice  of  the  Church.  Whether  he  be  studying 
the  deep  mysteries  of  Space  and  Time  ;  or  the  geological 
conformation  of  our  planet  ;  or  the  planetary  universe 
in  general;  —  on  all  these  subjects  the  Church  possesses 
indirect  authority.  In  all  these  investigations,  she  has 
the  fullest  right  of  peremptorily  interfering,  wherever 
she  judges  that  any  scientific  conclusions  lead  to 
consequences,  at  variance  with  that  doctrinal  deposit 
which  is  committed  to  her  keeping.*  But  such  inter- 

*  Lord  Macaulay  indeed  attributes  to  us  a  different  doctrine.  He  is 
referring  to  the  case  of  Galileo,  and  he  makes  this  remark  :  '  All  intelligent 
1  Catholics  now  hold,  with  Pascal,  that  in  deciding  the  point  at  all,  the 
'  Church  exceeded  her  powers,  and  was  therefore  justly  left  destitute  of 
'  supernatural  assistance.'  (Review  of  Ranke.)  I  hope  I  am  an  '  intelligent 
Catholic' ;  but  I  utterly  repudiate  any  such  position.  I  never  indeed 
heard  of  any  Catholic,  '  intelligent '  or  otherwise,  who  had  given  his  atten- 
tion to  the  subject,  holding  any  position  of  the  kind.  And  if  Lord  Macaulay 
be  right  in  thinking  that  Pascal  did  so,  it  is  only  necessary  to  reply,  that 
where  the  question  concerns  due  submission  to  the  Church,  Pascal  is  among 
the  very  last  guides  whom  a  well -instructed  Catholic  would  wish  to  follow. 
In  regard  to  the  censure  of  Galileo,  if  his  censured  propositions  had  been 
most  strictly  and  exclusively  theological,  it  would  have  none  the  less  been 
true,  that  the  c?nsure  was  not  of  that  character,  which  any  theologian  regards 
as  claiming  the  Catholic's  interior  assent.  It  so  happens,  that  proof  can 
be  adduced  of  this,  which  must  satisfy  the  most  eager  opponent. 


PREFACE.  XIX 

ferences  are  of  course  most  rare ;  nor  are  they  founded, 
on  any  kind  of  authority  which  she  possesses  over 
secular  science  as  such.  They  are  founded  on  the  obliga- 
tion under  which  she  lies,  of  protecting  her  own  science 
from  invasion  and  detriment ;  and  on  the  privileges  with 
which  she  has  been  invested  by  God,  for  the  fulfilment 
of  that  obligation.  Such  are  the  limits  of  the  Church's 
authority,  within  the  sphere  of  purely  secular  science. 
But  when  we  are  handling  such  subjects  as  those  with 
which  the  present  volume  is  occupied,  the  case  is  most 
different.  We  are  on  the  Church's  special  ground.  We 
must  look  to  her  at  every  step  for  guidance  :  we  must 
carefully  direct  our  course  by  those  landmarks,  which 
she  has  so  plentifully  provided ;  or  some  disastrous 
misadventure  will  result. 

But  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  speak  in  this  way, 
without  calling  to  mind  the  possibility,  that  this 
volume  may  come  under  the  eye  of  Protestants. 
They  will  read  such  language  as  the  above  with  so 
much  indignation  and  impatience,  that  it  seems  de- 

F.  Faure,  S.  J.  was  one  of  the  most  eminent  and  learned  theologians 
whom  the  last  century  produced.  His  eminence  as  an  astronomer  however 
was  far  from  equalling  his  eminence  as  a  theologian  ;  and  he  was  most 
intensely  opposed  to  the  Copernican  theory.  Nay,  he  opposes  Copernicanism 
on  theological  grounds ;  and  says  that,  if  we  once  admit  it,  we  have  no 
defence  left  against  Socinianism.  '  Argumentati  sumus,'  he  says,  *  neces- 
sariam  esse  illationem  a  Copernicanismo  affirmato,  ad  amrmandum  Socini- 
anismum' ;  with  very  much  more  to  the  same  purpose.  (Notes  on  St.  Augus- 
tine's Enchiridion,  Passaglia's  Edition,  p.  49,  col.  2.) 

Now  F.  Faure  is  writing  to  Catholics ;  and  he  holds  that,  even  on  theo- 
logical grounds,  Copernicanism  is  a  most  pernicious  and  destructive  error  : 
it  is  quite  certain  therefore,  that  he  will  make  every  use  in  his  power  of  any 
condemnation  of  Copernicanism,  which  the  Church  has  ever  pronounced.  I 
would  beg  the  reader  then  most  carefully  to  observe  the  following  language. 
*  Quee  omnia  cum  scribimus,  scimus  Socinianorum  errorem  .  . .  fuisse  et  esse 
ab  Ecclesia  damnatum  ;  quam  damnationem  adhuc  non pasta  est  hypothesis 


XX  PREFACE. 

sirable  to  say  something  on  its  manifest  reasonableness. 
It  is  difficult,  indeed,  at  all  times  to  apprehend  the 
precise  ground  of  Protestant  dissent  from  our  doctrines. 
The  deep  and  contemptuous  prejudice  with  which 
(alas  for  themselves!)  they  regard  our  Creed,  so 
possesses  them,  that  they  will  not  ordinarily  take  the 
trouble  to  analyse  their  objections,  or  put  them  into 
any  definite  shape.  And  so,  in  the  matter  before  us, 
they  deal  in  vague  generalities;  they  say,  e.g.  that  our 
maxims  fetter  the  intellect,  and  enslave  the  soul :  and 
they  leave  us  to  guess  at  the  meaning  of  these  gene- 
ralities as  best  we  may. 

Our  own  view  of  the  case  certainly  seems  on  the 
surface  simple  and  intelligible.  All  Truth  is  ordinarily 
a  blessing ;  but  Truth,  on  those  matters  which  directly 
concern  virtue  and  piety,  is  among  the  very  greatest 
blessings  which  we  can  receive.  If  then  the  Church  is 
divinely  commissioned  to  teach  us  such  Truth,  we  are 
most  grateful  to  God  accordingly.  We  should  no 
more  imagine  that  this  precious  gift  fetters  the  intellect 
and  enslaves  the  soul, — than  we  should  so  think,  if 


Copernicana,  sive  ull&  pontificia  bulla  sive  ullo  concilii  cecumenici  decreto. 
Ceeterum  nos,  non  auctoritate  (quae  nulla  nobis  est)  definientes,  sed  theo- 
logice  ratiocinantes,  argumentamur  ab  absurdo  :  quod  argumentationis 
genus  Catholic!  ipsi  Scholastic!  contra  Scholasticos  alios  usurpant,  sine  alterius 
injurid.'  (p.  52,  col.  1).  F.  Faure  is  evidently  desirous  that  Copernicanism 
should  be  condemned,  and  thinks  that  it  fully  deserves  condemnation  ;  yet 
he  is  obliged  to  confess  that,  at  the  moment  of  his  writing,  it  is  a  perfectly 
open  question. 

Nor  does  this  arise,  from  his  forgetting  the  censures  which  had  been  put 
forth  on  Galileo  ;  for  he  distinctly  mentions  them  immediately  afterwards. 
He  cites  the  '  decreta  Congregationis  Cardinalium  sub  Paulo  V.  die  5  Martii, 
1616  ;'  and  also  the  'censuratheologorum  de  mandato  pontificis  selectorum.' 
He  cites  these,  at  the  head  of  his  list  of  quotations ;  quotations  which 
are  adduced  to  shew,  how  many  and  how  strong  Catholic  authorities  he 


PREFACE.  XXI 

God  mercifully  revealed  the  efficacy  of  some  medicine, 
which  experience  had  not  yet  discovered;  or  than 
Adam  so  thought,  when  God  instructed  him  how  to  till 
the  earth  and  reap  its  fruits. 

Such  language  then  as  the  above  seems  most 
strangely  chosen,  if  all  which  Protestants  mean  to  ex- 
press is,  that  they  are  not  themselves  convinced,  by 
those  proofs  which  satisfy  us  of  the  Church's  infallible 
authority.  Such  a  difference  is  one  of  fact,  not  of 
principle  ;  and  it  seems  quite  unmeaning  to  express  it 
in  such  phraseology  as  we  have  been  considering.  If 
however  this  be  their  whole  meaning,  of  course  it  is 
impossible  here  to  reply  :  because  such  a  reply  would 
simply  be  a  discussion  on  the  grounds  on  which  the 
Church's  claims  repose ;  and  such  a  discussion  would 
occupy  a  volume.  Here  it  is  only  necessary  to  say, 
that  a  Protestant's  authority  on  such  a  matter  is,  in 
general,  worth  extremely  little  ;  for  a  Protestant,  who 
knows  with  any  kind  of  accuracy  what  we  believe  and 
why,  is  among  the  rarest  of  human  beings. 

But  I  cannot  help  thinking,  that  Protestants  do 
often  mean  something  more  definite,  when  they  use  such 

has  on  his  side.  But  the  idea  never  occurs  to  him  of  pressing  them 
further ;  of  even  starting  the  supposition,  that  they  bind  the  Catholic's 
opinion  to  one  side  of  the  question. 

I  should  add,  that  he  speaks  of '  Copernicani  Catholici,  si  qui  sunt  qui 
systema  illud,  non  tantuin  ut  hypothesin,  defendunt ;  in  quo  nulla  esset 
difficultas.'  This  shews,  I  suppose,  that  not  many  Catholics  in  F.  Faure's 
time  held  Copernican  opinions  ;  so  far  at  least  as  he  was  himself  aware : 
but  it  shews  much  more  clearly,  that  (in  Faure's  judgment)  they  might 
hold  them,  without  ceasing  to  be  Catholics ;  or  in  other  words  (which 
indeed  he  had  already  expressly  stated)  that  Copernicanism  had  never 
been  condemned. 

See,  On  the  relations  between  Christianity  and  Scientific  Investigation, 
an  able  essay  of  Father  Newman's : '  On  University  Subjects,'  p.  262. 


XXli  PREFACE. 

language.  Some  such  statement  as  the  following  may 
perhaps  correctly  express  their  objection.  '  Of  course, 
'  where  truth  is  to  be  received,  which  is  above  the 
4  sphere  of  the  intellect,  an  unquestioning  acceptance  of 
4  God's  Word  is  our  only  mode  of  arriving  at  it.  But 

*  within  the  region  of  Philosophy,  the  intellect  should 
4  reign   supreme    and    uncontrolled.      Wherever   any 
4  matter  is  concerned,  which  the  intellect  can  reach  at 
«  all, — its  one  way  of  reaching  it  is  the  way  of  free, 

*  unrestrained,  unbiassed  enquiry.    To  place  any  check 
'  upon  such  enquiry,  is  to  fetter  the  intellect  and  enslave 
4  the  soul.     Here  is  one  strong  reason,  in  addition  to  the 
4  many   others  which   will  ever  keep   me   back   from 
4  Catholicism ;    viz.  that  it  sanctions   such   tyrannical 
'  interference.     I  can  never  believe,  that  a  revelation 
4  from    God  goes  counter  to   those   intellectual  laws, 
4  which  God  Himself  established  in  creating  man/ 

This  is  undoubtedly  a  most  intelligible  objection  ; 
and  one  which  we  can  briefly  notice  in  this  place.  I 
reply  then  most  confidently,  by  denying  the  whole 
assumed  principle.  I  deny  altogether,  that  the  intel- 
lect's appointed  way  of  arriving  at  Truth,  is  that  of 
unbiassed  and  uncontrolled  inquiry.  I  assert  the  very 
contrary.  I  maintain,  that  so  soon  as  the  intellect  quits 
the  region  of  pure  mathematics,  it  absolutely  requires, 
for  its  healthy  action,  the  being  compelled  constantly 
to  compare  its  conclusions  with  some  external  standard. 
The  vast  majority  even  of  speculative  men, —  or  (to 
speak  more  truly)  the  whole  body  of  them  without 
exception, — have  so  constant  a  tendency  to  take  up 
premisses,  with  no  due  regard  to  their  truth  and  their 
sufficiency ;  and  to  adopt  reasoning  with  no  due  regard 


PREFACE.  XX111 

to  its  validity ;  that  the  human  intellect  will  inevitably 
plunge  more  deeply  into  error  at  every  step,  unless 
some  powerful  corrective  be  applied  to  its  spontaneous 
operations. 

My  first  illustration  of  this  statement  shall  be  one, 
to  which  my  opponents,  least  of  all  men,  are  likely  to 
demur :  the  case  of  mediaeval  physics.  I  am  wholly 
ignorant  myself,  I  regret  to  say,  of  the  very  rudiments 
of  physical  science  :  but  there  seems  a  consensus  of 
all  who  have  examined  the  subject,  that  the  aberrations 
of  physical  science  in  the  middle  age  were  incredibly 
great ;  and  that  those  aberrations  were  all  due  to  one 
cause.  Enquirers  of  that  age,  we  are  told,  had  not 
learnt  to  check  their  conclusions  at  every  step  by  ap- 
peal to  experiment.  Each  speculator  was  consequently 
enabled,  without  restraint  or  hindrance,  to  follow  his 
own  preconceived  ideas.  The  whole  mass  of  physical 
error  then,  prevalent  at  that  time,  was  owing  to  the  one 
fact,  that  the  intellect  was  left  to  its  own  intrinsic  and 
spontaneous  operations,  without  the  necessity  of  con- 
forming its  conclusions  to  some  external  standard. 

Since  the  days  of  Bacon,  it  would  seem,  all  this  has 
been  reformed.  The  great  body  of  physical  sciences 
seem  to  unite  those  two  characteristics,  which  (when 
found  together)  constitute  the  surest  proof,  that  a 
science  has  been  duly  constituted:  I  mean,  stability 
and  progressiveness.  Each  new  generation  of  enquirers 
find  fresh  ground,  for  holding  the  great  mass  of  Truth 
which  they  have  received  ;  and  at  the  same  time  have 
the  means  of  importantly  adding  to  that  mass.  Such 
are  the  advantages  which  flow,  from  the  intellect  being 
compelled  to  adjust  its  conclusions  by  an  external 
standard. 


XXIV  PKEFACE. 

But  there  is  one  science,  if  science  it  can  indeed  be 
called,  which  still  reminds  us  of  mediaeval  physics.  It 
is  the  Protestant  attempt  at  constituting  Morality  and 
Theology.  What  is  the  popular  account  of  ante- 
Baconian  physics?  Such  as  the  following.  We  are 
told,  that  the  treatment  of  physical  matters,  then  pre- 
valent, was  a  disputatious,  never-ending,  still-beginning, 
strife  of  words.  We  are  reminded,  that  the  most  in- 
genious series  of  deductions  is  useless,  or  worse  than 
useless,  where  no  pains  is  taken,  to  confront  them  with 
the  external  standard  of  actual  experiment.  We  are 
informed,  that  after  ten  centuries  so  employed, — after 
the  production  of  as  many  different  theories  as  there 
have  been  speculators,  each  professing  to  exhaust  the 
whole  domain  of  physical  science,  and  each  irre- 
concileably  at  variance  with  all  others, —  the  world  will 
end  just  as  wise  as  it  began. 

Such  is  the  description  popularly  given  of  physical 
science,  as  it  stood  before  the  era  of  experiment.  I 
earnestly  wish  my  readers  will  peruse  it  again,  and  see 
in  what  respect  it  can  be  said  to  differ  from  Protestant 
Theology.  In  this  also,  each  speculator  has  his  own 
especial  theory:  each  speculator  professes  to  exhaust 
the  whole  domain  of  revealed  science  ;  to  give  us  his 
views,  thought  out  by  himself  from  the  intimations 
of  Scripture,  on  the  Trinity,  on  Original  Sin,  on 
Eternal  Punishment,  on  Justification  by  Faith.  And 
what  has  been  the  result?  The  great  test,  as  I  just 
now  observed,  of  a  science  being  truly  constituted,  is 
the  union  of  stability  and  progressiveness.  As  to  the 
stability  of  Protestant  Theology,  it  is  but  insulting 
Protestants  to  name  the  very  notion  :  it  is  on  its  pro- 
gressiveness that  they  love  to  insist.  Now  what  has 


PREFACE.  XXV 

been  its  progressiveness  ?  Its  progressiveness  has 
consisted  in  its  declension.  Its  course  has  been  the 
gradual'  subtraction  of  one  doctrine  after  another ;  until 
at  length  it  seems  culminating  in  the  denial  of  all 
dogma  whatever  :  I  mean,  of  course,  as  dogma ;  as 
being  certainly  revealed  by  God.  The  number  of 
Protestants  surely  is  becoming  daily  fewer,  who  will 
say  of  any  doctrine,  of  any  moral  precept,  '  this  is  a 
certain  part  of  Christ's  Revelation?'  Things  are  more 
and  more  coming  to  this,  that  in  no  Protestant  society 
is  there  any  body  of  truths,  accepted  and  recognised 
among  its  members  as  the  truths  of  Revelation.  And 
how  are  we  to  account  for  this  state  of  things  ?  It 
arises  from  the  fact,  that  the  intellect  has  been  left  to 
work  upon  certain  data,  without  being  required  to  con- 
form its  conclusions  with  some  external  standard,  un- 
mistakeable  in  utterance  and  peremptory  in  authority. 
It  has  thus  become  a  prey  to  its  own  waywardness  and 
wilfulness. 

Reverting  however  to  physical  science, — I  will  ask 
this  question.  Suppose  some  eminent  philosopher  is 
led  by  deduction  to  a  certain  result :  he  compares  that 
result  with  phenomena,  and  finds  it  erroneous.  Does 
it  ever  occur  to  him,  that  by  this  process  his  intellect 
is  enslaved  and  his  soul  fettered  ?  On  the  contrary,  he 
is  most  grateful  for  this  opportunity  of  experimental 
disproof;  he  feels  confident  at  once,  that  either  his  pre- 
misses have  been  unsound  or  insufficient,  or  his  in- 
ferences too  hasty.  He  reviews  his  past  course  of 
reasoning,  fully  assured  that  he  will  make  one  or  other 
of  these  discoveries ;  and  his  assurance  is  invariably 
justified  by  the  event.  Such  is  precisely  the  course 


XXVI  PREFACE. 

adopted  by  a  Catholic  philosopher,  in  treating  on  such 
subjects  as  those  of  the  present  volume,  if  he  find  his 
conclusions  at  variance  with  the  Church's  voice.  If 
such  a  procedure  be  the  mark  of  intellectual  slavery, 
then  the  votary  of  modern  physical  science  is  of  all 
thinkers  the  most  enslaved.  But  in  fact  every  sober- 
minded  man  must  regard  it  as  an  inappreciable  advan- 
tage, that  some  guarantee  should  be  afforded,  against 
that  one-sidedness,  eccentricity,  partiality,  to  which  the 
unchecked  intellect  is  ever  exposed. 

I  need  hardly  add  of  course,  that  if  our  external 
standard  were  not  infallibly  correct,  there  would  be 
intolerable  bondage  in  being  required  to  adjust  by  it 
our  intellectual  conclusions :  and  indeed  unless  we 
firmly  believed  it  thus  infallible,  such  a  task  would  be 
simply  impossible.  I  am  not  here  at  all  professing  to 
argue  against  those,  who  merely  deny  our  allegation, 
that  there  is  sufficient  proof  of  the  Church's  infallibility. 
I  have  only  been  arguing  against  those  who  maintain, 
that  there  is  some  special  objection  to  the  very  principle 
on  which  the  Church  proceeds  ;  the  principle  of  re- 
quiring intellectual  submission  to  an  external  standard, 
on  matters  which  are  within  the  province  of  Reason. 

One  final  question  will  be  asked.  In  regard  to 
those  philosophical  truths  which  are  within  the  domain 
of  Theology,  what  is  the  distinction  between  their  philo- 
sophical and  their  theological  treatment?  I  think  the 
two  following  particulars  constitute  the  main  distinction. 
(1.)  The  philosopher,  as  such,  has  no  concern  with 
any  truth,  except  as  demonstrable  by  Reason  :  wherever 
he  has  no  proof  from  Reason  to  produce,  the  truths  are 
out  of  his  province.  (2.)  Although  the  Catholic  philo- 


PREFACE.  XXV11 

sopher  is  bound  to  take  care,  that  his  conclusions  are 
fully  in  accordance  with  the  pronouncements  of  sound 
Theology, — yet  it  is  no  part  of  his  business  to  exhibit 
that  accordance.  The  theologian,  on  the  contrary,  has 
no  task  more  peculiarly  his  own,  than  to  shew  in  every 
instance  the  accordance  of  those  doctrines  which  he  de- 
livers, with  the  decrees  of  the  Church ;  with  Scripture ; 
with  Tradition ;  and  with  the  other  '  loci  theologici.' 

IT  is  now  sufficiently  apparent,  what  is  meant  by  the 
*  philosophical  introduction  '  to  a  c  theological  treatise.* 
It  is  the  exhibition  of  those  truths,  as  demonstrable  by 
Reason,  the  mastery  of  which  will  enable  us  more  fully 
to  grasp  the  meaning  or  the  evidence  of  the  theological 
doctrines  appertaining  to  that  treatise.  How  far  the 
propositions  handled  in  the  present  Book  have  been 
well  chosen  for  that  end,  it  will  be  impossible  of  course 
for  the  reader  to  determine,  till  he  has  seen  the  subsequent 
volumes.  But  how  far  the  said  propositions  are  true, — 
and  how  far  the  argumentative  support  here  given  to 
them  is  adequate, — this  is  at  once  a  most  legitimate 
matter  for  criticism. 

Of  these  propositions,  by  far  the  most  important 
and  fundamental,  are  those  contained  in  the  three  first 
Sections.  The  second  and  third  of  these  treat  on  the 
nature  of  Moral  Truth  ;  and  the  first  lays  down  a 
necessary  foundation  for  such  treatment.  The  idea 
4  morally  good,' — with  its  cognates  '  morally  preferable/ 
4  morally  evil,' — occurs  at  every  step,  through  the  whole 
science  on  *  Nature  and  Grace/  So  far  as  we  apprehend 
these  ideas  obscurely,  such  obscurity  will  vitiate  our 
apprehension  of  almost  every  single  doctrine  in  the 


XXV111  PREFACE. 

science.  The  Church  has  not  determined  the  precise 
character  of  this  idea  ;  though  of  course  it  is  most  fully 
within  her  province  to  do  so  :  but  among  the  various 
theories  which  may  be  maintained  by  Catholics,  I  am 
most  strongly  convinced  that  the  theory  which  I  ad- 
vocate is,  in  all  essential  particulars,  the  theory  which 
Reason  declares. 

No  candid  student  indeed  of  Theology  or  Philo- 
sophy will  deny,  that  in  both  these  sciences  there  are 
many  questions,  even  very  important  ones,  of  a  more  or 
less  doubtful  character.  There  are  many  questions,  on 
which  much  may  be  urged  with  reason  and  soundness  on 
both  sides ;  on  which  the  investigation  of  Truth  is  a  most 
anxious  and  delicate  task  ;  and  on  which,  even  when  we 
have  decided  that  the  balance  inclines  in  one  direction, 
we  are  obliged  in  fairness  to  admit,  that  various  objec- 
tions and  difficulties  remained  unsolved.  We  shall  meet 
with  many  such  questions  in  the  succeeding  volumes, 
and  there  are  one  or  two  of  the  same  kind  in  the  present. 
But  I  maintain  confidently,  that  no  such  thing  can  truly 
be  said  on  the  matters  handled  in  those  two  Sections. 
I  maintain  confidently,  that  while  the  reasons  for  that 
theory  which  I  follow  are  cogent  and  irresistible, — 
there  is  neither  difficulty  nor  objection,  which  possesses 
the  slightest  force  on  the  opposite  side.  It  will  be  for 
my  reader  of  course  to  decide, —  after  having  carefully 
studied  the  reasoning  adduced, — how  far  that  reason- 
ing warrants  so  confident  a  judgment.  But  I  may 
refer  them  to  the  passage  from  p.  95  to  p.  98,  as  con- 
taining an  argument,  which  in  itself  (if  it  stood  alone) 
seems  to  me  quite  decisive.  And  I  may  refer  them  to 
the  passage  from  p.  102  to  p.  107,  as  noticing  that  ob- 


PREFACE.  XXIX 

• 

jection,  which,  more  than  all  others  put  together,  deters 
some  most  pious  and  admirable  Catholics  from  the  con- 
clusion which  I  advocate. 

•  On  this  most  important  matter,  as  will  be  seen,  I  am 
utterly  opposed  to  the  opinion,  that  all  moral  obliga- 
tion is  founded  on  the  Creator's  Command.  Now  I  have 
found  some  Catholics  under  the  impression,  that  this 
opinion  rests  on  a  degree  of  theological  authority, 
which  would  make  it  at  least  temerarious  in  any  Catholic 
to  question  it.  There  cannot  be  a  greater  miscon- 
ception than  this ;  I  am  confident  indeed,  that  the 
great  preponderance  of  authority  is  on  my  side.  I 
have  added  therefore  a  Supplementary  Section  to  shew 
this.  This  Section  in  no  way  professes  a  theological 
treatment  of  the  question ;  it  is  purely  defensive,  and 
directed  against  such  adverse  impressions  as  those  to 
which  I  have  just  referred. 

A  considerable  number  of  moral  truths,  in  my 
humble  opinion,  are  known  to  us  intuitively.  It  was 
necessary  therefore  to  prefix  a  preliminary  Section,  on 
the  authority  and  self-evidence  of  various  intuitive 
judgments.  Moreover,  some  of  the  most  current  objec- 
tions, to  that  view  of  morality  which  I  follow,  are  of 
such  a  nature,  that  if  they  were  once  admitted  as  of 
force,  nothing  could  reasonably  ensue,  except  the  most 
absolute  and  hopeless  scepticism.  It  was  therefore 
essential,  to  enter  in  sufficient  detail  on  this  question 
of  scepticism. 

My  immediate  reason  then  for  introducing  a  philoso- 
phical treatment  of  these  two  subjects, — viz.  (1)  the 
self-evidence  of  certain  intuitions,  and  (2)  the  character 
of  Moral  Truth, — has  been  simply  the  indispensable  ne- 


XXX  PREFACE. 

* 

cessity  of  such  treatment  for  the  purposes  of  our  science. 
But  if  I  had  been  specially  thinking  of  contemporaneous 
non-Catholic  philosophy,  I  could  not  have  made  a  more 
pertinent  selection.  Thus  (1)  the  main  drift  and  cur- 
rent of  such  philosophy,  as  Dr.  Brownson  most  justly 
remarks,*  is  towards  a  denial  of  Objective  Truth.  There 
is  no  refutation  of  this  error,  I  think,  so  available,  as 
that  which  shews  the  desolating  extent  to  which  such 
principles  must  consistently  be  carried,  if  they  are 
worth  any  thing  at  all.  This  I  have  attempted  to  shew 
in  my  first  Section.  It  will  also  be  found  (I  think) 
that  the  philosophical  principles  advocated  in  that  Sec- 
tion, if  accepted  as  sound,  add  most  importantly  to  the 
philosophical  argument  for  God's  existence.  So  much 
on  the  first  Section.  Then  (2)  the  Objective  Reality 
of  moral  distinctions, — the  subject  considered  in  the  two 
following, — is  perhaps  equally  important,  in  its  bearing 
on  the  controversies  of  the  time.  If  once  admitted,  it 
sweeps  clean  away  that  vague  and  misty  Pantheism, 
which  is  at  present  so  miserable  a  snare  to  the  non- 
Catholic  world.  No  human  being  has  ever  yet  been 
found,  who  thoroughly  holds  the  Objective  Reality  of 
moral  distinctions,  without  going  on  further,  to  recognise 
a  Personal  God,  the  Moral  Governor  of  mankind. f 

*  "  Protestantism  is  not  a  religion  ;  is  not  a  credo  or  a  worship  ;  but  is 
a  suspense  of  faith  ;  a  transition  from  the  old  superannuated  Catholic  form 

to  some  newer  and  nobler  form  yet  to  be  developed In  former  times 

religion  was  regarded  as  having  an  Objective  Truth,  a  subsistence  independent 
of  man  ;  and  the  question  was,  which  and  what  is  the  true  religion,  if  any  ? 
But  now  it  is  not  so.  This  order  of  thought  denies  all  Absolute,  and  there- 
fore all  Objective  Truth,  and  makes  both  religion  and  truth  purely  relative 
and  subjective.  To  refute  it,  we  must  establish  the  objectivity  of  thought 
itself;  i.e.  the  Objective  Truthfulness  of  Reason:'— Jan.  1860,  pp.  22,  23. 

t  This  has  been  most  ably  stated  by  Mr.  Martineau ;  a  writer  who 


PREFACE.  XXXI 

A  remonstrance  of  the  following  kind  has  reached 
me  from  one  or  two  Catholics.  4  Surely,'  they  say, c  all 
1  Catholics  are  united  in  essentials,  as  regards  the  real 
*  character  of  Moral  Truth.  No  Catholic  e.g.  really 
4  fancies,  that  God  could  command  pride  or  malevo- 
1  lence ;  nor  does  any  Catholic  on  the  other  hand  hold, 
4  that  there  is  some  abstract  Moral  Rule,  distinct  from 
'  and  independent  of  Himself.  Catholics  differ  on  such 
'  points,  rather  in  their  expressions  than  in  their  thoughts ; 
4  and  it  is  undesirable  to  dwell  on  such  points  of  differ- 
'  ence,  when  we  should  rather  aim  at  presenting  an 
4  united  front.' 

There  are  many  replies,  which  I  could  make  to 
this:  I  will  content  myself  with  two.  The  question 
here  to  be  considered,  it  will  be  seen,  is  not  whether 
those  views  be  correct  which  I  myself  maintain  on 
Moral  Truth,  but  whether  it  be  of  any  great  importance 
to  have  correct  views.  And  I  most  gladly  concur 
with  the  objector  in  thinking,  that  on  such  matters 

expresses  himself,  not  only  with  so  much  depth  and  clearness  of  thought, 
but  in  many  respects  with  such  deep  recognition  of  piety  and  religion,  that 
it  is  most  painful  to  think,  how  many  of  his  opinions  must  be  regarded  by 
every  Catholic,  as  not  erroneous  merely,  but  deeply  pernicious.  These  are 
his  words  on  the  matter  in  hand  : — 

"  No  ethical  conceptions  are  possible  at  all,  except  as  floating  shreds  of 
unattached  thought,  without  a  religious  background  ;  and  the  sense  of 
responsibility,  the  agony  of  shame,  the  inner  reverence  for  justice,  first 
find  their  meaning  and  vindication  in  a  Supreme  Holiness  that  rules  the 
world.  Nor  can  any  one  be  penetrated  with  the  distinction  between  right 
and  wrong,  without  recognising  it  as  valid  for  all  free  beings,  and  incapable 
of  local  or  arbitrary  change.  His  feeling  insists  on  its  permanent  recognition 
and  omnipresent  sway ;  and  this  unity  in  the  Moral  Law  carries  him  to  the 
Unity  of  the  Divine  Legislator.  Theism  is  thus  the  indispensable  postulate 
of  conscience ;  its  objective  counterpart  and  justification,  without  which 
its  inspirations  would  be  illusions  and  its  veracities  themselves  a  lie." 
Studies  of  Christianity,  p.  9.  See  also  p.  75  of  this  volume,  and  the  passage 
of  F.  Newman  there  referred  to. 


XXX11  PREFACE. 

Catholics  differ,  not  so  much  in  principle,  as  in  their 
respective  mode  of  analysing  those  principles  which 
they  hold  in  common.  Yet  it  is  of  very  great  moment, 
in  regard  to  a  most  extensive  part  of  theological  science, 
that  the  student  should  have  clear  views  on  the  terms 
'  right '  and  '  wrong ; '  and  the  same  thing  is  extremely 
important  on  other  grounds  also.  But  where  prin- 
ciples are  the  same,  to  hold  clear  views,  is  to  hold 
correct  views :  if  an  incorrect  view  be  consistent  with 
sound  principle  on  the  subject,  it  must  be  precisely 
because  such  view  is  obscure.  This  is  my  first  re- 
ply; and  I  proceed  to  a  second.  It  is  of  extreme 
moment,  that  the  Objective  Eeality  of  moral  distinctions 
should  be  urged  on  various  non-Catholic  philosophers. 
Now  we  can  only  urge  this  truth  on  them,  by  means  of 
argument;  and  argument  is  not  available  for  an  incor- 
rect statement  of  the  truth,  but  only  for  a  correct  one. 
On  both  these  grounds  therefore  it  is  in  the  highest 
degree  desirable,  that  we  Catholics  shall  come  to  agree> 
what  that  correct  statement  really  is. 

There  are  some  peculiarities  of  arrangement  in  the 
present  volume,  which  make  it  necessary  to  offer  some 
further  explanation,  in  regard  to  the  three  first  Sections. 

No  one  can  be  surprised,  that  I  feel  most  deeply 
the  anxious  and  momentous  character  of  the  work 
which  I  have  undertaken,  and.  the  great  danger  of 
falling  into  serious  mistakes  in  its  accomplishment. 
I  felt  it  very  desirable  therefore,  before  publishing 
this  volume,  that  I  should  obtain  the  judgment  of 
theological  friends  on  its  contents.  Accordingly,  I 
circulated  it  privately  so  long  ago  as  last  October ; 
and  I  have  been  so  fortunate  as  to  receive  numerous 


PREFACE.  XXxili 

and  valuable  comments  on  its  many  defects.  The 
course  of  reflection  into  which  these  comments  led 
me,  determined  me  wholly  to  re-write  the  three  first 
Sections.  It  did  not  appear  to  me  that  in  other 
portions  any  alteration  was  absolutely  indispensable. 
But  there  is  no  part  of  the  volume,  in  which  it  is  so 
important  to  convey  my  meaning  clearly  and  con- 
vincingly, as  in  these  first  Sections  ;  and  there  was  no 
part  in  which  I  had  made  less  approach  towards  attain- 
ing that  desirable  object. 

This  failure  arose  in  part,  from  my  having  attempted 
to  combine  two  incompatible  ends.  It  is  not  difficult, 
and  I  never  found  it  so,  in  dealing  with  students  who 
have  received  no  special  philosophical  instruction,*  to 
place  before  them  (what  I  consider)  the  true  principles 
on  Certitude  and  on  Morality,  with  amply  sufficient 
clearness ;  with  so  much  clearness,  as  should  enable 
them,  both  to  understand  those  principles,  and  to 
appreciate  their  argumentative  foundation.  Nor,  on 
the  other  hand,  can  I  admit  that  it  is  at  all  difficult  to 
place  the  same  principles,  with  the  same  clearness, 
before  those  who  have  given  considerable  attention  to 
Philosophy  :  for  the  unquestionable  truth  of  these 
principles  (according  to  my  view  of  the  case)  makes 
the  task  a  comparatively  easy  one.  But  to  combine 
these  two  ends,  (is  I  believe)  not  difficult,  but  impossible. 
Yet  in  this  volume,  as  it  first  issued  from  the  press,  I 
did  attempt  to  combine  them.  The  consequence  was, 
as  might  have  been  expected,  that  the  three  Sections 
were  too  lengthy  and  obscure  to  be  apprehended  by 

*  At  St.  Edmund's  I  was  allowed  to  give  some  instructions  to  those  who 
were  just  beginning  their  philosophical  studies. 


XXXI V  PREFACE. 

Beginners ;  while  they  were  too  brief  and  hurried,  to 
give  time  for  meeting  fairly  the  difficulties  and  ob- 
jections which  occur  to  those  versed  in  Philosophy. 
Indeed,  in  the  very  construction  of  the  volume  there 
was  ample  proof,  how  little  my  plan  had  been  matured. 
For  when  first  I  began  writing,  I  had  intended  to  omit 
all  direct  treatment  of  that  most  important  question, 
the  relation  between  God  and  Necessary  Truth.  As 
I  proceeded,  I  found  more  and  more  the  impractic- 
ableness  of  such  omission  ;  and  at  last  I  had  to  add  an 
Appendix,  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  what  I  ought 
to  have  stated  at  first. 

This  was,  in  part,  the  reason  why  these  Sections, 
in  their  original  state,  were  obscure  without  being 
profound,  and  lengthy  without  being  full.  Another 
reason  was  my  culpable  inattention  (here  and  there)  to 
strict  accuracy  of  statement.  The  strongest  instance 
of  this  is  referred  to  in  p.  30  with  the  appended  note. 
The  theory  there  mentioned,  and  which  many  attributed 
to  me,  had  never  so  much  as  occurred  to  my  imagi- 
nation; yet  I  could  not  deny,  when  my  attention  was 
called  to  it,  that  there  were  various  passages  which, 
considered  apart  from  the  general  context,  gave  much 
support  to  this  interpretation  of  my  meaning. 

I  have  consequently  re-written  the  three  first  Sec- 
tions ;  keeping  no  other  end  in  view,  except  to  present 
my  arguments  in  the  clearest  possible  shape,  before 
those  who  are  conversant  with  philosophical  inquiries. 
It  should  be  distinctly  understood  however,  that  I  have 
not  made  any  change  whatever  in  the  philosophical 
principles  which  I  have  advocated,  or  even  in  the 
slightest  detail  or  particular  of  philosophical  opinion : 


PREFACE.  XXXV 

as  any  one  may  readily  see,  who  will  read  the  Sections 
as  they  originally  stood.  It  is  necessary  to  make  this 
explanation,  quite  apart  from  any  vindication  of 
personal  consistency,  for  the  interests  of  what  I 
regard  as  truth.  I  could  not  expect  the  view,  which  I 
advocate,  to  be  considered  with  any  care  or  attention, 
if  it  were  supposed  to  be  a  theory  newly  adopted;  at 
variance  with  one  formerly  held ;  and  merely  taken  up, 
under  pressure  of  adverse  argument.  But  nothing  could 
be  more  contrary  to  the  fact  than  any  such  supposition. 
Indeed  the  various  comments,  which  I  have  received  on 
the  three  Sections,  would  have  greatly  increased  and 
intensified  my  conviction  of  their  substantial  truth,  if 
that  conviction  had  not  already  been  so  strong,  as  to  be 
incapable  of  increase  from  any  further  argumentative 
confirmation. 

I  have  greatly  increased  then  the  length  of  the 
first  Sections,  and  have  incorporated  into  them  what 
stood  as  the  Appendix.  In  order  to  make  room  for 
these  additions,  I  have  moved — to  the  end  of  the  volume 
— that  Section  which  stood  fourth  in  order,  giving  it 
the  title  '  Supplementary  Section/  Even  after  doing 
this,  two  or  three  pages,  and  two  or  three  numbers, 
will  be  found  twice  over :  I  have  therefore  marked 
them  with  an  asterisk,  where  they  occur  in  the  third 
Section.  Finally  I  have  added  a  brief  paper  of  '  Cor- 
rigenda ;'  chiefly  for  the  purpose  of  correcting  refer- 
ences, made  in  the  later  Sections,  to  the  first  three 
Sections  as  they  originally  stood. 

ON  the  rest  of  the  volume,  considered  in  detail,  very 
few  preliminary  remarks  seem  required.  In  the  re- 


XXX  VI  PREFACE. 

maining  Sections  of  the  first  Chapter,  I  have  pursued  on 
grounds  of  Reason,  these  three  enquiries.  (1)  What 
is  the  appropriate  means,  whereby  Reason,  were  it  left 
to  work  by  itself,  might  arrive  at  Moral  Truth?  (2) 
How  far  does  Moral  Truth  extend  over  the  various  acts 
of  us  men,  in  the  nature  and  circumstances  which  God 
has  appointed  to  us  ?  (3)  What  is  the  full  power  pos- 
sessed by  God  of  working  a  change  in  Moral  Truth  ? 
The  precise  relation  between  God  and  Moral  Truth 
cannot  possibly  be  understood,  till  this  last  point  has 
been  carefully  considered ;  and  the  seventh  Section  is 
consequently  devoted  to  its  investigation. 

The  various  matters,  treated  in  the  second  Chapter 
under  the  head  of  c  Ethical  Psychology,'  are  such,  that 
the  reader  will  at  once  see  their  importance,  in  the  way 
of  preparation  for  that  portion  of  Theology  which  we 
undertake.  I  may  however  beg  him  specially  to  notice 
the  distinction  between  'implicit'  or  'virtual'  and  merely 
4  habitual '  intention,  because  of  the  extremely  important 
practical  consequences  which  result  from  that  distinction. 
See  p.  233-238  and  p.  246-248.* 

*  One  of  these  consequences  is  so  incalculably  important,  in  its  bearing 
on  the  spiritual  life  of  every  single  day,  that  I  will  here  state  it.  It  will 
have  no  natural  place  in  the  body  of  this  treatise  till  we  come  to  the  third 
Book  ;  but  what  here  follows  will  be  readily  intelligible,  to  any  one  who 
has  read  carefully  the  above- cited  pages.  It  is  taken  almost  word  for 
word,  from  one  of  the  lectures  which  I  gave  at  St.  Edmund's. 

Men  unversed  in  Theology,  I  remarked  to  my  pupils,  sometimes  speak, 
as  though  a  merely  habitual  intention  could  make  a  present  action  good, 
which  would  otherwise  not  be  so.  They  will  tell  you,  e.  g.  that  if  in  the 
morning  I  refer  all  my  acts  of  the  day  to  God,  this  makes  every  act  of  the 
day,  which  would  be  otherwise  indifferent,  individually  good.  Yet  it  is 
hardly  credible  that  men,  not  absolutely  bereft  of  reason,  should  gravely 
put  forth  such  an  absurdity  as  is  here  stated.  Of  course,  if  the  morning 
reference  have  left  a  trace  of  itself  behind  ;  — if,  as  a  consequence  of  that 
reference,  I  am  in  fact  at  this  moment  really  (though  unconsciously)  refer- 


PREFACE.  XXX  Vll 

Again,  it  may  be  worth  while  to  mention  here, 
that  the  discussions  of  the  third  Section  in  this  second 
Chapter  lands  us  at  the  very  threshold  of  the  whole 
theological  doctrine  of  concupiscence.  There  could 
follow  immediately  afterwards  (1)  an  explanation  and 
definition  of  the  term  'concupiscence;'  (2)  a  detailed 
consideration  of  the  phenomena  which  that  term  ex- 
presses ;  and  (3)  a  treatment  of  those  very  important 
passages,  wherein  St.  Paul  refers  to  these  phenomena. 

I  would  also  direct  particular  attention  to  the  long  fifth 
Section,  '  On  the  Adaptation  of  our  Nature  to  Virtue.' 
This  Section  is  almost  entirely  independent  of  what 
precedes  and  follows,  and  its  reasoning  is  far  more  easy 
of  apprehension,  than  are  the  various  arguments  of  the 
first  Chapter.  It  is  possible  therefore,  that  various 
readers,  who  may  not  care  to  take  the  pains  of  mastering 
that  earlier  Chapter,  may  yet  be  not  unwilling  to  study 
this  particular  part  of  the  volume.  The  proposition  on 
which  I  lay  far  the  greatest  stress  is  this ;  that  there  is 
no  one  propension,  implanted  by  God  in  our  nature, 
which  is  not  capable  of  legitimate  gratification  in  the 

ring  my  acts  to  a  good  end  ; —  then  our  very  statement  is,  that  my  acts  (if 
otherwise  faultless)  are  truly  good.  Here  is  a  real  case  of  *  implicit  *  or 
'  virtual '  intention.  But  we  are  now  speaking  of  the  case,  when  the  morn- 
ing reference  has  not  left  behind  it  any  trace,  which  at  this  moment  exists. 
And  to  say  that,  in  such  a  case,  that  past  reference  makes  the  present  act 
good,  is  among  the  most  extravagantly  absurd  of  all  imaginable  proposi- 
tions. 

We  shall  in  due  time  have  to  consider  one  of  Luther's  strangest 
heresies  ;  it  is  this,  that  so  only  we  have  what  he  calls  faith,  (i.e.  unbounded 
confidence  in  the  certainty  of  our  own  salvation),  our  acts,  though  remaining 
bad,  are  counted  by  God  as  if  they  were  good,  and  are  requited  accordingly. 
A  monstrous  statement,  indeed !  but  yet  one  which  is  immeasurably  less 
absurd,  than  that  which  I  am  now  assailing.  For  my  present  opponent 
does  not  say  that,  in  consequence  of  my  morning's  reference,  my  present 
act  is  counted  by  God  as  though  it  were  good ;  but  that  it  actually  is  good~ 


XXXV111  PKEFACE. 

cause  of  virtue,  see  p.  259-359.  It  is  evident  at  once, 
how  vitally  momentous  is  this  proposition,  (if  once  it 
be  admitted  as  true,)  on  the  whole  theory  of  spiritual 
guidance  and  direction.  It  is  also  evident  at  once  how 
important  a  corroboration  it  will  furnish,  to  the  argu- 
ment for  that  all-important  truth,  the  Creator's  Sanctity, 
Were  it  only  on  these  grounds,  I  hope  that  my  readers 
will  carefully  examine  the  course  of  reasoning  on  which 
it  is  supported.  But  my  chief  reason  for  laying  so 
much  stress  on  it  has  been  the  following. 

There  is  one  miserable  habit,  against  which  it 
seems  to  me  that  we  have  especially  to  be  on  our 
guard,  in  the  present  age  : — the  habit  of  worldliness. 
By  this  I  mean,  the  not  practically  regarding  it  as 
any  part  of  our  ordinary  Christian  duty,  to  labour 

He  absolutely  says,  incredible  as  tke  fact  must  appear,  that  an  act  is  consti- 
tuted good,  from  a  circumstance  which  in  no  way  affects  it ;  from  a  circum- 
stance which  is  done  and  over,  leaving  no  trace  behind.  'Yesterday  afternoon,' 
e.g.  '  I  elicited  a  certain  act ;  this  present  afternoon  I  elicit  another,  which 
'  is  precisely  similar  to  yesterday's  in  every  single  circumstance  without 
'  exception.  Yet  the  act  of  yesterday  afternoon  is  good  and  the  act  of  this 
'  present  afternoon  is  bad, —  because  yesterday  morning  I  made  a  reference 
of  my  day's  acts  to  God,  and  this  morning  I  did  not.'  Intellectual  drivel- 
ling can  hardly  sink  below  this  ;  it  is  like  saying  that  my  evening  cup 
of  tea  is  sweet,  because  I  put  a  lump  of  sugar  into  the  cup  which  I  drank 
at  breakfast.  Lugo  gives  expression  to  this  common-sense  principle,  by 
taking  the  particular  case  of  temperance  at  meals.  You  and  I  are  both  at 
dinner :  our  will  is  affected  (we  will  suppose)  in  precisely  the  same  way 
towards  the  delicacies  before  us  ;  and  our  external  acts  also  are  precisely 
similar.  Yet  it  shall  be  judged  forsooth  that  I  am  acting  at  this  moment 
rightly  and  you  wrongly, — or  (in  other  words)  that  I  am  eating  temperately 
and  you  zratemperately, — because  in  the  morning  I  referred  my  dinner  to 
God,  and  you  did  not.  Of  course,  that  shews  that  in  the  morning  I  acted 
(so  far)  better  than  you  ;  that  I  at  least  elicited  one  good  act  which  you  did 
not.  But  how  upon  earth  can  this  circumstance  affect  the  present  act, 
unless  it  does  affect  the  present  act  ?  I  mean,  if  the  action  of  my  will  at  this 
moment  is  not  intrinsecally  affected  by  my  morning's  reference,  how  can 
the  moral  quality  of  that  action  be  affected  by  such  reference  1  ( Certum 


PREFACE.  XXXIX 

directly  and  systematically  at  the  task,  of  raising 
our  affections  from  earthly  to  heavenly  objects.*  In 
the  third  and  fourth  Books  I  shall  have  again  and  again 
to  revert  upon  this.  I  shall  have  to  shew  my  grounds 
for  believing  that  this  danger  now  very  specially  exists ; 
the  causes  which  (in  my  humble  judgment)  lead  to  it ; 
deplorable  and  degraded  state  of  mind  which  worldliness 
engenders,  and  which  is  the  more  deplorable,  because 
its  true  character  is  so  commonly  unsuspected ;  lastly, 
our  appropriate  safeguards  against  it.  I  need  hardly 
say  that,  among  those  safeguards,  theological  study 
itself  has  a  very  prominent  place,  for  those  who  have 
the  means  of  pursuing  such  study ;  because  the  great 
end  to  be  aimed  at  for  the  purpose  of  protection,  is  the 
obtaining  an  intimate  and  familiar  acquaintance  with 
the  great  Objects  of  Faith.  But,  not  here  to  dwell  upon 

mihi  est,'  says  Lugo,  'hanc  voluntatem  merd  habitualem  non  sufficere  ad 
meritum  .  . .  operis  sequentis. . .  Quare  qui  mane  refert  omnes  suas  actiones 
ad  Deum,  si  postea  pransurus  itd  se  hdbet  ac  si  earn  voluntatem  non  habuisset, 
nee  comestio  oritur  ex  ed  voluntate  nee  ab  alia  bona  et  honesta,  non  magis 
meretur  per  comestionem,  qudm  si  earn  voluntatem  non  habuisset.''  (De  Pceni- 
tentia,  d.  7,  n.  39.) 

In  a  word,  then,  I  cannot  now  be  eliciting  a  good  act  of  any  kind,  unless 
my  will  be  now  influenced  by  a  good  motive  :  unconsciously  perhaps,  but 
really  and  truly  ;  I  may  not  see  it,  but  God  sees  it.  I  am  not  now  eliciting 
an  act  of  justice,  because  I  elicited  one  in  the  morning ;  my  will  must  now 
be  fixed  on  the  virtuousness  of  justice.  I  am  not  eliciting  an  act  of  tem- 
perance now,  when  my  meal  is  over  and  I  am  engaged  very  freely  in  talking 
and  laughing, —  because  I  ate  my  meal  temperately  when  I  was  eating  it. 
And  in  like  manner,  if  I  wish  at  this  moment  to  have  the  advantage  of 
referring  my  acts  to  God,  I  must  be  referring  them  to  Him  at  this  moment ; 
not  perhaps  consciously,  but  really,  practically,  influentially.  It  does  not. 
make  my  present  act  good,  that  I  elicited  a  very  good  act  in  the  morning. 

Among  innumerable  testimonies  to  this  principle,  I  drew  their  particular 
attention  to  F.  Rigolieuc's  beautiful  treatise  '  De  la  Garde  du  Cceur.' 

*  See  Father  Faber's  most  powerful  chapter  on  'the  World,'  in  the 
'Creator  and  the  Creature.'  That  chapter  is,  I  think,  among  the  most 
masterly  things  he  has  ever  done. 


X.1  PKEFACE. 

tliis,  it  is  plain  that  one  most  powerful  help  will  be  ob- 
tained for  deliverance  from  worldliness,  in  proportion 
as  men  are  practically  impressed  with  the  conclusion, 
to  which  this  fifth  Section  is  mainly  directed.  It  is 
plain,  I  say,  that  men  will  be  immeasurably  more  en- 
couraged to  labour  at  fixing  their  hearts  on  the  Invisible 
World,  in  proportion  as  they  come  to  the  conviction, 
that  all  their  deepest  emotions,  all  their  keenest  af- 
fections, may  thus  receive  satisfaction,  both  far  more 
intense  and  far  more  permanent,  than  the  wretched 
objects  of  this  perishable  world  can  possibly  afford. 

In  regard  to  the  third  Chapter,  it  must  be  manifest 
to  any  one  reading  it,  how  completely  the  two  questions, 
there  discussed,  constitute  an  integral  part  of  our 
science. 

And  in  regard  to  the  short  fourth  Chapter,  its- 
indispensable  necessity,  for  our  subsequent  theological 
reasoning,  will  be  thoroughly  recognised  by  all  who 
may  read  the  following  volumes.  The  doctrine  of 
Liberty  e.g.,  and  again  the  unavoidableness  of  venial 
sin,  are  perfectly  unintelligible  without  such  a  pre- 
paration. 

HAVING  now  said  all  that  seems  necessary  on  the 
general  contents  of  the  volume,  I  will  close  this  Preface 
with  a  few  miscellaneous  remarks. 

It  will  be  observed,  that  I  have  introduced  a  large 
number  of  quotations  from  Father  Newman ;  and 
chiefly,  though  not  exclusively,  from  his  Protestant 
works.  I  have  had  two  reasons  for  doing  this.  In  the 
first  place,  I  was  desirous  that  Catholic  readers  should 
know,  how  large  a  fund  of  deep  Christian  Philosophy 


PREFACE.  xll 

is  contained  in  F.  Newman's  Protestant  works.  And 
those  who  may  be  struck  by  the  specimens  which  I 
bring  before  them,  will  not  improbably  be  led  to 
consult  the  originals. 

But  there  was  another  much  stronger  reason.  I 
hope  it  may  not  be  considered  egotistical,  if  I  speak  on 
the  intellectual  relation  in  which  I  stood  for  many 
years  to  F.  Newman.  Certainly  it  ought,  not  so  to  be 
considered ;  for  such  relation  was  in  no  way  peculiar 
to  myself:  on  the  contrary,  very  great  numbers  of  us 
converts  would  have  substantially  the  same  testimony 
to  give,  though  with  accidental  differences,  according 
to  the  circumstances  of  each  individual  case.  What  I 
have  to  state,  then,  is  this,  I  was  enmeshed  in  the  toils 
of  a  false  philosophy,  which  could  have  had  no  other 
legitimate  issue,  except  a  further  and  further  descent 
towards  the  gulf  of  utter  infidelity.  From  this  thraldom, 
the  one  human  agency  which  effected  my  deliverance 
was  F.  Newman's  teaching.  My  deliverance  was 
wrought,  not  merely  through  the  truth  and  depth  (as 
I  consider)  of  those  philosophical  principles  which  he 
inculcated ;  but  also  through  the  singular  large- 
mindedness,  whereby  he  was  able  to  make  those 
principles  both  intelligible  and  attractive  to  every 
variety  of  character.  In  regard,  then,  to  those  citations 
which  I  make  from  his  Protestant  works,  I  wish  to  ex- 
plain the  meaning  of  my  adducing  them.  I  do  not  quote 
them,  as  external  testimonies  for  this  or  that  truth,  to 
which  my  own  reflection  had  brought  me ;  every  one 
of  them  had  its  place,  in  opening  that  truth  itself  on 
my  apprehension.  Take  any  one  of  F.  Newman's 
utterances  in  his  Protestant  works  on  the  one  hand; 


Xlii  PREFACE. 

and  take  any  one  of  my  own  convictions  on  moral  and 
religious  matters  on  the  other  hand ;  it  is  often  im- 
possible for  me  even  to  guess,  how  far  the  former  may 
have  been  simply  the  one  exciting  cause  of  the  latter. 

I  am  saying  this,  simply  to  explain  the  meaning  of 
my  references  to  so  great  a  benefactor :  not  in  any  way, 
as  though  I  claimed  his  authority,  in  approval  of  what 
I  have  now  written.  I  might,  in  my  present  circum- 
stances, venture  to  differ  from  him,  even  on  very 
important  matters  of  thought  on  which  Catholics  are 
allowed  to  differ  ;  and  yet  I  must  not,  on  that  account, 
appear  to  forget,  that  to  him,  as  to  the  one  human 
cause,  I  owe  the  inestimable  blessing  of  having  become 
a  Catholic  at  all. 

The  mention  of  one  individual  leads  me  not  un- 
naturally to  speak  of  other  individuals.  I  have  criti- 
cised, in  my  first  Section,  Mr.  Mansel  and  Mr.  Mill,  as 
representing  in  different  ways  what  I  have  called  the 
semi-sceptical  position  in  Philosophy.  To  each  of 
these  gentlemen  accordingly  I  forwarded,  half  a  year 
ago,  the  volume  as  it  then  stood. 

I  have  to  thank  Mr.  Mansel  sincerely,  for  his  kind 
reception  of  it,  and  for  the  frank  explanation  which  he 
was  so  good  as  to  send  me  on  the  matter  between  us. 
My  own  statement  of  the  point  at  issue,  in  the  volume 
as  it  then  stood,  was  far  from  clear  ;  and  it  is  probable 
enough  that,  had  the  case  been  otherwise,  a  greater 
amount  of  agreement  would  have  resulted,  from  our 
mutual  communication.  However  that  may  be,  I  am 
still  (quite  as  strongly  as  before)  under  the  impression, 
that  Mr.  Mansel  and  I  are  at  direct  issue  on  the  matter 
referred  to ;  nor  can  I  honestly  speak,  as  though  I  con- 


PREFACE.  Xliii 

sidered  this  matter  to  be  one  of  subordinate  importance. 
See  p.  20-25.  But  in  expressing  very  earnest  dissent 
from  what  I  understand  to  be  Mr.  Hansel's  proposition, 
I  trust  that  neither  my  words  nor  my  tone  are  in  any 
way  inconsistent  with  most  sincere  respect.  Such 
respect  is  certainly  Mr.  MansePs  due,  for  the  great 
services  which  he  has  rendered  in  many  ways  to  the 
cause  of  sound  Philosophy. 

In  regard  to  Mr.  Stuart  Mill,  I  can  only  say  that 
he  could  not  have  treated  me  with  greater  kindness  or 
courtesy,  had  he  concurred  with  the  main  substance  of 
my  volume,  instead  of  differing  (as  I  fear  is  the  case) 
on  almost  every  premiss,  and  almost  every  conclusion. 
His  comments  have  enabled  me,  I  hope,  to  bring  out 
my  side  of  the  controversy  with  greater  distinctness 
and  precision ;  and  they  have  confirmed  me  in  the 
impression  which  I  have  long  entertained,  of  his 
intellectual  character.  Of  Mr.  Mill  certainly,  if  of  any 
man  living,  it  may  truly  be  said,  that  he  aims  at  doing 
the  fullest  justice  to  every  school  of  thought,  however 
remote  from  his  own ;  and  that  the  one  aim,  which 
consciously  influences  his  intellectual  exertions,  is  the 
pursuit  of  truth.  May  the  Merciful  God  grant  him, 
before  he  dies,  the  unspeakable  blessing  of  its  pos- 
session ! 

Reverting  to  the  general  contents  of  the  volume,  I 
should  observe  that  I  have  retained  the  form  of  Lectures 
throughout,  and  have  addressed  my  various  remarks  to 
an  imaginary  audience  of  pupils.  One  chief  reason  for 
this,  has  been  my  desire  of  thereby  rendering  my  style 
less  dull  and  heavy  than  it  naturally  is.  The  same 
desire  has  led  me,  in  various  places,  to  be  much  more 


PREFACE. 

frequent  in  the  use  of  Italics,  than  is  (I  fear)  really 
conducive  to  the  very  purpose  at  which  I  aimed. 

I  have  already  spoken  of  my  anxiety,  in  regard  to 
the  work  which  I  have  undertaken.  I  should  have 
felt  this,  in  undertaking  any  theological  treatise.  But 
surely  there  is  no  part  of  Theology,  in  which  it  is  so 
easy  to  fall  into  serious  mistakes, — in  which  it  is  so 
difficult  to  preserve  faithfully  the  true  mean, —  as  in 
that,  with  which  my  succeeding  volumes  are  to  be 
occupied.  Let  one  important  instance  of  this  be  con- 
sidered, as  a  sample  of  several.  On  the  one  hand  there 
is  the  danger,  lest  theological  doctrine  should  be  so 
represented,  as  unduly  to  alarm  those,  who  sincerely 
desire  and  pray  for  their  own  sanctification ;  but  who 
are  conscious  of  indefinite  weakness  and  inconsistency. 
On  the  other  hand  there  is  the  danger,  lest  any  thing 
should  be  even  accidentally  stated,  which  might  con- 
firm in  their  blind  and  presumptuous  confidence  those 
most  misguided  men,  who  have  no  practical  fear  in 
regard  to  their  eternal  lot,  while  yet  they  are  making 
no  efforts  at  all  to  discover  their  latent  faults  ;  to 
remove  their  affections  from  objects  of  this  earth ;  to 
measure  worldly  events  by  the  Divine  standard ;  to 
grow  in  personal  love  of  their  God  and  Saviour.  One 
hardly  knows,  which  of  these  two  extremes  is  the  more 
mischievous  and  dangerous ;  and  it  is  most  difficult, 
consistently  to  avoid  giving  some  countenance  to  one 
or  to  the  other. 

Such  being  my  dread  of  the  task  before  me,  I  might 
well  have  shrunk  from  attempting  it.  And  certainly 
indeed  I  should  have  so  shrunk,  had  not  circumstances 
of  various  kinds  led  me  strongly  to  think,  that  it  is  a 


PREFACE.  xlv 

work  which  God  desires  at  my  hands.  In  this  opinion 
I  have  been  confirmed,  by  more  than  one  clerical  friend, 
thoroughly  conversant  with  the  state  of  the  case,  and 
on  whose  judgment  I  have  the  greatest  reliance. 

I  have  only  therefore  earnestly  to  pray  for  God's 
Merciful  Guidance ;  and  to  submit  most  unreservedly 
each  volume,  as  it  appears,  to  the  Church's  judgment. 
In  this  very  Preface  I  have  strongly  urged,  that  nearly 
all  the  subjects,  treated  in  this  volume,  fall  most  directly 
and  absolutely  under  the  Church's  jurisdiction.  If 
then  there  be  any  proposition  in  them  which  the  Church 
may  think  fit  to  censure, —  God  forbid  there  should  be 
any  such  ! — I  am  certain  beforehand,  that  such  state- 
ment is  no  less  contrary  to  Reason  than  to  Theology  ; 
and  at  this  moment  I  implicitly  (implicite)  revoke  and 
renounce  it. 

It  is  abundantly  possible  again,  that  there  may  be 
various  views,  here  contained,  which,  though  not  incurring 
the  Church's  censure,  may  be  mistaken  in  themselves  and 
injurious  in  their  tendency.  May  God  grant  that  any 
such  views  may  be  speedily  and  efficaciously  refuted  ! 
If  on  the  other  hand  (as  I  earnestly  hope  is  the  case) 
there  are  other  propositions  which  are  true  and  sound, 
may  He  bless  them  to  the  one  ultimate  end  which 
every  theologian  must  propose  for  his  labours, — the 
sanctification  and  salvation  of  souls  ! 

Northwood  Park,  Cowes, 
Feast  of  St.  Joseph's  Patronage,  April  29, 1860. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS   TO   BOOK   I. 


CHAPTER  I. 

ON  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  MORALITY. 

SECTION  I. 
On  Intuitions  and  on  the  Principle  of  Certitude. 

PAOB 

1.  Judgments  of  Consciousness  and  Judgments  of  Intuition.  .  5 

2.  Judgments  of  unconscious  Inference.        ....  7 

3.  The  principle  of  Philosophical  Scepticism  stated.     .         .  9 

4.  The  Sceptic's  answer  to  a  Semi-sceptic 10 

5.  Consistently  to  hold  Sceptical  opinions,  is  physically  im- 

possible.  14 

6.  Semi-scepticism  is  an  utterly  unreasonable  and  inconsistent 

position.  ....     ^>^        ....       15 

7.  Scepticism  need  not  in  consistency  extend  to  Judgments 

of  Consciousness.      .         .         .         .         .         .         .16 

8.  Scepticism  a  worse  extreme  even  than  Rationalism.          .       ib. 

9.  The  Principle  of  Certitude  stated  and  defended.       .         .       18 

10.  The  Principle  of  Certitude  has  been  denied  by  Mr.  Man- 

sel,  though  partially  and  inconsistently.     .         .         .19 

11.  Also  by  Mr.  Stuart  Mill  and  his  school.  ...       25 

12.  Intuitional  light  the  reasonable  ground,  for  our  confidently 

holding  certain  intuitive  judgments.  ...       29 

13.  Fundamental  importance  of  laying  down  some  test  of  legi- 

timate intuitions.     .......  33 

14.  Two  explanatory  and  qualifying  statements  on  this.         .  34 

15.  F.  Burner's  tests  of  legitimate  intuitions.          ...  37 

16.  A  thesis  may  be  most  fully  founded  on  reason,  yet  not  on 

reasoning.        .........       38 

17.  Remarks  on  the  sense  in  which  we  throughout  used  the 

word  *  intuition,'  and  other  kindred  terms.         .         .       39 

18.  On  necessary  intuems 42 

19.  On  the  relation  between  God  and  Necessary  Truth.         .      ib. 

20.  Concluding  remark  on  the  Section.          .   "     .         .         .47 


Xlviii  CONTENTS. 

SECTION  II. 
On  the  Essential  Characteristics  of  Moral  Truth. 


PAGE 


21.  Various  judgments  stated,  which  include  in  different  shapes 

the  idea  *  morally  good.'    ......       48 

22.  What  is  meant  by  simple  and  complex  ideas  ?  50 

23.  What  is  meant  by  analytical  and  synthetical  judgments  ? 

Various  subdivisions  of  the  former.  ....       52 

24.  The  idea  '  morally  evil '  is  maintained  to  be  a  l  simple 

idea.' 55 

25.  Reply  to  that  attempted  analysis,  which  would  explain  it 

as  meaning  '  worthy  of  disapprobation  ; '  or  '  worthy  of 
blame  ; '  or  '  worthy  of  punishment.'  ...       56 

26.  Reply  to  that  attempted  analysis,  which  would  explain  it 

as  meaning  '  prohibited  by  the  Creator.'     ...       57 

27.  The  same  reasoning  equally  efficacious,  against  any  other 

attempted  analysis.  .         .         .         .         .         .         .61 

28.  That  particular  moral  judgment,  which  we  originally  cited, 

is  intuitive  and  not  inferential.  ....       63 

29.  It  is  a  legitimate  intuition.      ......       64 

30.  The  truth  intued  is  a  necessary  truth.      ....       67 

31.  Explanation  of  the  term  <  Moral  Truth.'          ...       68 

32.  Remarks  on  the  two  classes  of  philosophers,  who  are  op- 

posed to  our  doctrine.       ......       69 


SECTION  III. 
On  the  Relation  between  God  and  Moral  Truth. 

33.  Subject  of  the  ensuing  Section.       .....       71 

34.  Relation  between  God  and  Moral  Truth,  according  to  our 

doctrine. 72 

35.  Two  positions,  on  which  all  Catholic  philosophers,  who 

differ  from  our  doctrine,  would  agree  with  each  other.       76 

36.  First  adverse  theory  considered.     'Morally  evil   means 

freely  prohibited  by  the  Creator.'      ....       77 

37.  Second  adverse  theory.     '  Morally  evil  means  necessarily 

prohibited  by  the  Creator.'        .....       78 

38.  Third  adverse  theory.     'Morally  evil  means  necessarily 

detested  by  the  Creator.' 90 

39.  Fourth  adverse  theory.     '  Morally  evil  means  necessarily 

detested  by  the  One  Necessary  Being.'      ...       93 

40.  Fifth  adverse  theory.      *  Morally  evil  means  that  which 

separates  us  from  our  True  End.'      ....       ib. 

41.  General  argument  against  all  these  adverse  theories.         .       95 

42.  Can  we  say  that  Veracity  and  Benevolence  are  Perfections, 

because  God  is  what  He  is  ?     .  ...      98 


CONTENTS.  xlix 

PAGE 

43.  First  objection  considered.     *  You  exalt  an  abstraction 

above  the  Living  God/    .         .         ,         .         .         .100 

44.  Second  objection  considered.    *  A  creator  who  should  love 

mendacity  and  cruelty,  would  give  us  faculties  which 
regard  those  qualities  as  virtuous.'     .         .      '•' .         .     101 

45.  Third   objection  considered.     '  Every  obligation  is  con- 

sidered by  holy  men  as  coming  from  God,  and  as  part 

of  His  free  Providence.'    ......     102 

46.  Various  modes  in  which  our  doctrine  holds  up  God  as  the 

One  Object  of  undivided  reverence.  .         .         .     107 

47.  Distinction  between « Dei  Potentia  Absoluta'  and '  Ordinata.'     1 09 
48*The  Natural  Rule  and  the  Natural  Law.  .         .         .111 
49*'  Mala  quia  Prohibita,'  and  *  Prohibita  quia  mala.'    .         .   107* 
50*The  truths  of  these  Sections  in  their  ontological  order.       .   108* 
51*Conclusion  of  the  Section.  .  110* 


SECTION  V. 
On  the  Idea  of  Moral  Worthiness. 

48.  Instances  in  which  men  always  say,  that  this  act  is  more 

worthy  than  that.     .         .          .          .          .          .          .113 

49.  The  idea  'moral  worthiness'  a  simple  idea.      .         .         .114 

50.  Its  connection  with  the  idea  of  moral  obligation.       .         .115 

51.  Extreme  frequency  of  moral  judgments.  .         .         .         .116 

52.  Enlarged  sense  of  the  phrase  *  Natural  Rule.'  .         .         .117 

53.  Different  senses  in  which  it  may  be  asked,  how  far  the 

Natural  Rule  extends.      .      :=i*fc*-:     ....       ib. 

SECTION  VI. 
On  the  Extent  of  the  Natural  Rule. 

54.  Justice,  Veracity,  and  Benevolence,  are  intrinsecally  good 

ends  of  action.  .         .         .  .         .         .119 

55.  No  good  end  of  action  may  ever  be  contravened,  except 

for  the  sake  of  some  other  good  end,  which  at  the 
moment  conflicts  with  it.  .         .         .         .         .122 

56.  No  act  is  virtuous,  unless  done  for  the  virtuousness  of 

some  good  end.        ..         .         .         ..       .         .         .       ib. 

57.  Distinction  between  objective  and  subjective  virtuousness.     124 

58.  An  act  is  subjectively  better,  caeteris  paribus,  in  propor- 

tion as  the  will  adheres  more  firmly  and  efficaciously 

to  the  virtuousness  of  a  good  end 125 

59.  What  is  meant  by  an  Infinitely  Holy  Being  ?  .         .       ib. 

60.  Objection   made   against    the   proposition,    that   a   Holy 

Creator  cannot  deceive  us ;  and  reply  to  that  objec- 
tion.     ...         .         .     *   .         .         ,•       .    *     .     126 

d 


1  CONTENTS. 


PAGF 


61.  Virtuousness  of  those  good  acts  which  relate  to  God.        .     127 

62.  How  far  will  Reason  shew,  that  Humility,  Forgivingness, 

and  Purity,  are  virtuous  ends  of  action  ?    .         .         .128 

63.  '  Production  of  the  arc'  principle.    .  .  .       ib. 

64.  The  Moral  Faculty 129 

65.  Process  whereby  our  moral  judgments  increase  in    ac- 

curacy.   .         .         .         .         .         .  .         .132 

66.  Position  occupied  respectively,  by  the  Moral  Faculty  and 

by  the  other  intellectual  faculties,  in  arriving  at  moral 
truth.       ...  135 

67.  The   question,  'What  are    virtuous   ends   of  action? 'is 

immeasurably  more  important  than  any  other  moral 
question.  .         .         .          .         .         .          .         .138 

68.  Reason  shews  that  pride  is  sinful.    .         .         .         .         .139 

69.  Reason  shews  that  vindictiveness  is  sinful.       .         .         .144 

70.  What  are  the  various  grounds,  which  justify  infliction  of 

pain  on  our  fellow-men?  .         .         .         .          .         .146 

71.  Is  Forgivingness  simply  identical  with  Benevolence?        .     147 

72.  Reason  shews  the  virtuousness  of  Purity.         .         .         .     148 

73.  Catalogue  of  virtuous  ends  recognised  by  Reason.    .         .149 

74.  Probable  inference,  from  all  that  has  been  said,  on  the 

Extent  of  the  Natural  Rule  ;  and  harmony  of  this 
inference  with  the  dicta  of  theologians.      .         .         .150 

75.  Objection  to  our  whole  doctrine  answered.       .         .         .152 

76.  Our  principles  add  to  the  motives  of  credibility  for  Catho- 

licism.    .........     153 

77.  Reasons  for  holding  our  doctrine,  on  the  Moral  Faculty 

and  its  growth.         .         .         .          .         .         .          .154 

78.  Substantial  agreement  of  the  principles  put  forth  in  this 

Section,  with  those  usually  recognised  by  Catholics.        161 


SECTION  VII. 
On  God's  Power  of  Interference  with  the  Natural  Rule. 

79.  Interference  is  of  two  kinds.   .         .         .         .         .         .165 

80.  God's  Power  of  addition  to  the  Natural  Rule.  .         .       ib. 

81.  God's  Power  of  subtraction  from  the  Natural  Rule.  .     166 

82.  Mutable  part  of  the  Natural  Law 170 

83.  Immutable  part  of  the  Natural  Law.        .         .         .         .171 

84.  Theologians  cited  in  behalf  of  our  doctrine.      .         .         .175 

85.  How  far  can  God,  by  His  interference,  affect  the  relative 

moral  worthiness  of  acts  ?          .         .  .         .     187 

86.  Distinction  between  *  intrinsic'  and  'independent'  obliga- 

tion or  moral  worthiness.  .         .          .         .         .188 

87.  Concluding  remarks,  on  the  matters  treated  in  this  whole 

Chapter. %       .         .     190 


CONTENTS. 


li 


PACK 


CHAPTER  II. 

ON  ETHICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

88.  Explanation  of  the  term.         ...  .192 

SECTION  I. 
On  the  Threefold  Classification  of  Mental  Phenomena. 

89.  The  soul  is  a  simple  substance.        ...  .195 

90.  We  have  no  direct  knowledge  of  that  substance  itself.  .       ib. 

91.  Its  phenomena  fall  irresistibly  under  three  classes.  .  .     196 

92.  Emotions  in  general .197 

93.  Propensions,  and  an  important  division  of  them.       .  .       ib. 

SECTION  II. 
On  tjie  Passions. 

94.  Explanation  of  the  term 200 

95.  First  six  Passions  enumerated  by  the  scholastics.     .         .201 

96.  Supplementary  remarks  on  these.    .....  202 

97.  Remaining  five  Passions  enumerated  by  the  scholastics.    .  205 

98.  Criticism  on  this  latter  enumeration.        ....  207 

99.  Proposed  enumeration  of  the  Passions.     ....  209 

SECTION  III. 
On  the  Relation  between  Will  and  Sensitive  Appetite. 

100.  Act  of  Will,  corresponding  respectively  to  each  Passion.       211 

101.  Name  given  to  each  act  of  Will 212 

102.  *  Spes,'   'audacia,'  'delectatio  voluntatis,' considered  and 

analyzed.    Also  'envy'  and  '  ill-humour'  of  the  Will, 

and  'murmuring  against  God's  Providence.'      .          .     213 

103.  'Gaudium  Voluntatis'  and  'Delectatio  Morosa.'       .         .     217 

104.  Acts  of  the  Will  are  often  elicited,  without  any  correspond- 

ing emotions.     Caution  with  which  this  statement  is 

to  be  received.                   ,         .         .         .         ,         .  220 

105.  '  Motus  primo-primi'  and  '  secundb-primi.'       .         ,         .  222 

106.  'Actus  primo-primi'  and  '  secundo-primi.'       .                  .  224 

107.  Power  of  the  Will  in  resisting  emotion.  ....  ib. 


Hi  CONTENTS. 

SECTION  IY. 
On  Certain  other  Phenomena  of  the  Will. 

PAGE 

108.  Subject  of  the  Section 231 

109.  <  In tentio  finis.' ib. 

110.  'Absolute  end  ;'  'Relative  or  intermediate  ends.'      .         .  232 

111.  '  Unconscious  intention,'  either  '  implicit '  or  '  virtual.'       .  233 

112.  A   considerable  number  of  actual  ends  are  often  simul- 

taneously influential.         ......  235 

113.  '  In  tentio  finis '  is  applied  to  a  relative  end,  no  less  than  to 

an  absolute.      ........  236 

114.  '  Habitual  Intention.'     Subdivision  of  this.      ,          .         .  ib. 

115.  'Intentio,'  distinguished  from  'Amor'  and  ' Desiderium.'  238 

116.  Acts  of  the  Will  are  what  they  are,  and  not  what  we 

reflect  on  them  as  being.  ......  239 

117.  <  Bonum'  defined 242 

118.  '  Bonum  delectabile.' 243 

119.  '  Bonum  honestum.'         .......  244 

120.  Unconscious  intention  of  bonum  honestum.       .         .         .  246 

121.  No  other  'bonum,'  except  'honestum,'  'delectabile,'  and 

'  utile.'                                      •  248 


SECTION  V. 
On  the  Adaptation  of  our  Nature  to  Virtue. 

123.  Subject  of  the  Section 250 

124.  First  argument  for  our  thesis.     Virtue  is  pursued  for  its 

own  sake,  but  vice  cannot  possibly  be  so  pursued.       .       ib. 

125.  Second  argument  for  our  thesis.     '  Bonum  honestum '  and 

'delectabile,'  as  they  are  the  only  legitimate,  so  are 

the  only  possible,  ends  of  action.        ....     251 

126.  Third   argument.      Moral  judgments    are   so   extremely 

frequent  with  all  men.       .         .         .         .         .          .251 

127.  Fourth  argument.     The  pleasures  of  reflection  are  all  on 

the  side  of  virtue.     .......       ib. 

128.  Fifth   argument   stated.     Our  Propensions  are  the   sole 

occasion  of  sin;  and  yet  there  is  not  one  of  them, 
which  has  not  a  real  and  legitimate  place  in  leading 
us  to  virtue.  ........  252 

129.  Most  important  place  held  by  pleasure,  in  helping  us  to- 

wards virtue.  ........     254 

130.  Immense  benefits  of  sensible  devotion.      ....     257 

131.  Individual  propensions  examined.     Propension  of  Duty   .     259 


CONTENTS.  liii 

PAGE 

132.  Propension  of  Self- Charity.     .         .  .     260 

133.  Propension  of  Personal  Love 261 

134.  The   passion    'Amor,'   distinguished   both   from    'Amor 

Benevolentiae,'  and  '  Amor  Concupiscentiae.'        .         .     265 

135.  Singular  assistance  given  by  this  Propension,  to  growth  in 

love  of  God.     . 266 

136.  Propension  of  General  Love  for  mankind.         .         .         .  274 

137.  Propension  of  Compassion.      ......  276 

138.  Propension  of  Gratitude.         .                            ...  278 

139.  State  of  the  argument  considered.   .         .         .         .  ib. 

140.  Love  of  Honour  considered.    ......  279 

141.  Love  of  Power 283 

142.  Love  of  Money 284 

143.  Love  of  Intellectual  Exertion 289 

144.  Resentment 297 

145.  Love  of  the  Marvellous. .         .                   ....  311 

146.  Objection  to  the  statements  ofn.  144,  answered  by  help 

of  this  latter  Propension.  .         .....     312 

147.  Emulation  perverted  into  Envy.      .         .         .         .         .314 

148.  Love  of  Self-assertion  perverted  into  Pride.     .         .         .315 

149.  List  of  the  Propensions  already  enumerated.    .         .         .     324 

150.  What  are  those  Propensions  respectively  useful  for  our 

duties,  (1)  towards  the  Invisible  World  ;  (2)  towards 

our  own  interior;  and  (3)  towards  our  fellow-men  ?  .     325 

151.  Protestants,   in  proportion  as  they  are  'formally'  such, 

practically  deny,  that  God  can  be  a  satisfying  Object 
to  our  higher  Propensions.      This  view  stated  and 
examined.        ........     329 

149.*  As  men  grow  in  perfection,  it  is  not  that  new  Propensions 
spring  up  within  them,  but  that  the  Propensions, 
implanted  by  God  in  their  nature,  are  fixed  on  new 

Objects 347 

150.*  On  the  Bodily  Propensions 350 

151.*  On  the  Love  of  Beauty 355 

152.  Sixth  argument  for  our  Thesis.     The  ex-regarding  Pro- 

pensions  are  fully  as  powerful  as  the  self-regarding.  .     359 

153.  Seventh  argument.     Peace  obtained,  by  the  rest  of  our 

most  powerful  and  pervasive  Propensions,  in  the 
thought  of  God 361 

154.  How  far  are  virtue  and  earthly  happiness  ordinarily  co- 

incident?           363 

155.  How   far  does   our   earthly   happiness    consist,    in    our 

prospect  of  Future  Bliss  ? 373 

156.  Eighth  argument  for  our  Thesis.  None  of  our  most  power- 

ful and  pervasive  Propensions  can  possibly  come  into 
closer  contact  with  earthly  objects,  than  they  may 
with  heavenly ........  376 


By  some  mistake  nn.  149-151  have  been  repeated. 


Hv  CONTENTS. 


SECTION  VI. 


On  the  Marks  of  Moral  Degradation  in  our  Nature  as  it  now  exists. 

PAGE 

157.  Existence  of  evil  an  utterly  insoluble  difficulty.                  •  381 

158.  Testified  by  experience.           ......  ib. 

159.  The  difficulty  has  not  been  lessened  by  Revelation. .         .  383 

160.  Our  nature,  as  it  now  exists,  is  far  more  powerful  in  the 

wrong,  than  in  the  right,  direction.  ....  384 

161.  Our  Will  is  far  weaker  in  its  aim   at  virtue,   than   at 

pleasure. 385 

162.  Our  Will  is  most  wayward  and  capricious,  in  its  aim  at 

virtue 387 

163.  The  Propension  of  the  Flesh  seems  to  have  received  a 

most  morbid  intensity.      ......  389 

164.  Connection  of  this  with  the  dogma  of  Original  Sin.           .  390 


SECTION  VII. 


On  Certain  Philosophical  Terms. 

165.  On  the  term  c  Nature,'  as  applied  to  an  individual.    .         .     392 

166.  On  the  term  *  Nature,' as  applied  to  a  species.  .         .     397 

167.  On  the  terms  'species  sensibilis,'  '  species  intelligibilis,' 

'  phantasia,'  &c.  &c. 399 


CHAPTER  III. 


ON    SELF-CHARITY. 


168.  General  account  of  the  question  at  issue  on  this  subject 

between  Bossuet  and  Fenelon.  402 


CONTENTS. 


Iv 


SECTION  I. 

On  Mans  Desire  of  Felicity. 

1 69.  Statement  of  the  felicity-thesis,  as  advocated  by  Bossuet.  .     404 

170.  This   thesis  opposed   to   Theology,    Reason,  and  Expe- 

rience  406 

171.  There   is   no  one  absolute  end  of  human  action.       The 

argument,  brought  from  authority  against  this  state- 
ment, carefully  considered.        .....     409 


SECTION  II. 
On  the  Claims  of  Self- Chanty. 

172.  How  far  are  we  under  the  moral  obligation  of  aiming  at 

felicity?  .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .419 

173.  First   Principle.     It  is  metaphysically  impossible,    that 

what  is  morally  obligatory  shall  be  otherwise  than 
conducive  to  our  permanent  happiness.  .  .  .  ib. 

174.  Second  Principle.     It  is  metaphysically  impossible,  that 

one  course  of  conduct  shall  be  more  morally  worthy 
than  another,  without  being  also  more  conducive  to 
our  permanent  happiness.  .....  420 

175.  Third  Principle.    Self-Charity  is  a  virtuous  end  of  action.       ib. 

1 76.  Fourth  Principle.     If  I  aim  at  my  own  permanent  hap- 

piness, yet  not  for  the  virtuousness  of  so  doing,  still 

the  movement  of  my  will  on  the  whole  is  good.  .     422 


CHAPTER  IV. 

ON  THE  VARIOUS  KINDS  OF  CERTAINTY  AND  IMPOSSIBILITY. 

177.  Things  may  be  certain  objectively  or  subjectively.     First 

of  subjective  certainty.      ......     424 

178.  Experimental  certainty.  ......       ib. 

179.  Fundamental  certainty 425 


Ivi  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

180.  Metaphysical  certainty.  .......  ib. 

181.  Physical  certainty.           .......  ib. 

182.  Moral  certainty.      .                   426 

183.  Objective  a  priori  certainty 427 

184.  Impossibility ;  metaphysical,  physical,  and  moral.    .         .  428 


SUPPLEMENTARY  SECTION. 

BEING  SECTION  4TH  OF  CHAPTER  FIRST. 

Catholic  Authority  on  Independent  Morality. 

185.  No  Catholic  can  hold  that  Moral  Obligation  flows  from 

God's  free  Command 429 

186.  The  condemnation  of  two  certain  propositions,  cited  in 

opposition  to  the  theory,  that  obligation  flows  entirely 
from  His  Necessary  Command.          .          .          .          .431 

187.  Spiritual  Exercises  of  S.  Ignatius  cited.           .         .          .  ib. 

188.  Suarez. 432 

189.  Vasquez 440 

190.  Lessius 441 

191.  Lugo.    . 442 

192.  'Plures   ex    antiquioribus  et  recentioribus,'  adduced  by 

Lugo.      .........  444 

193.  Salas,  adduced  by. Lugo           .         .         .         .         .  ib. 

194.  Gregory  and  Gabriel,  adduced  by  Lugo.           .         .         .  ib. 

195.  General  views  of  theologians,  as  adduced  by  Lugo.           .  445 

196.  Coninck,  quoted  textually  by  Lugo.          ....  ib. 

197.  Bellarmine  cited.    ........  ib. 

198.  Compton  Carleton.          .......  ib. 

199.  Berti 448 

200.  Frassen 449 

201.  Consideration   of  the  condemned  proposition    on  Philo- 

sophical Sin.    ........  450 

202.  Viva's  doctrine  stated  and  opposed.          .         .         .         .  457 

203.  Gerdil  cited  in  our  favour.      ......  462 

204.  <  Praelectiones  Philosophic^.' 473 

205.  Solimani 474 

206.  Dmowski .                   .  477 

207.  '  Philosophia  Lugdunensis.'     ......  479 

208.  Noget-Lacoudre.     .                   .         .         .         .         .  ib. 

209.  Chastel 481 

210.  Theologians  cited,  who  hold  that  the  idea  'morally  good' 

does  not  contain  that  of  any  relation  to  God.     .         .  483 

211.  Philosophers  cited  to  the  same  effect 488 

212.  Conclusion  of  the  Section.  489 


BOOK   FIRST. 


PHILOSOPHICAL   INTRODUCTION. 


BOOK   FIRST. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 


I  AM  not  professing,  as  you  are  well  aware,  to  carry 
you  through  a  regular  course  of  Philosophy.  I  only 
wish  to  give  you  a  full  and  complete  grasp  of  certain 
great  philosophical  principles,  which  are  essential  to 
our  subsequent  theological  course.  We  are  not  there- 
fore to  be  considered  here  as  occupied  with  Philosophy 
for  its  own  sake,  but  simply  as  an  introduction  to 
Dogmatic  Theology. 

We  are  met  at  starting  by  a  great  disadvantage, 
under  which  many  other  scientific  courses  also  lie. 
It  would  be  greatly  desirable  if  the  earlier  part  of  our 
work  could  be  rendered  comparatively  clear  and  easy; 
for  by  such  means  an  interest  might  be  excited  in  the 
study,  and  an  ardour  be  stimulated  for  its  prosecution, 
which  would  greatly  animate  and  encourage  you,  in 
encountering  any  unavoidable  difficulty  which  meets 
us  in  our  path.  It  happens  however  most  unfortun- 
ately, that  the  chief  difficulties  occur  at  the  very  outset ; 
they  occur  before  you  have  had  any  opportunity  of 
tasting  the  sweets  (as  I  may  say)  of  theological  science, 
and  of  appreciating,  even  in  a  moderate  degree,  those 
most  beautiful  and  attractive  Objects,  which  it  opens  to 
our  contemplation.  For  we  must  begin  by  the  establish- 
ment of  abstract  principles ;  and  to  master  abstract 


4  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

principles,  is  necessarily  among  the  most  laborious  and 
ungrateful  tasks  in  the  world.  I  can  only  earnestly 
exhort  you,  to  take  that  on  faith,  which  you  have  as 
yet  had  no  means  of  knowing  by  experience.  I  can 
only  exhort  you  to  believe,  on  the  word  of  others,  that 
whatever  amount  of  discouraging  and  repulsive  labour 
may  meet  you  at  the  outset,  the  prize  for  which  that 
labour  is  to  be  encountered, — I  mean  the  mastery  of 
dogmatical  truth, — is  so  great  and  precious  a  treasure, 
as  most  abundantly  and  superabundantly  to  recompense 
you  for  all  preliminary  toil. 

It  will  cost  you  then,  I  think,  much  more  trouble 
to  master  the  first  Chapter  of  the  first  Book,  than  to 
apprehend  any  subsequent  part  of  the  entire  study  ; 
and  it  will  give  you  much  more  trouble  to  master  the 
first  Section  of  that  Chapter,  than  any  subsequent  por- 
tion. In  regard  indeed  to  the  first  Section,  I  beg  you 
to  pass  and  repass  carefully  in  your  mind  the  various 
statements  therein  contained,  so  as  fully  and  familiarly 
to  grasp  them,  before  you  attempt  any  study  of  the 
subsequent  sections. 

On  my  part,  I  will  do  all  in  my  power  to  save  you 
unnecessary  trouble ;  and  I  will  state  what  I  have  to 
say,  in  the  clearest  and  most  intelligible  language  I  can 
command.  I  heartily  wish  I  had  more  power  than  (I 
know)  belongs  to  me,  of  putting  abstruse  and  recondite 
matter  into  an  easy  and  familiar  shape. 


CHAPTER  I. 

ON  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  MORALITY. 

SECTION  I. 
On  Intuitions  and  on  the  Principle  of  Certitude. 

1.  I  MUST  begin  by  begging  your  particular  attention 
to  a  distinction,  which  seems  to  me  very  important, 
between  two  different  classes  of  intellectual  acts.  I 
will  call  them  respectively  Judgments  of  Consciousness 
and  Judgments  of  Intuition.  And  now  to  explain  the 
meaning  of  this  distinction. 

I  form  tbe  judgment,  that  I  am  this  moment  suffer- 
ing the  sensation  which  we  call  cold.  This  is  simply 
a  judgment  of  consciousness:  I  reflect  on  the  fact,  that 
I  am  at  this  moment  affected  in  a  certain  way ;  the 
judgment  begins  there  and  ends  there.  Again,  I  form 
the  judgment,  that  I  am  suffering  under  that  which  we 
call  low  spirits  ;  or  that  I  am  out  of  humour ;  or  the 
like.  These  are  all  judgments  of  consciousness  ;  the 
mind's  reflection  on  its  own  actually  present  experience. 

But  now  suppose  I  remember,  that  half  an  hour  ago 
I  endured  the  sensation  of  cold.  Here  first  there  is,  or 
may  be,  a  judgment  of  consciousness  ;  I  may  reflect  on 
the  impression  which  is  now  in  my  mind,  that  the  past 
fact  was  so.  But  there  is  another  judgment  of  far 
greater  importance,  which  I  also  confidently  form,  and 
which  we  may  call  a  judgment  of  intuition  or  an  intui- 
tive judgment.  I  may  judge  confidently  indeed,  that  I 
have  the  present  impression  of  having  undergone  that 


6  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTKODUCTIOtf. 

sensation  ;  but  this  is  not  all.  I  confidently  form  an- 
other judgment  also :  viz.  that  the  sensation  was  under- 
gone ;  that  I  actually  did  feel  cold,  at  the  time  to  which 
my  thoughts  refer.  Moreover  I  regard  this  truth,  not 
as  known  to  me  hy  way  of  consequence  or  deduction 
from  other  truths  ;  but  as  known  to  me  immediately 
and  in  itself.  Such  a  judgment  we  may  call  a  judg- 
ment of  intuition  :  a  judgment,  which  on  the  one  hand 
is  quite  distinct  from  the  mind's  reflection  on  its  own 
present  consciousness  ;  and  which  on  the  other  hand  is 
quite  distinct  also,  from  a  judgment  arising  in  my  mind 
in  the  way  of  consequence  from  other  judgments. 

As  our  second  illustration  of  an  intuitive  judgment, 
let  us  take  our  various  acts  of  belief  in  the  validity 
of  reasoning.  A  well-instructed  thinker  follows  some 
chain  of  demonstrative  reasoning,  and  forms  the  fol- 
lowing judgment  without  the  faintest  shadow  of  doubt: 
c  if  the  various  premisses  are  true,  the  various  conclu- 
sions, here  deduced  from  those  premisses,  are  most  cer- 
tainly true  also.'  He  does  not  elicit  merely  a  judgment 
of  consciousness:  i  I  am  impressed  with  the  idea  that 
these  conclusions  are  true,  if  the  premisses  are  true  ;  I 
am  so  constituted  that  I  cannot  help  thinking  this  to  be 
so.'  No ;  he  forms  also  an  intuitive  judgment.  It  is 
not  merely  '  I  cannot  help  feeling  as  if  the  conclusions 
followed  from  the  premisses,'  but  '  I  see  for  certain  that 
they  do  so  follow.' 

As  a  third  instance,  let  us  take  mathematical 
axioms.  '  A  rectilineal  figure  of  three  sides  has  neither 
more  nor  less  than  three  angles.'  So  soon  as  I  under- 
stand the  meaning  of  this  proposition;  —  so  soon  as  I 
can  produce  in  my  mind  the  representation  of  a  three- 
sided  figure,  and  have  a  moment's  leisure  for  reflection ; 
— I  judge  at  once  that  this  proposition  is  quite  cer- 
tainly true.  I  never  think  of  confining  myself  to  a 
subjective  judgment ;  '  I  am  so  constituted  that  I 
cannot  help  thinking  the  proposition  is  true  :'  no  ; 
the  judgment  which  I  form  is  objective;  'the  propo- 
sition is  true.' 

As  a  fourth  instance,  let  us  take  our  belief  in  an 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  CERTITUDE.       7 

external  world.  The  great  mass  of  men  never  think 
of  confining  themselves  to  a  mere  judgment  of  con- 
sciousness on  this  matter ;  '  I  am  impressed  as  if  there 
were  external  objects  :'  they  always  form  an  intuitive 
judgment,  '  there  are  external  objects.'  It  is  well 
known  that  certain  philosophers  have  existed,  who 
deny  that  there  are  grounds  for  any  such  judgment. 
But  it  is  no  part  of  our  business  here  to  consider 
the  arguments  of  these  philosophers  ;  for  we  are  not 
here  considering  how  far  these  intuitive  judgments  are 
true,  but  explaining  what  is  meant  by  an  intuitive 
judgment.  I  say  then,  the  great  mass  of  men  (rightly 
or  wrongly)  do,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  elicit  the  intuitive 
judgment,  *  external  objects  exist/  • 

Such  then  are  intuitive  judgments,  in  the  sense 
which  we  shall  consistently  assign  to  that  word. 
They  are  judgments,  which  I  do  not  hold  as  being 
inferred  in  any  way  from  other  judgments,  but  as 
immediately  evident.  Yet  on  the  other  hand  they  are 
totally  distinct  from  what  we  call  judgments  of  con- 
sciousness ;  or,  in  other  words,  from  the  various  reflec- 
tions made  by  my  mind  upon  its  actually  present  ex- 
perience. Many  of  the  judgments,  which  we  thus  form, 
are  true  ;  many  are  false  :  but,  whether  true  or  false, 
I  will  equally  call  them  judgments  of  intuition,  if  they 
are  immediate  judgments,  and  yet  not  judgments  of 
consciousness. 

2.  We  must  carefully  distinguish  however  these 
intuitive  judgments,  from  another  numerous  class 
which  on  the  surface  resemble  them.  There  are  very 
many  judgments,  which  appear  to  be  formed  imme- 
diately ;  in  forming  which,  the  mind  does  not  reflect 
on  any  premisses  from  which  they  result ;  but  which 
nevertheless  are  in  fact  formed  as  conclusions  from 
premisses.  For  instance.  An  experienced  farmer  goes 
into  a  corn-field,  and  says  to  himself,  on  looking  around, 
4  in  what  excellent  condition  and  how  abundant  is  this 
corn!'  Yet  this  judgment,  though  so  spontaneously 
formed,  is  in  fact  not  elicited  as  immediately  evident;  it 
is  elicited  as  a  conclusion,  resulting  in  part  from  various 


8  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

judgments  which  already  existed  in  his  mind.  These 
judgments  will  be  such  as  the  following. 

(1.)  c  I  remember  a  number  of  fields,  in  which  the 
corn  was  in  very  good  condition.' 

(2.)  '  These  fields  all  agreed  in  certain  charac- 
teristic marks.' 

(3.)  'If  certain  marks  prove  one  corn-field  to  be  in 
a  good  state,  marks  precisely  similar  must  prove  another 
to  be  so.' 

To  these  judgments,  with  which  he  was  already 
familiar,  one  intuitive  judgment  is  added,  which  he  now 
elicits  for  the  first  time.  '  There  are  in  this  field  the 
same  marks,  which  everywhere  characterise  a  good  con- 
dition of  corn.' 

All  these  various  judgments  go  to  make  up  the 
grounds,  for  his  opinion  on  the  corn-field  before  him. 
Most  of  them  indeed  are  so  familiar  to  him,  and  they 
are  all  formed  so  readily  and  inevitably,  that  he  does 
not  reflect  upon  them  at  all,  and  is  inclined  to  fancy 
his  judgment  to  be  immediate.  Yet  it  is  manifest 
on  a  moment's  consideration,  that  unless  every  one  of 
the  preceding  judgments  had  passed  through  his  mind, 
he  could  not  by  possibility  have  formed  the  original 
opinion  which  he  did  form.  That  opinion  was  in 
fact  the  conclusion  resulting  from  a  certain  logical 
process  ;  and  that  process  was  built  upon  these  respec- 
tive judgments,  as  among  the  premisses  on  which 
it  rested.  Let  his  belief  be  shaken  in  any  one  of 
these  judgments,  his  opinion  on  the  healthy  state 
of  the  corn-field  before  him  must  at  once  fall  to  the 
ground.* 

*  One  or  two  readers,  I  find,  have  doubted  whether  such  opinions  as 
the  above  are  really  inferential.  There  cannot,  I  think,  be  any  kind  of 
reasonable  doubt  that  they  are  so,  and  philosophers  (I  believe)  universally 
hold  this.  But  it  is  no  part  of  my  province  to  contend  for  this  statement ; 
for  my  arguments  in  the  next  Section  would  be  but  strengthened  if  it  were 
denied.  It  is  a  very  important  proposition,  advocated  by  me  in  the  next 
Section,  that  'moral  judgments,'  are  'intuitive.'  I  am  obliged  however 
to  admit,  that  the  mere  fact  of  their  appearing  immediate  is  no  sufficient 
proof  of  this  ;  because  (as  I  here  state)  many  inferential  judgments  appear 
intuitive.  If  this  were  denied,  my  arguments  in  the  next  Section  would 
but  proceed  moreseasily  and  flowingly. 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.        9 

On  the  other  hand  take  a  really  intuitive  judgment : 
— for  instance,  4I  recently  experienced  the  sensation  of 
cold/  It  is  plain  that  I  hold  this,  not  as  the  conclusion 
of  any  logical  process  whatever  ; — not  as  depending  on 
any  judgment,  whether  reflected  on  or  not; — but  in  the 
strictest  sense  as  an  immediate  conviction. 

If  our  direct  theme  were  Philosophy,  it  might  be 
desirable  to  proceed  at  greater  length,  in  illustrating 
this  distinction ;  but  under  our  present  circumstances, 
thus  to  have  indicated  it  will  suffice. 

3.  When  we  have  sufficiently  mastered  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  two  kinds  of  immediate  judgments, — 
Judgments  of  Consciousness  and  Judgments  of  Intui- 
tion,— we  shall  be  able  to  understand  wherein  philoso- 
phical scepticism  precisely  consists.  The  only  thesis, 
which  expresses  this  theory  with  perfect  consistency,  is 
the  following : — c  We  are  unable  to  know  with  certainty 
anything  whatever,  beyond  the  facts  of  our  actually 
present  consciousness  ;  because  no  intuitive  judgment 
can  possibly  carry  with  it  its  own  evidence  of  truth.' 

A  thinker  of  this  class  may  be  imagined,  with  a  cer- 
tain superficial  consistency,  to  argue  as  follows : — '  There 
4  can  be  no  possible  ground  for  holding  any  intuitive 
'  judgments ;  and  the  mass  of  men,  in  confidently  holding 
4  them,  are  simply  unreasonable.  Take  for  instance  the 
4  case  of  memory ; — what  imaginable  reason  canlhavefor 
4  supposing,  that  those  various  impressions,  which  I  call 
4  acts  of  remembrance,  correspond  to  real  facts  of  my 
4  past  history  ?  How  can  I  know,  for  instance,  that  I 
4  have  not  been  formed  by  some  malignant  being,  who 
4  has  given  me  mendacious  faculties  for  the  very  pur- 
6  pose  of  deceiving  me  ?  How  can  I  know  but  that 
4  this  being  makes  me  fancy  I  w^as  cold  e.g.  a  short 
4  time  ago,  when  I  was  really  experiencing  some  totally 
4  different  sensation  ?  But  this  supposition  indeed, — 
4  the  supposition  of  a  malignant  creator, — is  only  one, 
4  out  of  a  hundred  which  might  be  made;  each  one  at 
*  variance  with  the  belief,  that  my  memory  can  be 
6  trusted.  Surely  I  can  have  no  more  real  ground  for 
'  believing,  that  I  have  actually  gone  through  those 


10  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

4  various  experiences,  of  which  my  memory  presents 
6  the  impression,  than  a  madman  has  for  imagining 
4  himself  to  be  Csesar  or  Alexander  the  Great. *  In 
c  like  manner,  what  possible  ground  have  I  for  believing 
4  that  the  conclusion  of  a  syllogism  really  follows  from 
4  its  premisses  ?  or  again,  that  a  rectilineal  figure  of 
4  three  sides  has  three  angles?  No  doubt,  I  feel  as  if 
4  these  propositions  were  true  ;  I  cannot  help  thinking 
6  that  they  are  true ;  but  what  possible  warrant  have  I 
4  for  inferring,  from  my  own  intellectual  impotence,f 
4  the  truth  of  an  objective  and  external  fact  ?  I  must 
'  remain  then  for  ever,  in  a  state  of  utter  and  hopeless 
4  ignorance  of  everything,  beyond  the  actually  present 
4  phenomena  of  self.  I  must  remain,  shut  up  (as  it 
4  were)  within  the  region  of  present  consciousness.' 

4.  Now  in  order  to  the  true  refutation  of  scepticism, 
we  must  beyond  question  deny  its  premiss  :  we  must 
assert  most  confidently,  in  opposition  to  its  theory, 
that  certain  intuitive  judgments  do  carry  with  them 
their  own  evidence.  Various  thinkers  however  have, 
at  various  periods,  taken  a  different  course.  These 
philosophers  have  admitted  the  sceptic's  premiss,  but 
joined  issue  with  his  conclusion.  They  have  admitted 

*  "  Une  autre  consequence  egalement  juste"  (from  that  doctrine  of  scep- 
ticism which  the  author  is  opposing), "  est  que  nous  n'avons  aucune  certitude 
Gvidente  de  ce  qu'hier  il  nous  arriva  ou  ne  nous  arriva  pas  ;  et  meme  si  nous 
existions  ou  si  nous  n'existions  pas.  Je  crois  bien  etre  evidemment 
certain  qu'hier  j'6tais  au  monde  ;  mais  c'est  un  jugement  qui  pent  se 
trouver  sujet  d  erreur,  selon  les  philosophes  dont  nous  parlous.  Car,  selon 
eux,  je  ne  puis  avoir  d'evidence  que  par  une  perception  intime  qui  est 
toujours  actuelle ;  or,  actuellement,  j'ai  bien  la  perception  du  souvenir  de 
ce  qui  m' arriva  hier  ;  mais  ce  souvenir  n'est  qu'une  perception  intime  de  ce 
que  je  pense  presentement,  c'est-a-dire  d'une  pensee  actuelle,  laquelle  n'est 
pas  la  meme  chose  que  ce  qui  se  passa  hier  et  qui  n'est  plus  aujourd'hui. 
Par  la  m6me  raison,  je  serai  encore  moins  certain  si  je  ue  suis  par  en  ce 
monde  depuis  deux  ou  troismille  ans,  et  si  je  n'ai  point  anim6  le  corps  d'un 
crocodile  ou  d'un  moineau.  II  est  tres-evident  que  je  n'en  ai  aucune 
memoire  ;  mais  tout  cela  s'est  pu  faire,  sans  que  je  m'en  souvienne  actuelle- 
ment ;  comme  il  arrive  effectivement  que  chacun  de  nous  est  demeure 
plusieurs  mois  dans  le  sein  de  sa  mere,  sans  en  avoir  conserve  le  moindre 
souvenir.  Ce  manque  de  memoire  n'est  done  pas  une  certitude  evidente, 
centre  ce  qu'on  voudrait  supposer  de  I'anciennet6  de  mon  existence,  et  des 
situations  differentes  ou  je  me  serais  trouve"  dans  le  systeme  de  la 
metempsy chose." — Burner,  (Euvres  Philosophiques,  chap.  iii.  s.  20. 

t  This  excellent  phrase,  '  intellectual  impotence,'  was  used  by  an  able 
writer  signing  himself  M.  in  the  '  Rambler'  of  September  1859. 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.      11 

that  no  intuitive  judgment  can  carry  with  it  its  own 
evidence ;  but  to  avoid  the  sceptic's  inference  on  man's 
dense  and  utter  ignorance,  they  have  looked  in  other 
directions  for  proof  of  the  trustworthiness  of  certain 
intuitions.  They  have  maintained  accordingly,  that 
various  intuitive  judgments  may  be  proved  legitimate, 
by  means  of  some  prior  self-evident  truth.  As  these 
philosophers  admit  the  sceptic's  premiss,  I  may  be  per- 
mitted to  call  them  semi-sceptics  ;  and  I  maintain  that 
nothing  can  be  more  complete  in  itself,*  than  the  reply, 
put  forth  by  the  more  consistent  sceptic,  against  any 
such  attempt  at  compromise. 

The  semi-sceptic  then  professes  to  prove  the  trust- 
worthiness of  certain  intuitive  judgments,  by  this   or 
that  course  of  argument.     But  this  very  fact, — viz.  that 
he  does  appeal  to  argument, — furnishes  his  opponent 
with  a  triumphant  retort.     How  do  we  believe  that 
reasoning,  in  its  most  rigorous  form,  is  really  valid  ? 
Evidently  by  an  intuitive  judgment.     '  What  can  be 
4  more  illogical,'  then  the  more  consistent  sceptic  may 
proceed,  *  than  your  whole  procedure  ?     You  profess 
to  prove  that  there  are  some  intuitive  judgments  which 
may  be  trusted  ;  and  in  every  step  of  your  proof  you 
assume  that  there  are  some  which  may  be  trusted  : 
for  the  very  profession  of  argument  implies  that  pre- 
cise assumption.' 

So  much  then  on  the  mere  fact  that  arguments  are 
used  against  him  at  all.  Let  us  next  see  the  answers 
which  are  ready  to  his  hand,  in  reply  to  the  particular 
arguments  which  have  been  chiefly  attempted.  Thus 
Des  Cartes  puts  the  very  hypothesis,  which  we  have 
supposed  the  sceptic  to  make  ;  viz.  that  we  may  have 
been  formed  by  some  malignant  being,  who  has  implanted 
mendacious  faculties  for  the  very  purpose  of  deceiving 
us.  Des  Cartes  meets  this  difficulty,  by  setting  himself 
to  prove  the  existence  of  a  Holy  God  ;  and  from  this,  as 
from  a  fundamental  truth,  he  deduces  the  proposition, 


*  I  say  '  in  itself :'  because  of  course  in  a  sceptic,  the  use  of  any  reason- 
ing implies  self-contradiction. 


12  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

that  we  may  most  reasonably  trust  those  faculties  which 
He  has  implanted.*  But  how  obvious  is  the  sceptic's 
reply.  4  Either  you  believe  in  God's  Existence  by  an 
'  immediate  judgment  of  intuition,  or  you  believe  in  it 
c  as  in  a  truth  deduced  from  a  chain  of  reasoning.  In 
'  the  former  case,  you  take  For  granted  the  legitimacy 
4  of  that  intuitive  judgment ;  in  the  latter  case  you  take 
'  for  granted  the  validity  of  reasoning.  In  either  case 
'  you  assume  the  precise  proposition,  which  you  under- 

*  take  to  prove  ;    viz.  that  there  are  trustworthy  judg- 
'  ments  of  intuition/      Here  again  the  argument  is  in 
itself  irresistible. 

Another  mode  of  reasoning  against  the  sceptic  was 
devised  by  the  unhappy  La  Mennais.      He  says :  c  We 

*  may  derive  confidence  in  various  intuitive  judgments, 
'  from  the  fact  that  all  mankind  agree,  arid  cannot  but 
'  agree,  in  forming  them.' 

*  My  authority  for  this  statement  is  Reid.  His  whole  passage  is  worth 
considering. 

'  Des  Cartes  certainly  made  a  false  step  in  this  matter ;  for  having 
suggested  this  doubt  among  others — that,  whatever  evidence  he  might 
have  for  his  consciousness,  his  senses,  his  memory,  or  his  reason,  yet 
possibly  some  malignant  being  had  given  him  those  faculties  on  'purpose  to 
impose  upon  him  ;  and,  therefore,  that  they  are  not  to  be  trusted  without 
a  proper  voucher  ; — to  remove  this  doubt,  he  endeavours  to  prove  the  being 
of  a  Deity  who  is  no  deceiver  ;  whence  he  concludes,  that  the  faculties  He 
had  given  him  are  true  and  worthy  to  be  trusted. 

'It  is  strange  that  so  acute  a  reasoner  did  not  perceive  that  in  this 
reasoning  there  is  evidently  a  begging  of  the  question. 

'  For,  if  our  faculties  be  fallacious,  why  may  they  not  deceive  us  in  this 
reasoning  as  well  as  in  others  ?  and,  if  they  are  to  be  trusted  in  this 
instance  without  a  voucher,  why  not  in  others  ? 

1  Every  kind  of  reasoning  for  the  veracity  of  our  faculties,  amounts  to 
no  more  than  taking  their  own  testimony  for  their  veracity  ;  and  this  we 
must  do  implicitly,  until  God  gives  us  new  faculties  to  sit  in  judgment  upon 
the  old.  And  the  reason  why  Des  Cartes  satisfied  himself  with  so  weak  an 
argument  for  the  truth  of  his  faculties,  most  probably  was,  that  he  never 
seriously  doubted  of  it. 

'  If  any  truth  can  be  said  to  be  prior  to  all  others  in  the  order  of  nature, 
this  seems  to  have  the  best  claim;  because,  in  every  instance  of  assent, 
whether  upon  intuitive,  demonstrative,  or  probable  evidence,  the  truth  of 
our  faculties  is  taken  for  granted,  and  is,  as  it  were,  one  of  the  premisses  on 
which  our  assent  is  grounded.  How  then  come  we  to  be  assured  of  this 
fundamental  truth,  on  which  all  others  rest  ?  Perhaps  evidence,  as  in  many 
other  respects  it  resembles  light,  so  in  this  also — that,  as  light,  which  is 
the  discoverer  of  all  visible  objects,  discovers  itself  at  the  same  time,  so 
evidence,  which  is  the  voucher  of  all  truth,  vouches  for  itself  at  the  same 
time. 

'  This  however  is  certain,  that  such  is  the  constitution  of  the  human 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.       13 

But  the  sceptic's  answer  here  is  in  itself  no  less 
triumphant  than  in  the  former  cases.  4  Unless  you  as- 
4  sume  that  certain  intuitive  judgments  may  be  trusted, 
6  you  can  have  no  knowledge  whatever  of  the  fact  that 
'  men  do  agree  in  trusting  them  :  you  cannot  under- 
'  stand  the  very  meaning  of  a  single  sentence  which  is 
4  uttered  by  your  fellow-men  ;  nay,  you  cannot  so  much 
4  as  apprehend  its  external  bodily  sound.  I  say,  you 
'  cannot  so  much  as  apprehend  the  very  sound,  of  which 
c  a  spoken  sentence  is  composed,  unless  you  assume 
4  that  certain  intuitive  judgments  may  be  trusted.  You 
*  are  hearing  at  this  moment  the  last  word  of  the  sen- 
4  tence  ;  but  how  do  you  know  the  other  words  of  which 
4  it  consists  ?  Simply  by  remembering  them  :  either 
4  then  you  must  trust  that  kind  of  intuitive  judgment 
4  which  we  call  an  act  of  memory,  or  else  you  cannot 
'  apprehend  the  very  sound  of  which  a  spoken  sentence 
4  is  composed.  And  as  for  the  meaning  of  such  sentence, 
4  it  is  still  more  manifest  that  various  exercises  of  me- 


mind,  that  evidence,  discerned  by  us,  forces  a  corresponding  degree  of  assent. 
And  a  man  who  perfectly  understood  a  just  syllogism,  without  believing 
that  the  conclusion  follows  from  the  premisses,  would  be  a  greater  monster 
than  a  man  born  without  hands  or  feet. 

'  We  are  born  under  a  necessity  of  trusting  to  our  reasoning  and  judging 
powers  ;  and  a  real  belief  of  their  being  fallacious  cannot  be  maintained  for 
any  considerable  time  by  the  greatest  sceptic,  because  it  is  doing  violence 
to  our  constitution.  It  is  like  a  man's  walking  upon  his  hands  :  a  feat  which 
some  men,  upon  occasion,  can  exhibit ;  but  no  man  ever  made  a  long 
journey  in  this  manner.  Cease  to  admire  his  dexterity,  and  he  will,  like 
other  men,  betake  himself  to  his  legs.' — Reid's  Inquiry,  Essay  vi.  Chap.  v. 

Gioberti  quotes  the  following  passage  from  Jouffroy,  which  may  also  be 
cited  in  illustration : 

1  Quand  une  faculte  vient  a  s'appliquer  et  a  nous  donner  la  notion  qui 
lui  est  propre,  il  est  evident  que  nous  ne  croyons  et  ne  pouvons  croire  a  la 
verite  de  cette  notion,  qu'a  une  premiere  condition  ;  c'est  que  nous  avons 

foi  a  la  veracite  native  de  cette  faculte car  pour  peu  que  nous  en 

doutions,  il  ii'y  a  plus  de  verite,  plus  de  croyance,  possible  pour  nous.  Et 
cependant  rien  ne  prouve,  rien  ne  peut  prouver,  cette  veracite  native  de 

DOS  facultes Done,  messieurs,  le  principe  de  tout  certitude  et  de 

toute  croyance  est  d'abord  un  acte  de  foi  aveugle  en  la  veracite  naturelle 
de  nos  facultes.' — Cours  de  Droit  Naturel. 

I  find  this  passage  quoted  in  M.  Alary' s  French  translation  of  Gioberti's 
"  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  vol.  ii.  note  33,  p.  362."  I  suppose  I  need 
hardly  add,  that  I  am  very  far  from  agreeing  with  it.  I  maintain,  as  will 
be  seen,  that  the  '  natural  veracity  of  our  faculties'  is  a  truth,  in  no  way 
resting  upon  '  blind  faith,'  but  brought  home  to  us  with  perfect  evidence  by 
a  most  clear  light. 


14  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

4  mory  are  requisite,  in  order  that  you  may  ever  so 
'  distantly  guess  it.' 

5.  It  is  very  curious  to  see  how  completely  a  sceptic 
overreaches  himself,  if  he  set  himself  thus  frankly  and 
energetically  to  carry  out  his  principles.  For  the 
sceptic's  argument,  above  stated,  lands  us  in  this  con- 
clusion:— that  we  cannot  begin  listening  to  his  objec- 
tions, we  cannot  so  much  as  know  that  there  is  such 
a  doctrine  as  scepticism  in  the  world,  until  we  have 
first  committed  ourselves  to  its  denial;  until  we  have 
taken  for  granted  that  precise  thesis,  which  scepticism 
rejects.  Unless  I  can  trust  my  various  acts  of  memory, 
I  don't  even  know  what  the  sceptic  says,  much  less  what 
he  means.  But  if  I  can  trust  these  acts  of  memory,  then 
certain  intuitive  judgments  may  with  reason  be  con- 
fidently formed  ;  which  is  the  very  point  at  issue 
between  him  and  myself. 

Here  then  we  fully  see  the  truth  of  what  sound 
philosophers  continually  say ;  viz.  that  to  attempt  argu- 
ment against  scepticism  is  a  simple  absurdity.  I  cannot 
know  what  the  sceptic  says,  until  I  have  elicited  con- 
fidently various  acts  of  memory ;  i.e.  have  trusted  one 
class  of  intuitive  judgments :  and  I  cannot  argue  against 
what  he  says,  until  I  have  trusted  another.  For  to 
argue  implies  a  belief  in  the  validity  of  those  processes 
of  reasoning  which  I  adduce ;  and  what  can  such  a  belief 
possibly  be,  except  one  or  more  intuitive  judgments  ? 

Yet  let  this  be  most  carefully  observed.  While  on 
the  one  hand  it  is  a  simple  absurdity  to  argue  against 
scepticism,  on  the  other  hand  to  hold  sceptical  opinions 
in  their  full  consistency,  is  not  less  than  physically 
impossible.  As  a  first  proof  of  this  take  the  following. 
I  have  just  said,  that  until  we  have  committed  ourselves 
to  anti- sceptical  opinions,  we  cannot  even  listen  to  the 
arguments  brought  against  them.  The  converse  is 
equally  true.  The  sceptic  complains  that  men  in 
general  most  unreasonably  trust  their  intuitive  judg- 
ments. Now  consider  this  most  noteworthy  circum- 
stance :  he  cannot  know,  or  have  the  most  distant  idea, 
that  the  fact  is  so,  until  he  has  himself  followed  their 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.       15 

example;  until  he  has  trusted  at  least  one  class  of 
intuitive  judgments,  viz.  various  acts  of  memory. 
Unless  he  first  trust  those  acts,  he  cannot  so  much 
as  guess  at  the  opinion  of  his  fellow-men  on  any  single 
particular  (see  n.  4).  Now  I  ask,  has  he  really  the 
physical  power  of  doubting  in  many  cases  what  their 
opinion  is? 

For  another  instance,  the  story  told  of  Pyrrho  is 
well  known.  He  was  lecturing  to  his  disciples,  it  is 
said,  on  the  inability  of  our  faculties  to  apprehend 
truth  ;  when  a  waggon  suddenly  came  rushing  down 
the  hill,  and  the  sceptical  philosopher  was  the  first  who 
took  to  flight.  We  may  ask, — had  he  so  much  as  the 
physical  power  at  that  moment,  really  to  distrust  that 
faculty  of  memory,  through  which  alone  he  had  the 
means  of  so  much  as  guessing,  that  he  was  in  any 
danger  at  all  ?  evidently  not.  So  in  like  manner,  let 
any  one  of  us  try  to  regard  it  as  really  doubtful,  whether 
he  was  experiencing  a  minute  ago  what  his  memory 
declared  him  to  have  been  experiencing ; —  let  any  one 
try  to  do  this,  and  he  will  see  readily  the  truth  of  my 
remark,  that  the  task  is  physically  impossible.  He  can 
no  more  compel  himself  really  to  doubt  that  he  was  ex- 
periencing those  sensations  or  those  thoughts  which  he 
distinctly  remembers, — in  other  words,  he  can  no  more 
prevent  himself  from  holding  a  certain  intuitive  judg- 
ment with  the  most  undoubting  confidence, — than  he 
can  raise  himself  into  the  air  and  fly  to  the  top  of  a  tree. 

6.  We  have  arrived,  then,  at  two  vitally  important 
results.  (1.)  If  we  once  admit  the  sceptic's  premiss, 
— viz.  that  no  intuitive  judgment  can  carry  with  it  its 
own  evidence, — we  are  most  irresistibly  brought  to  his 
conclusion,  that  no  such  judgments  are  trustworthy  at 
all.  (2.)  This  conclusion  is  such,  that  no  human  being 
has  so  much  as  the  physical  power  really  to  believe  it.  I 
would  say  this  to  the  professing  sceptic : — take  the  dearest 
and  oldest  friend  you  have  in  the  world ;  either  maintain 
that  you  have  not  the  means  even  of  guessing  that  you 
ever  saw  him  before  in  your  life,  or  else  admit  that 
your  whole  scheme  is  a  delusion  and  a  mockery. 


16  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

7.  At  the  same  time  I  fully  admit,  that  the  sceptic's 
doubts  need  not,  in  consistency,  extend  to  what  I  have 
called  (n.  1)  Judgments  of  Consciousness.    Such  judg- 
ments, in  fact,  amount  to  no  more  than  this;    "my 
present  feeling  is  what  I  now  feel  it  to  be:''  and  the 
truth  of  such  judgments  as  these  would  not  certainly 
be  questioned,  by  the  most  consistent  advocate  (if  such 
a  person  could  be  found)  of  philosophical  scepticism. 
Put  even  the  impossible  case  supposed  by  Des  Cartes ; 
put  the  case,  that  I  had  been  created  by  some  malignant 
being,  who  has  given  me  mendacious  faculties  for  the 
very  purpose  of  deceiving  me.     Well :    even   such   a 
being  as  this  could  not   make  me  imagine,  that  my 
present  feeling  is  not  what  I  now  feel  it  to  be. 

We  need  not,  however,  enlarge  on  this  proposition : 
there  are  two  reasons  why  we  need  not  do  so.  Firstly, 
it  is  one  of  those  propositions,  which  are  in  themselves  so 
clear,  that  their  luminousness  is  obscured,  not  intensified, 
by  amplification  and  expansion.  Secondly,  so  far  is 
this  proposition  from  being  essential  to  my  argument, 
that,  on  the  contrary,  my  argument  would  be  even  (if 
possible)  increased  in  strength,  were  I  able  to  deny  it. 
My  argument,  I  say,  would  be  even  increased  in  strength, 
were  I  able  to  affirm,  that  the  sceptic  is  called  upon  by 
his  principles  to  deny  the  facts  of  actually  present 
consciousness.  He  is  not,  however,  so  called  upon  ; 
and  it  may  suffice,  once  for  all,  thus  to  have  fairly 
stated  what  is  certainly  undeniable. 

8.  I  have  been  led  thus  to  enlarge  on  the  sceptical 
position,  for  this  reason  among  others.     There  are  two 
false  principles,  in  extreme  antagonism  to  each  other, 
against  which  the  Catholic  philosopher  has  specially  to 
guard ;  because  they  are  far  more  prominent  and  pervasive, 
than  any  other  philosophical  errors  which  can  be  named. 
They  are  the  Scylla  and  Charybdis,  between  which  the 
bark  of  true  Philosophy  must  direct  its  course.     The 
one  of  these  is  Scepticism,  the  other  Rationalism.     But 
there  is  this  most  remarkable  difference  between  the 
two  errors.     Rationalism  can  be  most  abundantly  re- 
futed on  its  own  chosen  ground, —  the  ground  of  Reason. 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  P1UNCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.     17 

If  the  orthodox  combatant  be  at  all  equally  matched 
with  the  rationalist,  the  latter's  signal  overthrow  is 
quite  certain.  But  the  case  is  very  different,  where 
scepticism  is  our  opponent ;  for  when  we  have  to  assail 
it,  our  very  weapons  of  offence  fall  from  our  paralyzed 
hands.  We  set  out  to  refute  it  on  grounds  of  Reason  : 
but  we  are  at  once  reminded,  that  we  are  simply  begging 
the  question  at  issue ;  and  that  the  very  point  to  be 
determined  is,  c  Can  Reason  be  legitimately  trusted?' 

Scepticism,  then,  is  a  far  more  destructive  and 
desolating  error,  even  than  its  extreme  opposite.  It 
represents  all  knowledge  of  Truth,  great  or  little,  as 
simply  impossible  ;  it  corrupts  Philosophy  at  its  very 
source.  Our  very  first  philosophical  enterprise  must 
be  the  overthrow  of  that  error,  which  (once  admitted) 
would  render  all  thought  and  all  knowledge  impossible. 

Yet,  against  such  a  doctrine,  or  rather  such  a 
negation  of  all  possible  doctrine,  what  is  to  be  done  ? 
Reason  against  it  we  can  not;  for  to  reason  (as  the 
more  consistent  sceptic  urges)  is  to  assume  the  whole 
question  at  issue.  It  will  be  found  however  that  we 
can  accomplish,  what  will  be  amply  sufficient  in  practice 
to  overthrow  the  error. 

Firstly,  we,  who  are  not  sceptics  in  any  sense, — we, 
who  deny  the  sceptic's  premiss  as  well  as  his  conclusion, 
— may  communicate  with  each  other,  and  make  our 
combined  observation  on  the  enemy.  We  remark  to 
each  other,  that  it  is  physically  impossible  for  any 
human  being  to  carry  out  consistently  the  sceptical 
principle ;  and  that  every  professing  sceptic  is  (by 
consequence)  in  a  simply  self-contradictory  position. 

Secondly,  there  are  great  numbers  of  thinking  men, 
who  are  more  or  less  deeply  infected  with  the  sceptical 
poison, — some  indeed  to  a  very  considerable  extent. — 
who  yet  by  no  means  carry  their  principles  to  the 
length  of  distrusting  their  reasoning  faculty.  Indeed, 
total  distrust  of  the  reasoning  faculty,  is  one  of  those 
sceptical  demonstrations  which  are  not  less  than  phy- 
sically impossible.  Those  men  therefore,  who  will 


18  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

admit  reasoning  at  all,  may  be  addressed  by  means  of 
reasoning.  We  can  bring  them  face  to  face  with  the 
full  meaning  of  their  position.  We  can  labour  at 
oringing  home  to  their  reason,  and  again  to  their 
imagination,  the  extent  of  that  pitiable  and  debasing 
ignorance,  which  is  the  only  consistent  result  attainable 
in  that  position.  We  can  deter  them  from  unwarily 
acquiescing  in  some  among  the  less  monstrous 
exhibitions  of  the  sceptical  principle,  by  showing  them 
what  that  principle  is,  in  its  only  full  and  consistent 
development. 

Thirdly,  we  can  trace  back  this  whole  principle  to 
the  primary  argumentative  source  from  which  it  results. 
This  I  consider  that  wre  have  already  done  in  the 
present  Section.  We  have  taken  one  particular  pre- 
miss; viz.  '  it  is  impossible  that  any  intuitive  judgment 
4  can  carry  with  it  its  own  evidence  of  truth : '  and  we 
have  shown,  that  this  premiss  leads  by  legitimate  con- 
sequence to  the  full-length  sceptical  whole.  The 
sceptical  premiss,  I  say,  leads  to  the  sceptical  conclusion, 
by  logic  so  absolutely  clear  and  irresistible,  that  no  one, 
who  admits  the  validity  of  reasoning  at  all,  can  possibly 
deny  the  necessary  connexion  of  the  two. 

9.  We  may  very  suitably,  therefore,  designate  the  con- 
tradictory of  this  premiss,  as  the  Principle  of  Certitude. 
In  other  words,  the  Principle  of  Certitude  will  be  this 
proposition :  c  it  is  fully  possible  that  intuitive  judgments 
'  may  carry  with  them  their  own  evidence  of  truth.' 
And  this  proposition  may  well  be  called  the  Principle 
of  Certitude  ;  because,  unless  we  confidently  maintain  it, 
it  will  be  impossible  consistently  to  recognise  the 
certainty  (or  even  approximation  to  certainty)  of  any 
one  thing,  beyond  our  actually  present  experience.  If 
this  principle  were  untrue,  our  knowledge  would  be 
less  than  that  of  the  brutes ;  it  would  be  strictly  con- 
fined to  the  mind's  reflection  at  each  instant  on  its  own 
existing  consciousness.  We  could  not  compare  e.g. 
our  present  consciousness  with  our  past ;  for  unless  the 
Principle  of  Certitude  were  true,  we  could  not  even 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.     19 

guess  what  our  past  consciousness  lias  been.  Much  less, 
as  is  evident,  could  we  even  contemplate  comparing  our 
own  consciousness  with  that  of  others. 

To  ask  for  proof  of  this  principle,  is  manifestly 
illogical.  If  certain  intuitions  carry  with  them  their 
own  evidence  of  truth,  that  evidence  is  our  reasonable 
ground  for  accepting  them  as  true.  We  may  then 
proceed  to  reflect  on  the  fact,  that  we  do  thus  legiti- 
mately hold  various  intuitive  judgments  on  their  own 
evidence  ;  and  this  reflection  is  in  itself  an  assertion  of 
the  principle  before  us.  The  only  further  question, 
which  you  can  reasonably  ask,  is  4  what  is  the  nature  of 

*  that  evidence  on  which  these  intuitions  rest?'  and  of 
that  we  will  expressly  speak  before  we  close  the  Section. 

This  then  is  our  direct  and  appropriate  proof:  yet  we 
are  able  (as  has  been  seen)  to  give,  over  and  above,  an 
indirect  demonstration  of  our  principle,  founded  on  the 
manifestly  false  consequences  which  would  result  from 
its  denial.  We  can  give  such  a  demonstration,  I  say,  to 
all  who  admit  that  there  can  be  such  a  thing  in  rerum 
naturd  as  a  demonstration.  I  would  reply  as  follows 
to  the  sceptic.  If  you  deny  the  legitimacy  of  reasoning, 
you  commit  a  simple  absurdity  in  asking  for  a  proof  at 
all.  But  if  you  admit  the  validity  of  proof  at  all,  I  offer 
you  the  strongest  possible  proof  of  our  principle,  in  the 
shape  of  a  '  reductio  ad  absurdum.'  If  our  principle  be 
not  true,  you  have  no  ground  for  trusting  e.g.  the 
simplest  and  most  obvious  act  of  memory  ;  you  have 
no  ground  for  knowing,  that  you  ever  saw  in  your  life 
that  person,  who  is  your  dearest  and  most  intimate 
friend.  But  this  is  a  conclusion  so  undeniajbly  false, 
that  no  human  being  has  so  much  as  the  physical  power 
of  believing  it.  Hence  the  premiss,  from  which  the  con- 
clusion resulted,  is  also  false  ;  and  our  principle,  being 
the  contradictory  of  that  premiss,  is  undeniably  true. 

10.  It  may  plausibly  be  objected  then  :  '  if  no  one 

*  has  the  physical  power  of  consistently  questioning  the 
4  Principle  of  Certitude,  where  is  the  importance  of  thus 
1  laboriously  presenting  and  illustrating  it?'  I  reply,  it 
is  true  indeed  that  no  human  being  can  consistently 


20  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

question  it ;  i.  e.  can  really  believe  those  propositions, 
which  inevitably  result  from  its  denial.  Still,  though  this 
be  so,  many  philosophers  have  denied  it  partially  and 
inconsistently:  i.e.  they  have  denied  it  in  itself,  though 
they  have  refrained  from  carrying  that  denial  to  its 
legitimate  consequences.  And  as  the  first  instance  of 
my  statement,  strangely  enough,  I  can  cite  one  among 
the  most  eminent  and  most  sober  English  philosophers 
of  the  present  day  —  Mr.  Mansel. 

Take  for  instance  the  following  passage  from  his 
"Prolegomena  Logica:" — 

"  It  may  be  indeed,  that  the  condition  of  possible  thought  cor- 
respond to  conditions  of  possible  being ;  that  what  is  to  us  incon- 
ceivable is  in  itself  non-existent.  But  of  this,  from  the  nature  of 
the  case,  it  is  impossible  to  have  any  evidence.  If  man  as  a  thinker 
is  subject  to  necessary  laws,  he  cannot  examine  the  absolute 
validity  of  the  laws  themselves,  except  by  assuming  the  whole 
question  at  issue ;  for  such  examination  must  itself  be  conducted 
in  subordination  to  the  same  conditions.  Whatever  weakness, 
therefore,  there  may  be  in  the  object  of  criticism,  the  same  must 
necessarily  affect  the  critical  process  itself. 

"  We  may  indeed  believe,  and  ought  to  believe,  that  the  powers 
which  our  Creator  has  bestowed  upon  us  are  not  given  as  the  instru- 
ments of  deception.  We  may  believe,  and  ought  to  believe,  that, 
intellectually  no  less  than  morally,  the  present  life  is  a  state  of 
discipline  and  preparation  for  another ;  and  that  the  portion  of 
knowledge  which  our  limited  faculties  are  permitted  to  attain  to 
here  may,  indeed,  in  the  eyes  of  a  higher  Intelligence,  be  but 
partial  truth,  but  cannot  be  absolute  falsehood.  But  in  believing 
thus,  we  desert  the  evidence  of  Reason  to  rest  on  that  of  Faith  ;  and 
of  the  principles  on  which  Reason  itself  depends,  it  is  obviously  impos- 
sible to  have  any  other  guarantee. 

"But  such  a  faith,  however  well  founded,  has  but  a  regulative 
and  practical,  not  a  speculative,  application.  It  bids  us  rest 
content  within  the  limits  which  have  been  assigned  to  us:  it 
cannot  enable  us  to  overleap  them,  or  to  exalt  to  a  more  absolute 
character  the  conclusions  obtained  by  finite  thinkers  concerning 
finite  objects  of  thought.  For  the  same  condition,  which  dis- 
qualifies us  from  criticising  the  laws  of  thought,  must  also  deprive 
us  of  the  power  of  ascertaining,  how  much  of  the  results  of  those 
laws  is  true  in  itself,  and  how  much  is  relative  and  dependent  upon 
the  particular  bodily  or  mental  constitution  of  man  during  the  present 

v'lfis* 

*  The  italics  are  not  Mr.  MansePs. 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    21 

Considerable  question  has  been  raised  as  to  Mr. 
Hansel's  meaning  here :  but  the  more  I  consider  the 
passage,  the  clearer  it  appears  to  me  that  Mr.  Mansel, 
in  each  separate  paragraph,  states  or  implies  a  denial 
of  what  we  have  called  the  '  Principle  of  Certitude.' 

In  the  first  paragraph  he  takes  for  granted,  what  all 
of  course  admit ;  the  existence  of  certain  '  necessary 
laws '  to  which  '  man  as  a  thinker  is  subject.'  There 
cannot  be  a  more  undoubted  instance  of  such  laws,  than 
our  firm  conviction,  that  the  conclusion  of  a  syllogism 
really  follows  from  its  premisses.  Now  every  one,  who 
reads  the  first  paragraph  above  quoted,  will  recognise 
in  it  the  proposition,  that  '  it  is  impossible  to  have  any 
evidence '  as  to  '  the  absolute  validity '  of  those  laws. 
'It  is  impossible  to  examine  such  validity,  except  by 
assuming  the  whole  question;' — this  is  expressly  stated. 
'  It  is  impossible  to  have  any  evidence  of  such  validity 
without  examination,' — this  is  manifestly  implied  :  for, 
if  it  were  admitted  as  possible  that  there  could  be  such 
evidence,  the  whole  paragraph  would  become  totally 
unmeaning.  'We  are  so  constituted,'  Mr.  Mansel  im- 
plies, '  that  we  cannot  help  regarding  the  conclusion  of 
a  syllogism  as  resulting  from  the  premisses ;  but 
whether  it  really  do  so  result, —  of  this  "from  the 
nature  of  the  case  it  is  impossible  to  have  any  evi- 
dence.'" But  certainly  no  other  intuitive  judgment 
carries  with  it  stronger  evidence  of  truth,  than  does 
this  judgment,  that  syllogistic  reasoning  is  cogent. 
Hence,  '  from  the  nature  of  the  case  it  is  impossible,' 
according  to  our  author,  c  that  any  intuitive  judgment 
can  carry  with  it  its  own  evidence  of  truth.' 

The  second  paragraph  maintains  that  "  the  portion 
of  knowledge,  which  our  faculties  are  permitted  to  attain, 
cannot  be  absolute  falsehood :"  yet '  even  this  moderate 
degree  of  certainty,'  he  adds,  'is  not  attainable  by  Reason ; 
we  can  have  no  "  other  guarantee"  for  it  than  "  faith." 
Now  it  would  carry  us  much  too  far,  to  consider  the 
philosophical  value  of  this  most  extraordinary  state- 
ment, that  Faith  is  our  guarantee  for  the  legitimacy  of 


22  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Reason  :  *  and  our  immediate  question  is  not  the  value 
but  the  meaning  of  Mr.  Hansel's  theory.  And  of  its 
meaning  there  can  surely  be  no  doubt.  If  it  be  possi- 
ble that  intuitive  judgments  may  carry  with  them  their 
own  evidence  of  truth,  it  is  possible  to  have  some  other 
guarantee,  besides  Faith,  of  'the  principles  on  which 
Eeason  depends/  But  Mr.  Manscl  considers  it  "ob- 
viously impossible  to  have  any  other  guarantee."  Mr. 
Mansel  therefore  considers  it  obviously  impossible,  that 
intuitive  judgments  can  carry  with  them  their  own 
evidence  of  truth.  And  this  is  the  precise  opinion, 
which  I  ascribe  to  him. 

I  should  add  here,  however,  that  when  Mr.  Mansel 
speaks  of  c  Faith,'  he  does  not  contemplate  exclusively 
a  special  and  authenticated  Revelation  :  he  includes 
under  the  phrase  (as  I  have  good  reason  to  believe) 
Faith  in  that  primitive  Revelation,  on  God's  Existence 
and  Attributes,  which  was  made  to  man  at  his  creation, 
and  which  is  still  continued  throughout  the  world. 
This  does  not  in  the  least  affect  my  argument ;  but  it 
is  necessary  to  the  appreciation  of  the  author's  meaning. 

Lastly,  the  third  paragraph  above  quoted  refers 
again  to  the  '  laws  of  thought ; '  including  of  course  our 
belief,  that  the  conclusion  of  a  syllogism  really  follows 
from  the  premisses.  "  We  have  no  power  of  ascertain- 
ing," he  says,  "how  much  of  the  result  of  those  laws 
is  true  in  itself,  and  how  much  is  dependent "  on  our 
natural  "  constitution  "  of  body  or  mind.  Mr.  Mansel 
holds  then,  that  we  have  no  power  of  ascertaining 
whether  the  conclusion  of  a  syllogism  do  really  follow 
from  its  premisses  :  or  whether  our  belief  that  it  does 
so,  is  simply  "  dependent  on  our  particular  bodily  or 
mental  constitution." 

I  really  cannot  see  any  opening  for  doubt,  as  to  Mr. 
Mansel's  meaning  ;  and  in  the  earlier  part  of  this  Section 

*  I  may  briefly  however  ask,  what  is  an  act  of  Divine  Faith,  except  a 
certain  exercise  of  Reason  ;  viz.  the  believing  of  this  or  that  truth  on  God's 
Word  ?  If  we  have  no  independent  ground  for  trusting  our  Reason,  what 
sufficient  ground  can  there  possibly  be  for  our  act  of  Faith  ? 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    23 

I  have  said  (I  trust)  what  is  abundantly  sufficient  to 
refute  his  doctrine.  Here,  however,  I  may  be  allowed 
briefly  to  state  what  that  doctrine  really  comes  to,  and 
submit  it  to  his  own  maturer  judgment.  Mr.  Hansel's 
doctrine  then  is  in  fact  this.  '  Unless  we  lived  under  a 
'  Divine  Revelation,  we  could  not  even  guess,  whether 
'the  conclusion  of  a  syllogism  really  results  from  its 
'  premisses  ;  or  whether  on  the  other  hand  our  necessary 
'  belief  tlisit  it  does  so,  is  a  mere  delusion,  resulting  from 
'our  particular  mental  constitution.  Since,  however, 
'we  do  enjoy  the  light  of  Divine  Revelation,  we  know 
'  not  indeed  that  this  belief  is  precisely  true,  but  that 
c  it  cannot  be  absolutely  and  totally  false/ 

Again  surely,  as  I  just  now  incidentally  urged, 
those  intuitive  judgments  which  we  call  acts  of  memory, 
cannot  possibly  be  alleged  to  have  greater  means  of 
carrying  with  them  their  own  evidence  of  truth,  than 
have  those  intuitive  judgments,  whereby  we  recognise 
the  validity  of  reasoning.  Indeed  they  apparently  fall 
under  Mr.  Mansel's  very  words  :  for  if  I  was  cold 
some  short  time  ago,  then  my  present  impression  of 
/laving  then  been  cold,  is  a  c  necessary  law,'  to  which 
'  as  a  thinker  I  am  subject.'  According  to  Mr.  Mansel 
then,  were  it  not  for  Revelation,  my  memory  would  give 
me  no  ground  for  so  much  as  guessing  that  I  was  cold 
a  short  time  ago  :  '  nay  even  with  the  light  of  Reve- 
'  lation,'  according  to  him,  '  I  cannot  know  for  certain 
'  that  I  was  cold  a  short  time  ago  ;  but  only  that  this 
4  belief  of  mine  is  not  absolutely  and  totally  false.' 

I  would  ask  Mr.  Mansel  —  with  most  sincere  re- 
spect, and  with  great  admiration  of  his  many  high  philo- 
sophical gifts, — whether  in  this  shape  he  could  himself 
accept  his  own  theory?* 

*•  The  greater  part  of  Mr.  Hansel's  passage,  above  quoted,  occurs  agaiu 
in  the  author's  Bampton  Lectures  (p.  145,  6.)  It  will  be  of  some  value 
then,  towards  ascertaining  his  meaning,  if  we  say  a  few  words  on  the 
argument  of  those  lectures. 

Their  main  object  is  to  recommend  the  conclusion,  that  we  cannot 
possess  any  direct  knowledge  on  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute.  Now  my 
present  purpose  leads  me  to  consider,  not  how  far  this  proposition  is  true, 
but  what  is  the  argument  by  which  the  author  supports  it.  Let  us  enter 
on  this  question.  There  are  two  totally  distinct  syllogisms,  either  of  which 


24  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

A  further  reason  for  thinking  that  I  have  correctly 
seized  Mr.  Hansel's  meaning,  will  be  the  effect  produced 
by  his  writings  on  his  most  unreserved  admirers.  I  may 
refer,  in  illustration  of  this,  to  an  essay,  which  un- 
doubtedly displays  considerable  earnestness  and  ability. 
It  is  a  most  eulogistic  review  of  Mr.  Mansel's  Bampton 
Lectures,  which  appeared  in  the  c  Guardian '  newspaper 
of  Dec.  7,  1859.  No  words  can  possibly  be  more  ex- 
plicit than  the  following,  which  I  take  from  that  Essay. 

"  We  look  for  the  foundation  and  for  the  limit  of  our  belief  in 
our  own  faculties)  to  the  deep-seated  instinct  which  tells  us  that  God 
cannot  deceive.  Reason  cannot  guarantee  itself.  .  .  .  Surely  the 
religious  instinct,  which  bids  us  trust  in  God,  is  the  one  primary 
premiss  of  all  truths.  Neither  sense  nor  reason  can  warrant  them- 
selves :  we  believe  them,  because  we  believe  that  God  gave  them  and 
that  in  giving  them  He  must  needs  have  given  us  Truth/' 

Strange  indeed  that  this  writer  never  asked  himself 
the  question, —  how  can  we  know  that  we  have  a 
Creator,  or  that  that  Creator  is  Veracious,  except 
through  the  highest  and  choicest  acts  of  Reason  ?  If 
the  writer  considers  that  we  know  these  great  truths 
immediately,  he  considers,  in  other  words,  that  we  know 
them  through  certain  intuitive  judgments :  i.e.  through 
certain  momentous  acts  of  Reason,  appertaining  to  the 
class  which  we  call  'intuitions.'  If  he  holds  that  we 
know  these  truths  by  inference,  he  holds  that  we  know 
them  by  means  (1)  of  certain  intuitive  judgments, 
and  (2)  of  a  certain  process  of  inference,  based  upon 
those  judgments.  In  either  case  then,  we  know  these 

would  land  us  in  the  desired  conclusion  :  and  it  is  of  great  importance  that 
we  shall  precisely  understand,  which  of  these  two  syllogisms  is  the  one 
which  Mr.  Mansel  adopts. 

SYLLOGISM  I. 

'  Major  Premiss.     Whatever  Reason  really  declares  is  really  certain. 

'Minor  Premiss.  But  Reason  really  declares,  that  we  have  no  direct 
'  knowledge  of  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute. 

'  Conclusion.  Hence  it  is  certain,  that  we  have  no  direct  knowledge  of 
*  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute.' 

SYLLOGISM  II. 

'  Major  Premiss.  No  declaration  of  Reason  suffices  to  give  us  certain 
1  knowledge ;  (because  no  such  declaration  can  carry  with  it  its  own 
'  evidence  of  truth.) 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    25 

truths  through  the  highest  and  choicest  acts  of  Reason  ; 
and  cannot  possibly  know  them  in  any  other  way. 
But  if  Reason  cannot  'guarantee  itself,'  what  'guarantee* 
exists,  or  can  possibly  exist,  for  those  acts  of  Reason, 
which  give  us  our  knowledge  of  God's  Existence  and 
Veracity  ?  From  such  principles  as  these,  the  necessary 
consequence  is  nothing  less  than  scepticism,  the  most 
bewildering  and  the  most  desolating,  'Reason  cannot 
guarantee  itself;'  hence  there  is  no  possible  guarantee 
for  the  truth  of  Reason's  declaration,  that  there  exists  a 
Veracious  Creator.  But  this  particular  declaration  of 
Reason  is  c  the  one  primary  premiss  of  all  truths ;'  hence, 
according  to  our  reviewer,  '  there  is  no  possible  guaran- 
tee '  for  '  the  one  primary  premiss  of  all  truths.'  If  all 
truths  be  derived  from  one  primary  premiss, —  and  if,  for 
the  truth  of  that  premiss,  there  can  be  no  possible  gua- 
rantee,— the  only  inference  is,  that  we  have  no  reason- 
able ground  whatever  for  believing  any  thing  at  all. 

11.  I  will  take  my  second  instance,  from  a  school  of 
philosophy  the  most  opposed  to  Mr.  Mansel, — the  so- 
called  philosophy  of  experience:  a  school,  of  which 
perhaps  Mr.  Stuart  Mill  may  be  cited  as  the  worthiest 
English  representative.  These  philosophers  claim  as 
their  special  characteristic,  that  they  build  wholly  upon 
experience ;  '  and  this,'  they  proceed  to  say, '  is  the  only 
'  sure  basis  of  philosophy  :  for  once  abandon  the  solid 
'ground  of  experience,  each  man  will  at  every  turn 
'  mistake  his  own  personal  fancies  and  prepossessions 
'for  absolute  truth.' 

1  Minor  Premiss.  But  whatever  direct  knowledge  is  professed  of  the 
'  Infinite  and  the  Absolute,  is  merely  the  declaration  of  Reason. 

'  Conclusion.  Hence  we  do  not  really  possess  any  certain  knowledge  of 
1  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute.' 

These  two  syllogisms,  I  have  said,  are  totally  distinct ;  but  indeed,  as 
regards  the  question  before  us,  they  are  absolutely  contradictory.  The 
Major  Premiss  of  the  second  expressly  denies,  that  which  the  Major  Premiss 
of  the  first  as  expressly  affirms ;  viz.  that  a  real  declaration  of  Reason  is 
certainly  true.  Now  plainly,  in  regard  to  the  passage  quoted  in  the  text, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  which  of  the  above  syllogisms  it  is  intended  to  sup- 
port. It  is  absolutely  impossible,  by  any  stretch  of  ingenuity,  to  adduce  it 
in  confirmation  of  the  first  syllogism :  for  it  has  not  the  remotest  tendency 
to  support  the  Minor,  and  it  has  a  very  obvious  tendency  to  overthrow  the 
Major.  On  the  other  hand,  the  tendency  of  the  whole  passage  (if  its 
argument  were  admitted)  towards  establishing  the  Major  of  the  second 


26  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

I  would  ask  of  these  philosophers,  do  they  mean  by 
'  experience '  the  experience  of  the  present  moment, 
or  do  they  include  past  experience  also  ?  If  they  say 
the  former,  I  reply  it  is  obviously  false  that  they  do 
in  any  sense  build  their  philosophy  wholly,  or  chiefly, 
on  experience.  But  if  they  answer  (as  they  most 
certainty  will)  that  they  do  include  past  experience  as 
well  as  present,  then  again  I  deny  their  allegation,  that 
they  build  their  philosophy  wholly  on  experience  ;  and 
I  proceed  thus  to  argue  against  them,  on  behalf  of  my 
denial. 

You  make  use  of  your  own  past  experience, — you 
make  use  of  other  men's  experience, — as  part  of  the 
foundation  on  which  you  build.  How  can  you  even 
guess  what  your  past  experience  has  been  ?  By 
trusting  memory.  But  how  do  you  prove  that  those 
various  intuitive  judgments,  which  we  call  acts  of 
memory,  can  rightly  be  trusted  ?  So  far  from  this  being 
provable  by  past  experience,  it  must  be  in  each  case 
assumed  and  taken  for  granted,  before  you  can  have 
any  cognizance  whatever  of  your  past  experience. 

Moreover,  from  these  facts  of  past  and  present  ex- 
perience, you  deduce  argumentative  conclusions.  In  so 
doing,  you  assume  in  each  single  instance  the  validity 
of  the  reasoning  process.  It  cannot  be  even  superficially 
or  plausibly  maintained,  that  these  various  judgments, — 
'  the  conclusion  here  truly  results  from  the  premisses,7 
—  that  these  various  judgments  (I  say)  are  derivable 
from  experience. 

syllogism,  is  so  irresistibly  obvious,  that  further  words  are  superfluous  on 
so  plain  a  fact.  It  seems  beyond  question  then,  that  in  this  passage,  at 
all  events,  a  denial  of  what  we  have  called  the  '  Principle  of  Certitude '  is 
the  very  basis  on  which  the  author's  argument  has  been  built. 

Still  I  am  far  from  meaning  to  imply,  that  Mr.  Mansel  never  uses  the 
first  syllogism  to  prove  his  conclusion  :  for  in  one  or  two  places  he 
undoubtedly  does  so.  Thus  (p.  36)  he  expresses  distinctly  the  very  im- 
portant truth,  that  '  Reason  itself,  rightly  interpreted,  teaches  the  existence 
of  truths  above  Reason.'  And  the  following  passage  again,  is  so  justly  and 
admirably  expressed,  that  nothing  can  possibly  be  more  so. 

"  Reason  does  not  deceive  us,  if  we  will  only  read  her  witness  aright ; 
"  and  Reason  herself  gives  us  warning,  when  we  are  in  danger  of  reading  it 
"  wrong.  The  light  that  is  within  us  is  not  darkness ;'  only  it  cannot 
"  illuminate  that  which  is  beyond  the  sphere  of  its  rays."  (p.  198.) 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    27 

At  all  events  then  you  are  compelled  to  assume  two 
large  classes  of  judgments, —  and  those  of  most  vital 
importance, — on  no  ground  of  experience  whatever  : 
viz.  that  (1)  your  various  acts  of  memory,  and  (2) 
also  your  various  acts  of  reasoning,  correspond  with 
Objective  Truth.  In  making  these  tremendous  assump- 
tions, why  are  you  not  also  exposed  to  that  danger, 
which  you  would  fain  represent  as  exclusively  besetting 
your  opponents  ; — the  danger  of  mistaking  your  own 
personal  fancies  and  ideas  for  absolute  Truth  ?  You 
will  reply  perhaps,  that  you  assume  no  more  than  all 
mankind  necessarily  assume.  I  will  give  one  only,  of 
the  many  replies  which  might  be  made  to  that  state- 
ment; — and  I  answer  thus.  You  assume  proposi- 
tions of  these  two  classes,  before  you  know,  or  can  so 
much  as  guess,  that  any  other  man  living  assumes 
them  ;  for  it  is  only  by  means  of  their  assumption,  that 
it  is  possible  to  know,  or  even  so  much  as  to  guess, 
what  other  men's  opinions  are. 

As  it  is  most  desirable  to  bring  this  point  quite  clearly 
home,  I  will  cite  and  apply  a  passage,  in  which  Mr. 
Stuart  Mill  states  his  own  philosophical  doctrine. 

'  There  is  no  knowledge  a  priori ;  no  truths  cognisable  by  the 
'  mind's  inward  light,  and  grounded  on  intuitive  evidence.  Sensa- 
'  tion,  and  the  mind's  consciousness  of  its  own  acts,  are  not  only 
*  the  exclusive  sources,  but  the  sole  materials,  of  our  knowledge.'* 

Let  us  test  then,  by  these  principles,  an  act  of 
memory.  I  am  at  this  moment  comfortably  warm ;  but 
I  call  to  mind  with  great  clearness  the  fact,  that  a  short 
time  ago  I  was  very  cold.  What  datum  does  '  sensation ' 
give  me?  simply  that  I  am  now  warm.  What  datum 

With  this  sentiment  (I  need  hardly  say)  I  most  cordially  agree,  and  am 
very  grateful  to  the  author  for  such  valuable  and  important  enunciations. 
But  the  direct  philosophical  charge  which  I  would  venture  to  bring,  is  the 
following.  Two  different  syllogisms  are  separately  available,  in  behalf  of 
Mr.  Mansel's  conclusion  ;  syllogisms,  however,  which  it  is  impossible 
logically  to  combine,  because  the  Major  Premiss  of  the  one  directly  con- 
tradicts the  Major  Premiss  of  the  other.  But  Mr.  Mansel,  it  appears  to 
me,  has  most  illogically  united  these  antagonistic  syllogisms.  He  passes 
from  one  to  the  other  with  apparent  unconsciousness,  and  without  in  any 
way  recognising  their  mutual  inconsistency. 

*  This  passage  is  the  one  cited  from  Mr.  Mill  by  an  able  writer  in  the 
'National  Review,'  to  whom  I  shall  again  have  occasion  to  refer. 


28  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

does  i  consciousness '  give?  that  I  have  the  present  im- 
pression of  having  been  cold  a  short  time  ago.  But 
both  these  data  are  altogether  wide  of  the  mark.  The 
question  which  I  would  earnestly  beg  Mr.  Mill  to  ask 
himself,  is  this ; — what  is  my  ground  for  believing,  that  I 
was  cold  a  short  time  ago?  '  I  have  the  present  impres- 
'  sion  of  having  been  cold  a  short  time  ago  ;' — this  is  one 
judgment.  '  I  was  cold  a  short  time  ago ;' — this  is  a  totally 
distinct  and  separate  judgment.  There  is  no  necessary, 
nor  any  even  probable,  connexion  between  these  two 
judgments, — no  ground  whatever  for  thinking  that  the 
truth  of  one  follows  from  the  truth  of  the  other, — except 
upon  the  hypothesis,  that  my  mind  is  so  constituted  as 
accurately  to  represent  past  facts.  But  how  will  either 
4  sensation '  or  ;  consciousness,'  01*  the  two  combined,  in 
any  way  suffice  for  the  establishment  of  any  such  pro- 
position ? 

Those  who  have  maintained  the  4  experience '  theory, 
differ  widely  from  each  other,  as  to  the  degree  of 
religious  belief  which  they  have  professed  :  I  will 
therefore  so  state  my  argument,  as  to  cover  every  pos- 
sible case  of  belief  and  unbelief.  Either  my  soul  ( 1 ) 
was  created  by  some  Superior  Being;  or  (2)  was 
caused  by  some  non-creative  agency  ;  or  (3)  started 
into  existence  without  any  cause  at  all.  These  three 
alternatives  are  logically  exhaustive.  If  the  first 
alternative  be  taken  by  the  '  experience '  philosopher, 
I  ask  him  this  question  :  how  can  c  sensation  and  con- 
sciousness' suffice  to  shew  that  the  Creator  is  Veracious? 
that  he  has  so  formed  my  soul,  that  my  own  present  im- 
pression of  a  certain  past  sensation  corresponds  (even  in 
any  degree  whatever)  to  a  certain  past  fact?  to  the  fact, 
namely,  that  I  really  experienced  that  sensation,  at  the 
time  to  which  my  memory  refers?  If  the  second  al- 
ternative be  taken,  I  ask  a  similar  question  :  How  can 
'sensation  and  consciousness'  suffice  to  shew,  that  this 
non-creative  cause  has  issued  in  the  production  of  a  soul, 
possessing  this  singular  and  admirable  endowment,  that 
my  present  impression  of  a  certain  past  sensation  cor- 
responds (even  in  any  degree  whatever)  to  a  certain 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    29 

past  fact?  the  fact,  namely,  that  I  really  experienced  that 
sensation,  at  the  time  to  which  my  memory  refers  ?  If 
the  third  alternative  be  taken,  I  ask  again  a  similar 
question :  How  can  'sensation  and  consciousness'  suffice 
to  shew,  that  the  soul,  which  has  thus  without  any 
cause  started  into  existence,  is  so  singularly  and  ex- 
quisitely constituted,  that  my  present  impression  of  a 
certain  past  sensation  corresponds  (even  though  it  were 
in  ever  so  faint  a  degree)  to  a  certain  past  fact?  the  fact, 
namely,  that  I  really  experienced  that  sensation,  at  the 
time  to  which  my  memory  refers? 

For  the  sake  of  fixing  our  ideas,  I  have  confined 
my  remarks  to  the  case  of  memory.  But  it  is  plain, 
that  every  thing  which  I  have  said  equally  applies  to 
the  case  of  reasoning;  and  to  the  assumption,  universally 
made  by  the  experience  school,  that  the  syllogistic 
process  is  objectively  valid.  It  is  undeniable  then, 
that  these  philosophers  cannot  possibly  maintain  their 
ground.  'Sensation  and  consciousness'  are  not  suffi- 
cient foundations  for  any  knowledge,  which  shall  exceed, 
or  even  equal,  that  of  the  brutes  (see  n.  9).  These 
thinkers,  no  less  than  others,  must  admit  various  in- 
tuitive judgments,  as  carrying  with  them  their  own 
evidence  of  truth.  They  may  join  issue  no  doubt,  as  to 
the  number  of  legitimate  intuitions,  or  on  the  test  of 
their  legitimacy.  But  all  this  is  in  no  wise  a  question 
of  principle  ;  it  is  wholely  and  solely  a  question  of 
degree.  As  soon  as  they  have  admitted  one,  they  have 
abandoned  the  characteristic  tenet  of  their  school.* 

*  The  citation  made  in  the  text  of  Mr.  Mansel  and  Mr.  Mill,  as  types 
of  sceptical  philosophy,  was  also  made  in  this  volume  as  it  was  printed  last 
October.  After  that  period,  I  read  with  great  interest  an  article  in  the 
'National  Review'  (Oct.  1859),  on  Mr.  Stuart  Mill,  which  contains  a 
remarkable  agreement  of  opinion.  I  am  well  aware,  how  very  serious  are 
the  differences  between  a  Christian  writer  like  Mr.  Mansel,  and  such  an  un- 
believing philosopher  as  Kant ;  still  Mr.  Mansel  would  himself  admit,  that 
those  philosophical  utterances  of  his,  which  I  venture  to  regard  as  semi- 
sceptical,  have  their  origin  in  the  Kantian  school.  It  must  be  considered 
then  an  instance  of  agreement,  that  the  *  National  Review '  unites  the 
schools  of  Kant  and  of  Mill  in  one  category.  He  says  that,  amidst  the 
striking  contrasts  which  exist  between  these  two  schools  of  thought,  they 
agree  in  depriving  us  (if  they  could  establish  their  respective  principles) 
of  all  means  for  knowing  certainly  Objective  Truth.  I  have  net  the  article 
at  hand  this  moment,  and  therefore  quote  from  memory. 


30  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

12.  We  have  sufficiently  shewn  then,  that  the  pos- 
sibility of  our  possessing  any  knowledge  worthy  of  the 
name,  rests  (1),  upon  the  circumstance,  that  it  is  possible 
for  intuitive  judgments  to  carry  with  them  their  own 
evidence  of  truth ;  and  (2),  on  the  circumstance,  that 
certain  intuitive  judgments  do  carry  with  them  such 
evidence.  Your  next  question  will  be,  Of  what  nature  is 
that  evidence  ?  And  this  question  it  is  the  more  impor- 
tant to  answer  distinctly,  because  some  of  you  have  most 
seriously  misunderstood  what  I  intended  to  convey.* 

To  simplify  the  matter  as  much  as  possible,  let  us 
take  for  illustration  (as  hitherto  we  have  chiefly  done) 
two  classes  of  intuitions,  which  are  really  and  undeniably 
legitimate.  Let  us  take  (1),  those  intuitions,  wherein  I 
judge  that  I  really  experienced  sensations  which  I  dis- 
tinctly remember ;  and  that  I  experienced  them  moreover 
at  the  time,  to  which  my  memory  refers  back.  Let  us 
take  (2),  those  intuitions  wherein  I  judge, — a  syllogism 
having  been  drawn  out  in  its  logical  shape, — that  its 
conclusion  really  follows  from  its  premisses. 

Some  of  you  then  have  understood  me  to  maintain, 
that  my  belief  in  the  truth  of  these  judgments  is  the 
conclusion  of  a  syllogism.  Thus : — 

4  Major  Premiss.     My  memory  may  be  trusted. 

4  Minor  Premiss.  My  memory  testifies  this  past 
*  sensation. 

'  Conclusion,  Hence  I  may  know  that  I  really  did 
experience  that  sensation.' 

Or  again, 

4  Major  Premiss.  My  reasoning  faculty  may  be 
4  trusted. 

'  Minor  Premiss.  My  reasoning  faculty  testifies 
4  that  this  conclusion  really  results  from  those  premisses. 

4  Conclusion,  Hence  I  know  that  it  does  so  result.' 

But  nothing  would  be  more  preposterous  than  such 
a  notion  as  this ;  and  I  never  imagined  anything  at  all 
like  it.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  contrary  to  the  clearest 
facts.  Children  e.g.  distinctly  remember  past  sensa- 

*  It  was  not  some  of  my  pupils  who  thus  misunderstood  me,  but  some 
of  those  who  read  the  present  volume  as  it  was  printed  in  October. 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    31 

tions, — as  their  having  seen  their  mother's  or  their 
nurse's  face, — long  before  they  think  of  the  universal 
judgment,  that  memory  may  be  trusted.  Indeed, 
multitudes  of  men  (I  suppose)  pass  through  life,  having 
remembered  in  their  time  a  vast  variety  of  past  events, 
without  having  once  formally  elicited  any  such  uni- 
versal judgment. 

But  there  is  a  second  objection  to  this  absurd  theory, 
even  more  peremptory  than  the  adverse  testimony  of 
facts.  Such  a  theory  is  logically  self-contradictory. 
It  is  impossible  that  I  can  avail  myself  of  a  syllogism, 
without  holding  confidently  two  intuitive  judgments. 
The  first  of  these  judgments  is  an  act  of  memory;  for  I 
cannot  draw  the  conclusion,  without  remembering  the 
premisses.  The  second  is  an  act,  whereby  I  recognise 
that  the  conclusion  does  really  follow  from  the  pre- 
misses. You  see,  then,  how  impossible  it  is  that  our 
ground  for  confidently  forming  intuitive  judgments  can 
be  any  syllogistic  process.  You  see  that  the  very 
opposite  to  this  is  undeniable.  So  far  from  a  syllogistic 
process  being  our  ground  for  trusting  intuitive  judg- 
ments, we  must,  by  absolute  necessity,  trust  certain  in- 
tuitive judgments,  before  we  can  have  reasonable  grounds 
for  trusting  any  syllogistic  process  whatever. 

It  is  very  manifest,  indeed,  since  the  number  of 
judgments  which  we  form  is  not  infinite,  that  there 
must  be  certain  judgments,  which  are  not  derived  by 
reasoning  from  any  previous  judgments  whatever. 
These  judgments,  if  legitimate,  and  if  they  are  not  the 
mind's  mere  reflection  on  its  actually  present  con- 
sciousness, are  precisely  what  we  call  intuitive  judg- 
ments, carrying  with  them  their  own  evidence  of  truth. 
In  other  words,  my  soul  is  so  constituted,  that  I  not 
only  elicit  certain  intuitive  judgments,  but  elicit  them 
with  full  grounds  of  knowing  their  truth.  My  soul 
possesses  a  certain  intrinsic  quality,  which  gives  me 
full  evidence  of  their  truth  at  the  very  moment  when  I 
elicit  them.  When  I  return  (after  a  few  hours'  absence) 
to  my  children,  I  know,  and  have  the  fullest  intrinsic 
ground  for  knowing,  that  I  have  seen  their  faces  before. 


32  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

When  I  put  together  the  premisses, '  All  men  are  mortal/ 
and  'I  am  a  man;' — and  when  from  those  premisses  I 
draw  the  conclusion  that  CI  am  mortal;' — I  have  full 
ground  for  my  confidence,  that  this  inference  is  legiti- 
mate. This  ground  of  confidence  in  either  case  is,  and 
can  be,  nothing  else,  except  the  operation  of  a  certain 
intrinsic  mental  quality. 

In  regard,  then,  to  various  judgments  of  intuition 
which  might  be  named,  I  cannot  admit  for  one  moment 
that  they  are  either  less  certain,  or  less  immediate, 
than  judgments  of  consciousness.  All  which  can  be 
said  is,  that  judgments  of  intuition,  however  certain, 
require  for  their  evidence  the  operation  of  a  certain 
intrinsic  mental  quality ;  whereas  judgments  of  con- 
sciousness do  not  require  this.  Again,  every  judgment 
of  intuition  may  be  accompanied  by  a  corresponding 
judgment  of  consciousness;  see  n.  1:  and  yet  it  is 
remarkable,  how  seldom  it  is  so  accompanied.  The 
judgment  of  intuition  is  so  absolutely  certain,  that  we 
do  not  trouble  ourselves  to  elicit  the  parallel  judgment 
of  consciousness.  When  I  see  my  children  again, 
spontaneously,  and  without  reflection,  I  elicit  the  judg- 
ment, c  These  are  the  faces  which  I  saw  a  few  hours 
4  back.'  But,  unless  I  am  in  an  unusually  philosophical 
mood,  I  never  think  of  eliciting  formally  the  parallel 
judgment  of  consciousness.  I  never  think  of  saying  to 
myself,  c  I  am  so  affected  at  this  moment,  that  I  cannot 
c  help  thinking  I  saw  these  faces  a  short  time  ago.' 

This  intrinsic  quality  of  the  mind  then  it  is,  which 
renders  any  knowledge  possible,  beyond  the  knowledge 
of  my  own  actually  present  consciousness.  This  quality 
it  is,  of  which  a  consistent  sceptic,  if  such  a  thinker  were 
physically  possible,  would  question  the  existence.  This 
quality  it  is,  which  no  one,  except  that  impossible  mon- 
ster, can  question  with  any  consistency  at  all.  It  is 
through  the  operation  of  this  quality,  that  our  various 
thoughts  are  raised  from  mere  'intellectual  impotencies,' 
to  direct  and  trustworthy  perceptions  of  Truth.  It  is 
through  the  operation  of  this  quality,  and  in  no  other 
way,  that  we  are  enabled  to  apprehend  Objective  Keality. 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    33 

And  by  a  very  natural  and  obvious  figure,  this  quality 
is  commonly  called  a  *  light'  to  the  soul.  When  actual 
light  is  away,  we  are  shut  up,  each  in  his  own  company, 
and  debarred  from  all  direct  vision  of  the  external  world. 
And  so,  were  it  not  for  this  '-intuitional  light,'  we  should 
be  shut  up,  without  the  possibility  of  escape,  in  the 
dreary  region  of  actually  present  consciousness.  Thanks 
be  to  God,  we  possess  this  light :  and  in  its  bright  efful- 
gence, we  know  our  own  past  history  ;  we  know  our 
fellow-creatures  ;  we  know  our  Almighty  Creator. 

And  now  observe  this  further  inference.  There  can 
be  no  doubt,  that  acts  of  memory  at  least,  in  one  shape 
or  other,  proceed  throughout  our  whole  waking  life.  At 
every  instant,  we  at  least  call  to  mind  our  consciousness 
of  the  few  preceding  instants.  Consequently, — even 
though  there  were  no  other  legitimate  classes  of  in- 
tuition except  those  two  which  we  have  been  of  late 
specially  considering, — an  important  result  would  follow, 
in  regard  to  this  c  intuitional  light/  It  is  not  a  quality, 
like  many  others,  which  is  generally  dormant,  and  only 
from  time  to  time  called  into  activity  :  on  the  contrary, 
it  puts  forth  its  appropriate  operation  during  every 
instant  of  our  waking  lives. 

Philosophers  have  been  occupied  from  time  to  time, 
with  greater  or  less  of  diligence  and  success,  in  investi- 
gating the  nature  of  this  *  intuitional  light:'  and  the 
same  question  is  destined  hereafter  (I  expect)  to  play  a 
far  more  important  part  in  such  inquiries  than  it  has 
hitherto  done.  But  it  is  not  requisite  for  our  present 
theological  purposes,  to  pursue  this  matter  further. 

13.  Here  then  we  may  draw  our  breath  ;  having  at 
length  brought  to  an  end  our  protracted  train  of  argu- 
ment. It  will  be  desirable,  before  we  advance  further, 
that  you  should  again  proceed  over  the  ground  which 
we  have  already  traversed ;  that  you  should  examine 
carefully  the  course  of  argument,  which  we  have  gone 
through  ;  and  that  you  should  consider  how  far  your 
reason  freely  and  fully  recognises  its  cogency. 

If  you  have  followed  me  up  to  this  point,  you  will 
readily  proceed  with  me  one  further  step. 

D 


34  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

The  Principle  of  Certitude  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
one  key  to  any  knowledge  worthy  of  the  name.  But 
so  soon  as  the  philosophical  edifice  has  been  unlocked 
and  entered,  then  the  question  which  first  meets  us  on 
the  threshold,  will  be  the  test  of  legitimate  intuitions. 
All  reasoning  of  course  must  be  built  upon  premisses  ; 
and  there  must  therefore  of  necessity  be  a  certain 
number  of  primary,  premisses  which  are  known  to  us 
not  by  reasoning  but  by  intuition.  The  whole  of  our 
knowledge  is  obtained,  and  can  be  obtained,  by  no  other 
process,  than  combining  and  building  upon  such  primary 
premisses.  If  then  this  be  so,  how  vitally  important  is 
the  task  of  distinguishing  true  intuitions  from  false  ! 
For  once  suppose  our  foundation  to  be  erroneous,  then 
in  proportion  as  we  reason  the  more  consistently,  the 
more  accurately,  the  more  frankly  and  energetically,  so 
much  the  more  widely  mistaken,  and  in  all  probability 
so  much  the  more  mischievous,  will  our  conclusions 
become.  This  all-important  preliminary  inquiry, — the 
mode  of  distinguishing  true  intuitions  from  false, — has 
met  (I  cannot  but  think)  with  very  far  less  attention 
from  philosophers  than  was  its  due.  The  intellect,  as 
Father  Tapparelli  incidentally  remarks,  has  two  main 
functions;  the  intuitive  and  ratiocinative  :*  but  the 
former  has  surely  been  very  far  less  methodically  and 
systematically  treated  than  the  latter. 

14.  Here  however,  in  order  to  prevent  very  pro- 
bable misconception,  I  must  make  two  explanatory 
and  qualifying  statements. 

(1.)  I  am  very  far  indeed  from  meaning  to  imply, 
that  no  one  can  form  a  legitimate  intuition,  unless  he 
be  himself  prepared  with  .some  philosophical  test  to 
establish  its  legitimacy.  Far  indeed  otherwise.  The 
parallel  case  of  inferential  judgments  will  here  pre- 
cisely illustrate  what  I  mean  to  convey. 

There  is  no  more  common  phenomenon  in  the 
world  than  the  following.  A  man  of  great  natural 
shrewdness  but  uncultivated  intellect,  displays  the 

*  "La  faculta  intellettiva,  nelle  due  funzioni  d'intuito  e  raziocinio"  &c. 
— Natural  Diritto,  n.  32. 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    35 

greatest  acuteness  in  deciding,  what  means  will  or  will 
not  be  conducive  to  some  end  which  he  has  greatly 
at  heart.  His  reasoning  will  be  most  sound  from  first 
to  last ;  yet  not  only  he  will  be  quite  unable  to  give 
any  philosophical  test  of  its  validity,  but  even  so  much 
as  to  state  the  various  premisses  on  which  he  proceeds. 
Now  who  will  be  so  wild  as  to  maintain,  that  this  man 
has  really  no  valid  ground  for  his  conclusions  ?  that  he 
is  taking  them  up  accidentally  and  at  random,  and  is  as 
likely  to  be  wrong  as  to  be  right  ?  No  :  we  shall  all 
recognise,  that  he  is  using  that  power  of  reasoning, 
which  is  one  of  the  highest  faculties  implanted  in  his 
nature;  and  using  it  most  healthily  and  legitimately: 
nor  shall  we  under  ordinary  circumstances  have  any 
wish  at  all,  that  he  should  draw  out  with  any  greater 
accuracy  the  process  through  which  his  mind  has 
travelled.  Yet  on  the  other  hand,  if  we  had  to  do  with 
a  man  of  totally  inaccurate  mind,  who  is  leading  himself 
or  others  into  serious  mischief  by  his  bad  reasoning,  we 
should  act  otherwise ;  we  should  aim  at  persuading 
him  to  state  methodically  his  various  premisses,  in 
order  that  he  may  see  how  ludicrously  inadequate  they 
are  to  his  conclusions.  And  lastly,  in  the  case  of 
philosophical  and  systematic  writers,  of  them  we  do 
most  reasonably  expect,  not  merely  that  they  argue 
correctly,  but  that  they  put  before  us  their  premisses 
in  sufficient  detail ;  and  not  only  so,  but  be  prepared 
also  to  vindicate  the  validity  of  those  reasonings  which 
they  have  built  thereon. 

The  case  of  intuitions  is  in  every  respect  similar  to 
this.  There  are  multitudes  of  men  who  elicit  legi- 
timate intuitions,  who  would  be  wholly  unable  to  state 
any  philosophical  test  which  shall  establish  that  legiti- 
macy :  yet  it  would  be  monstrous  to  say  that  such 
intuitions  may  not  most  reasonably  be  trusted.  Again 
there  are  multitudes  of  men  (other  men  or  the  same) 
who  mistake  this  or  that  prejudice  of  their  own  for  a 
legitimate  intuition  :  and  in  such  instances  it  is  most 
suitable  to  urge  upon  their  notice,  on  philosophical 
grounds,  the  spuriousness  of  such  a  conviction ;  th@ 


36  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

fact  of  its  being  utterly  destitute  of  all  pretension  to  be 
accounted  true  and  genuine.  Lastly,  we  may  most 
fairly  call  upon  those  who  profess  to  write  scientifically 
and  to  instruct  us  in  philosophy,  that  they  lay  down 
some  plain  and  intelligible  method,  whereby  we  may 
distinguish  these  true  primary  premisses  from  spurious 
counterfeits ;  and  that  they  establish  moreover  to  our 
satisfaction  the  reasonableness  and  sufficiency  of  that 
method. 

(2.)  Now  for  my  second  explanatory  statement. 
There  are  certain  intuitions,  so  intermingled  (if  I  may 
so  express  myself)  with  the  very  first  springs  of 
thought, — such  indispensable  prerequisites  to  every 
intellectual  act  worthy  the  name, — that  it  is  simply 
impossible  to  apply  directly  and  methodically  any  test 
of  their  legitimacy.  Impossible  for  this  reason,  that 
in  order  to  apply  any  test  imaginable,  some  intellectual 
act  must  be  elicited ;  which  act  implies,  in  the  very 
process  of  eliciting  it,  ttyat  those  particular  intuitions 
are  genuine.  Instances  of  such  intuitions  will  be 
those  which  we  have  already  so  often  mentioned ;  our 
various  intuitions  of  memory  and  of  reasoning.  But 
then  it  is  these  very  intuitions,  in  regard  to  which 
each  one  of  us  has  the  strongest  possible  guarantee 
for  their  truth;  viz.  the  fact,  that  it  is  not  less  than 
physically  impossible  (see  n.  12)  to  doubt  them  for  one 
moment. 

Again,  even  as  to  these  most  fundamental  intuitions, 
a  certain  subsequent  and  negative  test  of  their  genuine- 
ness may  be  directly  and  methodically  applied.  It  is 
imaginable,  that  my  to-day's  memory  of  the  events 
which  passed  last  Sunday,  may  be  contradictory  to  my 
yesterday's  memory  of  those  same  events  ;  so  that  by 
the  fact  of  trusting  my  memory,  I  am  led  into  endless 
contradiction  and  confusion.  It  is  imaginable  again, 
that  the  same  premisses,  if  combined  in  one  order, 
would  lead  to  one  conclusion ;  if  in  another,  to  another 
and  a  contradictory  conclusion  :  so  that  by  the  fact  of 
trusting  my  reasoning  faculty,  I  am  brought  into  end- 
less contradiction  and  confusion.  I  need  not  say  that 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    37 

nothing  of  the  sort  takes  place  ;  but  that  on  the  con- 
trary, the  deepest  harmony  exists  between  those  various 
propositions,  which  my  memory  and  my  reasoning 
faculty  combine  to  establish.  Here  then  is  a  subse- 
quent and  a  negative  test,  yet  one  of  a  very  cogent 
description,  that  those  two  fundamental  classes  of  in- 
tuition are  genuine. 

15.  Having  so  far  explained  my  meaning,  I  return 
to  my  former  remark.  Philosophers  in  general  have 
laboured  far  less,  it  seems  to  me,  than  they  ought  to 
have  laboured,  at  the  all-important  task  of  providing 
us  with  tests,  whereby  genuine  intuitions  may  be  dis- 
tinguished from  spurious.  F.  Buffier  indeed,  the  well- 
known  Jesuit  metaphysician,  has  applied  himself  to 
this  work,  and  deserves  no  slight  praise  for  seeing  its 
importance  and  fundamentally  ;  yet  no  one,  I  think, 
can  regard  his  treatment  of  the  question  as  very  subtle 
or  profound.  The  tests  which  he  suggests  are  these 
three  :  — 

(1.)  That  the  judgments,  alleged  to  be  first  truths, 
be  so  clear,  that  when  one  undertakes  either  to  prove 
or  to  oppose  them,  one  can  only  do  so  by  the  help  of 
propositions,  which  are  manifestly  neither  clearer  nor 
more  certain. 

(2.)  That  they  be  so  universally  received  among 
men  in  every  time  and  place,  and  by  every  sort  of 
character,  that  those  who  oppose  them  find  themselves, 
in  comparison  to  the  rest  of  mankind,  not  more  than 
one  in  a  hundred  or  even  in  a  thousand. 

(3.)  That  they  be  so  strongly  impressed  on  our 
minds,  that  we  conform  our  conduct  to  them,  notwith- 
standing the  refinements  of  those  who  imagine  contrary 
opinions ;  which  latter  class  indeed  act,  not  in  con- 
formity with  their  opinions  thus  imagined,  but  with 
those  first  truths  which  are  universally  received.* 

*  "  Le  premier  de  ces  caracteres  est  qu'elles  soient  si  claires,  que  quand 
on  entrepreud  de  les  prouver  on  de  les  attaquer,  on  ne  le  puisse  faire,  que 
par  des  propositions  qui  rnauifestement  ne  sont  ni  plus  claires  ni  plus 
certaines ; 

"  D'etre  si  universellement  re9ues  parmi  les  hoinmes  en  tout  temps,  en 
tous  lieux,  et  par  toutes  sortes  d'esprits,  que  ceux  qui  les  attaquent  se 


88  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

While  admitting  that  I  cannot  be  satisfied  with 
these  three  criteria  as  at  all  adequate  to  the  occasion, 
it  must  not  be  supposed  that  I  profess  in  any  way  to 
improve  upon  them.*  But  I  would  venture  to  solicit 
the  serious  attention  of  philosophers  to  the  question  ; 
as  I  must  think  that  no  edifice  of  metaphysical  science 
can  be  considered  stable  and  trustworthy,  where  the 
security  of  its  very  foundation  has  been  so  greatly 
neglected.  Until  the  question  of  intuitions  has  been 
systematically  and  fully  considered,  I  must  think  it 
truer  to  affirm  that  most  copious  and  valuable  materials 
for  metaphysical  science  have  been  brought  together, 
than  to  affirm  that  that  science  itself  has  been  defini- 
tively called  into  existence. 

For  my  own  part  I  can  only  say  that,  without 
attempting  any  general  solution  of  the  question,  at  all 
events  I  will  not  allege  any  one  intuition  as  legitimate, 
until  I  have  brought  together  so  many  grounds  for 
my  statement,  as  will  (I  think)  satisfy  every  reflecting 
man. 

16.  We  have  already  seen  quite  enough,  to  guard 
us  against  falling  into  a  fallacy,  which  need  only  be 
stated  to  be  exposed.  It  happens  sometimes,  that  when 
we  claim  intuition  in  behalf  of  some  important  pro- 
position, certain  unphilosophical  men,  who  claim  to  be 
specially  philosophical,  regard  that  claim  itself  as  a 
confession  of  argumentative  weakness.  When  we  say 
plainly  that  we  can  advance  no  chain  of  syllogisms  in 
behalf  of  our  thesis,  they  regard  this  as  tantamount 
with  a  confession,  that  we  do  not  allege  Reason  in  its 

trouvent,  dans  le  genre  humain,  6tre  manifestement  moins  d'un  centre 
cent,  ou  meme  centre  mille  ; 

"  D'etre  si  fortement  imprime'es  dans  nous,  que  nous  y  conformions 
notre  conduit,  malgre  les  raffinements  de  ceux  qui  imaginent  des  opinions 
contraires,  et  qui  eux-memes  agissent  conforniement,  non  a  leurs  opinions 
imaginees,  mais  aux  premieres  verites  universellement  recues." — Burner, 
chap.  vii.  p.  22. 

*  I  have  not  attempted  any  methodical  consideration  of  this  most  im- 
portant matter,  because  such  consideration  would  have  carried  us  much  too 
far  on  purely  philosophical  ground.  Yet  I  may  refer  the  reader  to  some 
remarks  in  p.  130-133  with  the  note  ;  p.  159-161  ;  p.  419.  If  these  remarks 
be  admitted  as  true,  they  have  undoubtedly  a  bearing  on  the  general  ques- 
tion mentioned  in  the  text. 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    39 

behalf  at  all ;  that  we  cling  to  it,  and  admit  ourselves 
to  do  so,  on  grounds  of  fancy,  feeling  and  prepossession, 
in  defiance  of  Reason.  But  after  the  various  consider- 
ations which  have  occupied  us  in  this  Section,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  do  more  than  state  very  briefly  the  fol- 
lowing most  obvious  truth.  We  are  guiding  ourselves 
fully  as  much  by  Reason  when  we  hold  confidently 
legitimate  intuitions,  as  when  we  proceed  further  to 
draw  inferences  from  those  intuitions.  Nay  it  may  be 
said  in  one  sense,  that  we  go  more  by  Reason  in  the 
former  case  than  in  the  latter  ;  so  far  as  in  every  case 
premisses  may  be  said  to  possess  higher  certainty,  than 
the  conclusions  which  they  tend  to  establish.  When 
men  thus  thoughtlessly  call  for  argument  in  each 
particular  case,  they  forget  that  all  argument  must 
depend  on  certain  primary  premisses  which  are  not 
based  on  argument.  If  then  nothing  is  reasonable 
except  that  for  which  argument  is  produceable,  those 
primary  premisses  are  not  reasonable ;  hence  neither  are 
the  conclusions  based  on  them  reasonable  ;  and  hence 
again,  no  knowledge  of  any  kind  is  possible  at  all. 

If  indeed  no  more  is  meant  by  such  statements, 
than  that  we  should  be  very  careful  what  intuitions 
we  claim  as  legitimate; — that  this  must  not  be  left  to 
each  man's  private  fancy,  but  must  proceed  on  certain 
fixed  and  cognizable  principles ; — then  no  more  is  meant, 
than  what  I  not  merely  admit,  but  have  most  earnestly 
maintained.  But  many  men  really  seem  to  think  (most 
extravagant  as  the  proposition  must  appear  when  for* 
mally  stated)  that  all  intuitions,  from  the  very  nature 
of  the  case,  are  and  must  be  the  mere  offspring  of 
fancy,  prejudice,  or  caprice. 

17.  This  will  be  a  suitable  place  for  such  remarks 
as  seem  desirable,  on  the  sense  which  we  affix,  through- 
out this  Section,  to  the  word  'intuition,'  and  other 
kindred  terms.  What  the  sense  is  indeed,  in  which  we 
have  used  the  word  itself,  'intuition'  or  'intuitive 
4  judgment,'  this  will  be  now  quite  familiar  to  you.  If 
I  merely  reflect  on  my  actually  present  consciousness, 
I  elicit  a  'judgment  of  consciousness.'  On  the  other 


40  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

hand,  if  I  regard  a  certain  judgment  as  resulting  from 
certain  others,  this  act  of  the  mind  is  an  '  act  of  in- 
'  ference/  or  an  '  inferential  judgment.'  But  if  I  elicit 
a  certain  judgment  as  true  self-e violently  and  not  by 
way  of  inference, — and  if  this  judgment  is  not  a  mere 
judgment  of  consciousness, — we  call  it  an  '  intuitive  act,7 
or  an  '  intuition.'  We  call  it  so,  without  any  regard  to 
the  question  of  its  truth  or  falsehood  ;  and  accordingly 
we  subdivide  'intuitions'  into  'true'  and  'false,'  or 
'  legitimate '  and  4  illegitimate.' 

We  will  further  use  the  verb  '  intue,'  as  corre- 
sponding in  every  respect  with  the  substantive  '  intui- 
'  tion,'  and  the  adjective  '  intuitive.' 

But  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance,  to  distinguish 
quite  clearly,  between  the  intuing  act  of  the  mind  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  thing  itself  intued  on  the  other 
hand.  As  no  English  word  is  here  ready  for  our  use, 
let  us  coin  the  word  'intuern.'  I  am  well  aware,  of 
course,  how  contrary  is  this  word  to  philological  pro- 
priety; since  the  word  'intuition'  is  derived  from  the 
Latin  and  not  from  the  Greek.  Still,  I  am  sure  you 
will  admit,  that,  in  philosophical  discussion,  philological 
propriety  should  at  once  give  way,  where  any  increase 
of  clearness  and  accuracy  can  be  obtained.  I  will 
define  an'intuem,'  then,  'a  truth  legitimately  intued.' 
My  present  memory  of  having  seen  my  children  yester- 
day is  the  'intuing,'  or  '  intuitive'  act,  or  the  '  intuition ;' 
the  fact  itself,  now  called  to  mind,  that  I  did  then  see 
them,  is  the  '  intuem.' 

Various  criticisms  may  probably  enough  be  made 
on  this  use  of  words.  It  is  not  worth  while,  certainly, 
to  speak  at  any  length,  on  a  mere  question  of  verbal 
propriety.  The  less  so  indeed,  because  at  last  the  one 
adequate  defence  of  any  verbal  usage  is  its  proved 
utility:  and  this  defence  it  is  impossible  for  you  to 
appreciate,  except  by  proving  its  utility ;  that  is,  by 
proceeding  with  our  scientific  course.  Yet  a  few 
words  may  be  in  place,  to  explain  why  I  prefer  our 
sense  of  the  word  'intuitive,'  to  others  which  different 
writers  have  affixed  to  it. 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    41 

Many  philosophers  confine  the  term  to  our  immediate 
perception  of  necessary  truths.  On  the  meaning  of  this 
term  '  necessary '  we  are  to  speak  very  soon  ;  but  you 
have  now  probably  a  sufficient  general  notion  of  its 
sense,  to  understand  what  is  here  intended.  My 
reason  for  preferring  our  own  use  of  the  term  to  that 
employed  by  these  philosophers,  is  the  following.  I 
think  it  very  important,  that  we  should  be  trained  to 
contemplate,  as  a  class,  all  those  judgments,  which, 
without  being  mere  judgments  of  consciousness,  carry 
with  them  their  own  evidence  of  truth.  These  judg- 
ments agree  with  each  other  in  this,  that  a  special 
quality  of  mind  is  called  into  action,  to  make  their  truth 
self-evident.  They  also  agree  with  each  other,  in  being 
by  necessity  the  primary  premisses,  whereon  our  whole 
fabric  of  knowledge  is  built.  If  you  recognise,  with 
me,  the  importance  of  habitually  viewing  them  as  a 
class,  you  will,  of  course,  at  once  see,  that  no  way  so 
efficacious  can  be  suggested  of  securing  this,  as  to  call 
them  by  a  common  name. 

It  may  be  thought  a  more  questionable  usage,  that 
I  include  false  judgments  as  well  as  true  under  the  head 
4  intuitions.7  To  this  it  will  be  a  sufficient  reply,  if  I 
point  to  the  parallel  use  of  the  word  '  reasoning/ 
Whenever  I  regard  a  certain  judgment  as  resulting 
from  certain  others,  I  am  said  to  'reason;'  to  arrive  at 
my  result  by  means  of  '  reasoning : '  and  then  we  distin- 
guish 'sound'  reasoning  from  'unsound.'  Our  usage 
of  the  word  'intuition'  follows  precisely  the  same 
analogy. 

A  final  objection  may  come  from  an  opposite  quarter. 
If  the  word  'intuition'  extends  both  to  'true'  and 
6  false'  judgments,  why  is  not  the  word  '  intuem'  made 
similarly  extensive  ?  Here  again  we  may  point  to  the 
common  usage  of  speech,  in  regard  to  that  other 
principal  operation  of  the  intellect,  reasoning.  If  I 
reason  unsoundly,  it  is  always  said  that  the  result  at 
which  I  arrive  is  not  a  real  conclusion  from  the  pre- 
misses. And  so,  if  I '  intue'  unsoundly,  the  thing  intued 
is  not  a  real  *  intuem.' 


42  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

So  much  then,   on  the  comparatively  unimportant 
question  of  verbal  propriety. 

18.  Of  intuems,   some  are  c  necessary,'  others  not 
so.*     By  'necessary  intuem'  is  meant  a  verity  legiti- 
mately intued   as    'necessarily'   true.     When,    e.g.   I 
intue  by  memory  that  five  minutes  ago  I  was  seated  at 
this   table,  this   truth   is   no   necessary  intuem.     But 
when  I  intue  that  a  rectilineal  figure  of  three  sides 
has  three  angles,  the  truth  is  necessary,  and  is  legi- 
timately intued  as  such.     As  no  Catholic  philosopher 
(I   believe )   has   doubted   the  existence  of  necessary 
truths,  and  as  my  direct  purpose  is  not  philosophical 
disquisition,  we  need  not  say  much  in  mere  explanation 
of  this   term   'necessary.'      Anything,    I   suppose,    is 
'necessarily'  true,  when  its  truth  arises  from  nothing 
whatever  external  to  itself;  when  its  truth  arises  simply 
from    what   is   expressed   in   the    subject   and   in  the 
predicate  of  that  proposition  which  declares  it.     Thus 
the  intuern,  that  I  was  seated  five  minutes  ago  at  this 
table,  resulted  from  the  external  circumstance  that  my 
will  then  gave  my  body  the  requisite  command.     But 
the  intuem,  that  every  three-sided  rectilineal  figure  has 
three  angles,  arises  simply  from  the  intrinsic  connexion 
which  exists,  between  a  three-sided  and  a  three-angled 
rectilineal  figure.     The  truth  of  this  latter  intuem,  I 
say,  does  not  result,  nor  is  intued  by  me  as  resulting, 
from  any  external  circumstance,  as  for  instance  from  a 
Creator  commanding  that  such  figures  should  have  such 
a  property  ;    but  is  intued  as  wholly  intrinsic  to  the 
objects  themselves  whereof  we  are  judging. 

19.  This  leads  the  way  to  a  very  important  philoso- 
phical discussion.     We  believe  of  course  most  firmly, 
and   believe  as  a  truth  which   Reason  by   itself  can 
establish,  that  there  exists  an  All-holy,  Almighty  God, 
Infinite  in  every  Perfection,  The  One  Necessary  Self- 
existent  Being.     Here  then  a  difficulty  presents  itself, 

*  It  can  hardly  be  requisite  to  remark,  that,  throughout  this  Chapter, 
where  I  speak  of '  necessity,'  I  invariably  mean  what  is  called  '  metaphy- 
sical necessity,'  as  distinct  from  '  physical '  or  '  moral.'  These  three 
distinctions  correspond  to  the  three  distinctions  of  objective  certainty  :  see 
p.  427,  8. 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    43 

which  will  more  and  more  make  itself  felt,  in  proportion 
as  we  more  carefully  ponder  on  the  relations  which 
must  exist  between  God  and  Necessary  Truth.  Let  us 
enquire  then,  as  a  preliminary  step,  what  is  the  relation 
in  which  Necessary  Truth  stands,  to  the  Intellect  and 
the  Will  of  this  Adorable  Being.  We  assume  His 
existence  ;  and  we  proceed  upon  that  assumption.  Nor 
can  we  take  a  better  instance  of  Necessary  Truth,  than 
the  axioms  and  theorems  of  Geometry. 

Let  us  consider  then  two  propositions,  which  are  im- 
plied by  this  word  'necessary,'  in  regard  to  Mathematical 
Truth,  and  its  relation  to  God's  Intellect  and  Will. 

(1.)  Necessary  truths  do  not  derive  their  verity, 
from  the  fact  that  God  necessarily  intues  them.  Rather 
the  very  opposite  is  the  fact :  God  necessarily  intues 
them,  because  they  are  necessary  truths.  Who  would 
say  e.  g.  that  God  is  necessarily  Self-Existent,  because 
He  intues  Himself  to  be  so  ?  On  the  contrary  of  course : 
He  intues  Himself  to  be  so,  because  He  is  so.  In  like 
manner  He  necessarily  intues  the  base  angles  of  an 
isosceles  triangle  to  be  necessarily  equal,  because  they 
are  necessarily  equal :  He  necessarily  intues  that  the 
three  angles  of  every  triangle  together  necessarily 
equal  two  right  angles,  or  that  the  square  of  the  hypo- 
thenuse  necessarily  equals  the  sum  of  the  squares  of 
the  sides,  because  in  each  instance  the  truth  is  so. 

It  is  indeed  (as  is  manifest)  the  very  excellence  of 
God's  Intellect,  that  it  is  necessarily  determined  by 
Truth  ;  or  (in  other  words)  His  Intellectual  Perception 
depends  on  Truth,  not  Truth  upon  His  Intellectual 
Perception. 

What  Vasquez  says  of  Moral  Truth,  is  applicable  to 
all  Necessary  Truth  of  whatsoever  kind,  'Ante  omnem 
'  Dei  Voluntatem  et  Imperium,  immo  etiam  ante  omne 
4  JudiciumJ  this  truth  must  be  conceived  as  existing  ; 
'  praecedens,  secundum  rationem,  omne  Judicium  Divini 
«  Intellects.'  (In  lm  2"  d.  150,  n.  23.)  It  follows 
therefore,  that  through  all  Eternity  God  is  constantly 
and  necessarily  gazing  on  the  vast  mass  of  Necessary 
Mathematical  Truth. 


44  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

(2.)  It  is  not  only  certain  that  necessary  truths  are 
not  derived  from  God's  intuition  of  them,  but  that  in 
some  sense  they  seem  to  limit  His  Power.  God  cannot 
create  a  rectilineal  figure  of  three  sides,  which  has  more 
or  less  than  three  angles  ;  or  again,  whose  angles  taken 
together  amount  to  either  more  or  less  than  two  right 
angles. 

Here  then  we  are  brought  face  to  face  with  the 
difficulties  which  I  mentioned  as  existing.  Is  the 
assertion  endurable,  that  God  is  gazing  through  all 
Eternity  on  some  mass  of  Necessary  Truth,  external  to 
and  independent  of  Himself?  on  Truth,  co-eternal  with 
Himself,  and  yet  distinct  from  Himself?  on  Truth, 
equally  necessary  with  Himself,  and  yet  not  Himself? 
Again,  is  the  assertion  endurable,  that  God's  Power  is 
limited  by  something  external  to  Himself?  not  by  His 
Own  Intrinsic  Perfections  (as  e.  g.  He  is  unable  to 
destroy  Himself  because  of  His  Necessary  Self-exist- 
ence) but  by  some  body  of  external  Truth  ?  I  ask  again, 
is  either  of  these  assertions  endurable  ?  It  is  plain  that 
neither  could  be  tolerated  by  any  reflecting  Theist. 
And  yet,  if  we  wish  to  avoid  this,  there  is  but  one 
possible  resource  ;  in  other  words,  we  are  led  by  com- 
pulsion to  one  very  definite  conclusion.  We  are 
led  to  infer,  that  Necessary  Truth  is  not  distinct 
from  God  Himself;  that  (in  some  way  wholly  incom- 
prehensible to  us)  it  is  identified  with  Him;  that,  in 
gazing  on  it,  He  is  not  gazing  on  something  external  to 
Himself,  but  merely  penetrating  and  comprehending  the 
depths  of  His  Own  Nature;  that  when  His  Power  is 
limited  by  it,  it  is  limited  by  no  external  shackle,  but 
by  His  Own  Intrinsic  Essence.  That  this  fact  is  totally 
mysterious,  I  of  course  fully  admit;  though  really  not 
more  so,  than  is  every  proposition  which  concerns  the 
Incomprehensible  Creator.  It  is  totally  mysterious  : 
but  there  is  no  difficulty  whatever  (so  far  as  I  am  aware) 
in  the  way  of  our  receiving  it.  Nor  does  it  seem  to  me 
possible  to  avoid  this  precise  conclusion.  It  seems  to 
me  that  we  are  brought,  by  the  very  exigency  of  the 
case,  to  that  one  hypothesis,  which  avoids  all  difficulties, 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    45 

and  harmonizes  all  data ;  that  hypothesis,  which  admits 
all  that  Reason  testifies,  on  the  absolute  independence 
possessed  by  Necessary  Truth;  while  it  even  deepens 
and  intensifies  our  apprehension  of  God's  Greatness 
and  Incommunicable  Necessity. 

This  then  is  our  conclusion.  All  Necessary  Truth  is 
identical  with  God ;  in  intuing  it,  I  really  intue  the  One 
Necessary  Ens;  though  in  this,  as  in  so  many  other 
cases,  I  may  be  very  far  from  recognising  the  full 
extent  of  the  Object  which  I  contemplate.  God,  in 
intuing  Necessary  Truth,  intues  Himself;  a  creature, 
in  intuing  Necessary  Truth,  intues  God. 

Nor  is  there  absence  of  high  Catholic  authority  in 
support  of  this  view ;  Bossuet,  e.  g.  states  the  doctrine 
which  we  advocate  in  the  strongest  and  most  express 
terms : 

Tout  ce  qui  se  demontre  en  Mathematique,  et  en  quelque  autre 
science  que  ce  soit,  est  eternel  et  immuable :  puisque  Peffet  de  la 
demonstration  est  de  faire  voir  que  la  chose  ne  peut  etre  autrement 
qu'elle  est  demon  tree. 

Aussi,  pour  entendre  la  nature  et  les  proprietes  des  choses  que 
je  connois,  par  exemple,  ou  d'un  triangle,  ou  d'un  carre,  ou  d'un 
cercle,  ou  les  proportions  de  ces  figures,  et  de  toutes  autres  figures 
entre  elles,  je  n'ai  pas  besoin  de  savoir  qu'il  y  en  ait  de  telles  dans 
la  nature ;  et  je  suis  assure*  de  n'en  avoir  jamais  ni  trace  ni  vu  de 
parf'aites.  Je  n'ai  pas  besoin  non  plus  de  songer  qu'il  y  ait 
quelques  mouvemens  dans  le  monde,  pour  entendre  la  nature  du 
mouvement  meme,  ou  celle  des  lignes  que  chaque  mouvement 
decrit,  les  suites  de  ce  mouvement,  et  les  proportions  selon  les- 
quelles  il  augmente  ou  diminue  dans  les  graves  et  les  choses 
jetees.  Des  que  1'idee  de  ces  choses  s'est  une  fois  reveillee  dans 
mon  esprit,  je  connois  que,  soit  qu'elles  soiente,  ou  qu'elles  ne 
soient  pas  actuellement,  c'est  ainsi  qu'elles  doivent  £tre,  et  qu'il 
est  impossible  qu'elles  soient  d'une  autre  nature,  ou  so  fassent 
d'une  autre  fa^on. 

Et  pour  venir  a  quelque  chose  qui  nous  touche  de  plus  pres, 
j'entends,  par  ces  principes  de  verite  eternelle,  que  quand  aucun 
autre  etre  que  1'homme,  et  moi-meme  ne  serions  pas  actuellement ; 
quand  Dieu  auroit  resolu  de  n'en  creer  aucun  autre ;  le  devoir 
essentiel  de  I'homme,  d£s-la  qu'il  est  capable  de  raisonner,  est  de 
vivre  selon  la  Raison,  et  de  chercher  son  Auteur,  de  peur  de  lui 
manquer  de  reconnoissance,  si,  faute  de  le  chercher,  il  1'ignoroit. 

Toutes  ces  verites,  et  toutes  celles  que  j'en  deduis  par  un 


46  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

raisonnement  certain,  subsistent  independamment  de  tons  l*>s  temps: 
en  qnelqne  temps  que  je  mette  un  entendement  humain,  il  les 
connoitra ;  mais,  en  les  connoissant,  il  les  trouvera  verites,  il  ne 
\vsfera  pas  telles:  car  ce  ne  sont  pas  nos  connoissances  qni  font 
leurs  objets ;  elles  les  supposent.  Ainsi  ces  verites  subsistent  (levant 
tous  les  siecles,  et  devant  qu'il  y  ait  eu  un  entendement  humain : 
et  quand  tout  ce  qui  se  fait  par  les  regies  des  proportions,  c'est-a- 
dire  tout  ce  que  je  vois  dans  la  nature,  seroit  detruit,  excepte  moi, 
ces  regies  se  conserveroient  dans  ma  pensee ;  et  je  verrois  claire- 
rnent  qu'elles  seroient  toujours  bonnes  et  toujours  veritable?,  quand 
moi-meme  je  serois  detruit,  et  quand  il  n'y  auroit  personne  qui 
fut  capable  de  les  comprendre. 

Si  je  chercJie  maintenant,  ou,  et  en  quel  sujet  elles  subsistent 
e'ternelles  et  immuables,  comme  elles  sont,  je  suis  oblige  d'avouer  un 
Eire,  ou  la  verite  est  Eternellement  subsistante,  et  ou  elie  est  toujours 
entendue ;  et  cet  Etre  doit  etrela  Verite  meme,  et  doitetre  toute 
Verite;  et  c'est  de  Lui  que  la  verite  derive,  dans  tout  ce  qui  est  et 
ce  qui  s'entend  hors  de  lui. 

C'est  done  en  Lui,  d'une  certaine  maniere  qui  rrfest  incomprd- 
hensible,  c^est  en  Lui,  dis-je,  que^'e  vois  ces  verites  dternelles ;  et  les 
voir,  c'est  me  tourner  a  Celui,  qui  est  immuablement  toute  Verite, 
et  recevoir  Ses  Lumieres. 

Cet  Objet  Eternel,  c'est  Dieu,  eternellement  Subsistant,  eter- 
nellement  Veritable,  eternellement  la  Verite  meme.  —  De  la  Con- 
noissance  de  Dieu  et  de  Soi-meme,  cap.  iv.  n.  o. 

I  was  led  to  this  passage  of  Bossuet,  by  a  work  of 
M.  Jourdain  on  St.  Thomas's  Philosophy.  The  author 
adds,  that c  les  maitres  les  plus  autorises  de  la  philosophic 
du  17e  siecle  .  .  tombent  d'accord  avec  Bossuet 'in 
this  statement  (vol.  ii.  p.  375).  Fenelon  certainly 
holds  the  same  doctrine ;  as  large  passages  from  his 
work  on  the  Existence  of  God  amply  demonstrate. 
The  following  may  suffice:  — 

Toutes  nos  connaissances  universelles  ont  Dieu  meme  pour  Objet 
fmmediat ;  mais  Dieu  considere  avec  certaine  precision,  par 
rapport  aux  divers  degres  selon  lesquels  il  peut  communiquer 
Son  Eire.— Part  2,  n.  56. 

The  'Prselectiones  Philosophies,'  used  at  St.  Sulpice, 
make  the  same  statement : — 

f  In  Essentia  Diviria  continentur  relationes  essentiales  et  neces- 
sariaB  rerum.' — n.  1557. 

Nay,  M.  Jourdain  tells  us  that  William  of  Auvergne, 
as  bishop,  condemned  in  the  year  1240  the  '  heretical 


ON  INTUITIONS  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CERTITUDE.    47 

'  proposition/  c  qu'il  y  a  des  ve*rites  e*ternelles,  qui  ne 
'sont  pas  Dieu  meine.'  (Vol.  i.  p,  51.) 

A  little  research  would  enable  me  (no  doubt)  to 
accumulate  a  large  number  of  such  passages,  from 
the  highest  authorities.  But  there  is  no  need  of  such 
research  ;  for  the  conclusion  is  one,  which  will  at  once 
commend  itself  both  to  the  judgment  and  feelings  of 
all  devout  Catholics.* 

20.  Having  now  then  sufficiently  prepared  the  way, 
for  those  theses  which  I  am  mainly  anxious  to  prove,  I 
shall  here  close  the  present  Section,  the  various  pro- 
positions, which  we  have  (I  think)  established  in  the 
course  of  it,  are  very  closely  connected  with  philo- 
sophical controversies,  which  have  been  at  all  times 
most  keenly  and  earnestly  discussed,  and  never  more 
so  than  at  the  present  time.  I  have  endeavoured  how- 
ever to  steer  clear  of  these  controversies,  so  far  as  was 
consistent  with  what  was  absolutely  necessary  for  my 
design.  Not  that  I  regard  these  controversies  as  unim- 
portant :  on  the  contrary,  they  appear  to  me  vitally 
momentous  ;  and  perhaps  more  so  now  than  at  any 
former  period.  Nor  has  the  reason  of  my  procedure 
altogether  been,  that  I  am  without  a  decided  opinion 
upon  them ;  for  on  some  of  the  matters  at  issue,  I  have 
been  led  to  form  a  very  decided  opinion.  But  my 
direct  subject  being  Theology  and  not  Philosophy,  I 
have  felt  all  through,  that  it  was  very  desirable  to  con- 
fine strictly  our  philosophical  discussions  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  those  truths,  which  are  indispensably 
requisite  as  a  foundation  for  what  is  to  follow. 

*  A  very  able  and  learned  writer  in  the  'Dublin  Review'  (June  1857, 
p.  411,  note)  has  some  remarks  on  this  doctrine.  I  do  not  understand  him 
however  to  question  it,  but  to  deprecate  its  adoption  as  the  basis  of '  Ethi- 
cal Science  :'  'it  were  an  unsuitable  basis,'  he  says,  'on  which  to  build  up 
*  Ethical  Science.'  And  I  the  rather  think  this  must  be  the  writer's  mean- 
ing, because  only  a  few  pages  back  he  himself  seems  to  have  asserted  the 
same  doctrine.  '  Necessary  and  absolute  ideas,'  he  remarks  (p.  407)  { are 
'the  Divine  Idea  itself,  presenting  itself  under  different  aspects.' 

It  is  a  very  interesting  question,  and  one  which  it  is  very  desirable  that 
some  competent  person  should  treat,  how  far  the  scholastics,  in  all  which 
they  say  about  the  immutable  essences  of  things,  do  not  tend  in  some 
measure  to  imply  the  doctrine  stated  in  the  text.  See  a  very  remarkable 
passage  in  Vasquez,  on  the  1'  2'e,  d.  97,  n.  9. 


48 


SECTION  II. 

On  the  Essential  Characteristics  of  Moral  Truth. 

i 

21.  We  may  begin  this  Section,  by  stating  two  or 
three  extremely  simple  moral  judgments,  which  would 
be  formed  spontaneously  by  any  human  being,  who 
should  know  the  circumstances  of  the  respective  cases. 
The  first  judgment  given  shall  contain  the  special  idea 
of  moral  obligation. 

A  friend  of  mine,  who  has  loaded  me  with  benefits, 
entrusts  to  my  keeping  a  jewel  of  great  value,  for  the 
sake  of  its  safe  custody  ;  while  he  goes  to  seek  his  for- 
tune in  other  lands.  He  returns  in  a  state  of  great 
distress,  and  reclaims  his  jewel.  I  recognise  imme- 
diately, and  without  the  faintest  shadow  of  doubt,  that 
I  ought  to  restore  it ;  or  in  other  words  that  I  am  under 
the  moral  obligation  of  restoring  it. 

Now,  before  going  further,  let  us  consider  what  is 
precisely  meant  here  by  the  phrsse  'moral  obligation.' 
When  I  say  that  I  am  under  the  moral  obligation  of 
restoring  the  jewel,  I  mean  neither  more  nor  less  than 
that  the  not  restoring  it  would  be  '  morally  evil.'  If 
we  examine  our  own  consciousness,  we  shall  find  that 
invariably  this  term  '  moral  obligation '  is  but  corre- 
lative to  the  other  term  '  morally  evil.7  When  I  say 
that  such  an  act,  under  such  circumstances,  is  of 'moral 
obligation,'  I  mean  neither  more  nor  less,  than  that  to 
abstain  from  doing  it  would  be  'morally  evil.'  When 
I  say  that  c  the  avoidance  of  such  an  act  would  be  of 
moral  obligation/  I  mean  that  '  the  doing  it  would  be 
morally  evil.'  The  term  '  moral  obligation '  then,  by 
no  means  need  imply  the  existence  of  some  other  person, 


THE  ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MORAL  TRUTH.    49 

who  imposes  the  obligation;*  it  implies  no  more,  than 
the  existence  in  certain  acts  of  this  quality,  'moral  evil.'f 
Of  this  particular  term  '  moral  obligation '  then,  I  need 
not  make  any  further  explicit  mention  ;  because  its 
explanation  is  necessarily  contained,  in  the  explanation 
of  its  correlative  '  morally  evil.* 

The  first  moral  judgment  then,  which  I  have  given 
for  illustration,  may  be  stated  thus :  '  to  refuse  restora- 
tion of  the  jewel  under  these  circumstances  would  be 
morally  evil/ 

Take  this  as  a  second  judgment.  A  rich  man, 
instead  of  giving  himself  up  to  luxurious  indolence, 
devotes  himself  indefatigably  to  some  object  of  great 
public  importance.  If  I  believe  that  his  motives  for 
doing  so  are  pure  and  simple,  I  judge  that  this  conduct 
is  4  morally  good.' 

And  take  this  as  a  third  judgment.  A  and  B  are 
two  men  of  my  acquaintance.  A  devotes  the  main 
current  of  his  life, — devotes  his  labour,  his  time,  his 
wealth, — to  instructing  the  ignorant,  relieving  the  dis- 
tressed, promoting  the  cause  of  virtue.  B  on  the  other 

*  "  Ceux  qui  ne  veulent  pas,  que  la  connaissance  du  juste  et  de  Vinjuste 
suffise  pour  imposer  une  obligation  proprement  dite,  sont  fort  embarrasses 
de  trouver  le  fondement  de  Fobligation  a  la  Loi  Naturelle." —  Gerdil,  to  be 
quoted  at  length  in  Sec.  iv. 

t  The  text  is  so  worded  as  to  imply  a  doctrine,  which  I  hold  to  be 
certainly  true  ;  viz.,  that  the  '  malitia '  of  a  bad  act  is  a  positive  attribute  : 
This  question  is  to  be  considered,  among  others,  in  the  third  Book  ;  nor 
•would  it  have  been  alluded  to  here,  had  there  not  been  an  impression  (as  I 
find)  in  the  mind  of  some  Catholics,  that  the  doctrine  which  I  follow  is  of 
questionable  theological  soundness.  Some  Catholics,  I  say,  are  under  the 
impression,  that  there  is  at  least  a  consent  of  theologians  in  favour  of  a. 
proposition,  contradictory  to  our  doctrine ;  the  proposition,  namely,  that 
the  '  malitia '  of  an  evil  act  consists  entirely  in  the  '  privatio  rectitudinis 
debitse.'  The  following  extract  will  abundantly  show  how  totally  mistaken 
is  any  such  impression  ;  and  how  completely  the  question  is  an  open  one 
among  theologians.  It  is  taken  from  the  '  Theol  >gia  Scholastica '  of  that 
well-known  English  theologian,  F.  Compton  Carleton,  S.  J. 

'Secunda  ergo  et  probabilior  sententia  affirmat,  malitiam  moralcm  actus 
peccaminosi  consistere  in  aliquo  positive,  positivd  scilicet  difformitate  ad 
rectam  rationem.  Ita  Medina ;  Bannez  ;  Zamel ;  Caietanus,  asserens  se  non 
ausurum  fuisse  hoc  dicere,  nisi  id  clare  docuisset  S.  Thomas.  Addit  tamen 
huic  actui  Caietanus  aliam  malitiam  privativam,  in  carentia  rectitudinis 
sitam.  .  .  Eandem  sententiam  sequitur  Vasquez,  Lessius,  Erice,  Coninck, 
Gabriel,  Raymundus,  Arriaga,  Amicus ;  estque  communissima  hodie  inter 
recentiores  opinio.' — d.  100,  §  3,  n.  1. 

E 


50  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

hand,  without  grossly  neglecting  any  of  his  immediate 
duties,  leads  on  the  whole  a  life  of  great  comfort  and 
enjoyment.  If  I  believe  A's  motives  to  be  good,  I 
judge  without  the  slightest  doubt  that  A's  course  of 
life  is  *  morally  better '  than  B's. 

These  three  judgments,  I  need  not  say,  are  very 
closely  related  to  each  other.  In  the  first,  I  hold  that 
a  certain  act  is  'morally  evil;'  in  the  second,  that  a 
certain  course  of  life  or  series  of  acts  is  'morally  good;' 
in  the  third,  that  one  course  of  life  or  series  of  acts  is 
more  '  morally  good '  than  another.  I  have  the  idea 
then,  however  I  came  by  it,  of  a  certain  quality  which 
I  call  '  moral  goodness.'  This  quality  is  of  such  funda- 
mental importance,  that  no  more  momentous  question 
can  possibly  engage  our  mind,  than  an  examination 
into  its  real  nature. 

I  begin  with  making  one  statement,  which  will  be 
found  (1  think)  of  the  utmost  value,  both  in  promoting 
clearness  of  thought  on  the  subject,  and  also  in  serving 
as  a  basis  for  the  argument  which  will  succeed.  The 
idea,  expressed  by  this  term  'morally  good,'  is  a  'simple' 
idea.  And  in  a  matter  of  such  very  great  importance, 
you  must  allow  me  to  proceed,  first  of  all,  at  some  little 
length,  in  merely  explaining  what  is  meant  by  this 
statement. 

22.  The  idea  expressed  by  the  term  '  sweet,' — when 
I  judge  e.  g.  that  this  lump  of  sugar  is  'sweet' — is  a 
simple  idea.  I  may  explain  '  sweet '  indeed,  by  saying 
that  it  is  the  opposite  to  '  bitter  ;'  just  as  I  may  explain 
'  bitter '  by  saying  that  it  is  the  opposite  to  '  sweet.' 
But  any  further  explanation  than  this  is  impossible :  he 
who  has  never  experienced  the  sensation  in  question,  can- 
not possibly  understand  the  term.  So  I  may  explain 
'  morally  good,'  by  saying  it  is  the  opposite  to  '  morally 
evil ;'  or  I  may  explain  '  morally  evil,'  by  saying  it  is 
the  opposite  to  '  morally  good.'  But  I  maintain  that 
WKJ  further  explanation  of  the  term  is  impossible  ;  that 
if  a  man  had  never  experienced  the  exact  thought  in 
question,  he  would  not  by  possibility  be  made  to  under- 
stand the  term. 


TUB  ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MORAL  TRUTH.    51 

The  opposite  to  a  '  simple  idea  '  is  a  { complex  idea  ;' 
and  the  great  majority  of  those  which  the  mind  con- 
ceives are  of  this  character.  Take  for  instance  that 
idea,  which  we  express  by  the  term  l  a  poetical  tempera- 
ment:'— of  how  many  simple  ideas  is  it  not  composed! 
Numbers  of  men  no  doubt  use  the  term,  having  learned 
from  others  to  use  it  with  this  or  that  application,  who 
attach  to  it  very  little  definite  meaning.  But  how 
different  is  the  case  with  those  who  intelligently  apply 
it !  That  it  is  a  most  complex  idea,  is  admitted  by  all 
philosophers :  what  precisely  are  those  simple  ideas 
whereof  it  consists, — this  is  among  the  most  difficult, 
as  among  the  most  interesting,  of  psychological  ques- 
tions. There  are  certain  qualities  of  mind,  which  are 
found,  in  certain  marked  instances,  to  exist  together  in 
very  special  intensity ;  while  other  qualities  are  not 
found  to  exist  in  all  these  marked  instances  to  any 
intense  degree.  From  the  fact  of  the  former  qualities 
being  so  often  found  united  with  each  other  in  special 
intensity,  we  think  of  them  in  combination;  and  we  give 
to  that  combination  a  name  of  its  own.  But  to  resolve 
that  combination  into  its  component  parts, —  in  other 
words,  to  analyse  that  complex  idea  into  the  simple 
ideas  of  which  it  consists, — this  requires  the  most  care- 
ful and  accurate  observation. 

Let  us  suppose  the  analysis  rightly  performed.  By 
a  'poetical  temperament'  then,  is  meant  the  possession 
in  an  intense  degree  of  certain  mental  qualities  ;  A,  B, 
C,  D,  and  E. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  show  how  complex  is  the 
idea  expressed  by  that  phrase, — c  the  poetical  tempera- 
ment.' For  another  illustration,  consider  how  complex 
is  the  idea  which  we  express,  in  saying  that  '  A  and  B 
are  attached  friends.'  That  they  sincerely  desire  each 
other's  welfare, — this  is  part  of  the  idea:  but  how 
much  more  does  it  not  also  contain! 

A  third  instance  shall  be  given,  because  of  its  theo- 
logical importance.  The  One  Perfectly  Simple  Being, 
Who  exists  or  possibly  can  exist,  is  Almighty  God :  and 


52  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

moreover,  if  we  are  so  happy  as  hereafter  to  see  Him 
in  Heaven,  that  idea  of  Him,  which  we  shall  receive 
from  His  Facial  Vision,  will  be  simple  even  as  He  is 
Simple.  But  here  in  via  our  idea  of  Him  becomes 
more  complex,  in  proportion  as  it  becomes  more  real 
and  definite.  We  may  think  of  Him  vaguely,  as  the 
'  Cumulus  of  all  Perfections : '  but  if  we  wish  to  grow 
in  His  knowledge  and  love,  we  must  obtain  of  Him  a 
far  more  real  and  definite  notion.  How  do  I  form  for 
myself  such  a  notion  ?  I  ponder  on  one  Perfection 
after  another:  Power,  Knowledge,  Sanctity,  and  the 
rest ;  and  I  reflect  on  His  possessing  all  these  per- 
fections in  infinite  extent.  The  highly  complex  idea 
which  I  thus  obtain,  is  a  very  real  knowledge  of  Him, 
so  far  as  it  goes  ;  and  it  is  the  nearest  approach  to  a 
full  knowledge  which  we  can  possibly  gain,  so  long  as 
we  are  exiles  (alas!)  from  our  True  Home. 

But  as  there  are  c  complex  ideas,'  so  evidently  there 
must  be  'simple  ideas.'  Complex  ideas  are  analysed 
into  simpler  ones;  these  again  perhaps,  into  others 
simpler  still.  At  length  then,  we  must  come  to  a 
position  where  further  analysis  is  impossible;  a  posi- 
tion where  the  ideas,  into  which  we  have  decomposed 
the  original  idea,  are  themselves  perfectly  simple. 

23.  We  are  now  able  to  understand  two  terms, 
which  are  frequently  used  by  modern  philosophers,  and 
which  will  greatly  assist  us  in  our  subsequent  enquiries. 
Some  judgments  are  '  analytical,'  others  c  synthetical.' 
And  in  like  manner, —  since  a  '  proposition  '  is  merely 
the  verbal  expression  of  a  'judgment,' — some  pro- 
positions are  '  analytical,'  and  others  '  synthetical.' 

An  '  analytical  'judgment  is  one,  in  which  it  is  judged 
that  the  idea  of  one  term  is  contained  in  the  very  idea 
of  the  other.*  Thus  if  I  say  that  'he  who  possesses  a 
4  poetical  temperament,  possesses  in  an  intense  degree 
*  the  qualities  B  and  E,'  I  shall  be  forming  an  analyti- 

*  Perhaps  I  should  make  some  apology  for  using  the  words  'term,' 
'  subject,' '  predicate '  (both  here  and  elsewhere),  not  only  when  speaking  of 
propositions,  but  of  judgments  not  expressed  in  words. 


THE  ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MORAL  TRUTH.    53 

cal  judgment;  for  I  consider  that  the  idea  of  possessing 
these  qualities  in  an  intense  degree,  is  contained  in  the 
very  idea  '  a  poetical  temperament.' 

Those  judgments,  which  are  not  (  analytical,'  are 
called  '  synthetical :'  and  we  may  give  an  illustration 
or  two  almost  at  random,  for  the  purpose  of  making 
clearer  the  distinction  between  these  two  classes.  Sup- 
pose I  form  this  judgment ;  '  my  parents  were  instru- 
'  mental  to  my  birth  into  the  world :'  here  is  an  '  analy- 
tical '  judgment ;  this  is  part  of  what  I  mean,  when  I 
say  'my  parents.'  But  suppose  I  form  this  judgment; 
'  my  parents  should  be  honoured  and  obeyed  by  me  : ' 
here  is  a  '  synthetical  judgment.'  We  may  consider 
this  latter  judgment  indeed  to  be  intuitively  evident: 
but  still  the  idea  of  *  claiming  justly  my  honour  and 
obedience,'  is  not  part  of  the  idea  which  I  express,  when 
I  say  i  my  parents.'  Another  illustration  may  be  taken 
from  a  thesis,  which  I  argue  in  the  fifth  Section  of  the 
second  Chapter.  To  judge  that  happiness  consists  in  a 
gratification  of  the  propensions, — is  to  elicit  an  'ana- 
lytical' judgment:  the  judgment  results  at  once,  from 
considering  what  is  meant  by  '  happiness,' '  propension,' 
'gratification.'  But  to  judge  that  'earthly  happiness 
4  is  most  surely  obtained  by  means  of  virtue,' — this, 
however  true,  is  no  'analytical' judgment:  its  truth  is 
made  manifest,  by  examining,  not  the  sense  of  words, 
but  the  properties  of  things. 

Analytical  judgments  may  be  '  true  '  or  '  false  ;'  for 
it  is  evident  that  I  may  be  mistaken  in  my  opinion,  that 
this  idea  is  contained  in  that.  In  regard  to  the  more 
complicated  phenomena  even  of  my  own  mind,  I  may 
make  very  serious  mistakes  when  I  attempt  their 
analysis. 

A  second  division  of  analytical '  judgments  may  be 
into  '  objective '  and  '  subjective.'  For  (1)1  may  judge, 
that  one  idea  is  contained  in  another,  as  I  am  at  this 
moment  conceiving  the  latter  idea.  Or  (2),  I  may  judge 
that  those  who  conceive  the  complex  idea  most  clearly 
and  fully,  those  who  use  the  word  expressing  it  most 
intelligently, — that  those  men  tend  more  and  more  to 


54  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

include  in  it  such  and  such  simpler  ideas.  In  the 
former  case,  I  judge  that  the  complex  idea,  as  I  now 
conceive  it,  contains  these  simpler  ideas  :  in  the  latter 
case,  I  judge  that  the  complex  idea,  in  its  full  objective 
sense,  contains  them.  The  former  class  then  may  be 
called  'subjective,'  the  latter  '  objective  '  analytical  judg- 
ments ;  and  great  confusion  of  thought  sometimes  arises 
from  the  neglect  of  this  distinction. 

Then  again  we  may  divide  analytical  judgments 
into  '  exhaustive '  and  *  partial : '  accordingly  as  I  judge 
that  I  am  recounting  the  whole,  or  merely  some  part 
(greater  or  less),  of  those  simpler  ideas,  which  together 
constitute  the  4  complex.' 

There  is  one  class  of  propositions,  which  must  rank 
under  the  head  'analytical,'  but  which  are  quite  un- 
worthy of  so  respectable  a  name  ;  nay,  which  hardly 
deserve  the  appellation  of  propositions  at  all.  I  mean 
c  tautological '  statements,  or  truisms.  In  these  state- 
ments,— not  merely  the  idea  of  one  term  is  contained 
in  that  of  the  other  (as  it  is  in  all  analytical  proposi- 
tions), but  there  is  no  idea  expressed  in  either  term, 
which  is  not  clearly,  distinctly,  and  explicitly  expressed 
in  the  other.  Suppose  for  instance,  that  I  define  a  penta- 
gon to  be  '  a  rectilineal  figure  with  five  sides ; '  and  then 
proceed  gravely  to  enunciate  the  proposition,  '  every 
pentagon  has  five  sides.'  This  is  the  same  kind  of 
proposition,  as  though  I  affirmed  '  a  table  is  a  table,'  or 
ca  tree  is  a  tree.'  We  may  call  ordinary  analytical 
propositions  by  the  name  'solid/  to  distinguish  them 
from  such  empty  statements  as  these  tautologies. 

It  may  be  asked  in  conclusion,  '  can  those  judgments 
of  Consciousness,  spoken  of  in  the  preceding  Section, 
ever  amount  to  solid  analytical  judgments  ?'  Most 
clearly  not.  A  judgment  of  consciousness  is  one,  which 
does  not  require  at  all  for  its  evidence  the  mind's  '  in- 
tuitional light ; '  it  is  simply  the  mind's  momentary 
glance  on  its  actually  present  phenomena.  It  is  per- 
fectly impossible,  that  I  can  perform  a  solid  analysis  of 
any  one  among  my  mental  phenomena,  except  by 
fixing  my  gaze  on  it  for  some  period  of  time.  In  doing 


THE  ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MORAL  TRUTH.    55 

this,  I  take  for  granted  that  the  phenomenon  in  question 
is  substantially  the  same  at  each  separate  instant,  which 
it  was  in  the  previous  instant.  But  this  fact  cannot  be 
known  to  me  by  '  consciousness : '  it  is  only  known  to 
me  by  c  intuition ; '  by  that  particular  kind  of  intuition, 
which  I  call  an  act  of  memory.  A  judgment  of  con- 
sciousness then  is,  by  absolute  necessity,  a  simply 
tautologous  judgment:  4my  present  feeling  is  what  it 
is  ;'  or  '  is  what  I  now  feel  it  to  be/ 

24.  Proceeding  then  to  our  immediate  theme, — it  is 
plain,  from  what  has  been  said,  that  nothing  can  be 
more  thoroughly  intelligible,  than  the  inquiry  on  which 
we  are  about  to  enter.  If  I  say  that  the  taste,  which  I 
receive  from  this  lump  of  sugar,  is  c  sweet/  this  term 
'sweet'  expresses  a  simple  idea.  If  I  say  that  the 
lump  itself  is  c  hard/  this  term  expresses  a  complex 
idea;  for  it  includes  (1),  the  idea  of  muscular  pressure, 
and  (2),  of  resistance  to  that  pressure.  Now  in  con- 

•     1  •  .          •  .•  T       •  1  .  1  .        •   .        •  x  11 

rally 
is 

that 

this  is  *  morally  better  '  than  that.  The  question  before 
us  is,  whether  this  idea,  c  morally  good,'  and  its  opposite 
4  morally  evil,'  be  simple  or  complex  ideas ;  whether  they 
be  simple,  like  the  idea  4  sweet ; '  or  complex,  like  the  idea 
'  hard.'* 

On  questions  of  this  sort,  Reason  has  one,  and  one 
only,  court  of  final  appeal ;  the  impartial  judgment  of  a 
reasonable  man,  who  will  reflect  on  what  passes  in  his 
own  mind.  It  is  simply  unmeaning  to  ask  for  any 
proof  except  this  ;  all  that  a  controversialist  can  do,  is 

*  So  the  "  Prselectiones  Philosophies"  speak  of  those  philosophers  who 
hold,  *  boni  et  mali  notionem  primitivam  esse  et  in  aliam  clariorem  irreduc- 
'tibilem*  (n.  1510):  and  they  distinguish  these  from  others,  who  think 
*  bonitatem  et  malitiam  ex  pluribus  conceptibus  coalescere*  (n.  1513).  I 
should  add  in  candour  that  the  author  of  the  "Prselectiones"  differs  from 
me,  and  regards  'morally  evil'  as  a  complex  idea.  He  states  however 
(n.  1511),  that  the  whole  Scotch  school  of  Philosophy  take  the  view  which  I 
advocate  ;  and  I  need  hardly  add  that  Catholic  writers  always  express  great 
respect  for  the  dicta  of  this  school.  An  instance  will  be  found  of  this,  in 
the  quotation  from  Perrone  to  be  inserted  in  Sec.  4. 


56  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

to  lead  men  (as  best  lie  may)  to  fix  their  attention, 
each  for  himself,  on  those  particular  facts,  of  which  he 
may  wish  to  obtain  their  recognition.  And  obviously 
our  most  satisfactory  course  in  the  present  instance 
will  be,  to  begin  by  examining  what  our  opponents 
maintain.  We  will  proceed  then  at  once  to  consider 
the  different  analyses  of  the  term  '  morally  evil,'  which 
have  been  attempted  by  those  various  philosophers, 
who  have  regarded  it  as  capable  of  analysis. 

25.  By  far  the  most  plausible  of  all  these  analyses, 
are  those  which  would  explain  '  morally  evil,'  as  mean- 
ing 'worthy  of  disapprobation,'  or  '  worthy  of  blame,'  or 
'  worthy  of  punishment.'  The  connection  is  undoubtedly 
most  close  and  indissoluble,  between  the  various  phases 
of  the  idea  'moral  goodness,'  on  the  one  hand, — -and  of 
these  ideas, — '  deserving  approbation'  or  '  praise'  or  're- 
ward,'—  on  the  other  hand.  Consider  such  judgments 
as  the  following: — 'All  wicked  actions  are  worthy  of 
disapproval,  of  blame,  of  punishment.'  'All  morally 
good  acts  are  worthy  of  approbation,  of  praise,  of 
reward.'  '  If  act  A  is  morally  better  than  act  B,  it  is 
more  worthy  of  approbation,  of  praise,  of  reward.'  All 
these  judgments  are  formed  so  readily  and  unmistake- 
ably, — it  is  so  impossible  even  to  imagine  their  contra- 
dictories,— that  the  predicate  in  each  case  might  not 
unnaturally  be  regarded,  as  containing  an  analysis  of 
the  subject.  If  then  it  be  found  that  no  such  claim 
can  be  maintained,  much  less  is  it  probable  that  any 
other  attempt  at  analysis  will  be  found  successful. 

And  yet  a  very  little  consideration  will  suffice  to 
overthrow  the  hypothesis  before  us.  Let  us  first  take 
the  first  of  these  three  alleged  analyses, — '  worthy  of 
disapprobation.'  Evidently  this  is  no  real  analysis. 
The  idea  '  disapprobation '  is  not  more  simple  than  the 
idea  f  morally  evil,'  but  the  very  contrary.  It  is  more 
complex  ;  it  contains  the  idea  '  morally  evil '  as  part  of 
itself.  For  what  at  last  is  meant  by  my  '  disapproba- 
tion '  of  an  act  ?  simply  my  recognition  of  it  as  '  morally 
evil.'  The  quality  '  morally  evil '  is  presupposed  as 


THE  ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MORAL  TRUTH.    57 

appertaining  to  the  act ;  and  the  word  4  disapprobation/ 
expresses  the  recognition  of  that  quality,  whether  by 
the  agent  or  by  some  other  person. 

Neither  therefore  can  i  morally  evil '  be  analysed 
as  signifying  '  worthy  of  blame ; '  for  '  blame  is  but  the 
expression  in  words,  of  that  intellectual  judgment  which 
we  call  c  disapprobation/ 

The  ideas  then,  4  disapprobation  '  and  '  blame,'  are 
more  complex,  not  more  simple,  than  the  idea  '  morally 
evil:'  and  even  more  obviously  is  the  same  assertion 
true,  of  the  idea  *  punishment.'  We  fully  understand 
all  that  is  meant  by  the  proposition  that  '  an  act  is 
morally  evil,'  before  we  have  so  much  as  considered 
the  question,  whether  it  be  '  worthy  of  punishment.'  It 
happens  indeed  continually,  that  we  elicit  the  former 
judgment,  without  proceeding  at  all,  explicitly  or 
implicitly,  to  elicit  the  latter.  On  so  plain  a  matter 
no  more  certainly  need  be  said. 

26.  Having  disposed  of  these,  the  most  plausible 
endeavours  at  analysis,  I  will  next  consider  an  explana- 
tion of  the  terms  '  morally  evil,'  which  is  not  unfre- 
quently,  nor  unnaturally,  given  by  devout  Catholics. 
These  excellent  men  consider  the  idea  c  morally  evil,'  as 
a  complex  one ;  and  as  signifying  neither  more  nor  less 
than  this, — 'forbidden  by  the  Creator.'  In  the  next 
Section  I  hope  to  adduce  a  series  of  arguments 
against  this  allegation  ;  here  I  will  confine  myself  to 
one.  This  one,  however,  I  will  state  at  full  length  and 
in  considerable  detail ;  because  it  will  be  found  equally 
available,  against  every  other  imaginary  analysis  of  our 
term,  which  has  been,  or  can  be,  attempted. 

At  starting  it  is  hardly  necessary  (I  suppose)  to 
make  one  observation.  It  is  of  course  admitted  by  all 
Theists,  that  everything  morally  evil  is  forbidden  by  the 
Creator ;  we  are  but  enquiring,  whether  this  can 
truly  be  called  the  meaning  of  the  term.  And  we  shall 
the  better  arrive  at  a  solution  of  this  question,  by  giving 
one  or  two  more  illustrations,  of  '  analytical '  and  4  syn- 
thetical '  judgments  respectively. 


58  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Suppose  I  put  before  you  this  proposition,  and  pro- 
pose to  prove  its  truth  : — '  two  mutually  attached  friends 
(of  whom  I  have  heard)  are  sincerely  desirous  of  pro- 
moting each  other's  welfare.'  You  will  answer  at  once : 
4  no  need  of  proof ;  of  course  the  statement  is  true ;  the 
'  very  idea  '  mutually  attached  friends  '  includes  the 
idea  '  desirous  of  promoting  each  other's  welfare.' ' 
Suppose  I  ask  you  whether  it  is  true,  that  all  hard 
substances  resist  muscular  pressure :  '  of  course,'  you 
will  reply;  '  that  is  what  we  mean  by  'hard  substances.' ' 
Suppose  I  ask,  '  is  it  true  that  my  parents  were  instru- 
mental in  bringing  me  into  the  world?'  You  will 
answer, —  'this  is  included  in  the  meaning  of  the  very 
''term  parents.'  All  these  judgments  then  are  analytical. 

But  suppose  I  put  before  you  this  proposition :  —  'to 
4  refuse  the  restitution  of  a  deposit  is  morally  evil/ 
Will  you  say  that  this  statement  is  included  in  the 
very  meaning  of  the  subject  ?  Of  course  not.  You 
fully  understand  all  that  is  meant\>y  the  term, — '  refusing 
'the  restitution  of  a  deposit,' — before  you  so  much  as 
consider  the  question,  whether  such  refusal  be  morally 
good  or  evil.  If  any  one  of  you  were  so  morally 
insensible  as  not  to  admit  that  such  refusal  is  morally 
evil,  he  would  none  the  less  call  such  refusal  '  the 
refusing  restitution  of  a  deposit.'  This  judgment  then, 
however  certain  and  obvious,  is  not  '  analytical,'  but 
'  synthetical.' 

Again  suppose  I  put  before  you  this  proposition  :  — 
ca  child's  disobedience  to  his  parents  in  an  indifferent 
matter  is  morally  evil :' — you  will  make  the  same  remark 
as  in  the  former  case.  You  understand  all  that  is  meant 
by  the  term  'a  child's  disobedience,  &c.'  before  you 
consider  the  question  whether  it  be  morally  evil.  The 
proposition  is  synthetical. 

Or,  suppose  I  put  before  you  this  proposition  :  — 
'  disobedience  to  the  Creator  is  morally  evil :' — you  will 
be  quite  as  ready,  as  in  the  former  instances,  to  make  the 
very  same  remark.  You  understand  what  is  meant  by 
4  disobedience  to  the  Creator,'  before  you  consider  the 


THE  ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MORAL  TRUTH.    59 

question  whether  or  no  it  be  morally  evil.  If  a  monster 
could  be  found  who  denied  that  such  disobedience  is 
wrong,  he  would  none  the  less  call  it  '  disobedience.' 
This  judgment,  like  the  two  former,  is  plainly  synthetical. 

I  am  quite  certain  that  you  would  give  this  answer, 
quite  as  readily  in  the  latter  as  in  the  former  instances  ; 
and  I  have  been  anxious  to  obtain  your  spontaneous 
judgment,  before  you  should  be  aware  of  its  bearing 
on  our  question.  The  one  appeal  of  Reason  in  such 
cases,  as  I  have  already  said,  is  to  the  impartial  judg- 
ment of  an  intelligent  person,  who  will  reflect  on  what 
passes  in  his  own  mind.  Now  the  best  mode  of  secur- 
ing the  requisite  impartiality,  is  that  you  should  be 
induced  simply  to  examine  your  own  consciousness, 
without  even  knowing  the  philosophical  effect  of  your 
answer. 

That  answer  however  having  been  given,  I  would 
next  beg  you  to  observe  that  it  is  absolutely  decisive  on 
the  point  at  issue.  '  Disobedience  to  the  Creator,'  is 
neither  more  nor  less  than  the  'doing  that  which  is 
'forbidden  by  the  Creator  ;'  and  our  opponents  main- 
tain that  the  very  meaning  of  the  term  '  morally  evil ' 
is  simply  this.  But  so  far  is  this  from  the  case,  that  you 
have  already  admitted  its  precise  contradictory. 

We  have  been  considering  this  proposition, — c  the 
c  doing  what  our  Creator  forbids  is  morally  evil.7  On 
our  opponents'  view  this  proposition  is  analytical :  for 
on  their  view  the  very  meaning  of  the  subject  and  pre- 
dicate is  precisely  identical.  But  you  have  already 
admitted  it  as  most  clear  and  undeniable,  that  the  pro- 
position is  '  synthetical,'  and  not  analytical ;  or,  (in 
other  words)  you  have  admitted  it  as  clear  and  unde- 
niable, that  the  idea  '  morally  evil,'  is  not  equivalent  to 
the  idea  '  forbidden  by  the  Creator.' 

Nothing  more  need  in  strictness  be  added  :  but 
since  it  is  of  fundamental  importance,  that  your  full 
assent  should  be  given  to  the  thesis  which  we  are  ad- 
vocating, I  will  still  proceed  in  defending  it ;  I  will 
adopt  yet  another  method  for  bringing  home  to  your 
consciousness  the  same  argument  for  its  truth. 


60  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Let  there  be  a  '  true  subjective  analytical '  judgment, 
whether  '  exhaustive '  or  c  partial.'  It  is  literally  impos- 
sible for  us  to  to  elicit  a  judgment  contradictory  to  this  ; 
and  the  proposition,  which  would  express  such  contra- 
dictory judgment,  is  simply  unmeaning.  This  is  so 
evident,  that  it  belongs  to  the  region  of  Formal  Logic. 
By  the  term  Z,  I  mean  at  this  moment  to  express  a 
complex  idea,  which  includes  as  parts  of  itself  the 
ideas  A,  B,  and  C.  If  this  be  so,  to  speak  of  Z  as  existing 
without  A,  B,  or  C,  is  simply  unmeaning  :  it  is  like 
speaking  of  a  '  table  which  is  not  a  table,7  or  4  a  friend 
who  is  not  a  friend.' 

Illustrative  instances  of  this  are  ready  to  our  hand, 
in  any  number.  I  put  before  you  e.g.  this  statement : 
'there  are  two  mutually  attached  friends  of  my  ac- 
quaintance, who  have  no  desire  for  each  other's  welfare/ 
I  beg  you  to  apprehend  fully  the  meaning  of  this  pro- 
position, in  order  that  afterwards  you  may  form  some 
judgment  on  its  truth  or  falsehood.  You  will  reply 
of  course  :  '  the  statement  has  no  meaning  which  can 
cbe  apprehended;  one  of  its  terms  contradicts  the 
'  other ;  [  there  is  no  corresponding  judgment  at  all ; 

*  it  is  as  though  you  said  that  there  is  a  certain  table 
'  which  is  not  a  table,  or  a  certain  tree  which  is  not  a 

*  tree.'     And  the  same  would  be  your  answer,  if  I  put 
before  you  any  statements  which  are  contradictory  to 
'true  subjective  analytical '  propositions.     Suppose  e.g. 
I  said, — '  there  is  a  certain  hard  substance,  which  offers 
'  no  resistance  to  muscular  pressure ; '  or  l  there  is  a  cer- 
'tain  effect,  which  has  no  relation  to  its  cause.'     In  all 
such  cases,  the  more  carefully  you  should  examine  the 
terms  of  the  statement,  the  more  irresistibly  would  you 
recognise  the  fact,  that  it  has  no  real  meaning  what- 
ever. 

But  now  on  the  other  hand  consider  such  a  state- 
ment as  this  :  '  it  is  not  wrong  to  refuse  restitution  of  a 
deposit.'  Nothing  surely  can  be  more  intelligible  than 
such  a  statement,  though  nothing  can  be  more  obviously 
false.  Or  this  :  '  a  child's  disobedience  to  his  parents 
in  indifferent  matters  is  not  wrong.'  Or  this  :  '  dis- 


THE  ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MORAL  TRUTH.    61 

'  obedience  to  the  Creator  is  not  wrong  or  morally  evil/ 
This  last  statement,  like  the  two  former,  is  most  readily 
intelligible;  its  meaning  is  only  too  obvious  ;  it  is 
because  you  at  once  so  fully  understand  it,  that  you 
feel  against  it  such  prompt  and  irrepressible  detesta- 
tion. 

We  proceed  then  to  apply  our  principle.  Since  this 
statement  is  thus  readily  intelligible, —  since  it  is  in  the 
farthest  possible  degree  removed  from  the  attribute 
'unmeaning,7 — its  contradictory  is  not  a  'true  sub- 
jective analytical7  proposition.  But  according  to  our 
opponents,  its  contradictory  is  a  '  true  subjective  ana- 

*  lytical '  proposition.     For  what  is  its  contradictory  ? 
this  :  '  disobedience  to  our  Creator  (i.e.  the  doing  what 
our  Creator  forbids)  is  morally  evil.'     Now  it  is  the 
exact  and  definite  allegation  of  our  opponents,  that  this 
is    a    '  true    subjective    analytical 7   proposition ;    that 
whenever   I  use  the  term  '  morally  evil,'  I   precisely 
mean  '  that  which  the  Creator  forbids.7    Since  therefore, 
according  to  our  opponents7  doctrine,  this  would  be  a 
true  subjective  analytical  proposition; — and  since  we 
have  fully  established,  that  in  fact  it  is  not  such  a  pro- 
position ; — we  have  fully  established,  that  our  opponents' 
doctrine  is  mistaken. 

I  have  been  here  making  use  of  the  undeniable 
truth,  that  a  judgment,  contradictory  to  a  true  subjective 
analytical  judgment,  is  impossible  ;  and  that  the  pro- 
position, which  purports  to  express  it,  is  unmeaning. 
My  argument  in  no  respect  requires  me  to  deny,  that 
there  are  many  other  unmeaning  propositions  besides 
these  ;  but  only  that  these  are  unmeaning. 

27.  Now,  as  I  remarked  at  starting,  precisely  the 
same  mode  of  argument  which  I  have  adopted  in  the 
last  number,  will  apply,  with  precisely  the  same  force, 
to  the  refutation  of  every  other  analysis,  which  has 
been,  or  which  can  be,  attempted,  of  our  idea  '  morally 
good.7 

Thus  various   philosophers   have   maintained,  that 

*  morally   evil7  signifies  'adverse   to   the   interests  of 
'society.7     Take   then  this  proposition: — 'the  acting 


62  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

'  adversely  to  the  interests  of  society  is  morally  evil.' 
Is  this  an  '  analytical '  or  a  '  synthetical '  proposition  ? 
Plainly  the  latter.  For  (1)  we  understand  what  is 
meant  by  '  acting  injuriously  to  society/  hefore  we 
have  even  considered  the  question  whether  it  be  'morally 
evil.'  And  (2)  the  contradictory  to  this  proposition  is 
most  fully  intelligible,  however  obviously  false:  viz. 
4  the  acting  adversely  to  the  interests  of  society  is  not 
'  morally  evil.'  Our  proposition,  therefore,  is  most  un- 
deniably synthetical.  But  on  our  opponents'  view  it 
would  be  analytical ;  for  the  ideas  expressed  respectively 
by  the  subject  and  predicate  would  be  precisely  identi- 
cal. Since,  therefore,  the  proposition  is  undeniably 
synthetical; — and  since  it  is  equally  undeniable,  that 
on  our  opponents'  view  it  would  be  analytical; — it 
follows  that  our  opponents'  view  is  mistaken. 

I  may  now  safely  leave  to  you  the  easy  task,  of  ap- 
plying precisely  the  same  argument,  in  refutation  of  any 
other  attempt  at  analysing  the  idea  '  morally  evil.'  And 
we  may  consider  therefore  the  thesis  as  incontestably 
established,  that  this  idea,  and  its  correlative  '  morally 
'good,'  are  perfectly  simple,  and  incapable  of  further 
decomposition.  We  will  proceed  then,  without  further 
delay,  to  the  argument  which  we  propose  to  build  upon 
that  thesis.* 

*  It  will  have  been  seen  then  that  self-evident  moral  judgments  are 
considered  by  us  as  being  synthetical  intuitions.  Now  I  have  already 
(note  at  p.  29)  expressed  how  totally  I  condemn  that  scepticism,  which 
(I  believe)  is  at  the  very  foundation  of  Kant's  whole  philosophy.  I  shall 
not,  therefore,  be  misunderstood,  if  I  say  that  on  a  comparatively  sub- 
ordinate question,  if  I  rightly  understand  his  meaning,  I  cannot  but 
strongly  concur  with  him.  I  refer  to  his  position,  that  the  human  mind 
forms  various  '  a  priori  synthetical  judgments,'  and  that  moral  judgments 
are  in  the  number.  The  very  thoughtful  writer  in  the  "Dublin  Review," 
to  whom  I  have  already  referred  (note  to  p.  47),  although  declining  through- 
out to  express  his  own  moral  system,  yet  has  the  following  very  significant 
remark.  He  says  that  a  certain  statement  of  M.  Laforet '  must  inevitably 
'  force  on  one's  mind  the  conclusion,  that  ihe  subject' — i.e.  the  foundation 
of  moral  obligation — 'is  too  difficult  to  be  resolved  otherwise,  than  by 
'  taking  refuge  in  Kant's  theory  of  a  synthetic  judgment  a  priori.'  (D.  R. 
for  July  1857,  p.  434.)  And  elsewhere  he  says  of  Kant:  '  a  certain  class  of 
'  philosophers  ....  are  unable  to  measure  the  height  and  the  breadth  of 
'  the  great  philosopher  of  Konigsberg.  .  .  .  Kant  has  done  great  good  service 
1  in  Moral  Philosophy  as  well  as  elsewhere.  He  has  committed  grave 
'  mistakes ;  but  these  should  not  cause  us  to  forget  his  good  deeds'  (p.  420, 1). 


THE  ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MORAL  TRUTH.    63 

28.  Let  us  revert  to  the  particular  moral  judgment, 
stated  at  the  opening  of  the  Section  :  4  the  refusing  to 
4  restore  my  friend's  jewel  would  be  an  act  morally  evil/ 
We  now  set  ourselves  to  establish  in  order  the  three 
following  propositions.  First,  this  moral  judgment  is 
intuitive  and  not  inferential.  Secondly,  it  is  a  legiti- 
mate intuition ;  that  which  is  intued  is  a  real  intuem. 
Thirdly,  that  which  is  intued  is  a  necessary  intuem 
(see  n.  18,  p.  42). 

First,  I  say  this  moral  judgment  is  an  intuition; 
it  is  not  one  of  those  cases  mentioned  in  n.  2,  where  I 
fancy  that  to  be  an  intuition  which  is  really  an  inference. 
In  those  cases  we  can  state  various  propositions,  either 
already  recognised  as  true  or  now  themselves  intued, 
which  lead  by  way  of  logical  consequence  to  the  judg- 
ment in  question.  The  whole  distinction  between  in- 
tuitive judgments  and  inferential,  I  need  hardly  say, 
turns  upon  this  very  fact.  But  it  is  perfectly  impos- 
sible to  do  this  in  the  present  case ;  as  any  one  will  find 
who  makes  the  experiment.  Various  judgments  no 
doubt  are  formed,  antecedently  to  the  moral  judgment 
which  we  are  now  considering ;  but  they  are  formed, 
merely  as  the  matter  on  which  the  moral  judgment  is 
exercised,  not  as  premisses  whereof  the  moral  judgment 
is  a  conclusion.  Thus,  before  the  moral  judgment  in 
question,  I  have  judged  that  4  he  who  now  reclaims  the 
4  jewel  once  deposited  it  in  my  hands ;'  that  *  he  formerly 
4  loaded  me  with  benefits;'  that  'he  is  now  in  great 
4  distress;'  and  the  like.  But  no  number  of  such  judg- 
ments as  these,  however  brought  into  connexion  with 
each  other,  could  possibly  lead  by  way  of  logical  in- 
ference to  the  moral  judgment  founded  upon  them.  It 
is  perfectly  impossible,  I  say,  to  array  these  antecedent 
judgments  in  any  logical  shape,  such  that  the  moral 
judgment  which  we  are  considering  can  ever  emerge  as 
a  conclusion.  The  proof  of  this  is  obvious.  That  idea 


For  myself,  I  cannot  profess  any  such  acquaintance  with  Kant's  philosophy 
in  its  entireness,  as  would  warrant  me  in  holding  any  confident  judgment 
on  its  merits. 


64  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTKODUCTION. 

of  moral  good  or  evil,  which  is  the  most  characteristic 
element  of  this  moral  judgment,  is  not  met  with  ever 
so  distantly,  in  any  of  those  antecedent  judgments  to 
which  we  refer. 

If  indeed  4  morally  evil '  were  a  complex  idea,  this 
argument  would  not  be  conclusive.  It  might  be  argued 
in  reply,  '  True,  the  idea  "  morally  evil"  does  not  occur 
4  eo  nomine  in  those  anteeedent  judgments  ;  but  they 
4  may  nevertheless  very  possibly  contain  those  simple 
'  ideas,  whereof  the  complex  "  moral  evil"  is  composed. 
'  It  is  very  possible,  then,  that  our  moral  judgment 
'  may  be  the  result  of  a  logical  process.' 

But  *  moral  evil,'  as  we  have  seen,  is  a  perfectly 
simple  idea  ;  and  this  objection,  therefore,  cannot  be 
made.  Suppose  I  am  placed  in  the  circumstances 
above  mentioned,  and  that  my  friend  reclaims  his 
jewel.  I  readily  form  the  judgment,  that  '  to  refuse  its 
'  restitution  would  be  morally  evil.'  The  only  ante- 
cedent judgments,  whereon  this  persuasion  can  possibly 
be  supposed  to  depend,  are  those  judgments  whereby 
I  am  cognisant  of  the  facts  of  the  case.  Not  one  of 
those  judgments  contain  the  idea  'morally  evil'  directly 
or  indirectly  ;  while  of  the  moral  judgment,  on  the 
other  hand,  this  idea  is  the  most  prominent  character- 
istic. It  is  perfectly  impossible,  then,  that  this  moral 
judgment  can  result  by  logical  process  from  any  earlier 
judgments ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  it  can  be '  inferential.' 
But  if  not  i  inferential,'  it  is  '  intuitive.' 

29.  Having  shewn  then  that  this  moral  judgment 
is  an  intuition,  our  next  statement  shall  be  that  it  is  a 
legitimate  intuition.  In  order  to  establish  this,  let  us 
begin  by  applying  F.  Buffier's  three  criteria.  (See 
n.  15,  p.  37.) 

(1.)  The  first  of  these  criteria  is,  that  the  judg- 
ment intued  is  so  clear,  that  when  we  undertake  either 
to  prove  or  to  attack  it,  we  can  only  do  so  by  means 
of  propositions,  which  are  manifestly  neither  clearer 
nor  more  certain.  This  most  undoubtedly  holds  here. 
Suppose  you  set  about  proving  to  me  my  duty  of  re- 
storing this  jewel ;  what  proposition  can  even  be  ima- 


THE  ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MORAL  TRUTH.    65 

gined,  which  could  serve  you  as  a  premiss  ?  which 
could  strike  me  as  in  any  respect  clearer  or  more 
certain,  than  the  very  conclusion  at  which  you  would 
aim  ?  If  I  do  not  see  my  duty  at  once,  it  may  very 
safely  be  said  that  no  imaginable  course  of  argument 
could  make  me  see  it. 

(2.)  The  second  criterion  is,  that  the  judgment 
intued  shall  be  one,  so  universally  received  among  men 
in  all  times  and  places  and  by  every  sort  of  character, 
that  those  who  attack  it  shall  be  plainly,  as  compared 
with  the  rest  of  mankind,  fewer  than  one  to  one 
hundred  or  to  one  thousand.  The  moral  judgment 
before  us  does  more  than  satisfy  this  criterion  ;  for 
among  all  the  men  possessed  of  reason,  who  ever  lived 
or  who  ever  will  live,  not  one  could  be  found  to  call 
it  in  question. 

(3.)  The  third,  and  perhaps  the  most  important, 
criterion  suggested  by  the  Jesuit  philosopher,  is  the 
following ;  that  the  judgment  shall  be  so  strongly  im- 
pressed on  our  minds,  that  we  always  conform  our 
conduct  to  it,  notwithstanding  the  refinements  of  those 
who  imagine  a  contrary  opinion  :  which  very  men  in- 
deed themselves  act  conformably,  not  to  their  opinions 
thus  imagined,  but  to  those  first  truths  which  are  univer- 
sally received.  Now  to  apply  this.  Certain  ingenious 
philosophers  maintain,  that  he  who  keeps  back  a  deposit 
may  legitimately  be  regarded  by  us  with  hatred,  such 
as  that  which  we  feel  towards  a  foreign  invader,  as  an 
enemy  to  the  peace  and  welfare  of  society.  Or  again, 
they  say  that  he  may  be  regarded  by  us  with  pity,  as 
a  man  who  has  calculated  wrongly  his  own  chances  of 
happiness.  But  they  add,  that  the  judgment  which  we 
call  that  of  moral  disapprobation; — our  judgment  that 
his  conduct  is  morally  evil,  and  consequently  deserving 
of  reprobation  and  punishment; — that  all  this  is  un- 
founded and  delusive.  I  ask,  in  conformity  with  F. 
Buffier,  can  these  philosophers  themselves  carry  out 
their  principles  consistently  on  one  single  occasion  ? 
Is  it  possible  for  them  to  hear  of  conduct  so  flagitious, 


66  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

without  the  judgment  spontaneously  arising  in  their 
mind,  and  influencing  their  whole  demeanour  to  the 
offender,  that  it  is  flagitious  ?  I  repeat,  not  merely 
that  it  is  injurious  to  society  or  injurious  to  the  agent, 
but  that  it  is  also  flagitious  ?  So  much  on  F.  Buffier's 
criteria. 

But  again.  Suppose  we  wish  to  establish,  that  some 
mathematical  axiom  is  an  intuem  :  how  should  we  set 
about  the  enterprise  ?  For  instance,  '  every  rectilineal 
4  figure  which  has  three  sides  has  three  angles  :'  how 
do  we  know  that  our  intuition  of  this  verity  is  legitimate  ? 
I  suppose  it  is  a  sufficient  answer  to  say,  that  every 
one,  who  possesses  an  intellect  sufficiently  cultivated 
to  understand  the  terms  of  the  proposition,  by  the  con- 
stitution of  his  nature  must  assent  to  it.  To  apprehend 
precisely  what  is  meant  by  a  rectilineal  figure  of  three 
sides,  and  again  of  three  angles, — in  other  words,  to 
apprehend  what  is  meant  by  the  subject  and  the  predi- 
cate respectively, — this  may  require  some  little  mental 
effort.  But  so  soon  as  any  one  has  apprehended  this, 
he  forms  by  necessity  that  judgment,  which  recognises 
that  the  subject  and  predicate  agree  together.  I  am  not 
aware  that  any  further  proof  than  this  can  be  brought, 
for  the  legitimacy  of  this  mathematical  intuition. 

Now  a  proof  in  every  respect  equivalent  is  avail- 
able, to  establish  the  legitimacy  of  that  moral  judg- 
ment which  we  have  been  considering.  4  He  to  whom 
a  kind  and  bountiful  friend  has  entrusted  a  deposit, 
ought  to  restore  it  when  reclaimed  ;  or  acts  wickedly 
if  he  refuses  to  do  so.'  To  enter  sufficiently  into  the 
meaning  of  this  sentence, — in  other  words  to  master 
the  circumstances  of  the  case, — may  require  some 
little  effort ;  but  any  one  who  is  enabled  to  master  it, 
by  the  constitution  of  his  nature  forms  necessarily  the 
above  judgment.  I  may  add  also,  that  any  one  who 
Jinds  himself  under  similar  circumstances,  and  who  by 
consequence  penetrates  most  thoroughly  into  the  con- 
ditions of  the  case,  forms  the  relevant  moral  judgment 
with  far  greater  keenness  and  promptitude,  than  that 


THE  ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MORAL  TRUTH.    67 

with  which  he  would  form  any  mathematical  judgment 
whatever. 

30.  The  moral  evil,  then,  of  refusing  restitution  is 
an  intuem.  I  now  lastly  maintain  that  it  is  a  necessary 
intuem. 

It  is  admitted  by  all  Catholic  philosophers,  that 
mathematical  axioms  are  necessarily  true.  I  ask,  how 
they  would  profess  to  establish  this  important  state- 
ment ?  For  I  am  convinced  that  any  test,  which  would 
be  serviceable  to  their  purpose,  would  quite  as  fully 
establish  the  necessary  character  of  those  moral  axioms, 
which  we  are  here  considering.  I  suppose,  in  the  case 
of  mathematical  axioms,  they  would  put  the  thing  in 
some  such  way  as  the  following.  When  I  intue  that 
a  rectilineal  figure  of  three  sides  has  three  angles, 
I  intue  this  in  the  first  instance,  simply  with  reference 
to  that  particular  three-sided  figure,  which  I  have 
summoned  up  in  my  imagination.  Yet  a  moment's 
further  consideration  shews  me,  that  the  proposition 
is  not  confined  exclusively  to  this  figure ;  that  it  can  be 
predicated  with  equal  truth  of  every  three-sided  recti- 
lineal figure,  which  ever  did,  which  ever  will,  which 
ever  possibly  can,  exist.  The  test,  whereby  we  deter- 
mine that  the  axiom  is  legitimatelyintuedas  necessary, 
is  precisely  this  absolute  universality  of  the  judgment 
which  we  form  concerning  it. 

Now  in  the  moral  case  before  us,  this  identical  test 
applies  in  all  its  fulness.  Supposing  me  to  be  circum- 
stanced as  originally  supposed,  I  intue  in  the  first 
instance  that  I  am  under  the  moral  obligation  of  re- 
storing the  jewel.  But  a  moment's  consideration 
enables  me  to  carry  the  judgment  much  further.  On 
reflection  I  further  intue,  that  this  obligation  is  by  no 
means  peculiar  to  myself,  and  to  this  present  case ; 
I  intue  that  every  one  would  most  certainly  be  under 
the  same  obligation,  who  in  any  time  or  place  should 
be  found  under  the  same  circumstances. 

One  explanation  only  has  here  to  be  made.  When 
we  say  '  under  the  same  circumstances/  we  suppose 
that  the  whole  circumstances,  which  can  have  any 


68  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

bearing  on  the  morality  of  the  act,  are  identical  in  the 
various  instances.  I  might  imagine  the  case,  e.  g.  in 
which  this  friend  of  mine,  to  my  certain  knowledge, 
should  require  the  jewel,  for  the  purpose  of  committing 
some  great  crime.  To  say  the  least,  I  should  no  longer 
intue  with  any  clearness  that  it  would  be  my  duty  under 
such  circumstances  to  restore  it.  But  I  do  intue  with 
the  greatest  clearness,  that,  so  long  as  the  circumstances 
bearing  on  the  morality  of  the  act  remain  the  same, 
every  rational  being,  in  every  time  and  place,  would 
be  under  the  same  obligation  with  myself. 

31.  We  intue  it  then  as  a  necessary  truth,  that 
under  the  supposed  circumstances  the  jewel  ought  to 
be  restored ;  that  its  retention  would  be  sinful  or 
morally  evil.  Nothing  of  course  would  be  easier,  than 
to  mention  various  other  combinations  of  circumstances, 
under  which  also  the  path  of  duty  would  be  marked 
out  with  extreme  clearness.  In  every  such  case,  the 
arguments  which  have  been  brought  forward  in  this 
Section  retain  their  entire  force  ;  and  the  same  conclu- 
sion therefore  holds.  I  say,  we  legitimately  intue  it 
as  a  necessary  truth,  that  in  every  such  combination  of 
circumstances  a  certain  course  '-ought'  to  be  pursued  ; 
or  in  other  words,  that  there  is  a  c  moral  obligation'  of 
pursuing  it ;  or  in  other  words  again,  that  pursuing 
any  different  course  would  be  '  morally  evil.' 

Since  then  it  is  a  necessary  truth,  that  there  are 
various  combinations  of  circumstances  (be  they  more 
or  fewer)  under  which  a  certain  line  of  conduct  would 
be  morally  evil,  one  most  obvious,  yet  most  important, 
proposition  results. 

It  is  a  necessary  truth  then,  that  there  is  such  an 
attribute  as  we  denote  by  the  term  '  morally  evil ;'  an 
attribute,  which  is  not  a  combination  of  other  simpler 
attributes,  but  is  itself  perfectly  simple ;  an  attri- 
bute, which  appertains  to  certain  courses  of  conduct, 
pursued  by  certain  beings,  under  certain  circumstances. 
I  am  not,  of  course,  maintaining  it  as  a  necessary  truth, 
that  there  are  such  beings,  or  that  they  are  ever  placed 
in  such  circumstances.  But  we  have  shewn  it  to  be  a 


THE  ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MORAL  TRUTH.    69 

necessary  truth,  that  if  these  beings  exist,  and  if  they 
are  placed  in  such  circumstances,  certain  acts  done  by 
them  would  be  morally  evil.  On  precisely  the  same 
principles,  it  is  a  necessary  truth  that  a  second  class 
of  acts  done  by  them  would  be  '  morally  good  ; '  and  a 
third  class,  again, c  morally  preferable'  to  certain  others 
with  which  we  may  compare  them.  This  body  of 
Necessary  Truth,  whether  greater  or  smaller,  we  call 
Moral  Truth. 

32.  There  are  two  theses  then,  for  which  we  have 
been  principally  and  prominently  contending  in  this 
Section.  The  first  is,  that  'morally  evil,'  and  its 
correlative  '  morally  good,'  are  simple  ideas.  The 
second  is,  that  the  applicability  of  these  respective 
ideas  to  certain  acts,  done  under  certain  circumstances, 
is  intrinsecally  necessary.  There  are  many  philoso- 
phers, who  hold  the  latter  of  these  theses  without 
holding  the  former;  who  regard  Moral  Truth  as 
necessary,  but  do  not  consider  the  idea  of  moral  good- 
ness to  be  simple.  But  there  are  none  whatever  who 
hold  the  former  thesis  apart  from  the  latter  :  or,  in 
other  words,  every  thinker,  who  regards  the  idea 
'  morally  good  '  as  simple,  proceeds  to  the  further  con- 
clusion, that  Moral  Truth  is  necessary.  The  whole 
body  of  philosophers  then,  whether  Catholic  or  non- 
Catholic,  who  are  opposed  to  the  principles  of  this 
Section,  are  precisely  those  (neither  more  nor  fewer) 
who  deny  that  the  idea  '  morally  good '  is  simple. 

These  philosophers  may  be  divided  into  two  classes, 
essentially  different  from  each  other.  Those  of  one 
class  consider  that  the  idea  in  question  may  be  analysed, 
as  expressing  some  relation  to  God  ;  *  those  of  the  latter 

*  It  may  be  objected  that  I  myself  regard  the  idea  as  including  the 
idea  of  some  relation  to  God ;  because  I  regard  all  Moral  Truth  as  necessary, 
and  also  hold  that  all  Necessary  Truth  is  identical  with  God  (see  n.  19).  I 
reply  thus.  I  hold  most  firmly  that  all  Moral  Truth  is  identical  with  God  ; 
and  I  hope  to  enlarge  on  this  proposition  in  the  following  Section.  But  it 
by  no  means  follows  from  this,  that  the  idea  'morally  good'  includes  the 
idea  of  some  relation  to  God.  Mathematical  Truth  is  no  less  necessary 
than  Moral ;  and  accordingly  the  intuem  that  every  pentagon  has  five  angles 
is  a  truth  identical  with  God.  Yet  no  one  will  say  that  the  idea  'pentagon,' 
or  the  idea  '  angle,'  includes  the  idea  of  some  relation  to  God. 


70  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

class  deny  this,  but  consider  that  it  may  be  truly 
analysed  in  some  other  way. 

Of  these  two  classes,  the  latter,  as  it  seems  to  me, 
in  no  way  calls  for  any  more  detailed  refutation  than 
has  been  already  given.  Take  for  instance  the  follow- 
ing proposition  :  —  'It  is  morally  evil  to  disobey  God.' 
Then  consider  how  those  philosophers  stand,  in  regard 
to  this  proposition,  who  explain  '  morally  evil '  as 
signifying  c  adverse  to  the  interests  of  society.7  They 
are  bound  to  maintain  that,  when  we  say  '  disobedience 
to  God  is  morally  evil,'  we  mean  neither  more  nor  less 
than  that  *  such  disobedience  is  adverse  to  the  interests 
of  society.'  There  is  no  Theist  in  the  world,  who  will 
not  see  how  obviously  and  on  the  surface  absurd  is 
such  a  statement.  Nay,  any  atheist  surely  of  the  most 
ordinary  candour  will  admit  the  same.  Any  atheist,  I 
say,  of  the  most  ordinary  candour  will  admit,  that  if  we 
were  created  by  a  Being  Infinite  in  all  Perfections,  dis- 
obedience to  such  a  Being  would  be  c  morally  evil,'  in  a 
sense  totally  distinct  from  '  adverse  to  the  interests  of 
society.'  And  the  very  same  remark  holds  in  reference 
to  the  above  proposition,  whatever  other  analysis  of  the 
idea  c  morally  evil '  philosophers  of  this  class  may 
attempt.  I  need  only  add,  therefore,  that  no  Catholic 
writers  are  to  be  found  in  this  number. 

But  the  case  is  very  different  with  philosophers  of 
the  former  class.  I  am  thoroughly  convinced  indeed, 
that  the  more  carefully  we  examine  their  doctrine, 
the  more  irresistibly  we  shall  be  convinced  of  its  total 
untenableness  ;  still  no  one  can  say  that,  like  the 
former  doctrine,  it  carries  absurdity  on  its  face.  Now 
we  shall  be  engaged,  throughout  the  next  Section,  in 
considering  the  relation  which  exists  between  God  and 
Moral  Truth.  It  will  be  an  important  part  therefore 
of  that  Section,  to  pass  under  our  review  those  various 
attempts  at  analysing  the  idea  'morally  evil,'  which 
have  been  made  by  these  philosophers. 


71 


SECTION  III. 
On  the  Relation  between  God  and  Moral  Truth. 

33.  There  are  two  different  senses  in  which  the 
title  of  this  Section  may  be  understood.  It  may  be 
understood  as  raising  the  question,  'What  are  those 
propositions  concerning  God,  which  stand  as  part  of 
that  fabric,  which  we  call  Moral  Truth?'  And  this 
question  would  be  answered,  by  stating  e.g.  that  4  the 
obeying  and  loving  God  are  our  highest  duty;'  that 
4  God's  Commands,  on  matters  otherwise  the  most 
indifferent,  are  of  peremptory  obligation;'  that  '  God, 
by  His  interference,  may  make  many  acts  morally  good, 
which  would  otherwise  be  morally  evil ; '  &c.  &c.  These 
statements,  and  others  of  a  similar  kind,  are  most 
highly  important,  and  will  be  found  drawn  out  (I  hope) 
at  sufficient  length,  in  the  6th  and  7th  Sections  of  this 
Chapter.  They  are  not  however  those  statements, 
with  which  the  present  Section  is  concerned.  What 
we  are  here  to  consider,  is  the  relation  which  exists, 
between  God  on  the  one  hand,  and  Moral  Truth  as  a 
whole  on  the  other  hand.  Moral  Truth  is  Necessary 
Truth  ;  He  is  the  One  Necessary  Being  :  we  are  here 
to  enquire,  what  is  the  relation,  between  that  One 
Necessary  Being  and  this  particular  part  of  Necessary 
Truth.  I  intend  first  to  state  what  appear  to  me  the 
dictates  of  sound  Philosophy  on  this  question  ;  and 
afterwards  to  examine  those  views  on  the  matter, 
different  from  my  own,  which  various  theologians  and 
philosophers  have  advocated  from  time  to  time. 

I  shall  make  two  assumptions  throughout  this  Sec- 
tion.    I  shall  assume  (1)  that  Moral  Truth,  as  appli- 


72  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

cable  to  those  circumstances  in  which  God  has  placed 
us,  is  of  considerable  extent.  In  other  words  I  shall 
assume,  that  the  number  of  acts  is  considerable,  elicited 
by  us  men  under  our  present  circumstances,  of  which 
it  may  truly  be  said  that  '  A  is  necessarily  virtuous  ; 7 
that  c  B  is  necessarily  wicked ; '  that  '  C  is  necessarily 
preferable  to  D.'  And  I  shall  assume  (2)  that  Justice, 
Veracity,  Benevolence,  Humility,  Purity,  are  to  us 
virtuous  ends  of  action,  while  their  opposites  can  never 
be  so.  Both  these  truths  will  be  (I  trust)  fully 
explained  and  established  in  the  sixth  Section ;  and  it 
is  in  no  respect  illogical  to  assume  them  here,  because 
the  arguments  of  that  Section  in  no  single  respect 
depend  on  any  thing  which  will  here  be  said.  This 
assumption  is  made  convenient,  and  almost  necessary, 
by  the  fact,  that  all  the  Catholic  schools  of  Philosophy 
agree  in  the  above  propositions  :  so  that,  unless  we 
make  these  assumptions,  we  cannot  fairly  bring  the 
tests  of  those  schools  into  mutual  comparison. 

In  fact,  the  logical  place  of  this  and  the  following 
Section  would  be  between  what  now  stand  as  the  sixth 
and  seventh.  But  I  anticipate  the  logical  order,  for 
what  seems  to  me  a  very  sufficient  reason.  No  devout 
Theist  could  apply  himself,  calmly  and  without  em- 
barrassment, to  investigating  the  full  extent  of  Moral 
Truth, — until  he  had  first  satisfied  himself  on  the  matter 
which  we  are  now  to  consider.  Before  all  other  things 
he  will  wish  to  understand,  the  relations  which  exist 
between  those  moral  doctrines  which  are  to  be  the  one 
guide  of  his  life,  and  that  Almighty  Creator,  whom  he 
regards  as  its  One  Lord,  Governor,  and  Disposer. 
This  relation  being  once  thoroughly  understood,  he 
will  proceed  tranquilly  and  at  ease  with  the  interrupted 
thread  of  argument. 

However,  there  will  be  no  kind  of  inconvenience, 
should  any  of  you  prefer  it,  in  your  studying  the  fifth 
and  sixth  Sections  before  you  begin  the  present.  In 
that  case,  you  will  have  mastered  the  proof  of  those 
two  propositions  which  we  here  assume. 

34.  Now,  we  have  already  considered  the  relation 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   73 

which  exists  between  God  and  Necessary  Truth  in 
general ;  taking  Mathematical  Truth  as  our  particular 
instance  :  (see  n.  19)  I  will  ask  you  then  to  consult 
again  that  part  of  the  first  Section,  and  refresh  your 
memory  of  the  principles  there  stated  ;  as  our  business 
here  of  course  is  merely  the  applying  those  principles 
to  the  particular  case  of  Moral  Truth. 

And  here,  as  in  the  former  instance, we  will  begin 
by  considering  two  propositions  which  are  implied  by 
the  word  '  necessary,'  as  to  the  relation  between  such 
truths  and  Almighty  God. 

(1.)  Necessary  truths  are  not  derived  from  the  fact 
that  God  necessarily  iritues  them ;  the  very  contrary 
holds.  God  necessarily  intues  that  Justice  and  Bene- 
volence are  virtuous  ends  of  action,  because  they 
necessarily  are  so.  Hence  we  may  again  quote  the 
same  passage  from  Vasquez,  which  we  cited  in  n.  19: 
4  ante  omne  (Dei)  Imperium,  ante  omnem  Voluntatem, 
est  regula  qusedam  harum  actionum,  quae  suapte  natura 
constat.' 

(2.)  It  is  not  only  certain  that  necessary  truths 
are  not  derived  from  God's  intuition  of  them,  but  in 
some  sense  they  seem  to  limit  His  Power.  God  cannot 
create  a  triangle,  whose  angles  shall  together  exceed 
two  right  angles  ;  neither  can  He  create  a  being,  who 
shall  be  under  an  obligation  of  cultivating  the  disposi- 
tions of  pride,  malice,  and  impurity. 

These  propositions  then  hold,  in  regard  to  Moral 
Truth,  no  less  than  to  Mathematical.  As  God  is 
necessarily  gazing  on  the  latter  through  all  Eternity,  so 
also  He  is  gazing  on  the  former.  In  accordance  with 
His  Attribute  l  Verus  in  cognoscendo,'  He  intues  with 
the  most  unfailing  accuracy  the  precise  moral  quali- 
ties, which  appertain  to  all  the  various  actions  of  man- 
kind. Nay,  indeed  He  intues  immeasurably  more 
than  this.  He  intues  what  would  be  morally  evil, 
what  would  be  of  obligation,  what  would  be  preferable, 
under  every  possible  circumstance  in  which  any  rational 
being  could  be  placed.  It  is  this  vast  assemblage  of 
verities,  to  which  we  may  most  appropriately  give  the 


74  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

name  '  Moral  Truth ;'  and  its  whole  mass  is  evidently 
as  vast,  and  as  apparently  inexhaustible,  as  the  whole 
mass  of  Mathematical  Truth. 

(3.)  But  now  Moral  Truth,  as  distinct  from 
any  other  part  of  Necessary  Truth,  gives  scope  to 
another  Attribute  of  God  altogether,  as  well  as  to  the 
Attribute  c  Yerus  in  cognoscendo ; '  it  gives  scope  to  the 
Attribute  *  Sanctus.'  In  virtue  of  that  Attribute,  God 
necessarily  detests  that  which  is  intrinsecally  evil ;  and 
necessarily  prefers  that  which  is  intrinsecally  prefer- 
able. It  is  the  very  excellence  of  God's  Intellect,  as  we 
have  seen,  that  it  is  necessarily  determined  by  what  is 
true  ;  and  so  it  is  the  very  excellence  of  His  Will,  that 
it  is  necessarily  determined  by  what  is  good. 

Here  then  again,  as  in  the  case  of  Mathematical 
Truth,  we  make  one  final  enquiry.  Is  the  assertion 
endurable,  that  God  is  gazing  through  all  Eternity  on 
some  body  of  Necessary  Truth,  external  to,  and  inde- 
pendent of,  Himself?  Nay,  that  He  is  regulating 
necessarily  His  whole  conduct  by  a  Rule,  which  is  co- 
eternal  with  Himself,  and  yet  distinct  ?  which  is  equally 
necessary  with  Himself,  and  yet  not  Himself? 

It  is  quite  ^credible.  This  great  mass  of  neces- 
sary Moral  Truth,  is  not  distinct  from  God  Himself; 
but  in  some  way,  wholly  incomprehensible  to  us,  it  is 
identified  with  Him.  In  gazing  on  it,  in  regulating 
necessarily  His  conduct  by  its  dictates,  He  gazes  on 
nothing  external  to  Himself;  He  constitutes  nothing, 
external  to  Himself,  as  the  authoritative  rule  of  His 
actions  ;  He  is  but  penetrating  and  comprehending  the 
depths  of  His  Own  Nature. 

This  conclusion,  that  Moral  Truth  is  identical  with 
God,  is  based  on  the  same  grounds,  which  establish  the 
parallel  conclusion  in  the  case  of  Mathematical  Truth  : 
in  this  case,  as  in  that,  such  a  conclusion  is  the  only 
possible  mode  of  avoiding  objections,  otherwise  insuper- 
able. But  there  are  reasons  in  this  case,  of  quite  a 
different  kind,  which  also  press  most  strongly  towards 
the  same  conclusion. 

In  order  however  to  appreciate  those  reasons,  it 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   75 

will  be  necessary  that  you  shall  have  studied  the  views 
advocated  in  our  sixth  Section.  In  that  Section  we 
speak  of  those  various  intuitions,  whereby  we  become 
(faintly  and  very  partially)  acquainted  with  that  body  of 
Moral  Truth,  which  concerns  ourselves.  These  intui- 
tions, though  at  best  most  partial  and  incomplete,  yet 
grow  indefinitely  (as  we  there  argue)  in  accuracy,  in 
distinctness,  in  number,  by  means  of  consistent  moral 
action.  In  proportion  as  they  do  so,  they  more  and 
more  point  to  Moral  Truth  as  no  mere  abstraction,  but 
as  identified  with  some  Superior  Being.  I  recognize 
Moral  Truth,  as  an  authority  which  legitimately  claims 
my  most  abject  and  unreserved  submission ;  which 
possesses  by  right  an  absolutely  paramount  and  inde- 
feasible claim  on  my  allegiance.  Is  it  possible  to  think 
that  such  an  authority  as  this  is  a  mere  abstraction  ? 
"Who  can  suppose  it  ?  Surely,  in  intuing  such  an 
authority,  we  intue  a  Personal  Being:  and  so  the 
unanimous  testimony  of  mankind  proclaims.  Indeed, 
among  all  the  various  ways  whereby  men  are  drawn  to 
a  knowledge  of  their  Creator,  there  is  probably  none  so 
universally  efficacious,  as  that  which  leads  them  to 
Him,  through  their  obeying  the  Moral  Voice  within 
them.* 

Such  then  is  the  relation,  as  it  appears  to  me,  or 
rather  the  identity,  which  exists  between  God  and 
moral  truth.  Those  innumerable  verities, —  whether 
intuems  or  deduced  from  intuems, — which  together 
constitute  the  body  of  Moral  Truth,  are  identical  (each 
and  all)  with  Almighty  God.  In  gazing  on  Himself, 
He  gazes  on  them ;  His  Intellect  is  necessarily  deter- 
mined to  them  as  true  ;  His  Will  is  necessarily  deter- 
mined to  them  as  good.  As  '  Verus  in  cognoscendo,' 
He  intues  that  the  opposites  to  Justice,  Veracity, 
Benevolence,  are  morally  evil ;  as  4  Sanctus,'  He  is  Just, 
Veracious,  Benevolent.  He  cannot  be  called,  in  any 
proper  sense,  the  Originator,  or  Author,  or  Foundation, 
of  Moral  Truth ;  any  more  than  He  could  be  called  the 

*  See  the  second  part  of  the  quotation  from  Father  Newman  in  the 
note  at  p.  143. 


76  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Originator,  or  Author,  or  Foundation,  of  His  Own 
Aseity,  of  His  Own  Indestructibleness,  of  His  Own 
Omnipotence.  Moral  Truth  is  not  some  distinct  thing, 
originated  by  God;  it  is  God. 

35.  This  is  the  one  doctrine,  as  it  seems  to  me, 
which  necessarily  results  from  combining  two  beliefs  : 
(1)  the  belief  that  God  exists;  (2)  the  belief  that 
'  morally  good'  is  a  perfectly  simple  idea.  Those  on 
the  other  hand,  who  regard  the  latter  idea  as  containing 
in  some  shape  the  idea  of  God,  are  led  to  quite  a 
different  doctrine  from  ours,  on  the  relation  between 
God  and  Moral  Truth.  And  the  soundness  of  our  own, 
as  compared  with  theirs,  will  still  more  clearly  appear, 
by  our  proceeding  to  criticise  their  various  systems. 

Before  doing  this  in  detail,  it  may  be  interesting 
to  inquire,  whether  there  be  any  propositions,  on  which 
these  philosophers  agree  with  each  other,  while  differing 
from  us.  There  is,  of  course,  the  fundamental  pro- 
position, which  is  the  very  point  at  issue ;  viz.  that  the 
idea  l  morally  good7  includes  the  idea  '  God.'  But  are 
there  any  others  ? 

(1.)  They,  would  all  agree  in  saying,  that  God  is  in 
some  sense  the  Author,  or  Originator,  or  Foundation, 
of  Moral  Truth  ;  that  the  latter  is  not  simply  identical 
with  Him,  but  in  some  sense  distinct. 

(2.)  Although  they  would  agree  with  us  in  holding 
that,  whenever  I  form  a  true  moral  judgment,  I  have 
the  idea  of  God  in  my  thoughts ;  yet  they  would  totally 
differ  from  us,  in  their  way  of  explaining  this  statement. 
They  would  maintain,  that  on  such  occasions  I  have 
the  idea  of  God  in  my  thoughts,  because  the  idea 
'  morally  good'  or  '  evil3  includes  it.  But  we  maintain 
that  on  such  occasions  I  have  the  idea  of  God  in  my 
thoughts,  because  the  moral  judgment  itself  includes 
the  idea  of  'necessity;'  and  the  idea  of '  necessity '  is 
in  fact  the  idea  of  '  God.'  Let  the  moral  judgment  be 
expressed  in  a  proposition : — they  regard  the  idea  of  God 
as  contained  in  the  predicate  ;  we,  as  contained  in  the 
copula.* 

*  See  note  to  p.  69. 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   77 

There  may  probably  enough  be  other  propositions, 
held  in  common  by  them,  and  rejected  by  us :  but  none 
other  at  present  occur  to  my  mind.  Without  further 
preamble  then,  let  us  proceed  to  consider  the  various 
doctrines,  put  forth  respectively  by  these  various 
philosophers. 

36.  The  first  system  opposed  to  our  own  which 
comes  before  us,  is  in  fact  (as  we  shall  presently  see), 
divisible  into  two  theories,  essentially  different  from 
each  other.  But  we  will  first  consider  it,  so  far  as  it 
belongs  in  common  to  both  those  theories.  It  is  some- 
times pithily  expressed  by  the  seeming  truism,  '  every 
law  implies  a  lawgiver.'  How  far  this  is  a  truism, 
and  indeed  how  far  it  is  true,  depends  on  the  sense 
which  you  affix  to  the  word  '  law ' ;  and  it  need  not  be 
discussed  in  this  place.  But  those  who  adopt  the 
phrase  commonly  mean  to  say,  that  all  moral  obligation 
implies  the  existence  of  some  Being,  possessed  of 
legitimate  authority,  who  imposes  that  obligation. 
The  thesis  then,  intended  by  these  philosophers,  is 
this :  '  Whenever  an  act  is  said  to  be  '  of  moral  obliga- 
'  tion,'  such  a  proposition  cannot  be  true  in  any  other 
4  sense,  than  that  it  is  commanded  by  the  Creator.' 

Now,  they  do  not,  and  indeed  they  cannot,  deny 
that  the  phrase  'moral  obligation'  is  altogether  cor- 
relative to  the  phrase  c  morally  evil/  Whatever  is 
4  morally  evil '  we  are  self-evidently  under  the  '  moral 
'  obligation'  to  avoid  ;  the  violation  of  a  'moral  obliga- 
'  tion  '  is  self-evidently  '  morally  evil.'  Their  theory 
therefore  is  the  following;  and  so  I  have  no  doubt  they 
would  themselves  admit.  '  The  only  sense  in  which  it 
fc  can  be  truly  said  that  an  act  is  c  morally  evil,'  is  that 
<  it  is  c  forbidden  by  the  Creator.'  The  only  sense  in 
'  which  it  can  be  truly  called  of '  obligation,'  is  that  it 
6  is  '  commanded  by  the  Creator.'  The  only  sense  in 
4  which  it  can  be  truly  called  '  morally  preferable  to 
'  another,'  is  that  it  is  '  counselled  by  the  Creator  in 
'  preference  to  that  other.' ' 

Now  I  have  already  observed,  that  this  general  view 
is  divisible  into  two  theories,  essentially  different  from 


78  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

eacli  other.  The  first  of  these  indeed  would  be 
renounced  with  horror  by  every  Catholic  :  still,  since 
it  is  in  itself  imaginable, —  since  it  was  at  one  time 
actually  held  by  some  few  Catholics, —  and  since  it  has 
met  with  countenance  from  several  eminent  Protestants, 
— we  must  not  altogether  omit  its  mention.  According 
to  this  theory,  *  those  Commands  of  the  Creator  and 
1  those  Counsels,  which  constitute  Morality,  are  free 
6  Commands  and  Counsels.  Cruelty,  lying,  and  im- 
4  purity,  are  wrong,  because  the  Creator  has  freely 
'  forbidden  them,  and  for  no  other  reason  ;  He  might 
4  as  readily  have  counselled  or  commanded  them.' 

On  this  blasphemous  statement,  I  shall  say  no 
more :  for  three  reasons.  First,  no  Catholic  now-a-days 
dreams  of  holding  it.  Secondly,  the  argument  in  the 
last  Section  for  the  necessity  of  Moral  Truth  directly 
refutes  it.  Thirdly,  the  chief  arguments  to  be  adduced 
against  the  second  adverse  theory,  are  a  fortiori 
applicable  against  this  ;  as  I  will  show  in  the  next 
number. 

37.  The  second  adverse  theory  then,  and  one  held 

by  many  Catholics,  is  this  :    '  Morality  is  constituted, 

'  indeed,  by  the  Creator's  Commands  and  Counsels,  as 

above  explained ;  but  such  Commands  and  Counsels 

are  necessary  and   not  free.     The    Creator,   by  His 

Nature,  is  necessitated  to  forbid  injustice,   impurity, 

and  the  whole  catalogue  of  vices  ;  He  is  necessitated 

to  command  or  counsel  our  cultivation  of  the  opposite 

4  virtues.     Still,  the  only  sense  in  which  an  act  can  be 

4  called  with  truth  'morally  evil'  is,  that  such  act  is 

'  forbidden, — necessarily  however  forbidden, — by  the 

'  Creator.'     Against    this    theory   I   will    adduce    six 

different  arguments,  any  one  of  which  by  itself  would 

be  amply  sufficient  to  refute  it.     The  third  of  these 

arguments   indeed   depends  partially  on  the   second ; 

but  otherwise  they  are  mutually  independent. 

(1.)  Our  first  argument  shall  be  merely  a  re- 
production of  what  has  been  urged  in  the  previous 
Section.  We  will  endeavour  to  bring  the  argument  of 
that  Section  home  to  our  opponents,  by  thus  addressing 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   79 

them.  You  must  hold  one  or  other  of  the  three  fol- 
lowing positions.  Firstly,  you  may  say  that  the  term 
4  morally  evil'  does  not,  in  any  man's  mouth,  stand  for 
a  simple  idea,  but  a  complex  one ;  viz.  '  forbidden  by 
4  the  Creator.'  Secondly,  you  may  admit  that  when 
men  form  e.  g.  the  judgment,  '  retention  of  a  deposit  is 
4  morally  evil,'  the  idea  c  morally  evil'  is  simple  ;  but 
you  may  add,  that  this  universally-formed  judgment  is 
a  totally  mistaken  one.  Or,  lastly,  your  position  may 
be  more  complicated  :  you  may  say  that  with  some 
men  the  idea  'morally  evilf  is  simple,  but  that  with 
others  it  merely  signifies  '  forbidden  by  the  Creator.' 
And  then,  since  all  mankind  do  undoubtedly  judge  that 
'  the  retention  of  a  deposit  is  morally  evil,'  you  will 
add  that  the  former  class  of  men  are  mistaken  in 
forming  their  judgment,  and  the  latter  class  correct. 
Let  us  consider  in  order  these  three  positions. 

If  you  occupy  the  first  of  these  positions,  I  will  beg 
you  to  consider  this  judgment :  4  disobedience  to  the 
4  Creator  is  morally  evil.'  According  to  you,  this  is  a 
true  subjective  ^analytical  proposition;  and  its  contra- 
dictory therefore  is  simply  unmeaning.  Accordingly, 
the  proposition,  '  it  is  not  morally  evil  to  disobey  the 
4  Creator,'  will  not  be  regarded  by  you  as  expressing  a 
false  judgment,  a  monstrous  or  detestable  judgment,  but 
simply  no  judgment  at  all.  You  must  maintain,  I  say, 
that  this  proposition  is  as  simply  unmeaning^  as  the 
proposition,  l  There  is  a  certain  effect  which  has  no 

*  relation  to  its  cause ; '    or,  '  there  are  two  mutually 

*  attached  friends,  who  are  perfectly  indifferent  to  each 
4  other's  welfare;'    or  'my  parents  were   in   no   way 
4  instrumental  to  my  birth;'    or  any  other  such  self- 
contradictory  proposition.  Seen.  26,  p.  60.  Thereductio 
ad  absurdum  is  of  course  complete. 

Your  second  imaginable  position,  as  above  stated, 
is  totally  different.  According  to  this  position,  you 
will  admit  that  every  intelligent  man,  who  should 
understand  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  would  at 
once  consider  the  retention  of  a  deposit  to  be  '  morally 
4  evil;'  and  that  the  idea  'morally  evil,'  contained  in 


80  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Ills  judgment,  is  a  simple  idea.  But  then  you  must  go 
on  to  hold,  that  this  judgment,  so  universally  formed  by 
all  intelligent  men,  is  a  totally  mistaken  judgment  ; 
nay,  that  most  serious  evil  would  result, — nothing  less 
than  derogation  from  God's  Absolute  Sovereignty, — if 
this  judgment  were  admitted  to  be  well  founded  and 
true.*  Surely,  on  reflection,  you  must  admit  your- 
selves, that  to  discredit  the  spontaneous  and  universal 
judgment  of  all  mankind,  is  to  overthrow  (so  far  as 
you  can  overthrow  it)  your  only  possible  barrier 
against  the  most  desolating  scepticism.  The  axioms 
of  geometry  themselves  have  no  stronger  foundation, 
than  that  which  you  thus  denounce  as  worthless  and 
treacherous. 

Lastly,  if  you  occupy  the  third  position,  you 
maintain  that  some  men,  but  not  all,  conceive  '  morally 
c  evil'  as  a  simple  idea.  I  would  ask,  Who  are  the 
exceptions?  are  you  yourselves  such?  have  you  ever 
met  with  such?  Revert  once  more  to  our  old  pro- 
position, 'disobedience  to  the  Creator  is  not  morally 
1  evil  :'  do  you  yourselves  regard  it  as  a  simply 
unmeaning  proposition?  a  proposition  which  conveys 
no  imaginable  sense,  and  which  no  one  therefore  can 
censure  without  absurdity?  Do  you  believe  that  any 
intelligent  man  ever  existed,  who  could  so  regard  it  ? 
You  must  answer  in  the  negative  ;  and  yet  such 
negative  answer  is  simply  subversive  of  your  position. 

(2.)  Our  second  argument  shall  be  the  following. 

Perhaps  the  highest  and  most  vital  proposition  in 
all  Theology  is  the  following  :  '  Our  Creator  is  All- 
holy.'  But  on  our  opponents'  theory,  this  proposition 
is  literally  destroyed  and  emptied  of  all  meaning.  Now 
to  shew  this. 

There  are  various  acts  recognised  by  all  mankind 
as  morally  evil ;  whether  they  be  offences  against 
Justice,  Veracity,  Benevolence,  or  some  other  virtue. 

*  Those  who  maintain  the  theory  which  I  am  opposing,  universally 
regard  the  theory  which  I  advocate,  as  derogating  from  God's  absolute  Sove- 
reignty ;  inasmuch  as  it  maintains  the  existence  of  moral  obligation,  apart 
from  God's  Commands. 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   81 

Our  opponents  maintain,  that  in  calling  these  morally 
I'vil,  it  is  only  meant  that  they  are  forbidden  by  the 
Creator ;  we  on  the  contrary  maintain  that  they  are 
intrinsecally  eyil,  apart  from  all  reference  to  the 
Creator's  Will. 

Our  opponents  must  necessarily,  and  do  in  fact, 
nl  ways  proceed  to  say,  that  when  I  speak  of  some  man, 
A  or  B,  as  morally  good  in  such  or  such  a  degree,  I  mean 
no  more  than  this,  that  in  such  or  such  a  degree  he 
conforms  his  conduct  to  the  Creator's  Wishes.  But  we 
maintain,  that  when  I  speak  of  A  or  B  as  morally  good 
in  such  or  such  a  degree,  I  mean  that  he  possesses  in 
such  or  such  a  degree  those  qualities,  which  are  in- 
trinsecally virtuous,  independently  of  the  Creator's 
Wishes ;  Justice,  Veracity,  Benevolence,  and  the  rest. 
We  understand  by  'holiness'  or  'moral  goodness,' 
the  possession  of  certain  qualities  intrinsecally  vir- 
tuous ;  they  understand  by  it,  the  habit  of  conformity 
to  the  Creator's  Wishes.  The  question  is  now  to  be 
decided,  whether  their  explanation  or  ours  be  the  true 
one. 

Now  let  us  again  enunciate  that  solemn  truth,  which 
is  the  very  foundation  of  all  possible  religion  : — '  The 
'Creator  is  All-holy  ;'  or  (which  is  of  course  synony- 
mous) 'possesses  Moral  Goodness  in  the  most  perfect 
*  possible  way.'  What  can  be  more  satisfactory,  than  the 
sense  which  we  affix  to  this  proposition  ?  '  The  Creator 
'possesses,  in  the  most  perfect  possible  way,  Justice, 
'  Veracity,  Benevolence,  and  all  those  other  qualities 
4  which  are  intrinsecally  virtuous/  But  what  must  be 
our  opponents3  version  of  this  proposition  ?  '  The 
'Creator  possesses,  in  the  most  perfect  possible  way, 
4  the  quality  of  always  conforming  His  conduct  to  His 
4  Own  Wishes.1  Or  to  put  it  otherwise,  this  most  solemn 
and  fundamental  truth,  the  Creator's  Sanctity,  becomes 
in  their  mouths  no  more  nor  less  than  this  ;  'the 
4  Creator  does  in  every  respect  exactly  as  He  likes.' 

Indeed  let  any  one  of  common  sense  ponder  these 
two  propositions  ;  what  can  be  more  monstrous  than  to 
say  that  they  are  equivalent  ? 

G 


82  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Prop.  I.  '  The  Creator  possesses  Moral  Goodness  in 
the  most  perfect  possible  way.' 

Prop.  II.  '  The  Creator  always  does  exactly  what 
He  likes/ 

The  one  strength  of  our  opponents  is  their  view  (I 
think  of  course  a  most  mistaken  one)  of  what  is  due  to 
piety.  How  singularly  significant,  that  their  doctrine 
issues  at  once  in  a  conclusion,  so  frightfully  revolting 
to  piety ! 

(3.)  The  great  doctrine,  for  which  our  present 
opponents  are  jealous,  is  the  Creator's  Absolute  Sove- 
reignty over  the  creature  ;  the  main  reason  for  their 
dislike  of  our  theory,  is  their  belief  that  it  is  prejudicial 
to  that  doctrine.  I  am  now,  however,  about  to  argue, 
that  our  theory  is  the  only  method  of  establishing  that 
very  doctrine,  for  which  they  are  so  zealous  ;  and  that 
their  theory  is  wholly  subversive  of  it. 

The  doctrine  of  this  Absolute  Sovereignty  may  be 
expressed  thus  : — 'In  all  possible  cases  it  is  of  moral 
'  obligation  that  the  creature  obey  the  Creator.'  This 
is  the  judgment  which  we  are  now  carefully  to  consider, 
for  the  purpose  of  investigating  the  grounds  on  which 
it  rests.  Our  opponents  regard  it  as  even  an  analytical 
judgment;  they  hold  that  both  subject  and  predicate 
contain  the  very  same  idea.  But  we  maintain,  against 
them,  not  only  (1)  that  it  is  synthetical  and  not  ana- 
lytical ;  but  (2)  that  even  as  a  synthetical  truth,  it  is 
not  intued  but  deduced.  Undoubtedly  it  seems  at  first 
glance,  that  the  judgment  in  question  is  very  obviously 
and  immediately  intued  ;  yet  a  very  little  thought  will 
suffice  to  shew  that  the  case  is  otherwise.  A  very  little 
consideration  will  suffice  to  shew,  that  a  most  important 
qualification  is  always  understood  ;  and  that  the  truth 
really  intued  is  this  :  '  it  is  of  moral  obligation  to  obey 
c  the  Holy  Creator.'  Let  us  first  vindicate  this  state- 
ment, and  then  shew  its  bearing  on  our  argument. 

I  maintain,  then,  that  we  never  form  the  judgment 
'our  Creator  ought  to  be  obeyed,'  in  that  unqualified 
sense  which  would  include  a  morally  evil  creator.  Yet  it 
is  perfectly  imaginable,  that  some  wicked  demon  might 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   83 

possess  the  power  of  calling  into  existence  rational 
creatures.  We  are  all  of  course  very  well  aware, 
that  such  a  hypothesis  is  intrinsecally  impossible  ;  but 
many  a  thing  is  imaginable,  though  it  be  intrinsecally 
impossible.  Take  as  an  instance  of  this,  any  one  of 
Euclid's  '  reductiones  ad  absurdum.'  Take  e.g.  the 
case,  where  he  is  wishing  to  prove  it  as  an  intrinse- 
cally necessary  truth,  that  if  the  angle  A  B  C  is  equal 
to  the  angle  A  C  B,  the  straight  line  A  B  is  equal 
to  the  straight  line  A  C.  (Book  I.  Prop.  6.)  He 
says,  'for  if  not,-  let  us  suppose,  if  possible,  that  the 
'straight  line  AB  is  greater  than  the  straight  line 
4  A  C.'  He  is  calling  on  us  to  imagine  that  very  thing, 
which  he  is  going  to  prove  intrinsecally  impossible. 
And  so  here  :  that  an  evil  being  can  have  creative 
power,  is  intrinsecally  impossible ;  but  it  is  readily 
enough  imaginable. 

Let  us  imagine  then,  that  certain  rational  beings 
had  been  created  by  some  demon,  who  commands  them 
to  cultivate  diligently  the  dispositions  of  pride,  vindic- 
tiveness,  mendacity,  and  impurity  ;  threatening  them 
with  the  extremity  of  his  anger  if  they  refused  to  obey. 
Do  we  hold  that  in  such  a  case  compliance  would  be  a 
duty  ?  —  that  they  would  be  under  the  strict  obligation 
of  practising  mendacity,  injustice,  and  impurity  accord- 
ingly ? — of  hating  each  other  with  all  their  hearts? — 
in  one  word,  of  seeking  by  every  possible  means  to 
please  this  detestable  demon  ?  Yet  all  this  would  be 
so,  if  it  were  really  true,  that  so  soon  as  I  recognise 
any  being  for  my  creator,  I  at  once  legitimately  intue 
an  obligation  of  obeying  him. 

On  what  ground  then  do  we  hold,  as  true  and 
necessary,  the  judgment  that '  it  is  of  moral  obligation  to 
'  obey  the  Creator  ?'  By  inference,  not  by  intuition. 
Whatever  philosophical  process  be  chosen  for  establish- 
ing God's  Existence,  that  process  gives  us  warrant  for 
the  requisite  premiss.  In  virtue  of  that  process,  we 
hold  it  as  a  necessary  truth,  that  He,  Who  Alone  has 
the  power  of  creating,  is  intrinsecally  Holy.  A  syl- 
logism then  arises : — 


84  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

*  It  is  of  moral  obligation  to  obey  in  all  respects  a 
<  Holy  Creator. 

*  He,  Who  Alone  can  be  a  Creator,  is  essentially  Holy . 
Conclusion.     '  It  is  of  moral  obligation  to  obey  in 

all  respects  our  Creator.' 

And  now  comes  the  point  of  this  third  argument 
against  our  opponents.  They  are  precluded  from  the 
use  of  this  syllogism  ;  and  by  consequence  they  are  pre- 
cluded from  establishing  that  Absolute  Sovereignty  of 
God,  for  which  they  are  so  commendably  zealous.  How 
precluded?  Thus:  There  is  no  intuitive  judgment, 
such  as  the  major  in  the  foregoing  syllogism,  to  which 
they  can  consistently  appeal.  With  them,  if  they 
would  argue  consistently,  a  'holy  creator/  can  only 
mean  a  '  creator  who  acts  in  every  respect  exactly  as 
he  wishes.'  See  arg.  2.  But  in  this  sense  of  the  word, 
the  creating  demon  above  supposed  is  as  absolutely 
holy,  as  is  our  Adorable  God  Himself;  for  he  acts 
quite  as  unreservedly  in  accordance  witli  his  own 
wishes.  Now  no  one  will  say,  that  it  would  be  of 
moral  obligation  to  obey  in  all  respects  such  a  creator 
as  him  ;  far  less  would  any  one  say,  that  we  recognise 
intuitively  such  an  obligation.  We  cannot  possibly  then 
regard  it  as  an  intuem,  according  to  our  opponents' 
sense  of  the  word  '  holy/  that  it  is  of  moral  obligation 
to  obey  in  all  respects  a  holy  creator.  It  is  absolutely 
impossible  then  for  them,  according  to  their  theory,  to 
establish  that  doctrine  of  God's  Absolute  Sovereignty, 
which  is  in  their  eyes,  and  most  deservedly,  so  precious 
and  all-important.* 

*  It  may  be  thoughtlessly  objected  to  this  whole  argument,  that  an  evil 
creator  would  have  given  me  faculties,  which  should  mistake  evil  for  good, 
and  good  for  evil.  This  most  superficial  objection  will  be  considered  in  the 
present  Section  ;  here,  therefore,  the  following  brief  remarks  may  suffice. 
We  have  already  seen  (Sec.  1)  that  it  is  our  existing  faculties  which  cor- 
respond to  objective  truth ;  and  that  any  imaginable  faculties  which  should 
be  at  variance  with  them,  would  (so  far)  declare  what  is  objectively 
false.  Accordingly,  the  mode  in  which  we  are  to  arrive  at  truth  on  this 
matter,  is  to  consider  how  far  our  existing  faculties  would  declare,  that 
obedience  is  due  to  a  creating  demon. 

Dr.  Brownson,  on  totally  different  grounds,  would  be  prepared  (I  sup- 
pose) to  question  the  argument  in  the  text.  So  at  least  it  may  be  inferred 
from  the  following  passage,  which  occurs  in  his  Review  of  Jan.  1 859  : — 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   85 

(4.)  My  fourth  argument  is  perfectly  distinct  from 
any  one  of  the  previous  three.  How  am  I  enabled  to 
arrive  at  the  knowledge,  that  my  Creator  does  in  fact 
command  me  to  cultivate  the  dispositions,  e.  g.  of 
Justice,  Veracity,  and  Benevolence  ?  or  that  He  Him- 
self possesses  those  qualities  ?  I  must  arrive  at  this 
knowledge,  either  by  Reason  or  by  Revelation, 

If  you  suppose  this  knowledge  to  be  obtained  by 
Reason,  I  ask  by  what  process  of  Reason  ?  I  never 
heard  of  any  process  except  this.  I  first  recognise  by 
Reason  (whether  intuitively  or  inferentially)  that  our 
Creator  is  a  Being  Infinite  in  all  Perfections.  I  then 
accept,  as  another  truth  declared  by  Reason,  that  Sanc- 
tity is  a  Perfection,  and  that  Sanctity  includes  these 
qualities  of  Justice,  Benevolence,  and  the  rest.  Hence 
I  conclude  that  our  Creator  possesses  these  qualities. 
But  there  is  no  process  of  Reason  imaginable,  which 
can  shew  that  there  is  a  Perfection  called  Sanctity, 
except  that  which  shews  that  certain  things  are  in 
themselves  morally  evil,  apart  from  God's  Prohibition. 
This  has  been  shewn  under  our  second  argument.  You 
see  then  (1)  I  must  recognise  by  Reason  that  there  is 
a  perfection  called  Sanctity,  before  I  can  infer  that  my 
Creator  possesses  these  qualities;  and  (2)  I  must  know 
that  certain  things  are  morally  evil  apart  from  God's 
Prohibition,  before  I  can  recognise  by  Reason  that  there 
is  a  perfection  called  Sanctity.  I  must  know  therefore 
that  these  things  are  independently  evil,  before  I  can 
discover  by  Reason  that  God  prohibits  them. 

Let  us  pass  then  to  the    other  supposition,  that 

"  *  Therefore,'  said  Winslow, '  nothing  is  gained  by  the  attempt  to  found 
the  Sovereignty  of  God  on  his  intrinsic  Justice,  Goodness,  Love,  distinguished 
from  his  Omnipotence,  or  Creative  Power.  Goodness,  Justice,  Love,  so  dis- 
tinguished, give  the  law  according  to  which  the  sovereign  power  must  be 
exercised,  if  you  will ;  but  they  do  not  give  dominion  itself.  If,  per  impos- 
sibile,  some  other  power  had  created  us,  we  might  still  love  and  revere  God, 
for  what  He  is  in  and  of  Himself:  but  He  would  have  no  right  to  command 
us  as  a  sovereign,  for  in  that  case  we  should  not  be  His  creatures,  but 
another's.' 

" '  If,  then,  the  Devil  had  created  us,  we  should  have  been  bound  to  obey 
the  Devil,'  concluded  De  Bonneville. 

" '  Give  the  Devil  his  due,  is  a  maxim  one  often  hears  repeated,'  replied 
Father  John.  '  If  the  Devil  were  an  independent  being  and  were  really  our 


86  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

by  Eevelation  alone  we  know  of  God's  commanding 
Justice,  Benevolence,  and  the  rest.  No  Catholic  of 
course  would  venture  to  take  this  alternative ;  but 
it  is  well  nevertheless  to  consider  it  on  grounds  of 
Reason.  We  ask  then  at  once,  by  what  imaginable 
means  of  information  can  we  know  of  any  such  Reve- 
lation, as  coming  from  our  Creator  ?  You  will  say 

creator,  we  should  be  his,  and  bound  to  obey  his  commands.     But  the  sup- 

rition  is  absurd.  The  Devil  could  create  us  only  on  the  supposition  that 
is  not  himself  created  ;  that  he  is  real  and  necessary  being  ;  and  if  real 
and  necessary  being,  he  cannot  be  evil,  but  must  be  good  ;  and  hence  not  the 
Devil  but  God.' " 

In  this  extract,  two  totally  different  propositions  are  stated,  which  require 
separate  treatment.  The  first  is,  that  if  per  impossibile  God  were  not  our 
Creator,  He  would  have  no  right  to  command  us  as  Sovereign.  This  I 
fully  admit :  it  is  not  on  His  being  Holy,  but  on  His  being  our  Holy  Creator ', 
that  His  full  claims  on  our  allegiance  are  founded. 

But  the  second  proposition  is  very  different  from  this :  viz.  that  if 
per  impossibile  the  Devil  were  our  Creator,  we  should  be  bound  to  obey 
his  commands.  With  the  greatest  deference  to  Dr.  Brownson's  eminent 
philosophical  power,  I  cannot  but  dissent  most  strongly  from  this  proposi- 
tion. Let  us  suppose  e.g.  a  wicked  creator  commanding  me  to  lie.  On 
what  ground  would  Dr.  Brownson  rest  my  duty  of  obedience  ?  On  the 
following  syllogism : — 

'  Whatever  my  creator  commands,  however  wicked  he  may  be,  is  of  moral 
obligation.' 

*  But  he  now  commands  me  to  lie.' 

Therefore, '  This  lie  is  now  of  moral  obligation.' 

Now  I  totally  deny  that  the  major  premiss  of  this  syllogism  is  declared 
by  Reason  at  all.  But  let  me  first  suppose,  for  argument's  sake,  that  it 
were;  still  Reason  declares,  and  with  no  less  certainty  (to  say  the  very  least), 
that  lying  is  intrinsecally  evil.  The  obligation  to  abstain  from  a  lie,  I  say, 
is  declared  by  Reason  with  no  less  clearness,  than  is  the  obligation  to  obey 
a  wicked  creator.  Even  then  if  we  granted  Dr.  Brownson  his  premiss,  the 
very  utmost  which  would  follow  would  be  something  far  short  of  his  con- 
clusion :  it  would  follow,  net  that  we  owe  simple  obedience  to  this  command, 
but  that  we  are  under  two  contradictory  obligations  in  regard  to  it.  Nothing 
can  be  more  certain,  than  that  if  a  wicked  creator  commanded  that  which 
is  intrinsecally  evil,  we  should  be  under  the  indefeasible  obligation  of 
disobeying  and  defying  him.  This  would  hold  true,  even  if  it  were  also 
true,  that  we  should  (on  that  impossible  supposition)  be  under  the  inde- 
feasible obligation  of  obeying  him.  Nor,  of  course,  is  there  any  difficulty 
in  the  supposition,  that,  if  we  imagine  an  intrinsecally  impossible  hypothesis, 
two  contradictory  obligations  should  result. 

(2.)  But  further, — still  granting  to  Dr.  Brownson  his  premiss  for  argu- 
ment's sake, —  I  go  further  :  I  think  that  we  should  be  bound  to  disobey  a 
wicked  creator,  not  only  when  he  should  command  things  intrinsecally  evil, 
but  when  he  should  command  things  intrinsecally  indifferent.  It  is  most 
difficult  of  course  to  pursue  an  argument,  based  on  an  hypothesis  which  is 
admitted  on  both  sides  to  be  intrinsecally  impossible.  It  is  Dr.  Brownson 
however,  who  has  made  the  hypothesis  ;  and  I  am  but  following  him  over 
the  ground  which  he  has  chosen.  And  so  much  as  this  seems  very  safe. 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   87 

perhaps,  that  the  revelation  might  be  attested  by 
miracles;  but  I  rejoin  at  once,  that  no  amount  of 
miracles,  by  themselves,  can  tend  to  make  an  alleged 
revelation  even  remotely  probable.  Most  certainly 
not ;  and  all  Catholic  theologians  are  here  in  accord- 
ance. On  what  principle  do  we  accept  of  miracles,  as 
evidencing  the  Christian  religion  ?  On  this  principle, 

Every  command,  issued  by  a  wicked  creator,  would  be  issued  for  the  purpose 
of  promoting  his  detestable  schemes.  Now  it  is  intrinsecally  sinful  in  any 
rational  creature,  to  put  forth  any  direct  co-operation  with  such  schemes  : 
and  it  would  therefore  be  intrinsecally  sinful,  to  obey  commands,  the  most 
indifferent,  issuing  from  so  foul  a  source. 

I  have  hitherto  assumed  Dr.  Brownson's  premiss  :  viz.  that  Reason 
declares  the  intrinsic  obligation  of  obeying  a  creator,  however  wicked. 
And  I  have  argued,  that  even  if  we  granted  this  premiss,  Dr.  Brownson's 
conclusion  would  not  follow.  In  the  impossible  case  of  a  wicked  creator, 
it  would  not  follow  from  that  premiss,  that  we  should  be  simply  bound  to 
obey  him  ;  but  that,  whether  he  commanded  things  intrinsecally  evil  or 
indifferent,  we  should  be  under  two  contradictory  and  inconsistent  obliga- 
tions. We  should  be  morally  bound  to  obey,  and  morally  bound  to 
disobey. 

(3.)  But  I  cannot  think  that  Dr.  Brownson,  on  mature  reflection,  will 
adhere  to  his  premiss.  Imagine  the  case  supposed  by  him,  that  we  had 
been  created  by  the  Devil.  Imagine  that  we  had  been  called  into  existence, 
for  diabolical  purposes  and  by  diabolical  agency  ;  and  that  we  were  pursued 
by  our  Creator's  hatred,  from  birth  to  death,  as  the  Devil  does  hate  all 
other  rational  creatures.  Surely  no  one,  who  takes  pains  in  realising  this 
supposition,  will  seriously  maintain,  that  any  obligation  would  exist  of 
obeying  this  hated,  hateful,  hating,  author  of  our  existence.  There  would 
be  the  distinct  obligation  (as  we  have  seen)  of  disobeying  and  abhorring  him  ; 
but  surely  there  would  be  no  obligation,  no  semblance  of  obligation,  on 
the  other  side,  grounded  on  the  fact  of  his  having  created  us. 

In  one  respect  however  it  does  appear  to  me,  that  (on  this  fearful 
hypothesis)  we  should  be  under  two  contradictory  obligations.  We  shall 
see  in  the  third  Chapter,  that  I  am  under  the  intrinsic  obligation  of 
promoting  my  own  permanent  happiness  ;  and  this  happiness  would  be 
destroyed,  by  such  torments  as  this  demon  might  inflict  in  revenge  for  my 
disobedience.  On  this  ground,  therefore,  I  should  be  under  the  obligation 
of  avoiding  his  wrath  ;  while  on  other  grounds  I  should  be  under  the  con- 
tradictory obligation  of  incurring  it.  Yet  even  on  this  head  something  more 
has  to  be  said.  How  do  I  know  that  such  torments  will  be  inflicted  on  me  for 
disobedience  1  Because  the  demon  threatens  them  ?  What  reason  have  I 
for  believing  the  threats  of  this  arch-liar  1  Once  suppose  Dr.  Brownson's 
hypothesis  of  the  Devil  having  created  us, — and  what  is  more  probable  than 
such  a  further  supposition  as  the  following  1  What  is  more  probable,  than 
that  such  a  being  would  first  incite  his  '  creatures '  to  every  kind  of  wicked- 
ness, through  the  promise  of  reward; — and  then,  when  he  had  perhaps 
almost  debased  them  to  his  own  level,  should  deride  their  expectations  and 
inflict  on  them  his  heaviest  vengeance  1  Is  not  his  course  of  action  now 
precisely  similar  to  this  1  He  seduces  his  miserable  victims,  by  representing 
the  pleasures  of  sin  in  the  most  attractive  light ;  and  rejoices  in  adding  to 
their  torments,  when  they  become  his  fellow-prisoners  in  Hell. 


88  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

that  we  previously  recognise  our  Creator  as  essentially 
Veracious.  Suppose  per  impossibile  that  a  being,  not 
essentially  veracious,  had  created  us,  it  is  obvious  at 
once  that  he  might  have  multiplied  miracles  to  an 
indefinite  extent,  for  the  express  purpose  of  deluding 
us.  It  is  absolutely  necessary  therefore,  that  we  shall 
establish  God's  Veracity  on  grounds  of  Reason,  before 
there  is  so  much  as  an  opening  for  the  entrance  of 
Revelation.  And  (as  was  just  now  observed)  noway 
has  ever  been  so  much  as  suggested,  for  proving  that 
God  is  Veracious,  which  does  not  assume  as  a  premiss 
that  Veracity  is  of  independent  obligation.  If  then  you 
admit  that  Veracity  is  of  independent  obligation, — is 
obligatory  apart  from  God's  Commands,  —  you  totally 
give  up  your  principle,  that  those  Commands  are  the 
source  of  all  moral  obligation.  But  if  you  do  not  admit 
that  Veracity  is  of  independent  obligation,  you  have  no 
means  of  establishing  by  Reason  that  God  is  Veracious ; 
nor  any  reasonable  ground  therefore  whatever,  for  be- 
lieving either  His  Sanctity  or  any  other  doctrine,  on 
the  authority  of  His  Revelation. 

This  then  is  my  fourth  argument.  If  you  hold  that 
God's  Commands  are  the  foundation  of  morality,  you 
have  no  reasonable  ground  whatever  for  believing  that 
God  does  in  fact  command  Justice,  Veracity,  and  the 
rest :  neither  the  ground  of  pure  Reason,  nor  the  ground 
of  Revelation. 

(5.)  Our  fifth  reason  again,  for  the  thesis  which  we 
are  defending,  is  perfectly  distinct  in  character  from 
the  other  four :  being  based  on  the  admitted  Catholic 
doctrine  *  de  Deo ; '  a  doctrine  which  Reason,  no  less 
than  Revelation,  conclusively  establishes. 

In  Catholic  Theology  we  ascribe  to  God  every  pos- 
sible Perfection,  excepting  only  those  which  are  intrin- 
secally  incompatible  with  some  higher  Perfection.  Thus 
it  would  be  a  very  great  perfection,  if  God  possessed 
the  attribute  of  clearly  and  infallibly  seeing  every  future 
thing  as  future ;  yet  we  never  ascribe  to  Him  that  per- 
fection, but  on  the  contrary  deny  that  He  possesses  it. 
Why  is  this?  Of  course,  because  it  is  intrinsecally 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   89 

incompatible  with  a  still  higher  Perfection ;  viz.  the 
existing  extra  tempus  altogether,  and  viewing  alike,  as 
iin mutably  present,  what  we  regard  as  past,  present, 
and  future. 

Let  us  proceed  to  apply  this  undoubted  doctrine. 
We  all  agree  in  this,  that  we  deny  to  God  the  intrinsic 
power  of  acting  in  violation  of  Justice,  Veracity,  and 
Benevolence.  In  denying  Him  the  power  of  acting  in 
every  possible  direction,  we  plainly  deny  to  Him  a  cer- 
tain perfection.  Such  denial  then,  as  we  have  seen, 
can  only  be  defended,  by  maintaining  that  the  particular 
perfection  which  we  deny  Him,  is  intrinsecally  incom- 
patible with  some  still  higher  Perfection.  This  pro- 
position, according  to  our  thesis,  is  manifest  enough. 
Since  the  violation  of  Justice  Veracity  and  Benevolence 
is  independently  sinful,  it  is  an  indispensable  part  of 
God's  Perfections, — it  goes  in  fact  to  constitute  that  very 
Perfection  which  we  call  Sanctity, —  that  He  is  neces- 
sitated by  His  nature  to  abstain  from  any  such  viola- 
tion. But  our  opponents  maintain,  that  there  is  nothing 
independently  evil,  in  the  violation  of  Justice,  Veracity, 
or  Benevolence;  that  such  violation  is  only  evil  at  all, 
because  God  has  forbidden  it.  On  this  theory  then, 
God's  inability  to  act  inconsistently  with  these  three 
qualities  can  only  be  a  direct  imperfection.  A  con- 
clusion, I  need  hardly  say,  absolutely  fatal  to  that 
premiss,  of  which  it  is  the  legitimate  result. 

(6.)  My  sixth  argument  shall  be  an  appeal  to  your 
own  present  convictions.  God  imposed  on  the  Church, 
before  Christ,  the  obligation  of  circumcision  and  other 
rites  ;  but  when  the  Holy  Spirit  came,  He  removed 
that  obligation.  I  would  beg  you  to  imagine  what 
your  feelings  would  be,  if  you  were  told  that  God  did 
not  possess  the  physical  power,  either  on  the  one  hand 
of  commanding  circumcision,  or  on  the  other  hand  of 
removing  that  command.  The  Supreme  Lord  of  the 
Universe  is  at  once  degraded  to  a  low  and  subordinate 
place  in  His  own  creation.  Why  on  the  other  hand 
does  no  feeling  of  the  kind  arise  in  your  minds,  when 
you  are  told  that  He  has  not  the  physical  power  of 


90  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

revealing  false  doctrine,  or  of  commanding  pride  and 
vindictiveness  ?  Evidently  and  undeniably,  because 
you  do  possess  the  inextinguishable  intuition  (however 
energetically  men  may  labour  by  sophisms  to  blind 
you  to  its  existence)  that  there  is  an  intrinsic  difference 
of  character  between  the  two  Commands.  Because 
you  intue  that  the  practising  or  not  practising  circum- 
cision, is  a  thing  intrinsecally  indifferent :  but  that 
the  cultivating  pride  or  vindictiveness  is  a  thing 
intrinsecally  detestable  ;  —  intrinsecally  incapable  of 
being  commanded  or  permitted  by  a  Holy  Creator. 

Your  own  present  convictions,  then,  attest  the  truth 
of  that  principle  for  which  I  am  contending.  Your  own 
conviction  plainly  is,  not  that  these  sins  are  detestable 
because  God  prohibits  them,  but  the  very  contrary; 
that  God  prohibits  them  because  they  are  intrinsecally 
detestable.  If,  then,  they  are  intrinsecally  detestable 
apart  from  God's  Command,  then,  apart  from  such 
Command,  you  are  still  under  the  moral  obligation  of 
avoiding  them. 

Of  these  six  arguments,  all,  except  the  fifth,  apply 
a  fortiori  against  the  monstrous  theory,  that  morality  is 
based  on  God's  free  Command, 

38.  We  proceed  now  to  consider  the  third  adverse 
theory.*  This  is  frequently  expressed  by  saying,  that 
morality  is  founded  on  our  Creator's  Nature  ;  not  on 
His  Command  or  Prohibition  undoubtedly,  but  on  His 
Nature.  Now  these  words  are  in  themselves  somewhat 
vague.  Those  who  adopt  them  may  possibly  hold  no 
other  doctrine,  than  that  which  we  have  been  advo- 
cating ;  viz.  that  Moral  Truth,  as  being  necessary,  is 
identical  with  God.  But  many  philosophers,  in  using 
the  above  phrase,  do  undoubtedly  mean  to  express  a 
doctrine  altogether  different  from  ours.  They  mean 
to  say,  that  the  foundation  of  morality  is,  not  indeed 
the  Creator's  necessary  Command,  but  His  necessary 
Approval  or  Detestation.  They  mean  this.  c  The  only 

*  Those  readers  who  are  already  convinced,  that  the  idea  '  morally  good' 
in  no  sense  includes  the  idea  of  'God,'  may  omit  with  advantage  nn.  38,  39, 
and  40. 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   91 

*'  sense  in  which  an  act  can  with  truth  be  called '  morally 
4  '  evil'  is,  that  it  is  'necessarily  detested  by  the  Creator;' 

*  the  only  sense  in  which  it  can  with  truth  be  called 
'  'morally  good7  is,  that  it  is  'necessarily  approved  by 

*  'the  Creator ;7  the  only  sense  in  which  it  can  with 
4  truth   be  called  '  morally  preferable7  to   another,  is, 
'  that   it   is  *  necessarily  preferred   by  the  Creator  to 
'  that  other.7 ' 

Now  the  very  same  six  arguments,  which  we 
adduced  against  the  second  adverse  theory,  are  equally 
applicable  (mutatis  mutandis)  against  this.  As  they 
must  be  quite  fresh  in  your  mind,  I  will  draw  them 
out  far  more  briefly  in  their  new  application. 

(1.)  All  men,  on  occasion,  are  ready  to  elicit  the 
judgment,  that  the  retention  of  a  deposit  is  'morally 
evil.7  In  eliciting  this  judgment,  do  they  mean  by  the 
term  '  morally  evil 7  to  express  '  detested  by  the  Crea- 
tor ?7  On  such  a  supposition,  the  proposition  '  to  do 
what  the  Creator  detests  is  morally  evil,7  is  a  true  sub- 
jective analytical  proposition ;  and  its  contradictory 
therefore,  is  simply  unmeaning.  Will  any  one  main- 
tain that  this  is  so  ?  that  the  proposition, — '  to  do  what 
our  Creator  detests  is  not  morally  evil' — is  unmeaning? 
Or  will  not  every  one  rather  say,  that  it  is  false,  mon- 
strous, and  the  like?  We  understand  its  meaning  most 
readily  ;  and  its  contradictory  therefore  is  not  a  true 
subjective  analytical  proposition. 

I  would  proceed  thus  to  address  my  present  op- 
ponents. You  are  obliged  then  to  admit,  (1),  that  all 
men  will  elicit  this  judgment  'the  retention  of  a  deposit 
is  morally  evil;'  and,  (2),  that  in  that  judgment,  they 
mean  by  '  morally  evil 7  something  quite  distinct  from 
'  detested  by  the  Creator.'  Your  theory,  however, 
compels  you  to  maintain,  that  the  judgment,  thus  uni- 
versally elicited,  is  false  and  pernicious.  Such  a  state- 
ment must  consistently  land  you  in  the  most  absolute 
scepticism. 

(2.)  Take  the  all-important  proposition, '  The  Crea- 
tor is  All-holy.7  On  the  theory  of  these  opponents,  this 
proposition  is  literally  emptied  of  all  meaning.  For  on 


92  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

their  theory,  '  morally  good/  means  simply  '  approved 
by  the  Creator/  Hence,  on  their  theory,  the  above 
proposition  expresses  neither  more  nor  less  than  this, 
—'that  the  Creator  possesses  in  the  greatest  degree  the 
'  quality,  of  always  doing  what  He  Himself  approves/ 
But  this  is  a  quality,  which  would  equally  appertain  to 
any  demon,  who  should  be  so  obdurate  in  wickedness, 
as  to  regard  evil  as  good  and  good  as  evil.  Hence  on 
our  opponents'  theory,  our  Creator  is  not  Holy  in  any 
other  sense,  except  that  in  which  an  obdurate  demon  is 
holy. 

(3.)  Consider  that  very  proposition,  which  our  op- 
ponents justly  regard  as  so  true  and  so  important;  'to 
do  what  the  Creator  detests  is  morally  evil :'  they  ac- 
tually debar  themselves  from  all  power  of  establishing 
this  proposition.  For  consider.  Certainly  this  pro- 
position is  no  intuem.  Imagine  the  case  of  a  creating 
demon  :  certainly  our  opponents  will  not  maintain,  that 
we  intue  a  moral  obligation  of  avoiding  what  such 
demon  detests ;  of  avoiding  with  the  greatest  care  all 
approach  to  Justice,  Purity,  or  Benevolence.  The 
proposition  which  we  do  hold  as  self-evident  is, —  'to 
do  what  the  Holy  Creator  detests  is  morally  evil.' 
Now  Reason  establishes,  that  He,  Who  Alone  can  create, 
is  essentially  Holy  ;  and  thus  we  are  led  to  the  con- 
clusion, that  'to  do  what  the  Creator  detests  is  in  all 
cases  morally  evil.'  But  our  opponents  cannot  appeal 
to  any  such  self-evident  judgment  as  the  above  ;  for  on 
their  view,  the  creating  demon,  if  he  were  but  utterly 
blind  and  obdurate,  would  be  as  holy  as  the  Adorable 
God. 

(4.)  I  have  no  means  of  knowing  that  the  Creator 
does  detest  injustice,  impurity,  malevolence,  unless  I 
first  know  that  these  qualities  are  evil  apart  from  His 
detestation. 

(5.)  The  Creator  is  necessitated  to  detest  these 
qualities ;  but  this  would  be  a  great  imperfection,  unless 
they  were  independently  evil. 

(6.)  I  appeal  to  your  own  present  convictions.  Sup- 
pose you  heard  it  said,  that  the  Creator  is  necessitated 


THE  EELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   93 

to  detest  intellectual  slowness  or  bodily  awkwardness : 
you  would  be  utterly  shocked  at  such  a  statement. 
Yet  on  the  other  hand  you  believe  of  course,  as  we 
also  believe,  that  He  is  necessitated  to  detest  male- 
volence and  impurity.  Why  does  the  former  state- 
ment shock  you,  while  the  latter  is  implied  in  your  very 
idea  of  God  ?  Plainly,  because  you  do  recognise  an 
intrinsic  difference  between  these  two  classes  of  defects  ; 
because  you  recognise,  that  malevolence  and  impurity 
are  intrinsecally  worthy  of  God's  detestation,  while 
intellectual  or  bodily  incapacity  is  not.  You  are  con- 
vinced, in  other  words,  that  malevolence  and  impurity 
are  not  morally  evil  because  God  detests  them,  but  the 
very  reverse :  that  God  necessarily  detests  them,  because 
they  are  morally  evil. 

39.  The  fourth  adverse  theory  agrees  with  the  third, 
except  that  instead  of1  The  Creator'  it  would  substitute 
'  The  One  Necessary  Being.'    According  to  this  theory, 
the  only  sense  in  which  it  can  with  truth  be  said  that 
an  act  is  morally  evil,  is  that  such  act  is  detested  by 
the  One  Necessary  Being ;    and  similarly  as  to  other 
shapes  of  the  idea  4  morally  good.' 

As  the  fourth  theory  agrees  with  the  third  except 
as  to  this  one  substitution,  so  also  will  the  arguments 
adducible  against  it.  You  will  find  that  the  arguments, 
adduced  against  the  third  theory,  are  applicable  word 
for  word  against  the  fourth,  if  you  will  simply  make  in 
them  this  one  substitution. 

40.  The  fifth  adverse  theory  is  the  following,  c  The 
1  true  sense  of  *  morally  good '  is  '  that  which  unites  us 
c  to  the  Creator  our  true  End ; '  the  true  sense  of c  morally 
'evil'  is  'that  which  separates  us  from  Him.'     '  Since 
however  this  phrase  is  somewhat  vague,  I  will  state 
more   definitely  what  I  believe  to  be  intended  by  it. 
The  advocates  of  this  theory,  I  believe,  intend  to  say, 
that  by  '  morally  good'  is  meant  c  that  which  brings  my 

*  will  into  harmony  and  agreement  with  the  Creator's  ; ' 

*  and  by  'morally  evil '  that  which  places  it  in  opposition 
to  His.'     If  however,  our  opponents  will  mention  any 
distinct  sense,  different  from  this,  as  intended  by  the 


94  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

phrase,  our  arguments  may  with  perfect  facility  be 
adapted  as  against  this  other  sense  also. 

The  first  five  of  our  six  former  arguments  are 
equally  available  here,  as  the  following  recapitulation 
will  shew  :  though  it  may  be  perhaps  doubted  whether 
the  sixth  can  be  so  easily  brought  to  bear. 

(1.)  Consider  this  proposition, — cto  place  my  will 
in  opposition  to  the  Creator's  is  not  morally  evil/  No 
one  will  call  this  an  unmeaning  proposition ;  and 
consequently  the  first  argument,  as  drawn  out  against 
the  second  and  third  theories,  is  equally  efficacious 
here. 

(2.)  According  to  this  fifth  theory,  the  word  choly,7 
signifies  c  having  a  will  in  agreement  with  the  Creator's/ 
When  I  say  therefore,  '  the  Creator  is  All-holy,'  I  mean 
no  more  than  that  His  Will  is  in  agreement  with  itself. 
But  this  might  be  said  of  an  obdurate  and  consistently 
wicked  demon,  as  truly  as  of  our  Adorable  Creator. 
Hence,  according  to  this  fifth  theory,  God  is  not  Holy 
in  any  other  sense,  than  that  in  which  a  consistently 
wicked  demon  is  holy. 

(3.)  Our  opponents  debar  themselves  from  the 
power  of  establishing  that  very  proposition,  which  they 
regard  as  so  vitally  important :  viz.  that  4  to  place  our 
will  in  opposition  to  the  Creator's  is  morally  evil.'  It 
is  certainly  no  self-evident  truth,  unless  we  add  the 
qualification,  '  Holy  Creator.'  It  is  no  self-evident  truth 
(even  if  it  were  a  truth  at  all.)  that  it  is  '  morally  evil  to 
place  our  will  in  opposition  to  that  of  a  creating  demon/ 
But  our  opponents  are  unable  to  add  this  qualification 
*  holy ; '  for  if  they  would  reason  consistently,  they  must 
regard  the  word '  holy  '  as  expressing  no  quality,  except 
one  which  a  creating  demon,  if  absolutely  obdurate, 
would  possess  as  fully  as  God  Himself. 

(4.)  If  our  opponents'  theory  were  true,  we  should 
have  no  means  whatever  of  knowing  that  we  do  bring 
our  wiU  into  harmony  with  the  Creator's,  by  practising 
Justice,  Veracity,  Benevolence.  Before  I  know  this, 
I  must  know  that  God  is  Just,  Veracious,  Benevolent : 
but  this  again  I  cannot  know,  except  through  knowing 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   95 

that  Sanctity  is  a  Perfection,  and  that  Sanctity  includes 
these  qualities. 

But  so  soon  as  I  know  that  Sanctity  includes  the 
qualities  of  Justice,  Veracity,  Benevolence,  I  know  by 
the  very  force  of  terms  that  injustice,  mendacity,  and 
cruelty  are  morally  evil.  I  must  know  therefore  that 
these  are  morally  evil,  before  I  can  possibly  know,  that 
by  practising  them  I  place  my  will  in  opposition  to  my 
Creator's. 

(5.)  The  Creator,  as  my  opponents  are  even  forward 
in  maintaining,  is,  by  the  necessity  of  His  Nature,  Just, 
Veracious,  Benevolent.  But  His  inability  to  act  in 
opposition  to  these  ends,  would  be  a  great  imperfection, 
unless  it  were  true  that  such  action  would  be  in  itself 
morally  evil,  independently  of  His  Will's  determination. 
But  if  so,  such  action  would  be  morally  evil  in  us,  quite 
independently  of  the  determination  of  the  Creator's 
Will.  But  our  opponents  maintain  that  things  are 
morally  evil  to  us,  not  independently  of  the  determina- 
tion of  the  Creator's  Will,  but  on  the  contrary  ;  in  most 
simple  and  absolute  dependence  on  such  determination. 
Consequently,  if  our  opponents'  theory  were  true,  it 
would  follow  that  God's  inability  to  act  unjustly,  men- 
daciously, malevolently,  is  a  great  imperfection. 

On  consideration,  it  will  be  found,  (I  think)  ex- 
tremely difficult  to  distinguish  the  whole  doctrine  which 
we  have  just  been  considering,  from  the  third  adverse 
theory ;  the  theory,  viz.  that  '  morally  evil '  signifies 
4  that  from  which  God's  Will  is  necessarily  averse/ 

41.  It  is  probable  enough  that  certain  other  theories 
may  be  alleged, — closely  resembling  indeed  one  or 
other  of  those  which  we  have  considered, — but  differing 
in  this  or  that  subordinate  detail.  But  the  same  five 
arguments  will  be  found  equally  cogent  against  each 
and  all. 

All  these  various  theories,  whatever  their  mutual 
difference^,  in  one  respect  agree  with  each  other,  while 
opposed  to  those  principles  which  we  have  ourselves 
advocated.  They  all  represent  my  idea  of  c  moral  good- 
ness/ as  in  this  or  that  way  dependent  on  my  idea  of 


96  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

*  God  ;'  whereas  we  have  most  earnestly  maintained,  that 
my  idea  of  *  God  '  depends  most  essentially  on  my  idea  of 

*  moral  goodness.'     One  very  observable  consequence 
therefore,  follows  at  once  from  our  opponents'  doctrine : 
nay  it  follows   so  immediately,  so  irresistibly,  that  it 
can  hardly  be  called  a  consequence  at  all,  but  is  rather 
the  very  same  doctrine  differently  stated.     It  is  implied 
then  in  their  position,  that  we  may  rightly  and  suitably 
give  the  appellation  '  God,'  to  a  being,  whom  we  do  not 
yet  conceive  as  possessing  moral  goodness  or  sanctity. 
According  to  their  doctrine,  I  say, — if  we  conceive  of  a 
being  infinite  in  power  and  knowledge, — we  may  appro- 
priately call  that  being  God,  before  we  so  much  as  con- 
sider the  question  of  his  moral  goodness;  before  we  so 
much  as  consider  the  question,  whether  on  the  one  hand 
he  love  and  command  Justice,  Veracity,  and  Mercy,  or 
on  the  other  hand  love  and  command  oppression,  blood- 
thirstiness,  lying  and  impurity.     From  such  a  statement 
every  Theist  will  at  once  recoil ;  and  our  opponents,  I 
am  well  aware,  will  be  foremost  in  disclaiming  any  such 
notion :  yet  surely  their  doctrine  either  means  this,  or 
means  nothing  at  all. 

On  this  question  of  words  then,  I  have  pursued  the 
course  which  every  good  Catholic  will  approve.  I  have 
abstained  from  using  the  term  '  God '  to  express  any 
idea,  except  one  which  shall  prominently  include  the 
Attribute  of  Sanctity.  But  now  I  go  a  step  further.  I 
maintain  that  men  have  no  possible  grounds  for  be- 
lieving the  Infinite  Creator  to  be  Holy,  so  long  as  they 
consider  the  idea  of  moral  goodness  to  be  dependent  on 
the  idea  of  God.  In  giving  reasons  however  for  this 
statement,  I  must  not  be  considered  as  adducing  any 
argument  distinct  from  those  already  stated ;  but  rather 
as  expressing  in  another  shape,  what  has  been  already 
implied  in  the  reasoning  above  drawn  out.  The  doctrine 
which  we  are  advocating  is  of  such  vital  importance, 
that  it  is  important,  in  every  attainable  way,  to  bring 
home  to  your  reason  and  imagination  its  absolutely 
certain  and  irrefragable  character. 

Let  us  ask  then  in  the  first  place,  what  is  our  ground 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   97 

for  regarding  the  Creator  as  Infinite  e.g.  in  Knowledge. 
Now  there  are  various  philosophical  processes,  adopted 
by  various  schools  of  Philosophy,  for  the  purpose  of 
establishing  God's  Existence.  Choose  then  that  philo- 
sophical process,  which  you  may  regard  as  the  most 
undeniably  cogent  for  this  purpose ;  and  call  it  process 
P.  What  is  the  conclusion  in  which  this  process  lands 
you  ?  This,  that  the  Creator  is  Infinite  in  all  Per- 
fections. But  then  how  do  you  infer  from  this,  that 
He  is  Infinite  in  Knowledge  ?  In  this  way ;  and  no 
other  way  is  even  imaginable.  You  know  aliunde,  by 
some  process  altogether  different  from  P,  that  Know- 
ledge is  a  Perfection.  So  soon  therefore  as  you  have 
established  that  the  Creator  is  Infinite  in  every  Per- 
fection, you  necessarily  infer  that  Infinite  Knowledge  is 
included  in  that  statement.  Thus,  and  thus  only,  you 
are  able  to  establish,  that  He  is  Infinite  in  Power  ;  that 
He  is  Immense  ;  and  so  with  various  other  Attributes. 

It  must  be  then  in  a  way  precisely  similar,  that  we 
arrive  at  a  conviction  of  His  Infinite  Sanctity:  or  if 
this  be  denied,  let  some  other  imaginable  way  be  alleged. 
Process  P  will  only  establish,  that  He  is  Infinite  in  all 
Perfections  :  it  will  not  tell  you,  that  Justice,  Bene- 
volence, Veracity,  are  Perfections.  Let  me  then  again 
and  again  entreat  my  opponents  to  consider,  how  they 
can  arrive  at  the  conviction  that  these  qualities  are  Per- 
fections. What  other  mode  is  possible,  except  that 
which  we  have  advocated  ? 

On  the  other  hand,  according  to  our  principles  the 
whole  truth  hangs  together  without  flaw  or  confusion. 
(1)  Reason  declares  the  intrinsic  excellence  of  Moral 
Goodness  ;  that  term  being  used  to  express  a  perfectly 
simple  idea,  which  all  mankind  form  on  various  oc- 
casions, with  greater  or  less  distinctness.  (2)  Reason 
also  declares,  (see  Sec.  6),  that  Justice,  Veracity, 
Benevolence,  are  qualities,  of  which  that  term  '  Moral 
'  Goodness '  is  truly  predicable.  From  this  follows  the 
immediate  inference,  that  Justice,  Veracity,  Benevolence, 
are  Perfections.  Since  then,  by  process  P,  we  are  made 
aware  that  the  Creator  is  Infinite  in  all  Perfections,  we 

H 


98  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

infer  that  He  has  these  Perfections  in  an  infinite  degree, 
as  well  as  the  rest- 
But  let  all  this  once  be  admitted,  and  the  conclusion 
is  manifest.  Consider  the  result  of  any  such  admission. 
Quite  independently,  then,  of  our  arriving  at  a  convic- 
tion of  God's  Existence,  we  know  that  Moral  Goodness 
is  excellent ;  and  we  know  also  that  Justice,  Veracity, 
Benevolence  are  qualities,  whereof  that  term  is  truly 
predicable.  Independently  then  of  our  arriving  at  a 
conviction  of  God's  Existence,  we  know  that  certain  acts 
of  injustice,  mendacity,  cruelty,  are  morally  evil ;  or 
(in  other  words)  that  we  are  under  the  moral  obligation 
of  avoiding  them.  We  arrive  therefore  at  the  know- 
ledge of  moral  obligation,  by  a  road  which  is  altogether 
independent  of  our  arriving  at  a  conviction  of  God's 
Existence.  And  this  is  the  precise  question  at  issue.* 

42.  An  inquiry  has  been  made,  which  this  will  be 
a  convenient  place  for  answering.  c  Can  we  say,'  it  has 
been  asked,  ;  that  Veracity,  e.g.  and  Benevolence  are 
Perfections,  because  God  is  what  He  is  ?' 

(1.)  I  reply  in  the  first  place  somewhat  indirectly, 
by  asking  a  counter-question : —  Can  we  say  that  Power 
and  Knowledge  are  Perfections,  because  God  is  what 
He  is  ?  Whatever  answer  may  truly  be  given  to  the 
latter  question,  may  with  equal  truth  be  given  to  the 

*  My  readers  may  remember  two  notes  in  the  preceding  Section  (to  n.  24, 
p.  55),  which  contained  certain  extracts  from  the  'Prselectiones  Pbilosophicse.' 
These  extracts  may  lead  to  the  enquiry,  what  is  the  analysis  of  '  moral 
goodness,'  which  the  '  Prsclectiones '  advocate ;  and  how  is  their  doctrine  to 
be  refuted. 

Their  statement  is  this  : — '  Hinc  sequitur,  bonitatem  actus  voluntatis  in 
1  eo  consistere,  quod  in  suo  judicio  appretiationis,  et  in  suo  amore  qui  illud 
'  subsequitur,  ro  plus  entis  TM  minus  entis  anteponat  :  (a  preferer  Ic  plus  etre 
1  au  moins  etre)'  (n.  1526). 

I  profess  myself  unable  to  refute  this  statement,  because  unable  to 
understand  it.  Take  our  old  instance  :  '  the  detention  of  a  deposit  is 
'  wrong.'  Our  author  regards  this  statement  as  comparatively  obscure.  He 
thinks  that  a  '  clearer  '  (see  note  at  p.  55)  method  of  apprehending  the  same 
truth  will  be  to  say,  that  by  retaining  a  deposit  we  prefer  the'  moins  etre ' 
to  the  '  plus  etre.'  Few  persons,  I  think,  will  follow  the  author,  in  regarding 
the  latter  as  the  clearer  statement  of  the  two.  But  this,  I  admit,  is  not  the 
precise  question  :  the  question  is  (1),  can  'morally  evil'  be  regarded  as  a 
complex  idea  ?  and  (2)  is  its  true  analysis,  '  the  not  preferring  le  plus  etre 
au  moins  etre  1 ' 

Now,  the  only  meaning  which  I  can  imagine  of  this  statement,  is  one 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   99 

former.  This,  in  fact,  is  the  only  doctrine  on  the 
subject  for  which  I  am  very  anxious  ;  viz.  that  we  have 
as  direct  means  for  knowing  Justice  and  Benevolence 
to  be  Perfections,  as  we  have  for  knowing  Knowledge 
and  Power  to  be  such. 

(2.)  I  incline  to  think,  however,  that  we  do  not 
know  enough  of  God  here  in  via,  to  answer  the  question 
either  way.  The  very  opposite  allegation  might  surely 
be  made  with  quite  equal  plausibility.  It  might  be 
said  that  God  is  what  He  is,  because  Power,  Knowledge, 
Veracity,  Benevolence,  are  Perfections ;  in  other  words, 
that  He  is  Omnipotent,  Omniscient,  Infinitely  Veracious, 
Infinitely  Benevolent,  because  He  would  be  imperfect 
were  He  otherwise. 

(3.)  And  I  incline  to  think  that  the  formula,  above 
supposed,  is  at  all  events  an  undesirable  form  of  speech 
in  the  case  of  Moral  Perfections.  I  think  it  is  undesirable 
to  say,  that  '  Veracity  and  Benevolence  are  Perfections 
4  because  God  is  what  He  is  ;'  inasmuch  as  such  a  form 
of  speech  tends  to  obscure  a  doctrine,  which  it  is 
extremely  important  on  the  other  hand  to  place  in  the 
clearest  and  most  brilliant  light.  I  refer,  of  course,  to 
the  doctrine,  that  we  know  Veracity  and  Benevolence 
to  be  Perfections,  as  directly  and  as  fully  as  we  know 
Knowledge  and  Power  to  be  such. 

which  it  is  impossible  that  the  author  can  have  intended.  In  refusing 
restitution  of  a  deposit,  I  undoubtedly  prefer  what  is  pleasurable  to  what 
is  morally  good  :  and  this  the  author  might  conceivably  have  meant,  by  his 

*  plus  6tre  *  and  '  moins  e~tre.'    But  so  able  an  author  could  not  really  have 
meant  this.  He  alleges  that  'morally  good1  or  '  evil'  is  a  complex  idea :  and 
professes  to  resolve  that  complex  idea  into  its  simpler  elements.     And  yet, 
on  this  view  of  his  meaning,  among  those  simpler  elements,  he  places  the 
original  idea  itself  in  all  its  complexity.     *  By  '  morally  good,'  *  he  says,  '  is 

*  meant  the  preferring  what  is  morally  good  to  what  is  pleasurable.'     '  You 
1  profess  to  explain  the  phrase,'  a  student  will  reply, '  and  yet  you  use  the 

*  phrase  itself  in  the  course  of  your  explanation.' 

Another  similar  statement  has  sometimes  been  made  ;  viz.  that  *  moral 
goodness,'  signifies  *  the  preferring  what  is  preferable.'  But  we  may  ask, 
in  what  sense  preferable  ?  Pleasurably  preferable,  e.  g.  1  l  Of  course  not ; 
'  but  morally  preferable  !'  Your  doctrine  then  is  this  :'  '  Moral  goodness  is 
'  the  preferring  what  is  morally  preferable  ;'  or  in  other  words, '  moral  good- 

*  ness  is  the  acting  according  to  the  principles  of  moral  goodness.' 

If  I  were  able  to  discover  any  intelligible  sense,  as  appertaining  to  either 
of  the  above  formulae,  I  am  quite  certain  that  I  could  most  readily  refute 
such  formula,  according  to  the  principles  already  laid  down. 


100  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

43.  Our  whole  case  will  be  made  even  stronger,  (if 
that  were  possible,)  by  considering  the  principal 
objections  which  have  been  made  to  our  conclusion. 
The  first  of  these  I  will  state,  almost  in  the  very  words 
of  an  able  thinker,  who  urged  it  on  me  in  conversation. 
'  You  exalt,'  he  said,  '  an  abstract  quality,  which  you 
4  call  Sanctity,  above  the  Living  God.  Of  course  you 
'  are  far  from  intending  this ;  but  to  this  your  principle 
4  comes  in  fact.  The  Living  God,  according  to  you, 
4  has  no  claims  on  our  obedience,  till  He  shews  that 
4  His  Commands  are  in  accordance  with  this  abstract 
4  quality.' 

I  reply,  that  I  am  not  exalting  any  abstract  quality 
at  all :  but  vindicating  the  claim  of  God's  Attribute 
c  Sanctity,'  to  an  equal  consideration  with  His  other 
Attributes.  In  the  case  of  any  other  Attribute  except 
Sanctity,  I  am  sure  that  my  opponents  would  see  how 
unfounded  is  their  allegation.  Take  e.g.  the  Attribute  of 
Omniscience.  I  am  sure  they  would  fully  concur  in 
such  language  as  the  following.  '  Suppose  the  case 
4  (impossible  indeed,  yet  not  unimaginable,)  that  our 
'  creator  were  a  being,  infinite  indeed  in  sanctity  and 
4  in  power,  but  yet  limited  in  knowledge,  and  capable 
c  of  error.  Such  a  being  would  not  be  that  God  Whom 
1  we  adore  ;  and  our  duties  to  him  would  in  many 
4  respects  differ,  from  our  existing  duties  towards  God. 
'  The  duty  of  faith  e.g.  essentially  depends  on  the  circum- 
'  stance,  that  God  is  ^capable  of  error;  and  it  could  not 
'  be  exercised  towards  such  a  being  as  we  have  imagined/ 
Who  would  think  of  objecting  to  such  a  statement  as 
this  ?  Who  would  say  that  such  language  exalts  the 
abstract  quality  <  knowledge*  above  the  Living  God  ? 
Yet  such  an  objection  might  quite  as  plausibly  be 
adduced,  in  this  case  as  in  the  other. 

Such  is  the  direct  answer  to  this  objection  ;  and  it 
is  here  given  as  such.  Should  any  of  you  therefore 
feel  doubtful,  as  to  thai  further  statement  which  I  am 
now  about  to  make,  I  will  beg  you  to  remember  that 
such  statement  is  in  no  way  essential  to  my  argument. 
But  surely  the  devout  Theist  will  feel,  that  the  Attribute 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.  101 

Sanctity  is  far  more  prominent,  far  more  characteristic 
(if  I  may  be  allowed  the  term),  of  Almighty  God,  than 
any  other.  Let  us,  on  the  one  hand,  imagine  a  being, 
who  shall  be  infinite  indeed  in  sanctity,  knowledge,  and 
the  rest ;  but  limited  in  power,  and  capable  of  failing 
in  what  he  attempts  :  or  again,  infinite  in  sanctity  and 
in  power,  but  limited  in  knowledge  and  capable  of 
error.  Then  let  me,  on  the  other  hand,  imagine  a 
being,  who  shall  be  infinite  indeed  in  power  and  know- 
ledge, but  limited  in  sanctity,  and  capable  of  sin  ;  who 
shall  be  capable  of  injustice  and  mendacity.  Surely 
this  last  idea  is  quite  immeasurably  more  removed 
from  our  idea  of  God,  than  is  either  of  the  other  two. 
In  either  of  the  former  cases  we  imagine  a  being,  who 
falls  short  of  the  Living  God ;  but  in  the  latter  case  we 
imagine  a  being,  who  may  act  in  opposition  to  His  cause. 

44.  This  brings  us  to  the  second  objection  ;  an 
objection  which  has  really  been  made  by  good  Catholics, 
though  those  who  adduce  it  must  have  given  very  little 
attention  to  its  full  import.  It  is  this.  '  Of  course  we 
4  feel  very  certain  that  mendacity  e.g.  and  cruelty  are 
4  wicked  ;  because  we  have  been  created  by  a  Being 
4  who  abhors  them,  and  who  has  consequently  given  us 
4  faculties  which  compel  us  so  to  regard  them.  But  a 
*  creator,  who  should  love  mendacity  and  cruelty,  might 
'  Avith  equal  readiness  give  us  faculties,  which  would 
4  compel  us  to  regard  them  as  morally  good.' 

The  first  answer  to  this  is  very  obvious.  The 
objector  supposes  that  we  have  no  reasonable  ground 
for  absolutely  trusting  our  faculties ;  no  reasonable 
ground  for  certainly  knowing,  that  their  testimony 
corresponds  to  Objective  Truth.  In  the  first  Section 
I  have  pointed  out,  in  so  great  detail,  the  absolute  and 
desolating  scepticism  in  which  we  must  be  landed  by 
any  such  supposition,  that  not  a  word  more  need  here 
be  added  on  the  matter. 

But  a  second,  and  even  more  cogent  answer,  may 
be  made  to  the  objection.  There  are  various  thinkers 
who  hold  what  I  have  called  semi-sceptical  opinions 
(see  n.  4,  p.  1 1 ) ;  who  consider  that  our  belief  in  the  trust- 


102  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

worthiness  of  our  faculties  depends  on  our  knowledge 
of  God's  Veracity.  Yet  even  these  persons  hold,  that 
we  have  full  means  of  knowing  that  God  is  Veracious. 
They  may  be  inconsecutive  and  unphilosophical, — 
indeed  I  am  sure  they  are, — in  so  thinking ;  yet  they 
do  hold  this. 

But  the  objector,  whom  we  are  now  considering, 
actually  denies  this  :  he  says  that  we  have  no  means  of 
knowing  God  to  be  Veracious.  His  very  statement 
contains  this.  '  It  is  not  certain  e.g.1  he  says,  '  that  vin- 
'dictiveness  or  impurity  is  sinful;  it  is  only  certain 
'that  we  have  been  created  by  a  being,  who  for  his 
'  own  purposes  makes  us  think  so.'  If  it  is  not  certain 
that  those  qualities  are  sinful  which  our  faculties  declare 
to  be  so,  —it  is  not  certain  that  our  faculties  are  not 
deceptive.  If  it  is  not  certain  that  our  faculties  are 
not  deceptive,  it  is  not  certain  that  God  is  Veracious. 

It  is  truly  amazing,  how  constantly  this  sceptical 
philosophy  is  intruding  in  its  various  shapes  :  how  con- 
stantly it  is  reappearing  under  new  forms  and  features, 
when  we  flatter  ourselves  that  it  is  finally  put  down. 

45.  There  is  a  third  objection,  which  perhaps  ap- 
proaches much  more  nearly  than  any  which  has  pre- 
ceded, to  expressing  the  real  ground,  on  which  many 
devout  Catholics  find  a  difficulty  in  our  statement.  It 
deserves  therefore,  and  shall  receive,  our  most  careful 
and  anxious  consideration. 

'Surely,'  says  the  objector,  'your  principles  are 
c  adverse  to  the  alphabet  of  the  spiritual  life.  In  pro- 
4  portion  as  men  advance  in  sanctity,  in  that  very  pro- 
'  portion  do  they  more  and  more  recognise  the  direct 
4  agency  of  God,  in  every  moral  obligation  which  they 
4  encounter.  They  consider  the  Law  itself  to  come  as 
6  fully  from  God,  as  does  the  Grace  which  enables  them 
*  to  observe  the  Law.  Wherever  there  appears  a  moral 
4  preferableness  of  one  act  over  another,  they  have 
'  learned  to  recognise  simply  the  Voice  of  God,  coun- 
4  selling  the  one  and  dissuading  the  other.  God's  Com- 
4  mands  and  Counsels  are  regarded  by  them  simply  as 
4  parts  of  that  sweet  Providence,  whereby  God  deals 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   103 

4  with  them  individually  one  by  one.  And  what  all  men 
1  feel  in  proportion  as  they  grow  in  sanctity, —  that  we 
4  find  (as  might  have  been  expected)  most  fully  testi- 
4  fied  by  the  Saints  of  God.  And  Holy  Scripture  speaks 
4  throughout  in  the  same  tone.  "  Justificationes  Tuas 
1  custodiam  ;  non  me  derelinquas  usquequaque.''  He, 
4  who  is  supplicated  never  to  desert  me,  is  the  very 
4  Being  who  imposes  on  me  the  Law  :  I  resolve  to  keep 

*  it,  because  it  is  His  Law,  and  because  His  Grace  will 
4  enable  me  to  do  so.     Whereas  you  on  the  contrary 
4  would  disavow  that  sweet  individual   Providence   of 

*  God,  which  imposes  burdens  on  each,  in  proportion  as 
4  each  is  capable  of  bearing  them.     This  you  would 
4  disavow  ;    and  you  would  enthrone  as  lawgiver  in  its 
4  place,  a  kind  of  blind  pitiless  destiny,  enforcing  on  all 
4  indiscriminately  its  relentless  claims/ 

God  forbid  that  we  should  treat  this  most  serious 
objection  in  any  li^ht  or  summary  way.  God  forbid 
that  we  should  put  it  on  one  side,  without  giving  it  our 
most  careful  consideration.  Indeed  our  cause  is  best 
advanced,  by  considering  it  with  the  greatest  care  ;  for 
it  is  one  of  those  objections,  which  appear  formidable 
indeed  when  first  stated,  but  which  altogether  lose 
their  force,  when  closely  approached  and  minutely 
surveyed. 

(1.)  The  first  answer,  however,  which  I  will  make, 
is  but  of  an  indirect  and  negative  character.  I  would 
beg  you  to  consider  then,  how  very  far  the  objection 
would  go,  if  it  could  be  admitted  to  have  any  real 
efficacy.  Take  the  theory  most  opposed  to  that  which 
we  have  advocated, — the  theory,  viz.  that  all  moral 
obligation  is  founded  on  God's  Command.  All  Catholics, 
who  hold  this  theory,  unhesitatingly  add,  that  this 
Command  is  necessary  and  not  free.  Now  the  present 
objector  urges,  that  if  there  were  an  obligation,  which 
exists  independently  of  God's  Will,  it  would  be  impossi- 
ble to  regard  this  obligation,  as  being  part  of  His  sweet, 
free,  individual  Providence  ;  of  that  Providence,  which 
imposes  burdens  in  proportion  as  each  man  is  capable  of 
bearing  them.  But  plainly,  whatever  be  the  weight  of 


104  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

this  objection,  it  applies  with  fully  equal  force,  against 
those  Commands  of  God  which  He  is  necessitated  to  im- 
pose, and  which  are  irrespective  of  His  free  Appointment. 
Indeed  it  might  be  plausibly  urged,  that  the  idea  of  a 
'  blind,  pitiless,  relentless,  destiny '  is  even  more  power- 
fully suggested,  by  this  latter  theory  than  by  our  own. 
It  might  be  said  that  this  latter  theory  suggests  the  idea 
of  a  destiny,  which  does  not  indeed  directly  oblige  the 
creature,  but  which  has  even  greater  power ;  which 
necessitates  the  Will  of  the  very  Almighty  Creator. 
c  The  other  theory,'  it  might  be  said,  c  represents  this 
c  destiny  as  God's  rival;  but  this  represents  it  as  His 
i  superior.1 

Plainly  then,  the  objection  which  we  have  stated, 
cannot  be  urged  in  behalf  of  any  adverse  Catholic 
theory,  as  against  ours.  If  it  were  efficacious  at  all,  it 
would  be  efficacious  against  a  doctrine,  on  which  all 
Catholics  are  unanimous  ;  the  doctrine,  viz.  that  morality 
is  necessary  and  unchangeable,  and  independent  of 
God's  free  Appointment. 

(2.)  Now  I  say,  secondly  and  more  directly,  that  the 
objection  is  not  efficacious  at  all  against  this  doctrine. 
Let  it  be  observed  then,  that  the  necessity  of  Moral 
Truth,  as  of  Mathematical,  is  a  hypothetical  necessity. 
It  is  in  no  respect  necessary  that  God  shall  create  a 
triangle  ;  it  is  only  necessary  that,  if  he  create  one,  its 
three  angles  together  equal  two  right  angles.  In  like 
manner  it  is  in  no  respect  necessary,  that  He  shall  create 
beings  possessed  of  freedom  and  intelligence  ;  it  is  only 
necessary,  that,  If  He  do  create  such  beings,  they  are 
subject  to  this  or  that  moral  obligation.  And  this 
holds,  not  only  as  to  obligation  in  general,  but  also  as 
to  the  various  particulars  of  which  it  consists.  That 
there  are  creatures  capable  of  impurity,  flows  from 
God's  most  free  Appointment :  all  which  is  necessary 
is,  that  if  there  he  such  creatures,  in  them  impurity  is 
sinful.  That  there  are  beings  capable  of  pain,  is  part 
of  God's  free  Providence ;  the  necessary  truth  is,  that, 
if  such  creatures  endure  pain,  they  act  sinfully  by 
murmuring  against  their  Creator's  Decrees.  And  so  of 


TIIK  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.      105 

every  possible  combination  of  circumstances,  under  which 
this  or  that  duty  may  be  incumbent. 

It  may  be  said  then,  without  the  slightest  repug- 
nancy to  the  principles  which  we  have  established,  that 
God  is  the  free  Author  of  every  single  moral  obligation, 
to  which  any  one  of  His  creatures  is  subject.    We  shall 
see  this  readily  in  an  analogous  case.      No  Theist  will 
deny,  that  the  elliptical  revolution  of  the  planets  is  due 
wholly  to  God's  free  Appointment.     '  How   can  this 
'be?'  an  objector  may  nevertheless  ask.     '  Such  ellip- 
tical   revolution  follows   by    necessary   consequence 
from  these  two  data  :  first,  from  that  property  of  gravi- 
tation, which  appertains  to  all  matter  ;  secondly,  from 
a  certain  original  projection  in  space,  which  the  planets 
received.     It  is  true  indeed  that  the  property  of  gra- 
vitation,— it  is  true  that  the  original  projection, — are 
due  to  God's  free  Appointment :  but  these  once  supposed, 
the  rest  follows  by  necessary  consequence.'    True,  we 
reply:  but  then,  since  (1),  the  elliptical  revolution  is  a 
necessary  consequence  of  physical  laws,  which  God  has 
freely  established; — and  since  (2),  in  establishing  them 
He  distinctly  saw  and  intended  that   consequence  ; — 
what  is  our  conclusion?     We  unhesitatingly  ascribe  to 
His  free  Appointment  that  consequence  itself.     And 
this   answer  is  felt  by  all  Theists  to  be  abundantly 
sufficient. 

See  then,  how  universally  recognised  is  our  prin- 
ciple. If  there  be  a  certain  consequence,  which  neces- 
sarily results  from  this  or  that  free  Appointment  of 
God; — and  if  God,  in  that  Appointment,  distinctly  saw 
and  intended  that  consequence ; — we  at  once  ascribe  that 
consequence  itself  to  His  free  Appointment.  But  every 
moral  obligation,  which  can  possibly  press  upon  any 
creature,  is  in  this  very  category ;  every  such  obliga- 
tion results  necessarily,  from  this  or  that  free  Appoint- 
ment of  God ;  every  such  obligation  was  distinctly  seen 
and  intended  by  God  in  that  Appointment.  Hence  He 
is  the  free  Author  of  every  possible  moral  obligation. 

-It  is  of  very  great  importance,  that  this  should  be 
grasped  as  a  practical  truth,  and  not  merely  recognised 


106  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

as  a  theoretical  speculation.  You  will  not  therefore,  I 
hope,  think  me  tedious,  if  I  labour,  by  one  or  two 
instances,  to  shew  its  intimately  practical  character. 

I  am  beset  by  some  violent  temptation,  and  ear- 
nestly pray  to  God  for  strength  and  support.  It  is  to 
Him  then  that  I  look  for  Grace,  that  I  may  fulfil  the 
obligation  of  resistance.  Now  it  is  quite  equally  to 
Him  that  I  look,  as  being,  by  His  free  appointment,  the 
Author  of  that  obligation.  How  is  it  that  the  tempta- 
tion began  ?  how  is  it  that  it  now  continues  ?  Simply 
because  God,  in  His  free,  tender,  individual  Providence, 
ordains  and  permits  it.  Let  Him  but  speak  one  word, 
the  temptation  is  brought  to  an  end.  It  rests  simply 
with  Him, — and  so  I  feel  it  to  the  bottom  of  my  soul, — 
whether  He  continue  my  present  obligation,  or  merci- 
fully remove  it.  How  can  He  remove  the  obligation  ? 
by  making  impurity,  e.g.  innocent?  Is  it  this  which 
holy  souls  mean,  when  they  look  to  God  as  Author  of 
their  various  obligations  ?  or  is  not  this  rather  the 
foulest  blasphemy  ?  No,  God  removes  my  obligation  of 
resistance  to  the  temptation  in  a  most  different  way :  He 
does  so,  by  removing  that  temptation  itself,  which  is  the 
object-matter  of  the  obligation.  And  so  I  say  to  Him, 
with  St.  Augustine,  l  da  quod  jubes  et  jube  quod  vis  : 
do  Thou  but  give  me  grace  to  fulfil  Thy  Commandment, 
and  then  command  what  Thou  dost  please.  Command 
me  to  resist  temptation,  or  remove  that  Command,  as  to 
Thee  may  seem  best;  for  either  alternative  simply 
depends  on  Thy  good  Providence. 

And  so  with  any  other  of  these  various  obligations, 
which  are  my  means  of  probation,  and  essential  parts 
of  His  Providence  in  my  regard.  He  commands  me  to 
bear  adverse  and  trying  circumstances  with  cheerful- 
ness and  contentment:  but  by  one  Word  proceeding 
from  His  Mouth  that  Command  may  be  removed  ;  for 
my  circumstances  may  cease  to  be  adverse  and  trying. 
He  commands  me  to  love  those  who  inflict  on  me  the 
most  stinging  injuries;  but  He  may  withdraw  that 
Command,  by  changing  the  hearts  of  my  enemies  and 
making  all  such  provocation  to  cease.  In  fact,  from  the 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.  107 

beginning  to  the  end  of  my  life,  it  is  His  free  Appoint- 
ment, and  that  alone,  which  determines  what  shall  be 
these  various  obligations,  which  are  to  be  the  means  of 
training  me  to  Heaven.  He  adjusts  those  obligations, 
with  most  tender  and  loving  regard  to  my  power  of 
bearing  them;  and  harmonises  them  with  the  various 
dispensations  of  His  Providence  towards  me. 

46.  Having  concluded  our  answer  to  this  most 
weighty  objection,  it  will  be  well  to  pursue  the  same 
line  of*  thought  a  little  further.  I  will  put  before  you 
therefore  in  connection,  the  various  modes,  in  which 
our  theory  holds  up  Almighty  God  as  the  One  Object 
of  our  undivided  reverence. 

(1.)  There  are  various  truths,  which  have  an 
absolute  and  indefeasible  claim  on  the  submission  of  all 
creatures  who  are  rational  and  free,  so  far  as  such 
creatures  are  brought  within  their  scope.  These  truths 
are  of  the  following  kind :  *  Veracity  is  of  obligation  ; ' 
4  Benevolence  is  a  virtuous  end  of  action ;'  &c.  &c.  Now 
these  truths,  so  far  from  being  rivals  in  any  sense  to 
God,  (God  Himself  forbid  such  blasphemy!)  are  abso- 
lutely identified  with  Him.  In  vindicating  their  inde- 
feasible authority,  we  are  vindicating  the  indefeasible 
Authority  of  Almighty  God. 

(2.)  By  recognising  these  truths,  we  can  give  a  real 
meaning  (whereas  otherwise  we  could  not  do  so)  to  the 
all-important  proposition,  '  God  is  Holy ; '  and  it  is  per- 
fectly impossible,  except  by  means  of  that  proposition, 
to  vindicate  His  claim  on  our  allegiance  and  love.  (See 
n.  37,  arg.  3.)  In  truth  He  is  not  only  perfectly  Holy, 
but  infinitely;  and  to  this  proposition  also  we  are  able 
to  give  a  most  real  and  intelligible  sense,  as  we  shall 
find  in  the  Sixth  Section.  See  n.  59,  pp.  125,  6. 

(3.)  We  shall  see,  later  in  the  present  Section,  that 
God  is  necessitated  by  His  Sanctity  to  add  the  sanction 
of  His  Command,  over  and  above  the  intrinsic  obliga- 
B  tion  of  those  duties  to  which  we  are  thus  intrinsecally 
obliged.  Wherever  then  we  recognise  an  intrinsic 
obligation,  we  not  only  recognise  the  Nature  of  God 
with  which  that  obligation  is  identical ; — we  also  re- 


108  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

cognise  an  Act  of  His  Will,  expressly  commanding  our 
obedience.  And  as  in  every  case  of  moral  obligation 
we  recognise  God's  Command,  so  also  in  every  case  of 
moral  preferableness  we  recognise  His  Counsel. 

(4.)  We  have  said  that  these  moral  truths  possess 
an  indefeasible  claim  on  us,  so  far  as  we  are  within 
their  sphere.  But  now  it  is  to  be  further  observed, 
that  it  depends  simply  on  God's  free  Appointment,  how 
far  we  are  brought  within  their  sphere.  Every  moral 
obligation  which  binds  me,  binds  me  by  God's  free 
Appointment.  Whenever  this  act  is  morally  preferable 
to  that,  God  by  His  free  Appointment  has  placed  me 
in  those  circumstances,  which  are  the  foundation  of 
that  preferableness.  Every  instance  then  of  moral 
obligation  or  preferableness,  issues  to  me  directly 
from  God  ;  and  is  part  of  that  tender,  loving,  watch- 
ful, individual  Providence,  whereby  He  trains  me  for 
Heaven.* 

*  My  readers  will  now  be  able  to  judge,  how  far  I  should  agree  with  the 
following  passage  of  Dr.  Brownson' s,  from  which  I  have  already,  in  a  former 
note,  cited  an  extract.  It  is  most  clearly  and  powerfully  expressed  ;  specially 
as  to  the  identity  of  God  and  Moral  Truth  :  and  it  contains  very  far  more 
with  which  I  concur,  than  the  reverse.  Yet,  in  addition  to  the  statement 
criticised  in  my  former  note,  there  are  one  or  two  others  from  which  I 
must  dissent. 

Thus,  I  cannot  agree  in  denying  that  there  are  two  distinct  ideas,  one  of 
God,  and  another  '  of  good.'  It  seems  clear  to  me  that  these  ideas  are 
distinct,  and  that  our  idea  of  God  includes  that  of  good. 

Again,  Dr.  Brownson  says  '  that  to  ask  whether  God  be  good  is  absurd.' 
This  no  doubt  is  true  ;  for  by  '  God'  I  mean  the  Infinitely  Perfect  Being. 
But  to  ask  whether  our  Creator  be  good,  is  not  merely  (me  judice)  not 
absurd,  but  is  to  ask  the  most  real  and  important  question  that  can  be 
asked. 

On  the  other  hand  I  do  not  dissent  from  Dr.  Brownson,  when  he  states 
that  '  if  the  Devil  were  necessary  being,  he  cannot  be  evil,  but  must  be 
f  good.'  For  Dr.  Brownson  means,  as  the  context  shews,  not  that  on  such 
an  hypothesis  mendacity  e.  g.  and  cruelty  would  be  good  ;  but  that  on 
such  an  hypothesis  the  Devil  would  be  veracious  and  benevolent. 

The  following  is  the  passage  in  extenso  ;  and  I  am  sure  those  of  my 
readers  who  may  not  have  hitherto  seen  it,  will  be  much  impressed  with  its 
vigour  and  clearness  of  expression. 

" '  But  absolute  and  necessary  ideas,  if  not  God,  if  not  real  and  necessary 
being,  are  mere  abstractions,  and  therefore  nothing ;  for  the  necessary  is 
not  and  cannot  be  creature,  since  creature  is  always  contingent.  If  real  and 
necessary,  they  must  be  being  ;  and  therefore  God  Himself  the  only  being.  _ 
The  Xoyaj,  the  Word,  Verbum  Dei,  is  a  distinction  in  God,  not/row,  God,  for 
the  Word  is  God.  Reason  then,  when  distinguished  from  our  faculty  of 
intelligence  which  depends  on  it,  is  not  something  between  necessary  being 
and  contingent  existence  ;  but  is  real  and  necessary  being,  or  God  Himself 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.   109 

47.  There  are  one  or  two  minor  objections  to  our 
doctrine,  which  have  been  brought  to  my  knowledge. 
But  it  is  unnecessary  to  speak  of  them,  as  you  will  be 
able  most  easily  to  refute  them,  if  you  have  followed  at 
all  carefully  the  preceding  argument.  Indeed  they 
would  not  by  themselves  (I  think)  have  cost  much  diffi- 
culty to  any  one ;  though  they  may  reasonably  be 
adduced  as  additional  arguments,  against  a  proposition 
otherwise  questionable.  I  shall  now,  therefore,  con- 
sider myself  to  have  sufficiently  established  the  main 
proposition  for  which  I  have  been  contending ;  and  I 
shall  proceed  to  deduce  from  it  one  or  two  con- 
sequences. 

Before  proceeding  to  our  next  step,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  explain  a  distinction,  always  recognised 
in  theological  treatises  cde  Deo.'  There  are  certain 
things,  which  God  cannot  do  '  de  Potentia  Absolute!  ; ' 
certain  other  things,  which  He  can  do  indeed  '  de 

as  Fenelon  maintains :  and  therefore  the  idea  of  good  must  be  the  Good 
itself.' 

" '  The  ideal,'  interposed  Father  John,  '  is  the  intelligible,  and  the  intel- 
lect of  God  Himself  affirming  Himself,  and  in  the  act  of  affirming  Himself 
creating  and  illumining  our  intelligence  ;  and  He  is  at  once  the  Creator,  the 
immediate  Object,  and  the  Light  of  our  reason.  The  idea  of  good,  which  is 
the  principle  of  our  moral  judgments,  is  God  affirming  Himself  to  us  as  the 
Good  itself.  God,  then,  is  Himself  the  Principle,  the  Eule,  Standard,  or 
Measure  of  our  moral  judgment.  When  we  judge  that  this  or  that  particular 
thing  is  or  is  not  good,  He  is  the  term  of  comparison.  We  may  properly 
ask  whether  this  or  that  conception  of  God  Himself  be  true  or  false  in 
the  same  way  ;  but  to  ask  whether  God  be  good  or  not  is  absurd :  for  we 
can,  in  order  to  answer  the  question,  compare  Him  only  with  Himself.' 

" '  We  have  not,'  added  Diefenbach, '  two  distinct  ideas,  one  of  God,  and 
another  of  good,  between  which  we  can  institute  a  comparison,  or  which  we 
can  judge  the  one  by  the  other.  The  two  ideas  in  the  real  order  are  one 
and  the  same.  God,  as  Being,  is  identically  God  as  Good  ;  for  in  God  there 
is  no  distinction  between  Essence  and  Being,  and  none  between  Being  and 
Attribute,  or  between  one  Attribute  and  another.' 

" '  Therefore,'  said  Wiuslow,  *  nothing  is  gained  by  the  attempt  to  found 
the  Sovereignty  of  God  on  his  intrinsic  Justice,  Goodness,  Love,  dis- 
tinguished from  his  Omnipotence,  or  creative  power.  Goodness,  Justice, 
Love,  so  distinguished,  give  the  law  according  to  which  the  sovereign  power 
must  be  exercised,  if  you  will,  but  they  do  not  give  dominion  itself.  If, 
per  impossibile,  some  other  power  had  created  us,  we  might  still  love  and 
revere  God,  for  what  he  is  in  and  of  Himself;  but  He  would  have  no  right  to 
command  us  as  a  sovereign,  for  in  that  case  we  should  not  be  his  creatures 
but  another's.' 

" « If,  then,  the  devil  had  created  us,  we  should  have  been  bound  to  obey 
the  devil,'  concluded  De  Bonneville. 


110  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Potentia  Absoluta,'  but  not  4  de  Potentia  Ordinata. 
And  now  to  explain  this  distinction. 

God  can  do  anything  '  de  Potentia  Absoluta,7  which 
is  not  either  intrinsecally  impossible,  or  contradictory 
to  His  Attributes.  God  cannot '  de  Potentia  Absoluta ' 
create  a  triangle,  whose  angles  shall  be  greater  than 
two  right  angles  ;  or  command  His  creature  to  cul- 
tivate pride  and  vindictiveness.  But  short  of  these 
extreme  cases,  short  of  cases  which  involve  self-con- 
tradiction or  contradiction  to  His  Essential  Attributes, 
4  de  Potentia  Absoluta '  He  can  do  everything. 

Yet  there  are  many  things  which,  though  they  do 
not  involve  this  absolute  contradiction,  are  manifestly 

" '  Give  the  devil  his  due,  is  a  maxim  one  often  hears  repeated/  replied 
Father  John.  '  If  the  devil  were  an  independent  being,  and  were  really  our 
creator,  we  should  be  his,  and  bound  to  obey  his  commands.  But  the  sup- 
position is  absurd.  The  devil  could  create  us,  only  on  the  supposition  that 
he  is  not  himself  created  ;  that  he  is  real  and  necessary  being  ;  and  if  real 
and  necessary  being,  he  cannot  be  evil,  but  must  be  good,  and  hence  not 
the  devil  but  God.  The  devil  is  a  creature,  the  creature  of  God ;  and 
therefore,  like  any  other  creature,  belongs  to  God  in  all  he  is,  and  in  all  he 
can  do.  Whatever  the  power  he  may  have,  he  has  received  it  from  God, 
and  owes  it  to  him.  God  owns  him,  owns  his  power,  and  therefore  all  that 
by  that  power  can  be  brought  forth  ;  as  he  who  owns  the  parents  owns  the 
offspring  :  as  we  believe  is  asserted  by  the  laws  of  every  civilised  State.' 

" ( M.  De  Bonneville,'  said  Winslow,  *  is  a  French  royalist,  in  exile  for 
his  loyalty :  and  he,  I  presume,  holds  that  he  is  bound  to  obey  his  legitimate 
prince,  precisely  because  it  is  his  prince  who  commands.  The  same  com- 
mand, however  just  and  good,  issued  by  another,  would  not  be  a  command 
for  him.  How  then  is  it  that  he  fails  to  perceive,  that  the  obligation  to 
obey  God  does  not  depend  on  what  is  commanded,  but  on  the  fact  that  he 
who  commands  it  is  his  sovereign  ?  It  is  not  precisely  because  what  is 
commanded  is  just  and  good  that  God's  Commands  are  obligatory,  but 
because  they  are  the  Commands  of  Him  who  has  the  right  to  command.' 

" l  God's  Commands  bind  our  consciences  because  they  are  just  and 
good,'  said  O'Connor. 

" '  Rather,'  replied  Winslow,  '  they  are  just  and  good  because  they  are 
His  Commands.  I  love  the  law  of  God,  I  delight  in  it,  because  it  is  just 
and  good  ;  I  obey  it  because  it  is  the  Command  of  my  Sovereign.' 

" '  The  dispute  arises,'  said  Diefenbach, '  from  not  distinguishing  between 
the  real  sovereign  and  his  deputy  or  representative  ;  between  him  who  is 
sovereign  in  his  own  right,  and  him  who  is  sovereign  only  by  commission. 
God  is  Sovereign  in  his  own  right,  and  we  owe  him  unconditional  obedience  ; 
we  can  make  no  inquiry  into  the  intrinsic  nature  of  his  Commands  before 
obeying  ;  we  can  only  inquire  what  is  commanded,  and  whether  it  is  really 
He  who  commands.  The  real  sovereign  is  not  and  never  can  be  a  tyrant ; 
for  tyrant,  by  the  very  force  of  the  word,  means  a  usurper,  one  who  com- 
mands without  the  right  to  command.  Every  tyrannical  act  is  an  usurpa- 
tion of  power  ;  and  an  unjust  command  is  tyrannical,  because  no  one  has 
legitimate  authority  to  command  injustice.  "  Human  sovereigns,  even  the 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.  Ill 

incongruous  and  unworthy  of  Him.  For  instance :  He 
might  have  infused  into  the  soul  of  Christ  a  less  degree 
of  Habitual  Grace,  than  He  infuses  into  you  and  me  at 
Baptism .  There  is  nothing  here  either  self-contradictory, 
or  contradictory  to  His  Attributes:  yet  the  supposed 
act  would  be  so  manifestly  incongruous  and  unworthy 
of  Him,  that  we  might  have  been  quite  certain  He 
would  never  so  have  acted.  In  all  such  cases,  theo- 
logians say,  that  God  cannot  so  act  '  de  Potentia 
Ordinata  :'  in  other  words,  He  cannot  congruously  so 
act. 

48.*  Let  us  now  proceed  with  our  general  subject. 
We  have  seen  that  there  are  certain  combinations  of 


most  legitimate,  are  only  delegated  sovereigns,  and  possess  no  sove- 
reignty in  their  own  right.  Into  their  orders  we  may  inquire,  for  they 
have  no  authority  beyond  their  commission,  and  that  commission  never 
authorises  them  to  command  what  is  intrinsecally  unjust.  But  when  we 
know  the  Command  is  from  God,  to  inquire  if  it  be  just  or  not,  is  not  only 
irreverent,  but  absurd  ;  for  it  is  simply  asking  if  the  Command  of  God  be 
the  Command  of  God.' 

" '  But  that,  though  it  may  give  us  rights  in  face  of  the  delegate  or  human 
representative  of  power,  gives  us  none  before  God,'  said  O'Connor.  '  The 
law  of  justice  is  universal;  and  God  Himself  is  no  more  exempt  from  it  than 
the  meanest  of  His  creatures.  He  has  no  more  right  to  do  injustice  than  I 
have  ;  I  have  then  before  Him  the  right  of  Justice.' 

" '  The  law  of  justice]  said  Diefenbach,  *  is  universal,  not  because  it  is 
distinct  from  God,  above  Him,  or  anterior  to  Him,  but  because  it  is  Ood 
Himself.  He  is  bound  by  it,  only  in  the  sense  that  He  is  bound  by  His  own 
Being,  or  the  Perfection  of  His  own  Nature.  He  can  apply  the  law  to  His 
creatures,  or  create  existences  that  shall  come  under  it ;  but  He  cannot  alter 
it,  because  He  cannot  alter  or  annihilate  Himself,  or  His  own  real  and  neces- 
sary Being.  God  is,  and  is  necessarily  what  He  is.  He  only  is ;  and  what- 
ever is  distinguishable  from  Him,  is  not  being,  but  existence,  created  by 
Him,  and  having  its  being  in  His  being;  *  for  in  Him  we  live  and  move  and 
have  our  being.'  Abstractions  are  nullities,  and  an  abstract  law  is  simply 
no  law  at  all.  The  law  of  justice  must  be  real ;  then  being ;  and  if  being,  God. 
Hence  St.  Augustine  identifies  it  with  the  Eternal  Reason  or  Will  of  God. 
The  nature  of  things,  the  contrary  of  which  cannot  be  done,  is  not  something 
distinct  from  Ood,  and  subjecting  Him,  but  is  precisely  His  own  Etemwl  and 
Immutable  Nature.  The  nature  of  things  is  what  it  is,  because  He  is  what 
He  is,  and  cannot  make  Himself  other  than  He  is.  To  say  such  or  such  a 
thing  is  impossible  in  the  nature  of  things,  is  simply  to  say  that  it  is 
repugnant  to  the  Nature  of  God,  and  what  He,  from  the  Perfection  of  His 
Nature,  cannot  do.  God  cannot  be  subject  to  any  law,  but  that  of  His  own 
Being.  He  cannot  be  placed  under  obligation  ;  we  then  can  have  no  rights 
before  Him,  and  no  rights  at  all  except  from  Him,  and  under  Him :  for 
rights  on  the  one  side  are  obligations  on  the  other.' "  The  italics  are  mine. 

*  The  asterisks  are  added  to  distinguish  these  numbers  from  nn.  48,  49, 
60,  51,  already  printed  in  the  fifth  Section. 


112  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

circumstances,  under  which  certain  acts  are  of  inde- 
pendent obligation  on  human  beings.  Let  us  call  the 
assemblage  of  these  obligations,  by  a  name  not  un- 
frequently  given  to  it ;  let  us  call  it  for  the  present  the 
Natural  Rule  of  human  actions.* 

The  Natural  Rule  of  human  actions,  then,  according 
to  our  present  definition,  is  that  portion  of  Moral  Truth, 
which  contains  the  duties  iutrinsecally  obligatory  on 
us  men,  apart  from  God's  Command  ;  obligatory  on  us 
men,  as  possessing  that  nature,  and  placed  in  those 
circumstances,  which  God  by  His  free  Appointment  has 
ordained.  In  the  fifth  Section  we  shall  give  a  some- 
what larger  sense  to  this  phrase,  the  'Natural  Rule;' 
but  in  the  fullest  sense  which  we  shall  give  it,  it  will 
remain  but  a  small  portion  of  that  whole  fabric  which 
we  have  called  Moral  Truth  (see  n.  31,  p.  69).  The 
Natural  Rule  concerns  only  us  men;  but  Moral  Truth 
concerns  all  possible  creatures,  who  could  be  endowed 
by  God  with  freedom  and  intelligence.  See  n.  31. 

Now  in  what  relation  does  God,  our  All- holy 
Creator,  stand  to  this  Natural  Rule  ?  Two  things 
follow,  from  the  principles  already  laid  down.  First, 
He  was  perfectly  free  to  call  into  existence  creatures, 
or  not  to  do  so ;  to  call  into  existence  rational  creatures, 
or  not  to  do  so  ;  to  call  into  existence  us  human 
creatures,  or  not  to  do  so.  Secondly,  since  He  does 
resolve  to  call  human  creatures  into  existence,  He  is 
not  free  to  appoint,  that  they  shall  be  exempt  from  the 
intrinsic  obligatoriness  of  the  Natural  Rule.  But 
now  further  I  ask  thirdly  ;  is  He  necessitated  to  add  a 
further  distinct  Command  of  His  own,  in  corroboration 
of  that  Natural  Rule?  Let  us  consider  for  a  moment 
this  somewhat  important  question. 

It  is  very  plain,  that  'de  Potentia  Ordinata'  He  could 
not  have  acted  otherwise.  Strange  and  incongruous 
indeed  it  would  have  been,  that  an  All-holy  Being 
should  have  created  free  persons,  without  commanding 

*  'Ante  omne  Dei  Irnperium, — Voluntatem, — Judicium,  est  regula 
qucedam  harum  actionum,  quoe  sudpte  naturd  constat.'  Vasquez,  already 
quoted. 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.  105* 

them  to  practise  virtue  and  flee  from  vice.  And  that 
He  has  in  fact  so  acted,  no  Theist  ever  doubted.  But 
Suarez  goes  further  than  this  ;  and  I  think  that  every 
Theist,  on  reflection,  will  follow  him  in  his  further  step. 
He  considers  that  'de  Potentia  Absoluta'  God  could 
not  have  abstained  from  imposing  this  Command  ;  so 
that,  from  the  very  fact  of  knowing  that  He  is  a  Holy 
Being,  we  know  also  that  He  commands  us  to  fulfil 
those  duties,  which  are  of  independent  obligation. 
Suarez's  reasoning  is  as  follows.  When  I  know  by 
Reason  that  God  is  Holy,  I  know  also  that  what  is 
independently  good  pleases  Him,  and  what  is  inde- 
pendently evil  displeases ;  for  otherwise  He  would  not 
be  Holy.  Now  a  Holy  God,  by  the  very  fact  of 
creating  us,  takes  on  Himself  the  office  of  governing 
us;  and  He  who  holily  governs  us,  cannot  but  forbid 
us  to  do  those  things,  which  are  independently  bad, 
and  therefore  intrinsecally  displeasing  to  Himself.* 

*  "  Quidquid  contra  rationem  rectamfit,  displicet  Deo,  et  contrarium  illi 
placet ;  quia  cum  Voluntas  Dei  sit  summti  Justa,  nonpotest  Illi  non  displicere 
quod  turpe  est,  nee  non  placere  honestum,  quia  Voluntas  Dei  non  potest 
esse  irrationabilis,  ut  dixit  Ans.  lib.  i.  Cur  Deus  homo,  c.  8.  Ergo  .Ratio 
Naturalis,  quse  indicat  quid  sit  per  se  malum  vel  bonum  homini,  conse- 
quenter  indicat,  esse  secundum  Divinam  Voluntatem,  ut  unum  fiat  et  aliud 
vitetur. 

"  Dices :  '  ex  voluntate  complacentice  aut  displicentioe  in  Deo,  non  sequitur, 
{ qu6d  sit  Voluntas  obligans  per  modum  Prcecepti:  turn  quia  hac  ratione  non 
'tenemur  conformarionmiDivin9eVoluntati,qii8e  est  persimplicem  affectum ; 
'  imo  nee  omni  Voluntati  Beneplaciti  seu  Efficaci ;  sed  illi  tantum,  qua  vult 
'nos  obligare  ;  ut  suppono  ex.  1.  2.  q.  19.  Unde  hac  ratione,  licet  opera 
'  consiliorum  placeant  Deo,  non  inde  infertur  Voluntas  prsecipiens ;  turn  etiani 
'  quia  homini  justo  vel  beato  displicet  quidquid  a  me  contra  rationem  fit,  et 
*  tamen  nihilominus  ilia  voluutas  non  est  praeceptiva.'  Respondeo  primum, 
pon  esse  sermonem  de  quAcumque  voluntate  complacentice,  sed  de  ilia,  qua 
ita  placet  aliquid  ut  bonum,  ut  contrarium  vel  privative  opposituni  per 
dmissionem  dispticeat  tanquam  malum:  opera  autem  consiliorum  non 
placent  hoc  niodo,  sed  ita  placent,  ut  in  oppositis  omissionibus  non  dis- 
pliceat  aliqua  malitia  :  et  ide6  ilia  complacentia  vocatur  simplex  voluntas  ; 
prior  autem,  qua  ita  unum  placet  ut  aliud  simpliciter  displiceat,  censetur 
magis  absoluta.  Deinde  dico,  talem  Voluutatem  spectandam  esse  in  Deo 
'ut  in  Supremo  Gubernatore,  et  non  ut  inveniri  potest  in  persona  privata 
justa,  sive  beata  sive  viatrice :  Deus  enim,  habens  illam  absolutam  displi- 
centiam  aut  complacentiam,  vult  absolute  illud  opus  fieri  vel  non  fieri, 
quantum  ad  munus  Justi  Gubernatoris  spectat ;  ergo  est  talis  Voluntas,  ut 
per  illam  velit  subditos  obligare,  ut  idfaciant  vel  non  faciant.  Non  enim 
potest  esse  Voluntas  Efficax,  ut  opus  absolute  fiat  vel  noii  fiat ;  alias  nun- 
quam  opus  aliter  fieret  quarn  Deus  vellet :  quod  tamen  non  ita  est,  ut 
constat.  Neque  id  pertinet  ad  munus  Gubernatoris,  ad  quern  spectat  ita 

B* 


106*  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

On  a  matter  where  all  Catholics  will  be  probably 
agreed,  it  is  unnecessary  to  say  more. 

Here  then  we  arrive  at  the  idea,  implied  in  that  well- 
known  phrase  '  the  Natural  Law.'  It  is  simply  this :  the 
Command  given  us  by  God,  and  which  a  Holy  Creator 
could  not  but  give,  to  perform  those  acts  which  in  them- 
selves are  of  independent  obligation,  and  to  abstain 
from  those  other  acts  which  in  themselves  are  in- 
dependently evil.  Or  more  briefly  —  it  is  God's 
Command,  necessarily  imposed  upon  us,  to  observe  the 
Natural  Rule.*  Now  it  is  a  most  undoubted  intuem, 

velle  bona,  ut  permittat  mala,  et  sinat  causas  secundas  liberas  sua  libertate 
uti  expedite  et  sine  impedimento.  Ergo  oportet,  ut  sit  Voluntas  obligans : 
nam  hoc  modo  providet  subditis  in  hoc  genere,  quantum  ad  rectam  et 
prudentem  providentiam  spectat.  ' 

"  Dico  igitur  ex  Cajet.  dicto  a  8  Divinam  Voluntatem,  licet  simpliciter 
libera  sit  ad  extra,  tamen  ex  suppositions  unius  acids  liberi  posse  necessitari 
ad  alium :  ut  si  vult  promittere  absolute^,  necessitatur  ad  implendum 
promissum  ;  et  si  vult  loqui  aut  revelare,  necessario  debet  revelare  verum. 
Et  cum  eadeni  proportione,  si  vult  creare  mundum  et  ilium  conservare  in. 
or  dine  ad  talem  finem,  non  potest  non  habere  Providentiam  illius  ;  et  sup- 
posita  providendi  Voluntate,  non  potest  non  habere  Providentiam  perfectam, 
et  consentaneam  Suse  Bonitati  et  Sapientise  :  ideoque  suppositd  Voluntate 
creandi  naturam  rationalem  cum  sufficienti  cognitione  ad  operandum  bonum 
et  malum,  et  cum  sufficienti  concursu  ex  parte  Dei  ad  utrumque,  non  potuisse 
Deum  non  velle  prohibere  tali  creaturce  actus  intrinsece  malos,  vel  nolle 
prcecipere  honestos  mcessarios.  Quia  sicut  non  potest  Deus  mentiri,  ita 
non  potest  insipienter  vel  injuste  gubernare ;  esset  autem  providentia  valde 
aliena  a  Divind  Sapientia  et  Bonitate,  non  prohibere  vel  prcecipere  suis 
subditis  quce  talia  sunt.  Sic  ergo  ad  argumentum  distinguitur  minor  : 
nam  absolute^  posset  Deus  nihil  prsecipere  vel  prohibere;  tamen  ex  sup- 
positione,  quod  voluit  habere  subditos  rationes  utentes,  non  potuit  non  esse 
Legislator  eorum,  saltern  in  his  quse  ad  honestatem  naturalem  morum 
necessaria  sunt.  Item  ratio  supra  insinuata  est  satis  probabilis  :  quia  non 
potest  Deus  non  odisse  malum  rectse  rationi  contrarium  ;  habet  autem  hoc 
odium,  non  tantum  ut  privata  persona,  sed  etiam  ut  Supremus  Gubernator  : 
ergo  ratione  hujus  odii,  vult  obligare  subditos  ne  illud  cominittant." — 
SUAREZ,  De  Legibus,  lib.  2,  cap.  6,  n.  8,  9,  and  23. 

*  I  have  taken  this  definition  almost  literally  from  Suarez,  though  he 
does  not  give  it  as  a  definition.  In  explaining  what  is  meant  by  the  Natural 
Law,  he  says,  'Deus  habet  perfectam  Providentiam  hominum ;  ergo  ad  Ilium, 
ut  ad  Supremum  Gubernatorem  naturae,  spectat  vetare  mala  et  prsecipere 
bona  :  ergo  quamvis  ratio  naturalis  indicet  quid  sit  bonum  vel  malum 
rationali  naturce  ;  nihilominus  Deus,  ut  Auctor  et  Gubernator  talis  natures, 
prcecipit  idfacere  vel  vetare  quod  ratio  dictat  esse  faciendum  vel  vetandum? — 
De  Legibus,  lib.  2,  c.  6,  n.  8. 

There  is  a  definition  of  the  Natural  Law,  often  ascribed  to  St.  Thomas, 
nearly  equivalent  to  that  which  I  have  given.  "  Participatio  legis  seternse 
in  rationali  creatura,  dictans  et  prsescribens  illud  esse  agendum  quod  est 
intrinsece  bonum,  et  illud  fugiendum  quod  est  intrinsece  malum."  See  e.g. 
"  Philosophia  Lugdunensis."  But  I  cannot  find  it  in  St.  Thomas. 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.  107* 

that  disobedience  to  the  commands  of  an  Infinitely  Holy 
Creator  is  most  deeply  sinful.  Hence  an  important 
consequence  follows,  in  regard  at  least  to  all  those  who 
have  the  means  of  knowing  this  Command  imposed  by 
God :  this  consequence  is,  that,  in  violating  the  Natural 
Law,  these  men  incur,  not  merely  that  sinfulness  which 
is  independently  intrinsic  to  the  act,  but  another  totally 
distinct  ;  viz.  disobedience  to  the  Infinite  God.*  How 
far  it  is  possible  that  there  may  be  men  possessed  of 
reason,  who  have  no  sufficient  means  of  knowing  God's 
sanction  of  the  Natural  Rule,  is  a  question  of  some  im- 
portance ;  and  it  shall  be  considered  in  our  theological 
course.  A  condemned  proposition  on  Philosophical  Sin, 
which  we  are  to  treat  in  the  Supplementary  Section, 
goes  so  appalling  a  length,  as  to  maintain  that  we  cannot 
gravely  offend  God,  unless  we  are  distinctly  thinking  of 
Him  when  we  commit  a  sin.  It  is  difficult  to  imagine, 
how  any  one  can  have  seriously  maintained  so  astounding 
a  paradox. 

49*.  It  need  hardly  be  said,  that  the  Commands  of 
a  Holy  Creator  claim  unswerving  obedience  at  our 
hands,  whether  the  thing  commanded  be  of  independent 
obligation  or  not.  Hence,  when  God  commanded  the 
Jews  to  circumcise  their  children,  it  was  their  bounden 
duty  so  to  do  ;  when  He  commands  us  to  obey  the 
laws  of  the  Church,  we  violate  a  most  solemn  duty  in 
refusing  obedience. 

Here  we  see  the  distinction,  between  the  Divine 
Positive  Law  and  the  Natural  Law.  By  the  latter,  God 
commands  that,  which  is  in  itself  of  independent  obliga- 
tion ;  by  the  former,  He  commands  that,  which  carries 
with  it  no  obligation  whatever  except  His  Command. 

And  here  too  we  see  the  distinction,  which  con- 
tinually meets  us  in  Theology,  between  *  prohibita  quia 
mala,'  and,  '  mala  quia  prohibita.'  Pride,  vindictive- 
ness,  impurity,  are  'prohibita  quia  mala;'  prohibited 
by  God,  because  they  are  independently  evil.  To 
remain  separate  from  the  Catholic  Church,  is  c  malum 

*  We  shall  shew,  in  our  theological  course,  that  this  sinfuluess  is  not 
only  totally  distinct,  but  also  immeasurably  greater. 


108*  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

quia  prohibitum  ; '  it  is  evil,  simply  because,  under  the 
Gospel,  our  Holy  Creator  has  forbidden  such  separation. 
Again,  to  eat  flesh  on  Friday,  to  do  servile  work  on 
Sunday,  to  omit  confession  at  Easter,  are  '  mala  quia 
prohibita ; '  evil  because  they  are  forbidden  by  the 
Church,  to  which  God  has  given  the  power  of  enacting 
such  laws. 

50*.  There  are  various  truths,  of  fundamental  im- 
portance, which  have  engaged  our  attention  in  this  and 
the  preceding  Sections.  We  have  been  hitherto  occu- 
pied in  stating  these  truths,  according  to  their  logical 
order ;  I  mean  according  to  that  order  in  which  we 
arrive  at  their  knowledge.  It  will  conduce,  however,  to 
further  clearness,  if  I  terminate  this  Section  by  endea- 
vouring to  make  you  conceive  the  same  truths  in  their 
ontological  order ;  i.e.  according  to  that  order,  whether  of 
nature  or  time,  in  which  they  actually  exist.  In  this 
order,  of  course,  we  begin,  not  with  the  Principle  of 
Certitude,  but  with  Almighty  God.  I  must  first  then 
lead  you  to  conceive  of  Him,  with  sufficient  fullness  and 
explicitness  for  our  present  purpose.  I  must  lead  you 
to  conceive  of  Him, — not  indeed  in  all  those  various 
aspects  wrherein  we  are  able  to  conceive  of  Him, — but 
only  in  a  small  number  of  them ;  only  so  far  as 
we  are  led  to  contemplate  Him  by  those  particular 
truths,  which  we  have  been  considering  in  the  present 
Chapter. 

(1.)  We  must  begin  by  conceiving  of  Him,  as  the 
One  Self-existent  Necessary  Being.  On  this,  however, 
our  present  purpose  does  not  require  us  to  enlarge. 

(2.)  With  Him,  as  the  One  Necessary  Being,  all 
necessary  truths  are  identified.  Such  verities  as  the 
following  then  are  simply  identical  with  God.  '  The 
three  angles  of  any  triangle  together  equal  two  right 
angles ; '  '  Knowledge  and  Power  are  Perfections ; ' '  Sanc- 
tity is  a  Perfection ;'  c  Sanctity  includes  Justice  and 
Benevolence  ;'  &c.  &c. 

(3.)  The  will  of  this  Necessary  Being  is  necessarily 
directed  to  that  which  is  morally  good ;  or  (in  other 
words)  He  is  necessarily  Just,  Veracious,  Loving,  and 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.  109* 

the  rest.  This  is  that  Attribute  which  we  call 
Sanctity. 

These  three  particulars  lead  us  to  conceive  truly 
of  God's  Nature.  Now  in  regard  to  what  we  conceive 
as  His  External  Acts. 

(4.)  He  has  thought  fit,  for  the  wise  purposes  of 
His  Providence  and  in  accordance  with  His  Liberty,  to 
create  various  beings,  who  are  rational  and  free. 

(5.)  Since  He  is  necessarily  Veracious,  He  has 
necessarily  given  to  those  beings,  not  an  unsound,  but 
a  sound,  reason.  So  far  as  His  Power  was  concerned, 
He  might  most  easily  have  created  us,  so  that  our  rea- 
son should  testify  what  is  false.  He  might  have  so 
created  us,  that  we  should  be  invariably  fancying 
ourselves  to  remember  things  which  never  happened; 
or  that  we  should  fancy  certain  laws  of  reasoning  to  be 
valid,  which  really  lead  from  true  premisses  to  false 
conclusions.  But  His  Veracity  renders  it  impossible 
for  Him  so  to  act.  He  has  given  us  faculties,  which 
are  truthful  and  not  mendacious ;  He  has  given  us  a 
reason,  which  will  certainly  lead  us  to  truth,  if  we  do 
but  exercise  it  according  to  those  rules  which  itself 
prescribes. 

(6.)  But  it  would  be  of  no  service  to  give  us  truth- 
ful faculties,  unless  He  also  gave  us  the  means  of 
knowing  that  they  are  truthful.  This,  therefore,  He 
has  also  provided.  He  has  implanted  in  our  souls  that 
|  intuitional  light '  (see  n.  12,  p.  33)  whereby  certain 
judgments  carry  with  them  their  own  evidence  of 
truth. 

(7.)  As  He  has  given  us  full  means  of  knowing 
other  important  truths,  by  means  of  these  veracious 
faculties,  so  also  of  knowing  these:  (a)  that  there  is  a 
Perfection  called  Sanctity;  (|3)  that  this  Perfection 
essentially  includes  Justice,  Veracity,  Benevolence ;  (y) 
that  certain  acts,  done  by  certain  beings  under  certain 
circumstances,  would  possess  the  opposite  quality  ;  or, 
in  other  words,  would  be  intrinsecally  and  necessarily 

(8.)  He  has  further  given  us  full  means  of  knowing 


wrong. 


110*  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

His  Own  Existence ;  of  knowing,  that  our  Creator  is  the 
One  Necessary  Being,  Who  possesses  the  Perfection  of 
Sanctity,  as  He  possesses  all  other  Perfections  also,  in 
an  infinite  degree. 

(9.)  He  has  added  the  sanction  of  His  Command 
to  the  intrinsic  obligation  of  the  Natural  Rule ;  He  has 
forbidden  those  things  which  are  intrinsecally  wrong, 
and  counselled  those  which  are  intrinsecally  preferable. 
And  these  Commands  and  Counsels  are  made  known  to 
us  pari  passu  with  our  knowledge  of  the  Natural 
Rule  itself,  by  the  very  Reason  which  He  has  given  us. 
In  other  words,  He  has  promulgated  to  us  the  Natural 
Law,  by  His  gift  of  Reason. 

After  all  that  has  been  said  in  this  Chapter,  nothing 
more  need  be  added  to  make  this  whole  statement  fully 
intelligible :  I  will  but  call  your  attention  to  one  parti- 
cular contained  in  it.  You  will  remember,  that  in  the 
first  Section  I  protested  most  strongly  against  the 
notion,  that  our  confidence  in  the  trustworthiness  of 
our  faculties  depends  on  our  knowledge  of  God's  Vera- 
city. Now  I  have  just  been  stating,  that  the  fact  of 
their  trustworthiness  arises  from  the  fact  that  God  is 
Veracious;  and  I  wish  you  clearly  to  bear  in  mind,  that 
these  two  statements  are  most  perfectly  distinct.  To  say 
that  the  fact  of  their  trustworthiness  arises  from  the 
fact  of  God's  Veracity,  is  true  and  indeed  undeniable. 
But  to  say  that  our  knowledge  of  the  former  fact  arises 
from  our  knowledge  of  the  latter, —  or  in  other  words, 
that  we  must  know  God  to  be  Veracious  before  we  can 
reasonably  trust  our  faculties, —  this  is  not  only  erro- 
neous, but  absurd.  It  is  of  course  impossible,  without 
first  trusting  our  faculties,  to  approach  ever  so  distantly 
to  the  conviction  that  God  is  Veracious. 

51*.  Throughout  this  Section  I  have  been  con- 
sidering the  vitally  important  subject  before  us,  by 
the  best  light  which  my  reason  can  give  me.  Var- 
ious Catholics  however  seem  to  be  under  the  impres- 
sion, that  it  is  not  a  question  on  which  Reason  is  free  to 
decide ;  that  there  is  at  least  some  overwhelming  amount 
of  theological  authority  for  the  thesis,  that  all  moral 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  GOD  AND  MORAL  TRUTH.  Ill* 

obligation  springs  from  God's  Command.  So  far  is 
this  from  being  true,  that  I  believe  the  very  great  pre- 
ponderance of  theological  authority  to  be  against  any 
such  thesis.  But  the  mere  fact  that  this  impression 
exists,  will  (I  am  sure)  be  admitted  as  a  sufficient 
reason,  for  at  once  proceeding  to  examine  its  grounds. 
Here  therefore,  as  in  one  or  two  other  parts  of  the 
present  volume,  I  will  make  no  scruple  of  transgressing 
strictly  philosophical  ground,  for  the  sake  of  the  prac- 
tical advantage  obtainable  by  such  transgression. 

In  the  fourth  Section  then  of  the  present  Chapter,  I 
will  bring  together  such  a  collection  of  theological 
authorities,  as  will  be  amply  sufficient  for  my  purpose. 
They  will  be  amply  sufficient  to  shew,  how  absolutely 
unfounded  is  the  above  impression ;  and  how  completely 
at  liberty  is  every  Catholic  to  hold  those  doctrines 
which  have  been  here  advocated,  if  they  appear  to  him 
supported  by  Reason. 

This  fourth  Section,  for  reasons  of  mere  physical 
convenience,  has  been  removed  to  the  end  of  the  volume 
(see  Preface)  ;  but  it  may  be  studied  at  once,  imme- 
diately after  the  present.  Very  possibly  however,  you 
may  yourselves  have  had  no  such  misgivings  as  those 
above  mentioned;  very  possibly  you  may  have  never 
supposed  that  the  doctrines  which  I  have  been  engaged 
in  advocating,  whatever  their  philosophical  merit,  are 
theologically  reprehensible.  In  that  case,  you  may 
perhaps  prefer  to  postpone  the  purely  episodical  study 
of  theological  authorities,  and  proceed  at  once  to  the 
further  exploration  of  Moral  Truth. 


113 


SECTION  V. 
On  the  Idea  of  Moral  Worthiness. 

48.  I  pointed  out  in  the  second  Section,  that  there  is  a 
considerable  number  of  intuitions,  readily  elicited  by  all 
who  have  attained  the  use  of  reason,  which  include  the 
idea  of  '  ought'  or  c  moral  obligation/  I  will  now  direct 
your  attention  to  another  considerable  class ;  containing 
another  idea  closely  allied  to  the  former,  which  we 
may  call  '  moral  worthiness.'  Let  us  give  one  or  two 
illustrations. 

A.  and  B.  are  two  men  of  my  acquaintance.  A.  de- 
votes the  main  current  of  his  life — devotes  his  labour, 
his  time,  his  wealth, —  to  instructing  the  ignorant, 
relieving  the  distressed,  promoting  the  cause  of  virtue. 
B.  on  the  other  hand,  without  grossly  neglecting  any  of 
his  immediate  duties,  leads  on  the  whole  a  life  of  great 
comfort  and  enjoyment.  I  am  very  far  from  intuing,  as 
an  obvious  truth,  that  B.'s  course  of  life  is  wrong ;  but 
supposing  I  believe  A.'s  motives  to  be  pure  and  simple, 
I  intue  it  as  most  undeniable,  that  A.'s  course  of  conduct 
is  morally  better,  more  worthy  of  praise,  or  (to  use  the 
phrase  which  we  may  consistently  adopt)  more  morally 
worthy. 

Or  let  us  proceed,  from  general  courses  of  conduct, 
to  individual  acts  ;  let  us  revert  to  our  old  hypothesis 
of  the  deposited  jewel.  Suppose  I  am  surrounded  with 
enjoyments,  while  he  to  whom  I  owe  them  is  in  penury. 
By  restoring  that  jewel  which  is  his,  and  which  will 
enable  him  to  procure  all  necessaries,  I  satisfy  the  re- 
quisitions of  moral  obligation.  But  if,  from  the  pure 
motive  of  gratitude,  I  give  him  plentifully  from  what  is 
mine,  I  act  in  a  manner  more  morally  worthy.  If  from 

i 


114  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

the  same  motive  (and  supposing  no  other  claim  to 
interfere)  I  share  with  him  my  whole  substance,  my 
act  is  more  morally  worthy  still. 

49.  Now  after  what  has  been  said  at  length  in  the 
second  and  third  Sections,  it  will  not  be  necessary  to 
spend  many  words  on  a  further  step.  When  we  say 
that  act  H,  e.  g.  is  more  morally  worthy  than  act  K, 
this  idea  'moral  worthiness'  is  not  capable  of  being 
decomposed  or  analysed  into  other  more  simple  ideas. 
We  do  not  mean,  e.  g.  that  act  H  is  more  beneficial  to 
society  than  act  K  ;  nor  that  it  is  more  conducive  to 
the  agent's  happiness.  It  is  far  more  probable  indeed, 
that  the  more  virtuous  act  is  more  beneficial  to  society, 
and  more  conducive  to  the  agent's  (even  temporal) 
happiness.  But  to  make  either  of  these  two  latter 
statements  is  one  thing ;  and  to  make  the  original 
statement,  viz.  that  H  is  morally  worthier  than  K,  this 
is  quite  another  thing.  It  does  follow  on  the  other 
hand,  by  the  strictest  necessity,  that  if  H  is  more  morally 
worthy  than  K,  it  is  more  deserving  of  praise,  more 
deserving  of  reward,  and  the  like. 

Further,  and  very  importantly;  when  we  say  that 
act  H  is  more  morally  worthy  than  K,  we  do  not  at  all 
mean  that  H  is  more  pleasing  to  our  Creator  than  K. 
The  very  opposite  is  true ;  H  is  more  pleasing  to  our 
Creator  than  K,  because  it  is  intrinsecally  better.  Let 
us  make  a  supposition,  which  is  intrinsecally  impossible, 

Eet  is  perfectly  imaginable  (see  n.  20,  arg.  3,  pp.  48,  9). 
et  us  suppose  we  had  been  created  by  a  being,  who 
should  be  necessitated  indeed  to  avoid  what  is  intrin- 
secally wrong,  and  to  forbid  it  in  his  creatures ;  but  who 
should  be  in  no  way  necessitated  to  prefer  that  which  is 
intrinscally  more  morally  worthy.  Let  us  suppose  a 
being,  who  should  be  less  pleased  with  the  conduct  of 
one  who  labours  earnestly  to  avoid  every  deliberate 
imperfection,  than  with  that  of  another  who  is  totally 
indifferent  on  the  subject.  It  is  quite  plain  that  such 
a  being  would  not  be  holy,  in  that  sense  in  which  we 
ascribe  that  Attribute  to  our  own  dearest  Creator — 
the  Infinitely  Holy — the  one  Fountain  and  Source  of 


ON  THE  IDEA  OF  MORAL  WORTHINESS.       115 

holiness.  When  Reason  declares  to  us  that  our  Creator 
is  the  Cumulus  of  all  Perfections,  it  inclusively  declares 
that  He  possesses  Sanctity.  And  when  it  declares  that 
He  possesses  Sanctity,  it  declares,  among  other  things, 
that,  by  the  very  necessity  of  His  Nature,  He  prefers 
that  which  is  intrinsecally  more  morally  worthy  to  that 
which  is  intrinsecally  less  so.* 

50.  It  is  very  plain,  that  there  is  some  close  con- 
nection between  the  idea  of  moral  obligation  and  the 
more  general  idea  of  moral  worthiness.  Let  us  next 
therefore  consider  precisely  what  that  connection  is. 
We  have  already  seen  its  essential  nature  ;  for  we  have 
seen  that  the  being  morally  obliged  to  do  this  or  that 
act,  means  simply  that  the  failing  to  do  it  would  be 
morally  evil  or  morally  unworthy.^  We  may  suppose 
then  a  graduated  scale,  as  of  a  thermometer,  in- 
cluding all  moral  worthiness  and  unworthiness ;  and 
moral  obligation  will  be  at  the  zero  point  of  moral 
worthiness.  Whatever  may  be  the  circumstances  of 
the  moment,  if  I  simply  comply  with  my  obligation  and 
do  no  more,  I  keep  clear  indeed  of  moral  evil ;  but 
that  is  all  which  can  be  said.  I  am  at  zero  point; 
removed,  and  only  just  removed,  above  the  region  of 
moral  evil.  In  proportion  as  I  rise  above  that  zero 
point,  I  perform  acts  more  and  more  morally  worthy. 
If  I  fall  below  that  point,  I  fall  from  the  region  of 
moral  worthiness  altogether;  and  in  proportion  to  the 
degree  in  which  I  sink  below  it,  my  acts  become  more 
and  more  sinful. 

Let  us  illustrate  this,  by  reverting  to  our  old  case 
of  the  jewel.  If  I  share  my  whole  fortune  with  my 
friend,  this  is  more  morally  worthy  than  if  I  merely 
give  him  even  a  large  gift  in  addition  to  his  jewel. 
Another  act,  still  less  worthy,  will  be  illustrated,  if  I 
give  him  but  a  small  gift  in  addition  to  his  jewel ;  and 
the  lowest,  consistent  with  avoiding  evil,  if  I  simply 
restore  the  jewel.  It  is  plain  I  cannot  fall  below  this 

*  This  statement  will  be  further  explained,  and  (in  some  sense)  qualified, 
in  the  last  Section  of  this  Chapter, 
t  See  n.  19,  p.  42. 


116  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

act  in  moral  worthiness,  without  actual  sin  :  hence 
this  act,  the  restoration  of  the  jewel,  is  of  strict  obli- 
gation. 

51.  Here  then  are  two  different  classes  of  moral 
judgments:  (1)  this  or  that  act  is  good,  is  obligatory, 
is  morally  evil;  (2)  this  act  is  more  morally  worthy 
than  that.  And  take  the  two  classes  together,  so  far 
from  its  being  at  all  a  rare  or  exceptional  thing  to 
elicit  such  judgments,  it  will  perhaps  be  found  on  con- 
sideration, that  there  are  no  kind  of  judgments  what- 
ever, more  frequent  with  the  great  mass  of  mankind. 
4  How  wrongly  A.  behaved  on  such  an  occasion  P  *  How 
admirably  B.  encountered  that  trial!'  'How  far  pre- 
ferable is  C.'s  conduct  to  D.'s!'  Such  judgments  as 
these,  surely  succeed  each  other  quite  rapidly  in  the 
mind  throughout  the  day.  We  need  not  at  all,  and 
we  cannot,  maintain,  that  the  moral  judgments  of  men 
in  general  are  commonly  correct ;  but  we  do  say  that 
they  are  very  frequent.  In  other  words,  there  is  no 
one  idea  more  constantly  familiar  to  the  mind  of  every 
man,  than  the  idea  of  moral  worthiness  considered  in 
itself.  Men  may  make  great  mistakes,  as  to  those  acts 
or  persons  whom  they  praise  or  blame  ;  but  praise 
and  blame,  for  supposed  merit  or  demerit,  are  among 
the  very  commonest  thoughts  in  their  mind. 

Much  might  be  said,  were  this  the  appropriate 
place  for  saying  it,  on  the  religious  inferences  de- 
rivable from  this  fact.  Our  Creator,  it  seems,  is  quite 
in  a  special  degree  solicitous,  to  ensure  our  remem- 
brance of  this  moral  Rule  which  has  claim  over  all  our 
actions.  He  has  therefore  so  constituted  our  nature, 
that  even  those  who  are  most  engrossed  with  tem- 
poral objects,  who  live  most  undividedly  for  wealth, 
or  honour,  or  comfort,  bear  constant  witness  against 
themselves,  in  this  unceasing  reference  to  the  ideas  of 
moral  obligation  and  moral  worthiness.  But  all  such 
considerations  rather  belong  to  a  later  part  of  our 
work  ;  and  here  I  need  only  say,  that  you  will  find  it 
(I  expect)  a  most  edifying  and  almost  surprising 
study,  as  you  find  one  particular  after  another  evolved, 


ON  THE  IDEA  OF  MORAL  WORTHINESS.  117 

of  those  which  shew  how  singularly  He  has  formed  our 
nature  for  the  practise  of  virtue. 

52.  It  will  be  now  advisable,  to  extend  the  sense 
in  which  we  use  that  important  phrase  the  'Natural 
Rule/      We    have    hitherto    used   it   as    synonymous 
with  the  '  rule  of  independent  obligation7  (see  n.  24). 
Let  us  now  use  it  more  extensively,  as  synonymous 
with  the  '  rule  of  independent  virtuousness.'     Accord- 
ing to  its  former  acceptation,  it  signified  the  sum  of  all 
those  obligations,  which  bind  us  independently  of  God's 
commands.*     According  to  its  new  acceptation,  let  it 
include  also  the  sum  of  all  those  cases,  in  which  one 
act    is    more    morally    worthy     than    another,    inde- 
pendently  of  any   special    intervention    exercised   by 
God. 

53.  Here  then  we  are  led  to  a  further  very  im- 
portant enquiry ;  how  far  does  this  Natural  Rule  extend. 
And  this  general  enquiry  subdivides  itself  into  three. 
First,  we  may  ask  how  far  in  fact  does  this  Natural 
Rule  extend.     Secondly,  how  far  is  reason  in  the  ab- 
stract capable  of  discovering  it.     Thirdly,  as  to  reason 
in  the  concrete, —  exercised  under  those  circumstances 
in  which  mankind  are  placed, — we  may  ask  how  great 
progress  is  reason  in  this  sense  able  to  make,  towards 
discovering  the  Natural  Rule. 

Our  meaning  may  be  illustrated  by  a  parallel  case. 
There  is  an  indefinite  number  of  properties  impressed 
by  God  on  matter,  which,  by  their  various  combina- 
tions, account  for  all  the  physical  phenomena  of  the 
universe.  He  who  should  know  all  these  properties, 
and  all  their  combinations,  would  be  a  master  of  all 
physical  truth.  Now  (1)  nothing  is  more  probable, 
than  that  there  may  be  many  of  these  properties,  which 
Reason  is  absolutely  unable  to  approach ;  it  may  either 
not  possess  the  data,  or  the  intrinsic  power,  which 
would  enable  it  even  to  advance  towards  their  dis- 

*  So  Vasquez,  already  quoted  n.  30 :  '  Regida  Naturcdis,  quae  nulla 
voluntate  sed  suapte  natura  constat.'  *  Ante  omne  Imperium,  ante  omnem 
Voluntatem,  immd  ante  omne  Judicium  [Dei,  est]  regvla  qucedam  harum 
actionum,  quse  suapte  natur&  constat.' 


118  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

covery.  And  yet  we  might  in  other  ways,  as,  e.  g.  by 
Revelation,  be  enabled  to  acquire  a  full  knowledge  of 
such  properties.  But  (2)  there  will  be  a  considerable 
number  of  other  properties,  whose  discovery  is  quite 
within  the  domain  of  Reason :  Reason,  exercising  its  in- 
trinsic power  on  those  data  which  are  within  its  grasp, 
may  be  fully  competent  to  attain  them.  And  yet  (3) 
there  may  be  multitudes  of  these  latter  properties 
which  are  so  circumstanced,  that  the  reason  of  man 
here  below  never  will  in  fact,  nor  indeed  can,  arrive 
at  their  knowledge.  The  process,  required  for  that 
purpose,  may  need  such  constant  and  prolonged  exer- 
cise of  Reason,  or  so  very  wide  a  collection  of  data, 
that  in  fact,  circumstanced  as  we  are  in  this  visible 
world,  we  are  utterly  unable  to  accomplish  the  task. 

Just  so,  as  to  the  Natural  Rule.  One  question  is, 
how  far  it  does  in  fact  actually  extend;  another,  how 
far  Reason  in  the  abstract  is  able  to  attain  it;  a  third, 
how  far  our  reason,  in  our  existing  circumstances, 
enables  us  to  proceed.  The  following  Section  will 
be  devoted  to  a  consideration  of  these  three  most 
important  questions. 


119 


SECTION  VI. 
On  the  Extent  of  the  Natural  Rule. 

54.  Various  intuitive  judgments,  which  are  most 
certainly  legitimate,  and  which  are  common  to  all 
mankind,  enable  us  to  state  with  confidence  one  very 
important  proposition.  Justice,  Veracity,  and  Benevo- 
lence, are  intrinsecally  good  ends  of  action.  The  phrase 
'good'  or  virtuous  'ends  of  action,'  I  use  in  somewhat  of 
a  technical  sense  ;  which  will  be  fully  explained  as  we 
proceed.  On  the  other  hand,  when  we  speak  of  three 
ends,  we  are  not  speaking  with  very  strict  accuracy  ; 
for  Veracity  should  by  rights  be  included  under  Justice. 
I  mention  Veracity  however  separately,  because  of  its 
special  importance ;  since  (as  already  implied)  it  is 
only  by  proving  the  intrinsic  virtuousness  of  Veracity, 
that  our  acceptance  of  a  revelation  becomes  possible. 
However,  even  if  the  above  statement  in  itself  could  be 
considered  as  ambiguous  in  any  particular,  the  course 
of  our  remarks  will  amply  explain  and  define  it. 

I  intue  that  it  is  wrong,  not  to  give  my  friend  back 
his  jewel :  why  ?  because  it  is  contrary  to  Justice.  I 
intue  that  it  is  wrong,  if  a  governor  punishes  his  subjects, 
for  that  which  they  have  no  real  power  to  avoid  :  why? 
because  it  is  contrary  to  Justice.  I  intue  that  it  is 
wrong,  if  a  traveller  comes  home,  and  tells  me  all  kind 
of  falsehoods  about  the  countries  which  he  has  visited : 
why  ?  because  it  is  contrary  to  Veracity.  Suppose  any 
one  has  the  power  most  readily  to  do  a  great  deal,  in 
the  way  of  lessening  some  terrible  mass  of  evil  which 
surrounds  him ;  to  save  numbers,  e.  g.  from  imminent 
danger  of  death ;  and  suppose  nevertheless  he  does  not 
move  a  finger  in  the  matter  :  I  intue  that  such  conduct 
is  morally  culpable;  why?  because  it  is  contrary  to 
Benevolence. 


120  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Here  are  cases,  where  Justice,  Veracity,  and  Bene- 
volence, are  intued  as  obligatory :  now  for  others, 
where,  putting  aside  the  question  of  obligation,  they 
are  intued  as  virtuous  ends  of  action.  A  governor  is 
aggrieved  by  some  great  public  evil ;  but  on  preparing 
to  punish  the  offenders,  he  finds  that  they  have  really 
not  had  the  full  power  of  acting  otherwise.  Though 
greatly  provoked  at  the  evil  which  has  ensued,  and 
though  the  punishing  of  these  men  would  be  very  ex- 
pedient as  a  piece  of  state  policy,  he  refuses  to  do  so, 
because  it  would  be  unjust.  I  intue  that  this  act, 
wherein  his  will  is  thus  powerfully  affected  towards  the 
virtuousness  of  Justice,  is  a  very  virtuous  act.  A 
traveller  returns  from  abroad;  and,  though  he  might 
obtain  great  eclat  and  make  himself  a  very  interesting 
object  by  romancing  on  what  he  has  seen,  he  confines 
himself  to  strict  and  sober  truth.  I  intue  that  these 
acts,  wherein  his  will  is  thus  powerfully  affected  towards 
the  virtuousness  of  veracity,  are  very  virtuous  acts. 
A  landlord  devotes  his  energy,  his  time,  his  money, 
to  redress  the  misery  which  exists  among  his  tenants  or 
their  labourers.  I  intue  that,  if  he  does  all  this  because 
his  will  is  so  powerfully  affected  to  the  virtuousness  of 
Benevolence,  these  various  acts  are  extremely  virtuous. 

Nor  are  these  principles  confined  to  external  acts : 
they  apply  fully  as  much  to  acts  purely  internal ;  to 
acts  which  are  consummated  in  the  will,  nay,  and  to  acts 
which  do  not  in  any  way  contemplate  eveufuture  action. 
If  I  earnestly  wish  that  A.  B.,  who  has  laboured  in  the 
service  of  the  state,  may  receive  his  just  reward — 
though  I  do  not  contemplate  my  own  agency  as  tend- 
ing in  any  way  (now  or  hereafter)  to  obtain  it  for  him  — 
yet  such  wish  alone  is  virtuous,  under  the  head  of 
Justice.  If  I  rejoice  in  the  thought,  that  some  invention 
has  greatly  mitigated  human  suffering, — that  mere  act  of 
complacence  is  virtuous  under  the  head  of  Benevolence. 
Still  more  keenly  do  I  intue,  that  to  rejoice  in  the 
sufferings  of  any  of  my  fellow  -  creatures,  simply  as 
such,  is  among  the  most  detestable  sins  I  can  commit ; 
one  which,  more  than  almost  any  other,  has  earned  the 
title  of  diabolical.  I  intue  that  this  is  most  fully  the 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      121 

case,  even  though  I  should  not  contemplate  adding  to 
those  sufferings  by  my  own  acts  in  the  slightest  degree. 

It  is  implied  in  what  we  have  said — but  it  needs  to 
be  explicitly  stated — that  there  is  nothing  like  this  on 
the  opposite  side.  No  one  ever  thought  another  vir- 
tuous for  this  precise  reason,  viz.  because  his  will  was 
so  powerfully  affected  towards  injustice,  mendacity, 
and  cruelty.  The  meaning  and  force  of  this  remark 
will  be  made  clearer,  by  supposing  an  objection. 

4  Surely,7  then  it  will  be  urged,  '  there  are  number- 
4  less  cases,  where  unjust,  mendacious,  and  cruel  acts 
4  are  applauded.  We  invade  an  enemy's  country  ;  and 
'  think  it  no  kind  of  sin  to  deprive  the  poor  inhabitants 
4  of  that  harvest,  on  which  they  have  been  expending  a 
4  year's  toil :  yet  what  can  be  more  unjust  ?  Again, 
4  multitudes  of  men  think  a  lie  most  allowable,  if  there 
4  be  no  other  means  of  defending  a  friend's  life  or 
4  honour.  Lastly,  men  often  think  it  lawful  to  inflict 
4  very  considerable  suffering — e.g.  all  the  horrors  of 
4  war — simply  for  the  sake  of  national  honour  or  terri- 
4  torial  aggrandisement.  Here  then  is  a  large  number 
4  of  intuitions,  wherein  injustice,  mendacity,  and  cruelty 
4  are  held  as  virtuous.' 

The  answer  to  this  is  extremely  simple.  But  before 
giving  it,  c  ex  abundanti  cautela '  it  may  be  as  well  to 
make  one  most  obvious  remark.  The  question  through- 
out is  not  what  men  do,  but  what  they  approve;  not 
what  course  they  in  fact  follow,  but  what  they  believe 
to  be  the  path  of  virtue.  And  now  to  the  objection. 

Certainly  men  often  think  it  lawful  to  inflict  suffer- 
ing, for  very  inadequate  reason.  They  think  it  lawful, 
under  many  circumstances,  to  say  what  is  false.  But 
why  ?  Not  because  of  any  supposed  virtuousness  in 
mendacity  or  cruelty  as  such ;  on  the  contrary,  they 
probably  enough  recognize  the  intrinsic  claims  of 
Veracity  and  Benevolence,  at  the  very  moment  of 
acting  in  opposition  to  those  virtues.  Their  judgment 
is  of  the  following  kind.  4  Undeniable  as  is  the  claim 
4  of  Veracity  where  there  is  no  reason  to  the  contrary, 
4  my  friend's  claim  on  me,  to  save  his  life  or  honour,  is 
4  superior  and  should  prevail.'  And  the  very  sf\me 


122  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

account  may  be  given  of  the  other  cases  specified.  It 
is  not  mendacity,  that  is  recognized  as  having  a  counter 
claim  to  Veracity  ;  but  a  friend 's life  or  honour,  which 
is  thought  to  possess  such  a  counter  claim.  A  great 
multitude  of  acts  are  recognized  as  morally  good,  simply 
because  they  are  motived  by  the  virtuousness  of  truth- 
telling  as  such: — when  was  one  ever  regarded  as  good, 
simply  because  it  was  motived  by  the  (supposed) 
virtuousness  of  lying  as  such  ? 

This  will  appear  even  more  clearly,  if  we  contrast 
any  of  those  instances,  in  which  (I  fully  admit)  men  do 
elicit  false  intuitions,  in  regard  to  virtuous  ends  of 
action.  Many,  e.  g.  think  it  morally  culpable,  if  they 
leave  a  stinging  injury  unrevenged.  They  will  there- 
fore go  through  great  labour  and  self-denial,  for  the 
purpose  of  vengeance ;  for  the  sake  of  fulfilling  the 
(supposed)  obligation  of  vindictive  retribution.  And 
many,  who  witness  this  conduct,  will  admire  them  for 
so  acting.  Vindictive  retribution  then  is  regarded  by 
many,  I  admit  it,  as  a  virtuous  end  of  action.  But 
who  can  say  that  injustice,  mendacity,  or  cruelty,  has 
ever  been  regarded  as  such?  Who  ever  thought  it 
his  duty  to  do  any  one  thing,  for  the  sake  of  fulfilling 
any  supposed  obligation  to  practise  injustice,  mendacity, 
or  cruelty,  simply  as  such,  and  for  its  own  sake?  or 
who  ever  admired  another  because  he  so  acted  ? 

The  various  intuitions,  which  have  been  assumed  as 
legitimate  in  the  preceding  argument,  are  proved  to  be 
so,  on  precisely  the  same  grounds,  which  have  been 
already  (we  suppose)  admitted  as  satisfactory.  Let 
any  one  look  back  at  our  reasons  for  maintaining  that 
the  intuition  of  moral  obligation  is  itself  legitimate  (see 
n.  17,  pp.  37,  8);  he  will  see  that  they  apply  in  their 
full  force  to  the  intuitions  which  we  have  here  been 
considering.  We  infer  therefore,  that  Justice,  Veracity, 
and  Benevolence,  are  legitimately  intued  as  virtuous 
ends  of  action. 

55.  Before  proceeding  with  our  research  for  other 
virtuous  ends,  let  us  consider  various  important  truths, 
which  are  implied  in  the  very  fact  of  certain  ends  being 
virtuous.  Such  truths,  as  soon  as  established,  will  hold 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      123 

at  once  in  regard  to  Justice,  Veracity,  and  Benevolence ; 
and  they  will  also  of  course  hold  in  regard  to  any  other 
ends,  which  we  may  afterwards  prove  to  be  virtuous. 

(1.)  We  have  already  seen,  that  in  recognizing 
any  virtuous  end  of  action,  it  is  implied  that  we  never 
regard,  as  lawful,  the  contravening  such  an  end  purely 
for  the  sake  of  pleasure  or  caprice.  We  may  often 
indeed  consider  that,  in  this  or  that  particular  case, 
some  other  virtuous  end,  which  happens  for  the  mo- 
ment to  conflict,  has  a  preponderating  claim ;  that 
Veracity,  e.  g.  may  be  sacrificed  to  the  claims  of 
Justice  or  Benevolence.  But  where  no  conflicting 
claim  can  be  put  forward,  we  universally  admit  the 
authority  of  any  one  virtuous  end  to  be  paramount 
and  indefeasible.  We  never  think  it  lawful,  e.  g.  to 
inflict  cruelty,  except  to  satisfy  the  claims  of  Justice  or 
of  some  other  virtuous  end. 

56.  (2.)  Suppose  I  confer  various  benefits  on  my 
fellow-men,  yet  not  at  all  because  of  the  virtuousness 
of  Benevolence,  but  for  some  different  end  altogether  : 
for  instance,  suppose  I  so  act  in  order  that  I  may  keep 
a  promise  made  to  my  dying  father.  Such  an  act  may 
be  virtuous  under  the  head  of  Fidelity  (i.  e.  observance 
of  promises) ;  or  under  the  head  of  Filial  piety  :  but  in 
no  sense  under  the  head  of  Benevolence.  Or  suppose  I 
so  act,  for  the  simple  purpose  of  obtaining  the  affection 
of  those  whom  I  benefit,  with  the  sole  view  of  reaping 
some  temporal  advantage  by  their  help.  Such  an  act 
will  have  no  virtue  whatever ;  since  it  is  wholly  motived 
by  a  desire  of  temporal  gain.  Both  these  statements 
are  obvious  as  soon  as  made ;  from  them,  and  from 
an  indefinite  number  of  propositions  precisely  similar 
and  intued  with  equal  clearness,  we  derive  a  very 
important  generalization. 

No  act  is  virtuous,  unless  it  be  directed  to  the 
virtuousness  of  some  end  recognized  as  virtuous  ( c  nisi 
fiat  propter  honestatem  boni  cujusdam  honesti').  Nor 
is  it  virtuous  at  all,  except  so  far  as  regards  that  end, 
or  those  ends,  to  the  virtuousness  of  which  it  has  been 
directed. 


124  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

There  is  no  philosophical  proposition,  more  con- 
stantly used  in  Theology  than  this  ;  I  must  beg  you 
therefore  most  carefully  to  consider  its  meaning  and 
its  proof,  and  remember  it  for  future  use. 

57.  (3.)  We  are  now  able  easily  to  understand  the 
distinction,  so  frequently  expressed  by  philosophers, 
between  objective  and  subjective  morality.  To  confer 
great  benefits  on  a  multitude  of  men,  is  objectively  most 
virtuous  ;  but  if  I  do  so  merely  for  the  sake  of  tem- 
poral gain,  my  act  is  subjectively  immoral.  In  ob- 
jective morality,  we  consider  merely  the  thing  done  or 
resolved  on  ;  but  in  subjective  morality,  we  consider 
the  frame  of  mind  in  which,  the  circumstances  under 
which,  above  all  the  end  for  which,  the  agent  does 
it  or  resolves  on  it.  Nothing  is  more  common,  than 
for  acts  to  be  objectively  virtuous,  but  subjectively 
sinful. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  must  always  be  subjectively 
sinful,  to  do  that  which  I  recognize  as  objectively  wrong. 
It  is  a  contradiction  in  terms  to  say,  that  any  circum- 
stances can  make  me  right,  in  doing  that  which  I  know 
to  be  under  all  circumstances  wrong. 

But  I  may  often  be  subjectively  virtuous  in  doing 
what  is  objectively  wrong,  supposing  that  I  do  not 
know  it  so  to  be.  What  those  circumstances  are, — 
or  in  other  words  when  and  how  far  ignorance  excuses 
from  sin, — is  a  further  consideration.  You  will  find 
hereafter,  when  we  arrive  at  the  subject,  that  there 
is  hardly  a  more  difficult  question  in  all  Theology. 

The  same  distinction  applies  to  relative  degrees  of 
moral  worthiness.  Let  me  assume,  what  every  Ca- 
tholic holds,  that  the  life  of  Obedience,  Poverty,  and 
Celibacy,  objectively  speaking,  is  intrinsecally  more 
morally  worthy  than  the  life  of  an  ordinary  Christian. 
Yet  if  I  have  no  vocation  to  that  life, — in  other  words, 
if  God's  gifts  to  me,  whether  of  nature  or  grace,  are 
such  that  I  promote  my  own  sanctification  better  by 
the  more  ordinary  course, — then  subjectively,  in  my  own 
case,  that  ordinary  course  is  the  more  morally  worthy 
of  the  two.  Or  again,  if  in  any  way  God  were  to 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      125 

express  His  preference  that  I  should  pursue  the  more 
ordinary  course — wishing,  e.  g.  so  to  employ  me  in  some 
providential  work — then  also  this  course  would  be  sub- 
jectively the  better.  But  on  this  latter  instance,  God's 
expression  of  a  preference,  we  will  here  say  no  more,  as 
we  shall  treat  of  it  expressly  in  the  next  Section. 

58.  (4.)  A.  restores  his  kind  friend's  deposit  under 
circumstances  of  great  trial :  by  doing  so,  he  brings 
himself  into   the  necessity  of  labouring  for  his  daily 
bread.     B.  restores  the  deposit,  without   thereby  in- 
curring any  serious  inconvenience.     Objectively  speak- 
ing, A.'s  act  is  more  virtuous  than  B.'s  ;    for  the  just 
and  obligatory  act  is  performed  under  circumstances 
of  greater  difficulty. 

But  is  A.'s  act  also  subjectively  better  ?  On  the 
surface,  we  should  reply  c  certainly  yes  ; '  but  a  little 
consideration  will  shew  that  something  more  has  to 
be  said.  Why  are  we  inclined  to  think  A.'s  act  the 
better  ?  Because,  by  the  very  circumstance  of  resisting 
such  great  temptation  to  dishonesty,  he  displays  a  will 
firmly  and  efficaciously  adhering  to  the  virtuousness  of 
justice.  But  it  is  abundantly  possible,  that  B.'s  will 
may  in  fact  adhere  quite  as  efficaciously  to  that  vir- 
tuousness ;  only  that  he  has  no  opportunity  for  dis- 
playing that  fact.  If  therefore  we  knew  (e.  g.  by 
Revelation)  that  such  was  in  truth  the  case,  we  should 
have  no  hesitation  in  considering  that  B.'s  act  was 
subjectively  as  virtuous  as  A.'s.  Here  by  generalisa- 
tion we  arrive  at  another  proposition,  which  is  of 
extreme  importance  both  to  Theology  and  Philosophy. 

My  act,  casteris  paribus,  becomes  subjectively  more 
virtuous,  in  proportion  as  my  will  adheres  more 
firmly  and  efficaciously  to  the  virtuousness  of  the 
virtuous  end  'or  ends. 

59.  (5.)  We  are  now  able  to  arrive  at  our  general 
idea  of  a  perfectly   holy  being.     And   first  we   will 
suppose  that  being  to  be  finite. 

The  intuitions,  on  which  our  argument  has  hitherto 
rested,  apply  not  to  men  only,  but  to  all  rational 
creatures ;  as  will  be  evident  to  any  one  who  re- 


126  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

considers  them.  A  finite  being  then,  who  should  be 
perfectly  good  or  holy,  will  unite  two  characteristics. 
First,  he  will  avoid  all  sin ;  secondly,  his  will  will 
adhere  to  the  various  virtuous  ends  of  action,  with  a 
degree  of  firmness  and  efficacity  proportioned  to  the 
degree  of  his  sanctity. 

Even  at  the  present  stage  of  our  argument  then,  we 
have  proved  so  much  as  this.  So  soon  as  we  establish 
by  Reason  the  existence  of  an  Infinitely  Perfect  Being, 
we  establish  the  existence  of  a  Being,  Whose  Will 
adheres  with  infinite  firmness  and  efficacity  to  the 
virtuousness  of  Justice,  Veracity,  and  Benevolence. 
And  thus,  without  going  further,  we  have  done  all 
that  it  is  necessary  for  Reason  to  do,  in  order  that  the 
reasonable  acceptance  of  a  Revelation  may  be  possible. 
For  we  have  shewn  that  Veracity  is  a  part  of  Perfec- 
tion ;  and  that  we  are  warranted  therefore  in  believing 
whatever  a  Creator,  Infinite  in  Perfection,  authenticates : 
whether  He  does  so  by  miracles  or  in  any  other  way. 

60.  An  objection  indeed  may  here  be  interposed, 
which  it  would  be  most  unfair  to  pretermit.  4  God's  Will, 
'  as  we  have  seen,  adheres  in  an  infinite  degree  to  the 
4  virtuousness  of  Benevolence ;  and  yet  this  is  per- 
4  fectly  consistent  with  the  fact,  that  He  often  acts  in 
'  opposition  to  Benevolence,  nay,  and  with  considerable 
'  severity,  towards  His  creatures.  In  acting  thus, 
4  His  WTill  is  directed  to  the  virtuousness  of  Justice  ; 
*  of  requiting  worthily  deeds  of  sin.*  In  like  manner 
4  then,  His  Will  may  adhere  in  an  infinite  degree  to  the 
4  virtuousness  of  Veracity  ;  and  yet  this  may  be  con- 
4  sistent  with  the  fact,  that  here  and  there  He  acts  in 
'  opposition  to  Veracity,  while  aiming  at  some  other 
4  virtuous  end.  The  intuitions,  on  which  you  pur- 
4  ported  to  ground  the  virtuousness  of  Veracity,  did 
4  not  profess  at  all  to  establish  its  absolute  obligation 
4  under  all  circumstances ;  but  only  its  intrinsic  vir- 
4  tuousness,  and  its  obligation  where  higher  claims  do 
6  not  interfere.1 

*  This  question  of  retributive  punishment  will  be  considered  later  in 
the  Section. 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      127 

It  is  certainly  necessary,  yet  at  the  same  time  easy, 
to  answer  this  ohjection.  I  answer  it  thus.  If  there  is 
an  intuition,  in  the  whole  circle  of  them,  which  is  un- 
deniably legitimate — which  every  human  being  forms 
as  a  matter  of  course — which  exceeds  the  mathema- 
tical axioms  themselves  in  its  absolutely  irresistible 
character — it  will  be  the  following  : — 'A  creator,  who 
should  promulgate  to  his  creatures  a  false  revelation, 
would  not  be  holy.'  This  intuition  then  is  most  cer- 
tainly legitimate,  and  it  amply  suffices  for  our  purpose. 
It  is  quite  true  that  many  moralists  will  allow  to  men 
various  cases,  in  which  without  sin  they  may  speak 
falsely;*  but  in  all  cases  without  exception  the  reason 
of  this  is,  because  there  are  certain  important  ends, 
which  are  unattainable  except  through  such  false  speak- 
ing. In  God,  I  need  hardly  say,  nothing  of  the  sort 
can  have  place;  there  cannot  by  possibility  be  any 
want  of  power,  in  carrying  out  His  various  ends.  Lugo 
has  a  remark  similar  to  this  : — 

"  Qusestio  propria  nostra  prsesens  non  est,  an  Deus  possit  dis- 
pensare  cum  homine  aliquando  ut  mentiatur  vel  falsum  affirmet ; 
quse  quidem  qusestio  pertinet  magis  ad  primarn  secundse  in  tract, 
de  legibus,  vel  secundam  secundae  in  quaestione  de  mendacio. 
Qusestio  autem  nostra  est  de  solo  Deo,  an  ipse  Deus  aliquando 
possit  licite  mentiri,  vel  fallere  et  falsum  revelare :  et  ad  intallibi- 
litatem  fidei  divinse  sufficit,  quod  Deus  fallere  non  possit  nee  falsum 
testificari,  etiamsi  homines  ex  dispensatione  Dei  id  possent  licit& 
facere.  Et  quidem,  licet  aliquis  concederet  homines  aliquando 
id  posse  licite  facere,  vel  ob  necessitatem  vel  ex  Dei  dispensatione, 
non  posset  id  de  Deo  concedi ;  in  Quo,  ut  Plato  supra  adductus 
monuit,  non  posset  locum  habere  excusatio  ilia  necessitate :  cum 
Deus  facillime  posset,  absque  mendacio,  omnia  pericula«et  incon- 
venientia  impedire." — De  Fide  Divina,  d.  4,  n.  59. 

61.  We  have  now  then  established  securely  Justice, 
Veracity,  and  Benevolence,  as  stars  in  the  constellation 
of  moral  perfection.  To  another  class  of  virtues,  we 
may  with  equal  ease  vindicate  a  similar  place  ;  I  mean 
those  which  relate  to  God.  So  soon  as  we  believe  in 
an  Infinite  and  Holy  Creator,  the  following  intuitions 
are  most  obviously  legitimate.  '  It  is  a  duty  to  revere 

*  No  Catholic  moralist,  however,  allows  this. 


128  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Him  because  of  His  Greatness/  '  to  obey  Him  because 
of  His  just  Authority,'  '  to  aim  at  His  approbation  as 
being  our  moral  Governor,' ;  to  conform  our  Will  to  His 
because  of  His  Sanctity :' — all  these  intuitions,  I  say,  are 
most  obviously  legitimate.  They  are  not  indeed  so 
universally  elicited  by  all  mankind,  as  are  those  on  which 
I  have  been  hitherto  insisting  ;  simply  because  the  mass 
of  men  either  know  so  little,  or  think  so  little,  about 
God.  But  no  one  can  apprehend  the  terms  of  the  various 
propositions  just  recited,  without  intuing  the  truth  of 
these  propositions.  They  apply  also,  as  is  most  evi- 
dent, not  to  men  only  but  to  all  rational  creatures. 

62.  But  there  are  other  virtues  which,  in  the  Christ- 
ian's eye,  have  quite  as  great  intrinsic  excellence,  as 
Justice,  Veracity,  and  Benevolence.    I  mean  such  as  the 
following :  Humility,  Forgivingness,  Chastity.     Revela- 
tion indeed  declares  that  they  are  intrinsecally  virtuous, 
and  we  can  accept  that  truth  of  course  on  God's  autho- 
rity.    Yet  it  is  a  question  of  great  interest  and  of  some 
importance,  to  see  how  far,  by  Reason  alone,  we  can 
arrive  at  the  same  conclusion.     I  am  confident  that  we 
can,  to  the  fullest  extent ;  and  I  proceed  to  lay  down 
two  important  principles,  which  will  greatly  help  us  in 
the  enquiry. 

63.  The  first  of  these  we  may  call  the  i  production 
of  the  arc'  principle.     It  will  often  happen,  that  if  we 
see  only  a  very  small  portion  of  the  arc  of  a  circle,  we 
cannot  distinguish  it  from  a  straight  line :  produce  it, 
and  its  real  nature  is  apparent.     Something  altogether 
analogous  takes  place  in  reference  to  moral  conduct. 
If  act  A  be  virtuous   under   circumstances    C,  since 
morality  is   necessary,  a  similar  act  will  be  virtuous 
whenever    similar    circumstances    recur.       We    have 
therefore  to  judge,  not  on  an  isolated  case,  but  on  a 
whole  class  of  cases  ;  we  have  to  consider,  not  simply 
whether  one  act  A  is  virtuous,  but  whether  all  these 
acts  A  are  virtuous.    And  it  will  frequently  happen,  that 
the  multitude  of  men  might  have  been  unable  to  form 
any  confident  opinion  on  the  former  question,  who  may 
yet  decide  with  the  most  perfect  clearness  on  the  latter. 
For  instance,  '  is  it  lawful  for  a  man  harassed  by  poverty 


ON  THE  IDEA  OF  MORAL  WORTHINESS.  129 

c  (I  am  not  supposing  actual  danger  to  life)  to  take 
'  something  from  his  rich  neighbour  ?  the  latter  would 
*  hardly  so  much  as  be  aware  of  the  loss,  while  to  the 
'former  it  would  be  an  inestimable  benefit/  There 
are  perhaps  many,  who  could  not  at  all  events  see 
very  clearly  that  this  is  wrong.  But  put  the  case 
universally — produce  the  arc — there  will  be  no  doubt 
as  to  the  decision.  No  one  will  fail  to  see,  how  mon- 
strous would  be  the  supposition,  that  every  one,  who 
considers  himself  harassed  by  poverty,  may  plunder  his 
rich  neighbour.  To  mention  no  other  consequence — 
the  rich  neighbour  would  soon  become  as  poor  as  they. 

On  this  ground  alone,  were  there  no  other,  special 
weight  would  be  due  to  the  moral  judgments  of  a  good 
man.  He  acts  consistently  on  his  moral  rules,  hour 
after  hour,  day  after  day  ;  and  by  consequence  he  has 
unconsciously  c  produced  the  arc.'  His  moral  rules 
have  been  applied  to  a  large  number  of  parallel  cases, 
and  have  been  proved  able  to  bear  the  weight  of  sus- 
tained and  consistent  moral  action. 

64.  But  the  second  principle  to  which  I  have 
alluded  (n.  62),  goes  far  more  nearly  into  the  heart  of 
the  matter  than  the  first ;  and  indeed  (in  my  humble 
opinion)  gives  us  far  more  light  on  the  real  trust- 
worthiness of  moral  judgments,  than  anything  which 
has  hitherto  been  said  throughout  this  Section.  It  will 
require  therefore  to  be  treated,  at  a  length  somewhat 
proportioned  to  its  importance  ;  and  it  will  necessitate 
some  little  psychological  investigation.  The  latter  cir- 
cumstance is  a  matter  for  regret ;  as  it  would  have  been 
undoubtedly  more  convenient,  if  we  could  have  reserved 
all  our  psychology  for  the  next  Chapter. 

I  assume  then,  from  what  will  be  said  more  at 
length  in  the  next  Chapter,  that  the  soul  is  a  simple 
substance.  When  therefore  we  speak  of  dividing  it 
into  intellect,  will,  and  the  like,  we  are  not  speaking  of 
any  real  division  ;  the  intellect  and  will  are  not  two 
different  parts  of  the  soul,  as  fore  and  aft  are  two  dif- 
ferent parts  of  a  ship.  When  the  soul  puts  forth  acts 
of  cognition,  it  is  convenient  that  those  acts  be  referred 

K 


130  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

to  the  intellect ;  when  acts  of  volition,  to  the  will :  and 
the  intellect  and  will  respectively  are  but  abstract  terms 
used  accordingly. 

To  this  remark  we  here  add  another.  Just  as  we 
divide  the  soul  into  intellect,  will,  and  the  like,  so  we 
subdivide  the  intellect  into  its  different  faculties.  In 
this  case,  as  in  the  former,  nothing  can  be  further  from 
our  thoughts  than  the  idea  of  any  real  division  ;  we  are 
but  saying,  that,  for  convenience  of  arrangement,  some 
intellectual  operations  of  the  soul  are  referred  to  this 
faculty  and  some  to  that.  Our  various  acts  of 'memory  we 
refer  to  the  remembering  faculty  ;  our  various  acts  of  in- 
ference to  the  reasoning  faculty ;  and  so  on  with  the  rest. 

On  what  principle  do  we  ordinarily  decide,  as  to  the 
number  of  distinct  faculties  which  we  shall  enumerate  ?  I 
think  on  the  following.  Let  us  suppose  that  there  is  a 
number  of  intellectual  operations,  so  similar  to  each 
other,  that  whoever  performs  one  of  these  well  ordinarily 
performs  the  others  so,  and  whatever  discipline  will  in- 
crease his  power  of  performing  one,  will  equally  increase 
his  power  of  performing  the  rest; — in  such  a  case,  we 
refer  these  operations  to  the  same  faculty.  Operations 
on  the  other  hand,  which  are  not  so  similar,  we  refer 
to  distinct  faculties. 

Let  us  take  our  illustrations  from  one  of  the  most 
important  classes  of  operation,  and  from  one  of  the  least 
important ;  the  operations  of  remembering  and  the  ope- 
rations of  observing  distances  at  sea.  The  operations 
of  remembering  are  connected  closely  with  each  other 
in  the  mode  just  described  :  he  who  remembers  one 
thing  very  well,  probably  remembers  other  things  also 
very  well,  which  have  been  with  equal  frequency  in  his 
thoughts  ;  whatever  discipline  will  improve  his  power 
of  remembering  one  thing,  will  improve  his  power  of 
remembering  other  things  also.  The  various  operations 
of  observing  distances  at  sea  are  likewise  mutually  con- 
nected in  the  same  way. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  probability  whatever, 
that  he  who  remembers  well  will  be  clever  in  judging 
rightly  on  marine  distance;  nor  will  the  discipline 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      131 

which  assists  the  memory,  give  any  material  benefit  on 
the  latter  undertaking.  Hence  we  refer  our  various 
acts  of  remembering  to  one  faculty,  and  our  various 
acts  of  observing  marine  distances  to  one  faculty  ;  but 
we  count  these  two  faculties  as  distinct  from  each  other. 
There  is  one  faculty,  and  not  more,  of  remembering ; 
one,  and  not  more,  of  observing  marine  distances  :  but 
it  is  to  two  faculties,  and  not  to  one,  that  we  ascribe 
the  respective  operations,  1st  of  remembering,  2nd  of 
observing  distances  at  sea. 

In  like  manner,  I  suppose  there  is  a  distinct  faculty 
of  judging  on  pictures,  and  another  distinct  faculty  of 
judging  on  music.  And  so  we  might  proceed ;  but  that 
enough  has  been  said  to  explain  our  meaning. 

I  conceive  that  the  faculty  of  reasoning  is  one,  and 
not  more.  In  other  words,  he  who  reasons  well  on  one 
matter,  will  reason  equally  well  on  any  other  with  which 
he  is  equally  conversant ;  and  the  same  discipline  which 
will  make  him  reason  better  on  one  subject,  will  also 
make  him  reason  better  on  any  other  with  which  (as 
before)  he  is  equally  conversant.  This  is  by  no  means 
a  self-evident  fact ;  yet  on  the  other  hand,  as  it  does 
not  bear  on  our  argument,  it  will  be  better  not  to  be 
led  away  into  those  various  statements,  which  would  be 
necessary  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  it.  Let  it 
suffice  then  thus  to  have  stated  my  own  humble  opinion.* 

*  It  may,  perhaps,  be  worth  while  to  point  out  in  a  note,  that  those  who 
excel  in  logical  deduction,  excel  equally  in  logical  mduction.  The  latter 
(I  need  hardly  say)  is  wholly  different  from  physical  or  Baconian  induction  ; 
and  appertains  as  simply  to  Formal  Logic,  as  does  deduction  itself.  Its  type 
is  such  as  the  following  :  '  Every  right-angled  triangle  has  this  property  ; 
every  obtuse-angled  triangle  has  it;  every  acute-angled  triangle  has  it. 
But  these  three  classes  make  up  all  triangles  whatever  ;  hence  all  triangles 
whatever  have  it.'  As  the  deductive  reasoning  goes  from  generals  to  par- 
ticulars, so  inductive  from  particulars  to  generals.  I  think  this  inductive 
reasoning  is  far  more  common  than  we  are  sometimes  apt  to  fancy.  At  all 
events  I  may  take  this  opportunity  of  remarking,  that  it  has  often  occurred  in 
the  preceding  pages.  Thus  for  instance  in  this  very  Section  (n.  56)  I  draw 
attention  to  a  particular  intuition  ;  I  state  that  there  is  a  countless  number 
of  similar  intuitions  ;  and  by  logical  induction  I  make  a  generalization. 

It  may  be  thought  perhaps  at  first  sight,  that  the  acts  of  observing 
distances  at  sea  (to  take  the  illustration  which  I  have  suggested)  are  not 
intuitive  but  inferential  judgments  ;  after  the  type  of  those  mentioned  in 
n.  2.  Take  the  following  judgment — 'We  are  now  three  miles  from  land,' 
and  no  doubt  this  is  an  inferential  judgment.  It  may  arise,  e.g.  from  such 


132  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Now  of  all  these  various  faculties  three  things  may 
be  remarked : — 

(1.)  Some  men  are  by  nature  far  less  gifted  with 
this  or  that  faculty  than  are  other  men. 

(2.)  Putting  aside  exceptional  cases,  in  every  man 
every  faculty  admits  of  being  indefinitely  improved. 

(3.)  The  one  mode,  by  which  that  improvement 
takes  place,  is  practice;  exercise  of  the  faculty  in  putting 
it  to  that  purpose,  which  it  was  evidently  intended  to 
subserve.  We  learn  to  remember  better  and  better, 
in  proportion  as  we  apply  ourselves  to  learning  things 
by  heart.  We  learn  to  intue  more  accurately  the 
mutual  relations  of  marine  distances,  in  proportion  as 
we  give  our  attention  to  the  task  of  comparing  them. 
We  improve  our  judgment  in  music,  by  accustoming 
ourselves  to  hear  it.  We  grow  in  good  taste  for 
pictures,  in  proportion  as  we  give  exercise  to  such 
taste  as  we  have. 

65.  Our  foundation  having  thus  been  laid,  I  proceed 
to  state  what  appears  to  me  the  real  process,  whereby 
our  moral  judgments  increase  in  accuracy.  I  will  first 
state  it  and  assume  it  to  be  true.  When  we  have  seen 
the  various  results  to  which  it  leads,  I  will  then  beg 
your  attention  to  the  various  arguments  in  its  behalf. 
I  will  merely  premise,  that,  in  considering  the  whole 
matter,  we  must  put  out  of  sight  the  fact  of  Revelation ; 
because  our  question  regards  the  power  of  unaided 
reason  to  discover  moral  truth. 

I  lay  down  then  the  following  two  theses  : — 

(1.)  As  there  is  one  faculty  whereby  we  remember, 
and  another  whereby  we  observe  distances  at  sea ;  a 
third  whereby  we  judge  rightly  on  the  excellence  of 
music,  a  fourth  on  pictures  ; — so,  and  in  precisely  the 

reasoning  as  this:  'The  present  distance  is  just  three-quarters  of  the 
distance  which  I  observed  last  week  ;  and  which  I  knew  aliunde  to  be  four 
miles.'  But  it  must  be  observed  that  the  first  part  of  this  sentence,  '  this 
is  three-quarters  of  thatl  is  undeniably  an  intuitive  judgment ;  and  a 
judgment,  which  will  be  probably  true  or  false,  accordingly  as  the  faculty  of 
observing  distances  at  sea  is  in  a  sound  or  unsound  state.  A  mere  landsman 
will  probably  be  altogether  mistaken  in  forming  such  a  judgment.  This 
whole  remark  is  applicable  to  an  indefinite  number  of  cases,  where  it  might 
be  thought  that  the  elicited  judgment  is  inferential  and  not  intuitive. 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      133 

same  sense,  there  is  another  faculty,  whereby  we  intue 
moral  truth.  Let  us  call  this  the  Moral  Faculty. 

(2.)  As  our  other  faculties  improve  by  being  put 
to  that  purpose  for  which  they  are  intended,  so  also 
does  the  Moral  Faculty. 

66.  To  see  the  full  bearing  of  this  second  thesis,  let  us 
first  consider  what  is  the  *  purpose'  for  which  the  Moral 
Faculty  is  *  intended.'  Evidently,  that  it  should  be  the 
one  guide  of  our  life.  If  there  be  such  a  quality  as 
moral  evil  attaching  to  certain  actions,  we  cannot  tell 
how  many, — it  becomes  a  most  indispensable  duty,  to 
take  good  heed  that  none  of  those  daily  actions  which 
we  are  in  the  habit  of  performing,  may  come  under  the 
number.  It  becomes,  I  say,  a  most  indispensable  duty, 
to  pass  under  review  from  time  to  time  our  course  of 
life,  that  we  may  carefully  consider  how  far  we  have 
means  of  knowing  that  any  part  of  it  is  wrong.  He 
who  recognizes  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  moral 
obligation  at  all,  is  self-condemned,  unless  he  aims  at 
enthroning  it  in  the  place  of  absolute  and  despotic 
authority  over  his  whole  life. 

The  same  thing  may  be  more  accurately  and  pro- 
fitably stated,  if  we  here  assume  a  proposition  which  is 
undeniably  true.  When  once  men  begin  seriously  to 
lay  to  heart  moral  obligation,  they  will  at  once  recognize 
the  Existence  of  a  Holy  Creator.  By  what  process 
this  recognition  takes  place — whether,  e.g.  by  inference, 
or  intuition,  or  in  what  other  way,  —  this  is  a  most 
important  philosophical  inquiry,  yet  here  we  need  not 
consider  it.  It  could  not  by  possibility  be  discussed 
satisfactorily,  without  occupying  very  considerable 
space,  and  leading  us  through  a  number  of  very  diffi- 
cult questions;  while  our  course  of  argument  is  not 
affected  by  it  one  way  or  the  other.  I  will  only  here  ex- 
plain how  far  1  am  from  meaning,  that  in  fact  men  first 
arrive  by  means  of  reason  at  a  knowledge  of  God.  On 
the  contrary,  I  believe  that  in  fact  the  first  announcement 
of  God's  existence  ever  comes  through  the  agency  of 
Revelation  ;  there  being  no  country  so  barbarous  or  so 
isolated,  as  that  some  remains  at  least  of  the  Primitive 


134  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Revelation  do  not  remain  among  them,  imparting  a  real 
light  from  Heaven.  At  the  same  time,  to  say  that  the 
first  announcement  is  in  fact  due  to  Revelation,  is  of 
course  most  fully  consistent  with  saying,  as  I  do  say, 
that  reason  is  superabundantly  able  to  establish  and 
substantiate  this  fundamental  truth. 

Reverting  then  to  the  course  of  our  argument,  and 
interweaving  with  it  this  proposition  of  God's  Existence, 
I  assert  that  those  only  put  their  Moral  Faculty  to  that 
purpose  for  which  it  is  intended,  who  are  in  the  habit 
of  striving  earnestly  and  perseveringly  to  please  their 
Creator.  In  other  words,  those  only  do  so,  who  are  in 
the  habit  of  ( 1 )  frequently  passing  under  review  every 
detail  of  their  conduct,  for  the  purpose  of  considering  how 
far  it  will  be  approved  by  the  Omniscient  God;  and  (2) 
of  labouring  earnestly,  that  the  current  of  their  lives 
may  be  really  in  harmony  with  that  which  they  have  dis- 
covered to  be  God's  Will.  That  such  a  course  is  utterly 
impossible  without  Prayer  and  Grace,  I  am  indeed  well 
aware  ;  and  we  shall  see  this  truth  most  fully  esta- 
blished, when  we  come  to  Theology.  Still  reason  alone 
would  shew  the  importance  and  obligation  of  Prayer ; 
while  experience  would  testify  to  its  most  efficacious 
results.  We  are  able  therefore  to  make  the  supposition 
that  men  do  so  act  with  reasonable  consistency,  without 
introducing  the  hypothesis  of  a  special  and  authenti- 
cated Revelation. 

Our  second  thesis  comes  then  to  this :  that  in  propor- 
tion as  we  carefully  pursue  the  course  just  described, 
our  Moral  Faculty  will  acquire  a  constantly  increasing 
refinement  of  intuition,  enabling  it  to  form  'moral 
judgments'  with  constantly  increasing  fineness  and 
accuracy.*  To  understand  therefore  fully  the  said 


*  This  is  held  by  Gioberti ;  though  I  cannot  but  think  that  he  is  far 
from  laying  such  stress  upon  it,  as  its  extreme  importance  deserves. 
Surely  all  must  confess,  that  if  a  truth,  it  is  a  more  important  one 
than  most  others.  The  following  is  M.  Alary's  translation  of  Gioberti's 
words  : 

"  L'inclination  et  la  propension  affectueuse  de  la  volonte*  .  .  .  tournent  au 
profit  de  la  connaissance  elle-meme ;  1'accroissent,  la  fortifient,  la  perfec- 
tionnent.  Voila  pourquoi  les  amis  des  verit6s  intellectives  ont  de  celles-ci 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      135 

thesis,  one  final  question  must  be  answered; — *"what  is 
precisely  meant  by  a  moral  judgment?1 

By  a  'moral  judgment/  we  understand  a  judgment, 
of  which  the  idea  of  'moral  worthiness,'  in  one  or 
other  of  its  various  shapes,  stands  as  predicate.  Moral 
judgments  therefore  will  be  always  reducible  to  such 
types  as  the  following :  '  A  is  virtuous,'  '  B  is  of  obliga- 
tion,' c  C  is  morally  evil,'  '  D  is  morally  worthier  than 
E,'  &c.  &c.  Thus  that  humility  is  virtuous,  is  a  moral 
judgment ;  but  that  such  or  such  a  mental  discipline 
will  conduce  to  humility,  this  is  not  a  '  moral '  but  a 
psychological  judgment.  This  latter  judgment,  I  say, 
does  not  predicate  moral  goodness,  or  badness,  or  pre- 
ferableness,  of  any  act  or  person ;  but  simply  states 
that  a  certain  relation  exists  between  two  certain  mental 
phenomena.  Now  it  is  'moral  judgments,'  and  not 
psychological  nor  any  other,  which  (I  maintain)  will 
be  more  accurately  elicited,  in  proportion  as  the  Moral 
Faculty  is  improved  through  moral  discipline. 

66.  Do  we  mean  therefore,  that  as  our  Moral  Faculty 
thus  grows,  we  are  able  for  certain  to  judge  more 
clearly,  under  every  combination  of  circumstances,  what 
is  right  or  wrong,  and  what  is  morally  preferable?  By 
no  means.  The  Moral  Faculty  is  able  indeed  to  judge 
more  accurately  on  the  cases  brought  before  it ;  but  the 
wrong  case  may  be  brought  before  it.  This  very  mode 
of  expression  suggests  an  obvious  analogy.  When  we 
wish  to  obtain  a  lawyer's  opinion, — so  to  draw  up  our 
case  as  fully  and  accurately  to  represent  the  circum- 
stances, is  often  a  very  difficult  task.  If  we  perform 
this  task  badly,  though  the  lawyer  were  the  best  in  all 
England,  his  opinion  could  be  of  no  real  service.  It 
might  be  an  excellent  opinion  on  the  case ;  but  not  on 
the  real  circumstances:  the  fault  would  be,  not  that 
the  opinion  is  legally  erroneous,  but  that  the  circum- 
stances are  erroneously  represented.  Take  another 
illustration  from  a  pair  of  scales.  They  may  be  so 

une  intuition  beaucoup  plus  vive  et  plus  prononcee,  que  ceux  dont  Tame 
est  enveloppee  et  endurcie  dans  Va/ection  vicieuse  des  choses  sensuelles?  &c. 
— Introduction,  vol.  iii.  p.  40. 


136  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

exquisitely  made,  so  nicely  adjusted,  as  to  be  im- 
pressed by  a  feather's  weight ;  and  yet  what  will  be 
the  value  of  their  decision,  if  the  wrong  parcel  is 
put  in  ? 

To  apply  these  illustrations.  Our  moral  judgments, 
as  we  have  seen,  are  of  the  following  kinds.  4  Under 
'  the  circumstances  as  I  conceive  them,  A  is  morally 
'  evil,  B  is  lawful,  C  is  morally  better  than  D.J  But 
that  the  circumstances  as  I  conceive  them,  shall  be  in 
fact  the  circumstances  as  they  are, — in  other  words  that 
I  shall  have  accurately  represented  the  circumstances 
to  my  mind  —  this  requires  a  different  kind  of  judgment 
altogether.  This  latter  kind  of  judgment  is  one,  which 
it  is  often  most  difficult  to  form  correctly ;  but  its 
correctness  in  no  way  depends  on  the  good  condition  of 
my  Moral  Faculty.  And  we  shall  see  this  still  more 
strongly,  if  we  consider  the  production  of  the  arc  (see 
n.  63).  For  the  question,  on  which  I  have  to  pronounce 
a  moral  judgment,  is  not  whether  in  this  particular  case 
the  act  is  lawful  or  preferable,  but  whether  in  every 
parallel  case  a  parallel  act  is  so  to  be  considered.  It 
is  necessary  therefore,  before  the  requisite  judgment 
can  be  pronounced,  that  I  shall  suppose  such  acts, 
as  universally  done  under  parallel  circumstances ; — that 
I  shall  follow  out  with  sufficient  accuracy  and  com- 
pleteness the  various  results  which  would  thus  ensue  ;— 
that  I  shall  follow  out  with  equal  accuracy  and  com- 
pleteness the  results  which  would  ensue  on  the  opposite 
hypothesis; — and  then,  having  thus  brought  up  the 
whole  case  (and  no  mere  fragment  of  it)  for  judgment, 
that  I  shall  finally  pronounce.  Plainly  it  will  happen 
again  and  again,  that  the  real  difficulty  is  far  more  in 
the  preparatory,  than  in  the  final,  process ;  far  more 
in  the  process  which  depends  on  other  intellectual 
operations,  than  on  that  which  specially  appertains  to 
the  Moral  Faculty. 

You  will  say  perhaps,  that  if  this  be  the  only 
method  of  arriving  at  a  sound  ethical  conclusion,  the 
cases  must  be  comparatively  few,  in  which  reason  will 
enable  us  with  any  confidence  to  hold  such  a  conclu- 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      137 

sion.  If  this  be  your  inference,  you  are  only  antici- 
pating what  I  shall  have  earnestly  to  advocate  in  a 
later  part  of  the  Section.  Here  we  are  only  considering 
what  the  true  process  is. 

A  particular  instance  may  perhaps  make  clearer  our 
meaning.  The  question  has  sometimes  been  raised, 
whether  it  is  morally  preferable  to  give,  or  to  refuse, 
money  to  a  beggar  who  asks  alms,  into  whose  circum- 
stances I  have  no  means  of  inquiring.  For  the  moment, 
we  have  nothing  to  do  with  decisions  of  the  Church, 
texts  of  Scripture,  and  the  rest,  because  we  are  sup- 
posed to  be  investigating  the  case  on  pure  grounds  of 
reason.  But,  apart  from  these,  as  a  mere  matter  of  intui- 
tion, numbers  of  excellent  persons  will  in  a  moment 
pronounce,  that  it  is  very  decidedly  better  to  give  than  to 
withhold.  Yet  a  little  consideration  will  shew,  that  they 
are  not  really  pronouncing  on  the  alternative  intended. 
Their  '  scales'  may  be  in  a  very  good  state,  but  wrong 
4  parcels'  have  been  put  into  them.  They  understand 
the  question  to  be,  '  which  of  these  two  is  morally  pre- 
4  ferable — the  giving  to  an  accidental  beggar,  or  the 
4  retaining  for  our  own  enjoyment.'  This  however  is 
not  at  all  what  is  meant,  but  rather  the  following.  4  A 
4  certain  sum  of  money,  a  certain  amount  of  self-abne- 
4  gation,  being  fixed,  as  that  from  which  the  poor  are 
4  to  be  relieved — is  it  preferable  that  this  sum  should 
*  be  partly  given  to  those  of  whom  we  know  nothing, 
4  or  that  it  should  be  wholly  devoted  to  persons  into 
4  whose  circumstances  we  can  fully  inquire?'  Now  I 
suppose  the  *  moral  judgment,'  which  all  would  pro- 
nounce, as  soon  as  the  case  proposed  is  really  under- 
stood, is  of  the  following  kind  :  4  our  answer  must  de- 
'  pend  on  the  question,  which  of  the  two  courses  is  more 
'  conducive  to  the  spiritual  and  temporal  benefit  of  the 
'  poor  as  a  class?  that  course  is  morally  preferable, 
4  which  is  the  more  conducive  to  such  welfare'  This 
is  the  only  judgment  in  the  case,  whereof  *  lawful,'  or 
4  wrong,'  or  4  morally  preferable,'  stands  as  predicate ; 
and  this  therefore  is  the  only  one  which  is  properly  a 
4  moral  judgment.'  Thus  the  real  difficulty  here  does 


138  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

not  lie  with  the  action  of  the  '  scales,'  but  with  the  pre- 
liminary action,  of  getting  together  the  right  'parcels' 
which  are  to  be  weighed.  The  really  doubtful  part  of 
the  question,  I  say,  does  not  lie  within  the  sphere, 
within  reach,  of  the  Moral  Faculty  at  all ;  even  a  Saint 
might  judge  quite  mistakenly  upon  it :  it  has  to  be 
solved,  as  best  it  may,  by  a  careful  use  of  our  other 
intellectual  faculties.* 

67.  So  far  then  I  have  frankly  admitted  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  the  Moral  Faculty,  for  the  determination  of 
moral  truth.  But  there  are  other  instances,  and  those 
far  more  really  important,  in  which  the  growth  of  this 
Faculty  is  our  one  safe  and  sufficient  means  of  arriving 
at  such  truth.  I  allude  particularly  to  the  question, 
what  are  virtuous  ends  of  action  (see  nn.  54  and  62); 
and  I  say  that  this  question  is  at  last  far  more 
practically  important  than  any  other.  We  have  seen 
that  he  is  subjectively  the  best  man,  whose  will  is 
ordinarily  fixed,  with  the  greatest  degree  of  firmness 
and  efficacity,  on  the  various  good  ends  of  action  what- 
ever they  may  be.  (See  nn.  58,  59.)  Our  own  per- 
sonal progress  in  goodness  then,  depends  on  our  know- 
ledge, what  these  virtuous  ends  really  are ;  and  it  does 
not  depend  on  our  knowledge  of  any  other  moral 
truths  whatever.  Suppose  a  man  could  direct  his 
conduct  consistently  to  the  (supposed)  virtuousness 
of  pride  or  vindictiveness,  he  would  become,  not  the 
better  but  the  worse  man,  in  actual  proportion  to  the 
steadiness  and  perseverance  of  his  moral  action  :  it 
becomes  therefore  inappreciably  important,  to  shew 
that  such  a  result  is  utterly  impossible ;  that  it  is  ab- 
solutely and  totally  repugnant  to  the  constitution  of 
our  nature.  But  let  us  assume  that  he  made  bona  fide 
ever  such  great  mistakes,  as  to  what  is  the  morally 
preferable  way  of  relieving  the  poor;  or  what  is  the 
degree  of  violence  which  he  may  innocently  use  in 
self-defence ;  or  in  what  cases  he  may  lawfully  receive 

*  I  give  this  as  an  illustration  of  what  is  meant  by  my  principle, 
should  be  very  sorry  if  it  were  thought  that  I  myself  disapprove  the  habit 
of  giving,  under  various  circumstances,  to  unknown  beggars. 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      139 

interest  for  his  money ;  or  on  a  thousand  other  such  ques- 
tions. Well — I  am  not  in  the  least  wishing  to  under- 
state the  serious  mischief  of  this;  but  evidently  such 
mischief  is  different,  not  in  degree  merely  but  in  kind, 
from  the  tremendous  evil  which  must  ensue,  on  the 
preceding  hypothesis ;  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  continued 
mistake  in  regard  to  the  truly  virtuous  ends  of  action. 

Now  as  to  these  virtuous  ends  of  action,  three 
in  particular  (n.  62)  remained  for  consideration  ; 
Humility,  Forgivingness,  Purity.  Let  us  take  them 
in  this  order. 

68.  As  to  pride,  it  is  very  certain  that  its  sinful- 
ness  is  no  matter  of  universal  intuition.  It  is  plain 
enough  indeed,  that  to  pride  myself  on  what  I  know 
to  be  morally  wrong — on  the  success  of  my  knavery 
or  of  my  lawless  violence, — cannot  but  itself  be  morally 
evil  and  detestable.  Again,  to  pride  myself  on  my 
ancient  birth  or  extreme  wealth — no  one  (I  suppose) 
will  think  this  virtuous ;  though  as  to  the  degree  of  its 
viciousness,  there  will  be  great  difference  of  opinion. 

But  suppose  I  pride  myself  on  what  I  believe  to  be 
good  and  virtuous.  There  are  multitudes  of  men,  who 
are  just,  benevolent,  grateful,  in  their  external  con- 
duct, mainly  and  principally  for  this  reason ;  that  they 
would  be  ashamed  of  themselves  if  they  acted  differ- 
ently. This  was  particularly  the  case,  with  those  hea- 
thens who  are  popularly  called  virtuous.*  Cato  is 
punctiliously  just  in  his  dealings;  for  it  would  greatly 
lower  the  illustrious  Cato  in  his  own  eyes,  if  he  were 
not  so.  He  fulfils  the  various  duties  of  a  just  man  and 
a  good  citizen,  so  far  as  he  understands  those  duties, 
from  the  same  motive.  Month  after  month  and  year 
after  year,  he  inhales  the  sweet  incense  of  his  own 

*  I  am  very  far  from  meaning  that  heathens  perform  no  really  virtuous 
acts  at  all.  In  the  theological  portion  of  our  work,  we  shall  have  again  and 
again  to  consider  the  very  important  condemnation  of  Baius's  proposition, 
'  Omnia  opera  infidelium  sunt  peccata,'  and  of  his  follower's, '  Necesse  est 
infidelem  in  omni  opere  peceare.'  On  the  other  hand  we  shall  also 
have  to  consider  the  Church's  singularly  emphatic  enunciation,  '  Fortitu- 
dinem  gentilium  mundana  cupiditas  .  .  .  facit.'  —  Cone.  Arausicanum, 
canon  17. 


140  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

esteem ;  and  he  is  thus  ever  increasing  that  intense  appre- 
ciation, wherewith  he  regards  his  own  dignity.  At  length, 
it  seems  the  one  obviously  virtuous  course,  that  he 
shall  stab  himself,  rather  than  that  so  exalted  a  cha- 
racter should  undergo  the  ignominy  of  falling  into  his 
enemy's  power.  Such  is  heathenism;  and  there  have 
been  many  Protestants  in  various  ages,  hardly  better 
than  heathens,  who  have  loudly  applauded  his  con- 
duct.* This  habit,  of  priding  ourselves  on  our  sup- 
posed virtue,  requires  such  careful  and  frequent  con- 
sideration in  Theology,  that  it  should  have  a  distinct 
name  of  its  own.  I  will  consistently  therefore  call  it 
'  moral  pride.'  And  I  ask,  can  it  be  shewn  by  reason, 
against  these  heathens  and  heathenish  Protestants,  that 
their  intuitions  on  the  virtuousness  of  moral  pride  are 
totally  mistaken? 


*  "  The  celebrated  Roman  patriot,  Cato,  stabbed  himself  when  besieged 
at  Utica,  rather  than  fall  into  the  hands  of  Caesar.  He  thought  this  a  very 
great  action,  and  so  have  many  others  besides.  In  like  manner  Saul,  in 
Scripture,  fell  on  his  sword  when  defeated  in  battle  ;  and  there  have  been 
those  who  reproached  Napoleon  for  not  having  blown  out  his  brains  on  the 
field  of  Waterloo.  Now,  if  these  advocates  of  suicide  had  been  asked  why 
they  thought  such  conduct,  under  such  circumstances,  noble,  perhaps  they 
would  have  returned  the  querist  no  answer ;  as  if  it  were  too  plain  to  talk 
about,  or  from  contempt  of  him,  as  if  he  were  a  person  without  any  sense  of 
honour,  any  feeling  of  what  becomes  a  gentleman,  of  what  a  soldier  or  hero 
owes  to  himself.  That  is,  they  would  not  bring  out  their  first  principle, 
from  the  very  circumstance  that  they  felt  its  power  so  intensely ;  that 
first  principle  being,  that  there  is  no  evil  so  great  in  the  whole  universe, 
visible  and  invisible,  in  time  and  eternity,  as  humiliation 

"  In  the  instance  I  have  mentioned,  the  folly  and  the  offence,  in  the  eyes 
of  the  Romans,  was  proselytizing ;  but  let  us  fancy  this  got  over,  would  the 
Christian  system  itself  have  pleased  the  countrymen  of  Cato  at  all  better  1 
On  the  contrary,  they  would  have  started  with  his  first  principle,  that 
humiliation  was  immoral,  as  an  axiom  ;  they  would  not  have  attempted  to 
prove  it ;  they  would  have  considered  it  as  much  a  fact  as  the  sun  in 
heaven  ;  they  would  not  have  enunciated  it ;  they  would  have  merely 
implied  it.  Fancy  a  really  candid  philosopher,  who  had  been  struck  with 
the  heroic  deaths  of  the  martyrs,  turning  with  a  feeling  of  good-will  to 
consider  the  Christian  ethics  ;  what  repugnance  would  he  not  feel  towards 
them !  to  crouch,  to  turn  the  cheek,  not  to  resist,  to  love  to  be  lowest ! 
Who  ever  heard  of  such  a  teaching  1  It  was  the  religion  of  slaves  ;  it  was 
unworthy  of  a  man  ;  much  more  of  a  Roman.  Yet  that  odious  religion  in 
the  event  became  the  creed  of  countless  millions ;  what  philosophers  so 
spontaneously  and  instinctively  condemned,  has  been  professed  by  the 
profoundest  and  the  noblest  of  men,  through  eighteen  centuries.  So  possible 
is  it  for  our  first  principles  to  be  but  the  opinion  of  a  multitude,  not 
truths?— Newman  on  Catholicism  in  England,  pp.  268,  269,  and  275,  276. 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      141 

Our  thesis  on  the  growth  of  the  Moral  Faculty 
affords  us  a  ready  means  for  doing  so.  If  there  be 
certain  acts  intrinsecally  evil,  and  before  examination  a 
man  cannot  tell  how  many  there  may  be, — there  is  an 
objective  rule,  indefinite  in  extent,  external  to  himself, 
which  legitimately  claims  his  abject  deference  and  sub- 
mission ;  a  rule,  which  possesses  over  him  nothing  less 
than  a  paramount  authority,  from  which  there  is  no 
appeal  and  no  escape.  Reason,  I  say,  summons  him 
to  exhibit  this  deference  and  submission;  and  yet  this 
pseudo-virtuous  heathen  has  totally  failed  in  doing  so. 
He  has  pursued  his  darling  pleasure  self-esteem,  with 
the  very  same  keen,  impetuous,  unreserved,  eagerness, 
with  which  the  ambitious  man  pursues  honour,  or  the 
money-getter  wealth.  He  has  no  more  checked  and 
restrained  himself  in  the  violent  pursuit  of  his  charac- 
teristic pleasure,  than  they  in  the  pursuit  of  theirs.  The 
main  difference  between  him  and  them  is  simply  this ; 
that  whereas  he  derives  his  favourite  enjoyment  from 
the  thought  of  his  own  virtuousness,  such  imagination 
of  virtuousness  is  continually  in  his  mind.  But  as  for 
anything  like  subjection  to  an  external,  authoritative, 
paramount,  rule,  you  will  find  no  more  trace  of  it  in 
his  conduct  than  in  theirs. 

Indeed  let  us  consider  on  what  ground  we  should 
justly  blame  those  other  characters,  the  ambitious  and 
money-getting ;  for  whatever  argument  can  be  found 
available  against  them,  will  tell  no  less  forcibly  against 
Cato  himself.  We  should  say  that  they  are  culpable 
for  this  cause — because,  having  fullest  means  of  know- 
ing this  Supreme  Rule,  in  their  conduct  they  have 
ignored  it ;  they  have  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  the  Moral 
Voice  within  them ;  and  instead  of  carefully  measuring 
their  acts,  one  after  another,  by  this  paramount  autho- 
rity, they  have  recklessly  and  unrestrainedly  pursued 
the  bent  of  their  various  inclinations.  All  the  essential 
part  of  this  may  be  said,  with  equal  truth,  against  the 
morally  proud.  He,  like  they,  has  recklessly  and 
unreservedly  pursued  the  bent  of  his  dominant  inclina- 
tion ;  in  him,  no  more  than  in  them,  will  be  found  any 


142  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

traces  of  abject  and  slavish  submission  to  a  superior 
authority.  His  Moral  Faculty  then  is  simply  in  its 
infancy ;  it  has  received  no  real  growth  whatever ;  his 
moral  intuitions  deserve  neither  respect  nor  even  con- 
sideration. 

Now  surely  it  needs  no  very  careful  observation  of 
human  nature  to  see,  that  if  he  once  began  that  course 
of  life  to  which  reason  summons  him,  his  moral  judg- 
ments would  begin  to  undergo  a  total  revolution.  In 
proportion  as  he  should  even  aim  at  pursuing  the  path 
of  humble  deference  to  this  supreme  authority,  however 
feeble  and  vacillating  his  progress  along  that  path,  he 
would  see  that  his  former  course  contained  in  itself 
hardly  any  element  of  virtue ;  he  would  see  that  virtue 
consists,  and  can  consist,  in  nothing  else,  than  in  this 
submission  and  prostration  of  the  will.  In  other  words, 
in  proportion  as  his  Moral  Faculty  should  receive  any 
kind  of  cultivation,  he  would  recognize  pride  as  sinful, 
and  humility  in  its  place  as  the  virtuous  end  of  action. 

It  is  very  certain  indeed,  that  the  Authority  whose 
absolute  and  peremptory  claims  he  will  thus  learn  to 
recognize,  is  no  mere  abstract  Rule,  but  a  Personal 
Being.*  I  have  already  said,  that  from  the  first  moment 
when  we  begin  seriously  thinking  of  moral  obligation, 
we  shall  begin  to  recognize  the  Existence  of  an  All- 
holy  Creator.  And  here  I  may  add  to  this,  that 
nothing  will  more  tend  to  increase  the  strength,  earnest- 
ness, rootedness,  of  this  recognition,  than  firm  and  con- 
sistent moral  action.f  It  is  true  that,  as  I  have  avoided 

*  See  Appendix  to  this  Chapter. 

t  "  What  is  the  main  guide  of  the  soul,  given  to  the  whole  race  of 
Adam,  outside  the  true  fold  of  Christ  as  well  as  within  it,  given  from  the 
first  dawn  of  reason,  given  to  it  in  spite  of  that  grievous  penalty  of 
ignorance,  which  is  one  of  the  chief  miseries  of  our  fallen  state  ?  It  is  the 
light  of  conscience ;  the  '  True  Light,'  as  the  same  Evangelist  says  in  the 
same  passage,  'which  enlighteneth  every  man  that  cometh  into  this 
world.'  Whether  a  man  be  born  in  Pagan  darkness,  or  in  some  corruption 
of  revealed  religion, — whether  he  has  heard  the  name  of  the  Saviour  of  the 
world  or  not, — whether  he  be  the  slave  of  some  superstition, — or  is  in 
possession  of  some  portions  of  Scripture,  and  treats  the  inspired  word  as  a 
sort  of  philosophical  book,  which  he  interprets  for  himself,  and  comes  to 
certain  conclusions  about  its  teaching, — in  any  case,  he  has  within  his 
breast  a  certain  commanding  dictate ;  not  a  mere  sentiment,  not  a  mere 
opinion,  or  impression,  or  view  of  things,  but  a  law,  an  authoritative  voice, 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      143 

entering  on  the  philosophical  proof  of  God's  Existence, 
I  am  not  entitled  to  make  use  of  it  in  my  reasoning : 
but  I  have  not  made  use  of  it;  as  the  following  sum- 
mary of  my  argument  will  prove. 

I  have  shewn  then  (1)  that  the  very  existence  of 
moral  obligation  implies  the  obligatoriness  of  a  certain 
course  of  conduct ;  the  course  of  abject  deference  to  an 
external  rule:  and  (2)  that  every  human  being,  in 
proportion  as  he  sincerely  tries  to  pursue  that  course, 
intues,  with  ever-increasing  distinctness,  that  moral  pride 
is  intriusecally  sinful.  On  these  two  grounds  I  base  my 
conclusion,  that  this  intuition  is  legitimate.  And  a 
fully  sufficient  ground  is  afforded  for  this  inference,  by 
the  second  thesis  of  n.  65 ;  even  as  that  thesis  would 
stand,  without  any  reference  to  the  Existence  of  a  Holy 
Creator.  But  if  it  be  further  true  (as  it  is)  that,  by 
beginning  the  same  course  of  conduct,  we  come  at  once 

bidding  him  do  certain  things  and  avoid  others.  I  do  not  say  that  its 
particular  injunctions  are  always  clear,  or  that  they  are  always  consistent 
with  each  other  ;  but  what  I  am  insisting  on  here  is  this,  that  it  commands, 
that  it  praises,  it  blames,  it  promises,  it  threatens,  it  implies  a  future,  and 
it  witnesses  of  the  unseen.  It  is  more  than  a  man's  own  self.  The  man 
himself  has  not  power  over  it,  or  only  with  extreme  difficulty.  He  did  not 
make  it ;  he  cannot  destroy  it.  He  may  silence  it  in  particular  cases  or 
directions  ;  he  may  distort  its  enunciations  ;  but  he  cannot,  or  it  is  quite 
the  exception  if  he  can,  he  cannot  emancipate  himself  from  it.  He  can 
disobey  it  ;  he  may  refuse  to  use  it;  but  it  remains. 

"  This  is  conscience ;  and,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  its  very  existence 
carries  on  our  minds  to  a  Being  Exterior  to  ourselves,  for  else  whence  did 
it  come  ?  and  to  a  Being  Superior  to  ourselves,  else  whence  its  strange, 
troublesome  peremptoriness  1  I  say,  without  going  on  to  the  question 
what  it  says,  and  whether  its  particular  dictates  are  always  as  clear  and 
consistent  as  they  might  be,  its  very  existence  throws  us  out  of  ourselves, 
and  beyond  ourselves,  to  go  and  seek  for  Him  in  the  height  and  depth, 
whose  Voice  it  is.  As  the  sunshine  implies  that  the  sun  is  in  the  heavens, 
though  we  see  it  not;  as  a  knocking  at  our  doors  at  night  implies  the 
presence  of  one  outside  in  the  dark  who  asks  for  admittance  ; — so  this  Word 
within  us,  not  only  instructs  us  up  to  a  certain  point,  but  necessarily  raises 
our  minds  to  the  idea  of  a  Teacher,  an  unseen  Teacher  ;  and  in  proportion 
as  we  listen  to  that  Word  and  use  it,  not  only  do  we  learn  more  from  it,  not 
only  do  its  dictates  become  clearer  and  its  lessons  broader  and  its  principles 
more  consistent,  but  its  very  tone  is  louder  and  more  authoritative  and 
constraining.  And  thus  it  is,  that  to  those  who  use  what  they  have,  more 
is  given  ;  for,  beginning  with  obedience,  they  go  on  to  the  intimate  perception 
and  belief  of  One  God.  His  Voice  within  them  witnesses  to  Him,  and  they 
believe  His  own  witness  about  Himself.  They  believe  in  His  Existence, 
not  because  others  say  it,  not  on  the  word  of  man  merely,  but  with  a 
personal  apprehension  of  its  truth." — Newman's  Occasional  Sermons,  pp. 


144  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

to  the  clear  knowledge  of  an  All-holy  Being,  in  Whose 
comparison  we  are  but  as  worms  or  the  very  dust  of 
the  earth, — it  does  but  follow  that  the  force  of  our  con- 
clusion is  increased  a  thousand- fold.  That  a  reasonable 
person  shall  recognize  a  Holy  and  an  Infinite  Creator, 
and  yet  in  his  daily  conduct  (instead  of  striving  to 
grow  in  humble  obedience  to  that  Creator)  shall  delibe- 
rately aim  at  the  promotion  of  his  own  dignity  and 
aggrandizement — this  is  a  spectacle,  the  utter  and 
monstrous  unreasonableness  of  which  must  strike  the 
most  casual  thinker,  who  has  given  any  real  cultivation 
to  his  Moral  Faculty.  I  speak,  as  my  argument  leads 
me,  of  its  monstrous  unreasonableness;  on  its  moral 
odiousness,  it  is  not  necessary  that  I  should  speak. 

We  have  added  then  Humility  to  our  catalogue  of 
virtuous  ends. 

69.  We  next  come  to  Vindictiveness.  There  are 
various  men,  who  regard  this  as  an  eminently  virtuous 
end  of  action ;  who  consider  that  when  I  have  received 
a  serious  affront  or  injury,  a  kind  of  obligation  rests 
upon  me  to  requite  it;  that  until  I  have  done  so,  I  ana 
in  a  low  and  contemptible  position.  What  is  to  be 
said,  on  our  principles,  in  opposition  to  such  a  view? 

First,  such  an  opinion  is  very  far  from  being  so 
general  as  at  first  sight  appears.  Again  and  again  the 
wrong  case  is  presented  to  the  Moral  Faculty  for  its 
judgment  (see  n.  66) ;  for  it  is  supposed  by  multitudes, 
as  a  matter  of  course,  that  the  forgiving  an  injury 
proceeds  from  cowardice.  Here  then  they  are  wrong 
as  to  the  matter  of  fact,  but  not  as  to  the  moral  prin- 
ciple ;  for  it  is  a  thing  worthy  of  blame,  that  I  should 
so  give  way  to  fear,  as  to  be  held  back  by  it  from 
conduct  which  I  recognize  as  right.  The  real  question 
then  must  be  put  in  some  such  way  as  the  following  :— 
Suppose  that  by  great  deeds  of  bravery,  or  in  whatever 
way,  I  had  shewn  most  plainly,  that  fear  of  danger 
could  be  to  me  no  restraint  upon  action ;  and  suppose, 
having  so  exhibited  myself,  I  freely  forgive  the  most 
stinging  injuries,  on  the  expressed  ground  that  vin- 
dictiveness  is  sinful.  The  question  is,  how  great  is  the 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      145 

number  of  men,  who  in  that  case  would  regard  such 
forgivingness  as  censurable? 

Those  who  do  so,  would  proceed  on  one,  and  one 
only,  ground.  They  would  assume,  as  a  first  principle, 
the  great  obligation  incumbent  on  each  man,  of  cherish- 
ing a  sense  of  his  own  dignity ;  and  they  would  regard 
forgivingness  as  censurable,  precisely  because  any  one, 
who  receives  an  affront  without  resenting  it,  must  lower 
himself  in  his  own  eyes,  and  be  deficient  in  that  spirit 
of  self-exaltation  which  is  so  great  a  duty.  The  sup- 
posed virtuousness  of  revenge  is  entirely  built  on  the 
supposed  virtuousness  of  self-exaltation.  Their  judg- 
ment then  is  not  intuitive,  but  inferential ;  being  based 
on  the  premiss  above  mentioned.  But  this  premiss  has 
been  overthrown  (I  think)  in  the  preceding  number; 
we  have  shewn  that  there  is  no  kind  of  virtuousness  in 
self-exaltation :  and  the  premiss  failing,  the  conclusion 
also  fails.  Indeed  whoever  will  attend  at  all  carefully 
to  the  phenomena  of  the  human  mind,  will  see  quite 
clearly  the  following  fact.  In  proportion  as  I  live  more 
and  more  in  subjection  to  an  external  rule,  which  I  recog- 
nize as  possessing  over  me  a  paramount  claim — immea- 
surably more,  in  proportion  as  I  regard  that  paramount 
authority  to  be  no  mere  abstract  rule,  but  the  Personal 
and  Living  God  —  in  that  proportion  the  following 
result  will  ensue.  I  shall  recognize  more  and  more 
clearly  and  unmistakably,  that  there  is  no  baseness 
whatever  in  the  spirit  of  forgivingness,  no  virtuousness 
whatever  in  revenge  as  such.  We  cannot  indeed  claim 
this  judgment  as  intuitive,  for  the  reason  already  given ; 
but  it  is  an  inference  which  will  be  more  and  more  cer- 
tainly drawn,  in  proportion  as  my  intuitive  judgment 
on  the  virtuousness  of  humility  becomes  more  emphati- 
cally elicited. 

We  have  already  remarked  (n.  54),  that  on  the  one 
hand  all  mankind  regard  various  acts  as  virtuous  simply 
because  they  are  benevolent;  whereas  no  one  ever  re- 
garded an  act  as  virtuous  simply  because  it  was  cruel. 
To  this  we  are  now  able  further  to  add,  that  neither  can 
any  act  of  aggression  on  others  be  truly  regarded  as 

L 


146  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

virtuous,  simply  because  it  was  done  in  revenge  for 
some  injury,  which  had  been  previously  received  at 
their  hands. 

You  may  object,  that  I  have  not  proved  vindictive- 
ness  to  be  wrong,  but  merely  not  to  be  of  obligation. 
Why  may  it  not  be  lawful  to  requite  an  insult  or  injury, 
simply  for  the  sake  of  that  vindictive  pleasure  which 
we  derive  from  so  doing?  I  reply  readily.  We  have 
seen  (n.  55)  that  it  is  undoubtedly  wrong  to  contra- 
vene any  virtuous  end,  except  for  the  sake  of  some 
other  obligation,  which  we  may  regard  as  justly  pre- 
ponderating. Now  Benevolence  is  most  undoubtedly 
one  of  these  virtuous  ends.  Hence  it  is  undoubtedly 
wrong  to  contravene  Benevolence — i.  e.  to  inflict  an 
injury  on  our  fellow-men — except  for  the  sake  of  some 
other  obligation.  Now  we  have  just  proved,  that  there 
is  no  kind  of  obligation  to  requite  an  injury  vindictively  ; 
hence,  neither  is  it  lawful  so  to  do. 

70.  What  then  will  be  the  various  motives,  which  can 
justify  infliction  of  pain  on  our  fellow-men?  They  are 
reducible  perhaps  to  three  heads : — - 

(1.)  Self-defence.  If  a  burglar  attacks  me  with 
every  species  of  violence,  no  other  way  is  probably 
open  of  repelling  his  aggression,  except,  repaying  him 
in  kinet  Or,  passing  from  the  mere  physical  infliction 
of  pain,  it  will  often  happen  that  I  cannot  vindicate 
my  just  rights,  without  being  the  cause  (contrary  to  my 
wish)  of  much  suffering  to  others.  Yet  the  motives, 
which  lead  me  to  such  vindication,  may  most  rightly 
preponderate  over  those  which  would  dissuade  me  from 
it.  This  again  is  one  principal  end,  designed  by  the 
civil  society  in  her  infliction  of  punishments.  Violent 
and  unruly  men  would  literally  tear  her  asunder,  were 
they  not  restrained  by  a  salutary  fear  of  her  severe 
penalties. 

(2.)  Moral  improvement  of  the  offender.  Thus 
parents  punish  their  children  to  wean  them  from  bad 
habits.  This  also  is  one  motive  (though  subordinate 
to  the  former)  which  leads  society  to  enact  penalties 
against  transgressors. 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      147 

(3.)  Just  retribution  for  moral  evil.  It  has  been 
the  fashion  of  late  years,  to  deny  in  theory  that  the 
state  can  legitimately  act  on  this  motive.  To  discuss 
this  question  as  it  deserves,  would  carry  us  a  great  deal 
too  far;  I  will  content  myself  therefore  with  protesting 
most  earnestly  against  any  such  notion.  Indeed  if  the 
legislator  attempted  really  to  put  it  in  practice  —  if  he 
attempted,  in  his  apportionment  of  punishments,  wholly 
to  neglect  the  relative  turpitude  of  the  various  offences, 
and  consider  exclusively  their  relative  injuriousness  to 
the  state  —  I  am  confident  he  would  be  met  by  an 
universal  cry  of  horror  and  indignation. 

However,  whatever  may  be  the  functions  of  the 
state,  no  Theist  will  deny  that  God  acts  on  this  prin- 
ciple ;  that  the  very  idea  of  a  Just  moral  Governor 
includes  the  notion  of  punishing  sin,  no  less  than  of 
rewarding  virtue. 

And  generally,  all  God's  direct  inflictions  on  man 
may  be  classed  perhaps  under  one  or  other  of  the  three 
foregoing  heads. 

(1.)  Thus  He  punishes,  not  indeed  exactly  for  the 
purpose  of  Self-defence,  but  for  the  purpose  of  defending 
and  sanctioning  His  Laws.  The  punishments  which  He 
inflicts  on  us  here,  and  very  much  more  those  which 
He  threatens  hereafter,  are  among  the  most  effectual 
means  whereby  He  retains  mankind  in  obedience. 

(2.)  He  punishes  in  this  life  from  the  motive  of 
paternal  tenderness ;  for  the  sake  of  awakening  men  to 
a  sense  of  their  faults,  and  giving  them  an  occasion  for 
self-discipline  and  merit :  4  for  whom  the  Lord  loveth 
'  He  chastiseth,  and  scourgeth  every  son  whom  He 
4  receiveth.' 

(3.)  Those  awful  inflictions,  which  He  will  inflict 
on  wicked  men  hereafter,  are  but  the  just  retribution 
of  the  fearful  'malitia'  contained  in  mortal  sin.  The 
heinous  character  of  this  4  malitia'  will  be  considered 
in  our  theological  course. 

71.  We  shall  be  returning  more  nearly  to  our 
immediate  subject,  if  we  here  consider  another  question. 
'  Is  Forgivingness  a  separate  and  special  virtuous  end  of 


148  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

c  action  ?  or  is  it  only  reducible  to  the  more  general  head 
'  of  Benevolence  ? ' 

One  thing  is  plain  at  starting.  Suppose  I  have 
received  some  most  galling  injury  or  affront,  and  yet 
proceed  at  once  to  confer  some  great  kindness  on  the 
aggressor ;  my  will  must  be  directed  to  the  virtuousness 
of  Benevolence  with  a  singular  degree  of  firmness  and 
efficacity.  But  then  my  will  may  be  directed  with  the 
same  degree  of  efficacity  (see  n.  58),  when  I  am  bene- 
fiting some  one  who  has  not  injured  me.  The  acting 
rightly  under  temptation,  shews  greater  virtuousness 
than  could  otherwise  be  shewn ;  but  it  does  not  prove 
that  greater  virtuousness  exists,  than  might  otherwise 
exist. 

Now  for  the  question  started:  it  is  not  very  im- 
portant, but  its  true  answer  appears  to  me  the  follow- 
ing. In  the  case  of  us  men — whose  wills  are  so  weak, 
and  who  are  so  constantly  offending  our  Creator— 
Forgivingness  is  a  special  virtue,  when  based  on  the 
remembrance  that  we  ourselves  so  deeply  need  forgive- 
ness. But  in  rational  creatures  who  should  not  be  thus 
full  of  sin — or  in  ourselves  when  our  forgiveness  of 
others  is  not  based  on  remembrance  of  our  own  sinf ill- 
ness— then  I  can  see  nothing  to  distinguish  an  act  of 
forgivijjgness,  from  any  other  act  (internal  or  external) 
of  benevolence. 

72.  Lastly  we  come  to  the  virtue  of  Purity.  In  one 
very  important  respect,  this  virtue  should  rather  be 
classed  with  those  of  Justice,  Veracity,  and  Benevolence, 
which  we  first  considered,  than  with  those  of  Humility 
and  Forgivingness,  which  have  been  lately  occupying  our 
attention.  For  just  as  no  one  ever  considered  an  act 
as  virtuous,  simply  because  it  was  cruel  or  mendacious ; 
— so  neither  did  any  one  ever  consider  an  act  virtuous, 
simply  because  it  was  impure.  No  doubt  there  are 
many  most  frightful  sins  under  this  head,  which  multi- 
tudes of  men  do  not  regard  as  sinful  at  all;  yet  no  one 
thinks  them  virtuous,  on  the  ground  of  the  great  sensu- 
ality which  is  involved  in  their  commission.  Take  then 
the  worst  and  most  depraved  man  alive.  There  are 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATU11AL  RULE.      149 

certain  of  the  more  atrocious  impurities,  which  even  he 
regards  as  censurable;  and  if  I  avoid  these  atrocities 
simply  because  of  the  virtuousness  of  Purity,  I  should 
receive  (so  far)  his  praise.  Just  then  as  in  the  case 
of  Justice  and  Benevolence,  so  here.  There  are  certain 
acts  which  are  considered  good,  because  directed,  under 
certain  circumstances,  to  the  virtuousness  of  Purity  as 
such  ;  there  are  no  acts  which  are  considered  good, 
because  of  being  directed  to  any  supposed  virtuousness 
inherent  in  impurity  as  such.  By  the  consent  of  all 
mankind  then,  Purity  is  a  virtuous  end  of  action. 

But  in  another  respect,  Purity  should  rather  be 
ranked  with  Humility  and  Forgivingness ;  for  there  is 
no  virtue,  in  which  we  see  with  more  unmistakable 
clearness,  the  increase  of  discernment  which  the  Moral 
Faculty  acquires  by  means  of  exercise.  Let  any  man 
act  up  to  his  light  in  this  matter,  so  far  as  he  has  the 
moral  power  of  so  doing,  and  by  help  of  constant 
prayer, — and  contemplate  the  certain  result.  It  is  truly 
amazing,  how  rapidly  his  moral  perception  will  expand ; 
and  how  soon  he  will  see  foulness  and  pollution  in  a 
multitude  of  acts,  which  he  has  hitherto  regarded  as 
indifferent. 

73.  We  have  established  then  on  grounds  of  reason 
— and  it  is  difficult  adequately  to  estimate  the  import- 
ance of  our  conclusion — that  virtuous  ends  of  action 
aiv  such  as  the  following:  (1)  Love  of  God;  (2)  Obe- 
dience to  God;  (3)  Reverence  for  God;  (4)  Justice; 
(5)   Veracity;    (6)   Benevolence;    (7)   Humility;  (8) 
Forgivingness  ;  (9)  Purity.  We  become  morally  better, 
in  proportion  as  our  will  adheres  to  these  various  ends 
with  greater  firmness  and  efficacity.     Moreover,  as  will 
be  evident  on  referring  to  what  has  been  said,  the  whole 
of  our  reasoning  applies,  not  to  mankind  only,  but  to 
every  possible  creature  possessing  reason  and  liberty. 
There  are  but  two  exceptions  to  this  statement:  viz. 
first  in  regard  to  Purity ;   and  secondly  in  regard  to 
that  special  motive  for  Forgivingness,  which  results  from 
human  sinfulness. 

74.  Is  there  any  probable  inference  which  we  may 


150  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

now  draw,  as  to  the  extent  of  the  Natural  Rule?  If 
we  take  the  term  according  to  that  full  sense  suggested 
in  n.  52,  we  shall  find  reason  to  think  it  most  widely 
extensive.  Nay,  we  shall  find  reason  to  think  that  it 
reaches  over  almost  every  act  of  our  daily  life :  that 
every  such  act  has  by  necessity  its  own  independent 
worthiness,  both  objective  and  subjective ;  intrinsecally 
better  than  this,  intrinsecally  less  good  than  that.  Let 
A  and  B  be  two  different  acts,  either  of  them  at  this 
moment  in  my  power  to  do,  and  which  seem  on  the  sur- 
face of  equal  moral  value.  I  soon  find  some  good  con- 
sequence, which  I  had  not  thought  of  before,  which 
would  probably  result,  if  act  A  were  universally  elicited 
under  such  circumstances  ;  or  some  bad  consequence 
which  would  ensue,  if  act  B  were  thus  elicited.  Every 
fresh  discovery  of  this  kind  affects  the  relative  position 
of  A  and  B  in  the  moral  scale.  Then  suppose  that 
when  I  have  exhausted  all  such  discoveries,  the  two 
acts  seem  yet  equally  balanced — it  still  remains  very 
probable,  that  in  proportion  as  my  Moral  Faculty  in- 
creases by  exercise  in  keenness  of  perception,  it  will 
detect  some  difference  where  now  none  is  apparent. 

But  if  it  appears  from  reason  highly  probable,  that 
the  Natural  Rule,  as  discoverable  by  reason  in  the 
abstract,  is  thus  widely  extensive; — it  is  absolutely 
certain  on  the  other  hand,  that  our  actual  and  practical 
power  of  exploring  it  by  reason  is  trifling  indeed.  How 
utterly  insignificant  is  our  power  of  tracing  conse- 
quences with  any  accuracy !  how  miserably  small  is  the 
degree,  in  which  we  have  cultivated  our  Moral  Faculty 
by  the  practice  of  virtue  ! 

The  disproportion  then  is  enormous,  between  the 
extent  of  the  Natural  Rule  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
practical  power  of  unaided  reason  to  discover  it  on  the 
other  hand.  This  is  true  of  the  Natural  Rule,  in  that 
wider  sense  which  we  have  given  to  the  phrase,  as  the 
'rule  of  independent  virtuousness'  (see  n.  52);  audit  is 
no  less  true  in  its  narrower  sense  the  J  rule  of  indepen- 
dent obligation.'  Nothing  is  more  probable,  than  that 
there  may  be  a  large  number  of  acts,  objectively  sinful 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.     151 

in  their  own  intrinsic  nature,  which  man's  unaided 
reason  would  never  have  guessed  to  be  such.  Their 
sinfulness,  indeed,  is  in  the  abstract  discoverable  by 
reason.  Their  sinfulness,  I  say,  could  be  recognized  by 
any  man,  who  should  (1)  possess  preternatural  powers 
of  observation ;  and  (2)  should  have  given  perfect 
cultivation  to  his  Moral  Faculty,  through  a  course  of 
obedience  unsullied  by  venial  sin  or  imperfection.  But 
as  none  of  us  are  such,  the  sinfulness  of  such  acts  is  not 
(I  repeat)  discoverable  by  us ;  we  owe  our  knowledge 
of  it  to  Revelation,  and  to  Revelation  alone. 

Now  see  how  precisely  this  conclusion  harmonizes 
witli  the  dicta  of  theologians,  as  to  the  extent  of  the 
Natural  Rule  in  this  its  narrower  sense.  According 
to  Suarez,  it  is  an  '  axioma  theologorum '  that  under 
Christianity  there  are  no  Positive  Divine  Precepts  (see 
n.  25)  except  only  under  the  head  of  Faith  and  of  the 
Sacraments  ;  and  he  quotes  a  very  strong  passage  from 
St.  Thomas,  to  that  precise  effect.* 

Now  without  here  proceeding  to  enquire,  as  Suarez 
does,  how  far  even  these  should  strictly  be  called  Positive 
precepts  (on  which  question  I  hope  to  touch  in  the  next 
Section),  see  how  large  an  idea  this  gives  us  as  to  the 
extent  of  the  Natural  Rule.  Every  single  thing  then, 
forbidden  under  the  Gospel, — except  under  these  two 
heads  of  Faith  and  the  Sacraments, — is  forbidden  by  the 
Natural  Rule  ;  is  intrinsecally  evil,  apart  from  any 
Divine  Prohibition.  All  that  we  find  in  our  Moral 
Theology  treatises  under  the  first  commandment,  as  to 
love  of  God  and  our  neighbour  ;  all  that  we  find  under 
the  sixth,  as  to  thoughts  or  acts  of  impurity  ;  or  under 
i\\QJifth,  as  to  forgiving  injuries  ;  or  under  the  seventh, 

*  "  Intelligitur  ex  dictis,  quomodo  verum  sit  axioma  theologorum 
dicentium,  in  Nova  Lege  nuLla  esse  Divina  Prcecepta  [Positive],  nisi  tidei  et 
sacramentorum  ;  ut  loquitur  Soto  in  4,  d.  40,  a.  4,  et  sequuntur  alii  moderni, 
et  Covar.  in  4  Deer.  c.  6,  §  10,  in  priuc.  qui  id  sumpserunt  ex  D.  Th.  in 
dicta  q.  108  a.  1,  ad.  2,  ubi'non  tarn  expresse  id  affirmat ;  in  Quodlibet 
autem  4,  a.  13,  dicit,  Legem  Novam  esse  contentam  [1]  praeceptis  moralibus 
Naturalis  Legis,  et  [2]  articulis  Fidei,  et  [3]  Sacrameutis  Gratise."  —  De 
Legibiis,  lib.  10,  c.  2,  n.  20. 

"Christus  non  tradidit  Pnecepta  moralia  Positiva,  sed  Naturalia  itta 
magls  explicavit." — Ibid.  lib.  2,  c.  15,  n.  9. 


152  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

as  to  the  duty  of  restitution  ;  all  tins,  and  much  else 
which  might  most  easily  be  added,  is  an  integral  part  of 
the  Natural  Rule  :  all  the  duties  therein  prescribed  are 
of  independent  obligation,  apart  from  God's  Command- 
ment altogether.  It  was  most  perfectly  free  to  God  not 
to  create  men  at  all,  or  not  to  place  them  under  such 
circumstances ;  it  was  not  free  to  Him,  having  so 
created  or  so  placed  them,  to  abstain  from  giving  the 
sanction  of  His  command  to  these  duties,  over  and 
above  their  intrinsic  and  independent  obligation. 

75.  But  here  it  may  seem  that  an  objection,  which 
has  already  been  answered  in  the  abstract,  derives  fresh 
force  and  deserves  fresh  notice.  '  If  the  region  of 
4  necessary  moral  truth,'  it  may  be  said,  *  is  so  singularly 
c  wide  and  extensive,  you  seem  to  exclude  God  from  in- 
4  fluence  in  His  own  creation,  to  an  absolutely  intolerable 
4  extent.'  Repeating  to  a  great  extent  what  has  already 
been  said,  I  will  give  three  replies  to  this  objection.  I 
will  only  premise,  that  I  am  arguing  for  no  private  fancy 
of  my  own,  but  for  what  Suarez  calls  an  4  axioma  theo- 
logoruna.' 

(1.)  First,  then,.  I  reply,  that  the  mere  extent  of 
necessary  truth  cannot  justly  cause  any  increased  diffi- 
culty to  the  reason,  though  it  may  startle  the  imagina- 
tion. Let  it  be  but  admitted  that  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  necessary  truth, — e.  g.,  that  God  has  not  the 
power  of  creating  an  equilateral  triangle,  which  shall 
not  be  equiangular ;  or  that  He  has  not  the  power  of 
creating  a  person  whose  obligation  it  shall  be  to  hate  the 
Holy  Creator; — let  this  be  admitted,  and  everything  is 
conceded  which  can  give  the  reason  any  real  difficulty. 
If  there  be  one  necessary  truth,  there  may  be  thousands 
such  ;  the  difficulty  to  the  reason  is  no  greater  in  the 
latter  than  in  the  former  case. 

(2.)  It  will  be  seen  in  the  following  Section,  that 
God  does  possess  very  considerable  power,  in  interfering 
with  the  Natural  Rule.  It  will  be  seen  that  this  can  be 
recognized  as  undeniably  the  case,  without  infringing  in 
the  slightest  degree  on  the  various  principles  which  we 
have  been  laying  down. 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      153 

(3.)  I  appeal  as  I  did  before  (n.  21)  to  the  parallel 
instance  of  mathematical  truth.  Will  you  maintain 
that  the  axioms  of  geometry  are  true,  because  of  God's 
appointment?  Will  you  maintain  that  the  reasoning 
process  is  valid,  because  of  God's  appointment?  If 
you  will  maintain  neither  of  these  things,  you  must 
admit,  that  the  whole  assemblage  of  mathematical  truth, 
built  by  means  of  reasoning  upon  these  axioms,  is  also 
true,  independently  altogether  of  God's  appointment. 
But  how  immeasurably  vast  is  this  great  assemblage  of 
truth  !  to  which  indeed  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  that 
there  can  be  any  possible  limit.  If  then  necessary 
mathematical  truth  possesses  most  undeniably  so  vast 
an  extent,  why  should  it  be  thought  a  difficulty  that 
necessary  moral  truth  also  is  most  widely  extended  ?  * 

Another  objection  of  quite  a  different  kind  may  be 
made  to  our  conclusion.  It  may  be  objected,  that  our 
Blessed  Saviour,  in  various  parts  of  the  Gospel,  con- 
trasts Christian  morality  with  all  others;  and  thereby 
implies,  that  it  does  in  many  important  respects  add  to 
the  Natural  Law.  These  declarations  deserve,  and 
shall  receive,  our  most  careful  attention ;  but  the  suit- 
able place  for  their  consideration  will  obviously  be  our 
theological  course.  In  the  next  Book  then,  I  hope  to 
enter  on  the  whole  Scriptural  bearing  of  our  doctrine, 
with  sufficient  accuracy  and  completeness. 

76.  The  principles  laid  down  in  this  Section,  as  they 
seem  certainly  conformable  to  reason,  so  also  add  not  in- 
considerably to  the  motives  of  credibility  on  behalf  of  the 
Catholic  religion.  It  appears  (as  we  have  seen)  from 
Reason  alone,  in  the  highest  degree  probable,  that  the 
Natural  Law  extends  over  a  wide  circle  of  human  acts  ; 
while  it  is  certain  that  our  unassisted  reason  cannot 
carry  us  beyond  a  most  insignificant  distance,  in  explor- 
ing its  various  details.  With  these  conclusions,  the  voice 
of  the  Church  is  singularly  in  harmony.  For  theologians 
declare  with  almost  complete  unanimity,  on  the  one 
hand,  that  the  Natural  Law  is  thus  widely  extensive  ;  on 

*  See  a  more  direct  treatment  of  this  whole  difficulty  in  the  Appendix 
to  this  Chapter. 


154  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

the  other  hand,  that  one  of  the  most  important  functions 
performed  by  the  Church,  one  of  the  most  important 
ends  for  which  God  has  founded  it,  is  to  declare  and 
testify  moral  truth.  Reason  alone,  it  is  constantly  urged 
by  Catholic  writers,  would  ever  be  leading  us  astray 
in  matters  of  morality,  were  it  not  for  the  Church's 
infallible  guidance  correcting  such  aberrations. 

Further,  Reason,  as  we  have  seen,  determines  that 
Humility,  Forgivingness,  and  Purity  are  virtuous  ends  of 
action,  while  their  opposites  can  never  be  so.  Yet  of 
what  Protestant  body  can  it  be  said,  that  they  are  to 
any  reasonable  extent  in  possession  of  these  truths? 
On  the  other  hand,  who  has  realized  and  practised  them 
comparably  in  degree  to  the  Saints  of  the  Church  ?  And 
is  not  this  very  fact, — their  being  so  penetrated,  so 
pervaded,  by  those  principles, — the  main  cause  why  a 
Protestant  ever  so  despises  these  illustrious  servants  of 
God;  why  he  regards  them  as  fanatical,  narrow-minded 
men,  totally  wanting  in  self-respect  and  manly  feeling  ? 
But  on  all  this  we  shall  have  to  speak  at  length  in  our 
theological  course. 

77.  Such  then  finally  is  the  answer  we  give  to 
that  wide  and  general  enquiry,  which  was  laid  down 
(n.  53)  as  our  subject  in  the  present  Section.  I  must 
not  conclude  however,  without  putting  before  you  our 
grounds  for  holding  that  view  of  the  Moral  Faculty, 
which  we  have  so  largely  used  in  the  later  part  of  the 
Section.  What  then  is  our  reason  for  thinking,  that 
the  Moral  Faculty  increases  in  accuracy  and  precision 
of  judgment,  through  the  means  of  virtuous  action? 
In  answering  this  question,  be  it  observed,  I  must 
avoid  various  most  cogent  considerations,  founded  on 
the  Attributes  of  God;  I  must  avoid  these,  I  say,  be- 
cause in  the  present  Chapter  we  have  declined  entering 
on  the  formal  proof  of  His  existence. 

(1.)  The  analogy  of  our  other  faculties  suggests 
one  clear  argument  to  our  purpose;  for  every  one  of 
them  is  capable  of  indefinite  improvement,  and  yet  by 
no  other  method  than  this  one  of  constant  exercise. 

To  this  argument  one  ingenious  objection  may  be 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OE  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      155 

suggested.  *  Our  other  intellectual  faculties  improve 
1  by  means  of  intellectual  acts,  and  in  no  other  way : 
4  viz.  our  memory  by  the  practice  of  remembering ; 
'  our  reasoning  faculty  by  the  practice  of  argument ; 
k  and  so  with  the  rest.  But  you  represent  the  Moral 
4  Faculty  as  moving  towards  perfection,  by  means 
4  of  acts,  which  appertain  not  to  the  intellect  but  the 
*  Will;  not  through  practice  in  intellectual  discrimi- 
4  nation  between  good  and  evil,  but  through  prac- 
'  tice  in  acting  virtuously.  The  analogy  of  the  other 
4  faculties  therefore,  very  far  from  being  in  your  favour, 
4  is  directly  against  you.' 

I  reply  firstly,  that  our  whole  reasoning,  through- 
out this  Section,  would  stand  in  every  respect,  though 
we  did  place  the  Moral  Faculty  in  every  respect  on 
the  very  same  footing  with  all  others.  There  is  no 
such  phenomenon  to  be  found,  as  men  who  exercise 
themselves  carefully  through  the  day,  in  discrimination 
between  good  and  evil,  between  the  greater  and  the 
less  good, — for  any  other  purpose  except  this  one; 
the  purpose,  namely,  of  acting  in  accordance  with  such 
discrimination.  Those  therefore  who  most  practise  the 
Moral  Faculty  are  precisely  those  who  act  most  consis- 
tently on  its  dictates.  This  must  be  taken  as  my  direct 
reply  to  the  objection,  and  it  is  amply  sufficient. 

I  cannot  but  think  however  myself,  and  that  very 
strongly,  that  the  practice  of  virtue  has  a  direct  and 
powerful  effect  on  refining  the  Moral  Faculty.  And  by 
introducing  the  thought  of  a  Holy  Creator,  we  can  give 
a  very  good  reason  of  congruity  for  this.  Every  other 
intellectual  faculty  attains  the  full  end  for  which  it  was 
given,  in  proportion  as  we  perform  certain  intellectual 
acts :  the  memory,  e.  g.  in  proportion  as  we  more  accu- 
rately remember  the  past ;  the  reasoning  faculty  in 
proportion  as  we  more  bring  our  various  opinions  into 
consistency  with  each  other,  and  carry  them  forward  to 
their  full  results.  The  Moral  Faculty  is  the  one  excep- 
tion ;  and  for  this  simple  reason,  that  it  is  the  one  which 
directly  and  immediately  dictates  to  the  will.  Neither 
memory  nor  reasoning  faculty  elicit  the  judgment  *  my 


156  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

will  ought  to  do  this  rather  than  that ; '  whereas  this  is 
precisely  the  kind  of  judgment  elicited  by  the  Moral 
Faculty.  So  far  therefore  as  the  will  fails  to  act  in 
harmony  with  this  judgment,  the  faculty  fails  of  its  due 
results.  The  Moral  Faculty  I  say,  does  not  attain  the 
end  for  which  God  gave  it,  except  in  proportion,  not  as 
we  know  our  duty,  but  as  we  practise  it.  And  it  is 
evidently  in  the  highest  degree  conformable  to  our 
natural  ideas  of  God's  Moral  Government,  that  He 
should  so  act  as  our  theory  supposes ;  that  he  should 
reward  those  who  act  up  to  the  light  they  have,  by 
imparting  more  light. 

"It  would  certainly  involve  great  disadvantages,"  argues  a 
very  thoughtful  writer,  "  if  moral  knowledge  was  gained  by  mere 
intellectual  processes.  Uneducated  people  would  be  more  unable 
than  ever  to  judge  themselves  between  right  and  wrong:  and 
those  who  were  most  capable  of  guiding  them,  would  not  neces- 
sarily be  inclined  to  guide  them  right;  nay,  by  that  very  know- 
ledge would  be  enabled  more  easily  to  guide  them  wrong.  Much 
knowledge  of  good  would  be  wasted  on  men  who  did  not  wish 
to  profit  by  it;  and  clever  persons,  without  much  energy  of 
character,  would  be  overwhelmed,  by  seeing  at  once  the  extent 
of  that  change  of  nature  which  they  had  to  effect  in  themselves, 
if  they  were  to  conform  themselves  to  what  was  really  right. 

"  Now  so  far  as  moral  discrimination  is  acquired  by  practice, 
and  not  by  reasoning,  these  imperfections  are  avoided.  Viewed 
as  a  means  of  improvement  for  ourselves,  knowledge  is  given 
where  it  will  be  used ;  of  power  over  others,  where  it  will  not 
be  misused; — viewed  as  a  blessing,  it  is  given  to  the  deserving; 
—  viewed  as  a  trial,  it  is  accommodated  to  the  infirmity  of  the 
weak. 

"  And  on  the  other  hand,  who  are  they  who  require  the 
brand  of  ignorance  to  mark  them  in  the  sight  of  their  fellow- 
creatures,  who  deserve  to  be  left  without  knowledge  of  anything 
beyond  their  own  miserable  desires,  but  those  who  have  refused 
to  obey  such  knowledge?  What  wiser,  and  what  juster,  and 
what  more  really  merciful  law,  than  that  man  shall  not  be  able 
to  receive  into  his  head,  what  he  will  not  receive  into  his  heart 
also  ?  What  less  to  be  wondered  at,  than  the  sentence,  dreadful 
as  it  is,  that  if  man  hardens  his  will,  God  will  harden  his  intellect 
against  truth?  Surely  the  true  difficulty  in  the  world,  if  we  are 
to  find  one,  is  not  that  such  a  law  exists,  but  that  it  does  not 
exist  more  exclusively.  Surely  it  is  only  the  unwarrantable 
value  which  is  set  on  intellect  in  this  particular  age,  which  pre- 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.     157 

vents  us  from  seeing  how  very  strange  it  would  be  if  knowledge 
of  this  kind  were  given  only,  or  even  chiefly,  to  the  wise  in  this 
world,  to  the  sharp,  clear-headed,  and  argumentative,  and  not 
to  the  humble  and  conscientious  lover  of  goodness.  What 
business  would  they  have  with  such  ad  vantages  ?"* 

However,  as  already  remarked,  our  direct  and  (as 
it  were)  formal  proof  of  the  proposition  before  us,  must 
not  assume  God's  Existence.  In  meeting  therefore  the 
objection  which  has  been  raised,  it  is  only  the  former 
part  of  my  reply  on  which  I  can  logically  insist;  but 
this  former  part,  as  I  observed,  is  amply  sufficient. 

(2.)  I  proceed  now  to  the  second  argument  in 
behalf  of  our  proposition ;  an  argument  which  (equally 
with  the  first)  prescinds  from  the  Existence  of  God 
altogether.  We  have  proved  incontestably,  that  there 
are  various  genuine  intuitions  on  moral  truth :  viz.  all 
those  on  which  all  mankind  are  agreed ;  and  especially 
that  fundamental  one,  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as 
moral  obligation,  quite  apart  from  the  Will  of  our 
Creator.  Yet  on  the  other  hand,  on  most  matters,  the 
diversity  of  men's  moral  judgments  is  extreme.  Are 
we  to  say  that  in  all  these  matters  all  men's  intuitions 
are  spurious?  or  (which  is  almost  as  strange)  that  on 
all  these  matters  it  is  quite  impossible  to  distinguish 
the  genuine  from  the  spurious  ?  Surely,  if  in  regard 
to  the  great  bulk  of  human  conduct,  reason  were  wholly 
destitute  of  all  intrinsic  power  to  distinguish  right  from 
wrong,  the  better  from  the  less  good,  a  great  presump- 
tion would  arise,  that  its  power  of  deciding  in  the  few 
matters  of  universal  agreement  is  but  a  delusion.  The 
reasonableness  of  this  statement  is  made  more  evident 
from  the  fact,  that  it  is  admitted  by  all  mankind. 
Utilitarians  and  others,  who  deny  intrinsic  morality, 
have  ever  built  their  chief  objections  on  this  one  fact, 
the  diversity  of  men's  moral  judgments ;  while  their 
opponents,  so  far  from  denying  the  relevancy  of  this 
fact,  have  expended  all  their  skill  and  ingenuity  in 
denying  or  extenuating  it.  Here  then  is  the  first 

*  From  a  most  able  article  on  "  Utilitarian  Moral  Philosophy,"  British 
Critic,  1841,  pp.  35  and  36. 


158  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

premiss  of  my  second  argument.  If  reason  have  really 
the  intrinsic  power  in  certain  cases  of  perceiving  moral 
truth  (and  I  have  shewn  c  satis  superque'  that  it  has  this 
power)  —  it  is  in  the  very  highest  degree  probable,  that 
this  power  extends,  far  beyond  those  comparatively  few 
cases  on  which  all  men  are  agreed.  In  other  words,  it 
is  in  the  highest  degree  probable,  that  there  is  some 
means  of  distinguishing  genuine  from  spurious  intui- 
tions, over  and  above  that  obvious  one  of  men's 
unanimous  testimony. 

My  second  premiss  is,  that  according  to  the  principle 
for  which  I  am  arguing — the  principle  that  our  Moral 
Faculty  is  developed  by  exercise — two  things  may  be 
undoubtedly  maintained.  First,  Reason  in  the  abstract 
has  the  intrinsic  power  of  advancing  without  limit, 
towards  the  discrimination  of  true  moral  intuitions  from 
false,  on  every  single  detail  of  human  conduct.  Secondly, 
Reason  in  the  concrete,  Reason  I  mean  as  it  may  be 
exercised  and  is  frequently  exercised  by  men  under 
their  existing  circumstances,  can  take  a  very  important 
step  in  the  same  direction.  For  certainly  no  one  can 
call  it  an  unimportant  proposition,  that  Humility  and 
Forgivingness  are  virtuous  ends  of  action,  while  their 
opposites  are  not  so.  And  this  proposition  is  held  with 
the  most  complete  unanimity  and  the  strongest  con- 
viction, by  every  human  being  who  has  given  himself 
to  the  task  of  consistently  practising  virtue ;  practising 
it,  I  mean,  according  to  the  extent  of  his  knowledge. 
Mankind  in  general  are  not  more  unanimous  in  recog- 
nizing that  cruelty  and  ingratitude  are  evil,  than  these 
men  are  unanimous  in  denouncing  pride  and  unfor- 
givingness. 

My  third  premiss  for  this  second  argument  is,  that 
no  other  principles  (so  far  as  I  know)  have  ever  been 
laid  down,  on  which  there  would  be  this  approach  to 
unanimity.  Certainly,  so  far  as  this  last-named  moral 
truth  is  concerned,  reasoning  has  no  such  tendency  to 
produce  unanimity.  No  one  will  say  that  all  good 
reasoners  have  agreed,  in  deducing,  from  the  first  prin- 
ciples of  morality,  the  sinfulness  of  pride  and  unfor- 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.     159 

givingness.  No  one  can  say  this,  or  anything  ever  so 
distantly  approaching  it. 

On  these  three  premisses  I  build  my  second  argu- 
ment. Firstly,  it  is  in  the  highest  degree  probable,  that 
there  is  some  method,  whereby  reason  may  tend  towards 
harmonizing  the  diversity  of  men's  moral  judgments; 
secondly,  the  principles  of  this  Section  afford  such  a 
method;  and  thirdly,  no  others  which  have  been  sug- 
gested hold  out  any  such  promise.  Hence  it  is  in  the 
highest  degree  probable,  that  these  principles  are  true. 

(3.)  Yet  at  last  the  two  arguments  just  given,  are 
in  their  nature  quite  inadequate  to  the  kind  of  conclu- 
sion, for  which  they  are  adduced.  The  real  means, 
whereby  the  genuineness  of  an  intuition  is  brought 
home  to  my  conviction,  must  at  last  be  some  intrinsic 
quality,  inherent  in  the  intuition  itself;  and  not  some 
merely  extrinsic  fact,  such  as  the  general  agreement 
of  mankind.  Of  what  nature  that  quality  is,  and  how 
it  may  be  securely  recognized,  is  a  question  which 
seems  to  have  been  most  unduly  neglected  by  philoso- 
phers (see  n.  9);  but  of  the  fact  just  stated  there  can 
be  no  doubt.  In  regard  to  two  of  our  faculties  indeed, 
those  of  remembering  and  of  reasoning,  it  has  already 
been  shewn  (n.  10,  p.  21)  that  we  are  actually  compelled 
to  trust  them,  before  we  can  so  much  as  guess  that  there 
is  any  agreement  of  mankind  on  the  matter.  But  take 
other  instances  also ;  take  the  truth,  e.  g.  that  a  pentagon 
must  have  five  angles,  or  that  I  am  bound  to  restore  my 
friend's  jewel :  surely  it  is  quite  plain,  that  my  convic- 
tion of  these  truths  is  absolute  and  ineradicable,  before 
I  have  so  much  as  considered  the  question  whether  other 
men  agree  with  me  or  not. 

And  indeed  this  intrinsic  difference  of  quality,  in  a 
genuine  as  distinguished  from  a  spurious  intuition,  un- 
deniably exists ;  however  difficult  it  may  be  to  analyse 
or  explain  it.  Dreams,  e.  g.  abound  in  spurious  intui- 
tions. I  believe  myself  to  see  what  I  do  not  see,  and 
to  remember  what  never  took  place ;  nor  does  a  doubt 
cross  my  mind,  on  the  reality  of  the  whole  scene.  I 
wake ;  and  I  begin  really  to  see,  reallv  to  remember.  I 


160  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

intue  with  the  most  unmistakable  distinctness,  not 
merely  that  my  waking  impressions  correspond  to  truth, 
but  that  my  sleeping  impressions  have  not  so  corre- 
sponded. 

A  distinction,  exactly  similar  in  kind  though  less  in 
degree,  may  be  found  in  every  case,  accordingly  as 
any  individual  faculty  has  or  has  not  been  duly  ex- 
ercised. A  novice  in  music  pronounces,  with  perfect 
confidence,  that  a  light  air  of  Donizetti's  is  preferable  to 
a  symphony  of  Beethoven.  He  gives  himself  for  years 
to  the  study,  and  at  the  end  of  that  time  hears  again 
the  same  two  compositions.  It  is  not  merely  true  that 
his  present  intuition  is  opposed  to  his  first;  he  recog- 
nizes most  unmistakably  a  difference  of  quality  between 
these  two  intuitions.  I  repeat;  it  is  not  merely  that, 
when  thinking  of  the  music,  he  elicits  an  intuition 
opposite  to  that  which  he  remembers  to  have  elicited 
several  years  ago  :  a  further  phenomenon  also  takes 
place.  When  thinking  of  that  first  intuition,  he  plainly 
discerns  in  it  a  faulty  and  untrustworthy  character. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  case  is  most  undoubtedly  the 
same  with  moral  judgments.  A  man  of  the  world 
holds,  with  the  utmost  confidence,  that  self-exaltation  is 
a  virtuous  end  of  action,  and  that  he  would  rightly  lower 
himself  in  his  own  eyes,  by  allowing  an  insult  to  go 
unrequited  :  he  holds  with  no  less  confidence,  that  it 
is  simply  absurd,  to  regard  the  more  ordinary  sins  of 
impurity  as  lessening  a  man's  title  to  respect  and 
admiration.  He  happily  yields  himself  to  the  grace 
of  God,  and  for  years  makes  it  his  chief  business  to 
adjust  his  moral  conduct,  so  far  as  possible,  in  every 
particular  to  his  ideas  of  moral  rectitude.  At  the  end 
of  that  time,  he  recognizes  the  virtuousness  of  humility, 
the  viciousness  of  impure  thoughts,  with  a  degree  of 
clearness  which  it  is  impossible  to  exceed.  It  is  really 
no  exaggeration  at  all  to  say,  that  he  has  no  more  the 
physical  power  of  calling  in  question  the  truth  of  these 
intuitions,  than  he  has  of  distrusting  his  memory  or  his 
reasoning  faculty. 

Indeed   the   difference   is    much   greater,  between 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.      161 

the  judgments  which  proceed  from  the  trained  Moral 
Faculty  on  the  one  hand  and  the  untrained  on  the 
other, — than  in  the  case  of  any  other  faculty  whatever. 
And  it  is  very  easy  to  see  the  reason;  viz.  that  the 
difference  in  the  degree  of  training  is  greater  in  the 
case  of  this  faculty  than  of  any  other.  Take  the 
musical  faculty  for  instance.  He  who  cultivates  it 
most  assiduously,  will  give  to  it  a  certain  number  of 
hours  in  each  day ;  while  he  who  cultivates  it  least,  hears 
probably  one  or  other  piece  of  music  in  every  month. 
In  the  Moral  Faculty  on  the  contrary,  the  Saint,  in 
almost  every  waking  minute  of  every  day,  is  pursuing 
that  course  which  tends  to  its  refinement  and  per- 
fection ;  while  the  careless  liver,  c  who  remembers  not 
God,  neither  is  God  in  all  his  thoughts/  floats  un- 
resistingly along  the  current  of  his  inclinations,  and 
never  from  the  motive  of  duty  denies  himself  one 
gratification. 

A  theological  difficulty  here  however  may  be  raised, 
of  the  following  kind.  'Faith  is  the  one  means  of 
'merit;  but  if  the  saint  thus  clearly  intues  moral  truth, 
'  how  can  he  accept  it  on  faith  ?  In  proportion,  there- 
4  fore,  as  a  man  becomes  saintly,  there  is  a  constantly 
'  increasing  proportion  of  his  acts  in  which  he  cannot 
4  merit.  A  more  monstrous  conclusion  cannot  well  be 
'imagined.'  I  mention  this  difficulty,  merely  to  shew 
that  I  have  not  overlooked  it.  It  cannot  be  treated 
of  course,  until  we  have  methodically  considered  the 
exact  instrumentality  of  faith  towards  justification  and 
merit.  But  when  this  has  been  clearly  understood,  it 
will  be  found  that  the  above  difficulty  disappears  of 
itself. 

78.  One  concluding  question  will  be  asked,  in  regard 
to  the  statements  here  put  forward :  how  far  do  they 
accord  with  those  usually  recognized  by  Catholic  theo- 
logians and  philosophers?  I  proceed  to  answer  this 
question. 

(1.)  These  writers  always  admit  the  existence  of 
moral  intuitions,  which  serve  as  premisses,  from  which 

M 


162  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

the  more  remote  truths  of  morality  are  to  be  deduced. 
Thus  we  have  seen  that  Suarez  speaks  of  these  two  truths 
as  dictamina  rationis,  '  Deus  est  colendus,'  4  parentes 
sunt  honorandi.'  Now  man's  perception  of  these  truths 
is  simply  a  moral  intuition  in  our  sense  of  the  word. 
The  idea  of  deserving  honour  is  not  included  in  the 
term  '  our  parents ; '  all  which  is  meant  by  that  term 
is,  '  those  two  human  beings  who  have  been  God's 
instruments  in  bringing  me  into  the  world.'  AVhen 
therefore  I  recognize  as  a  'dictate  of  reason'  (and  I 
do,  according  to  Suarez,  so  recognize  it)  that  these 
human  beings  justly  claim  my  honour,  I  am  simply 
eliciting  a  real  intuitive  judgment. 

(2.)  Yet  these  writers  do  not  (I  think)  in  general 
distinctly  state,  that  my  correctness  in  forming  such 
judgments  will  increase,  in  proportion  as  I  more  con- 
sistently practise  the  duties  which  I  know.  On  the 
contrary,  in  regard  to  those  moral  truths  which  are 
not  recognized  by  all  mankind,  these  writers  seem  to 
regard  such  truths  as  known  to  us  mainly  in  quite 
a  different  way  ;  viz.  by  logical  deduction  from  those 
moral  truths  which  are  universally  admitted.  In  laying 
stress  therefore  on  the  increased  power  of  discern- 
ment, accruing  (as  we  maintain)  to  the  Moral  Faculty 
from  moral  practice,  we  lay  stress  on  a  principle,  which 
has  not  been  inculcated  at  all  prominently  by  Catholic 
theologians  or  philosophers.  At  the  same  time  Gioberti, 
as  we  have  seen  (n.  66,  note),  does  distinctly  state  it; 
and  for  my  own  part  (as  has  been  said)  I  cannot  but 
regard  it  as  altogether  conformable  to  reason. 

(3. )  Moreover  there  is  a  very  great  analogy,  between 
this  principle,  and  the  doctrine  laid  down  by  all  theolo- 
gians, as  to  the  means  of  arriving  at  faith.  For  all  say 
that  in  proportion  as  men,  by  the  help  of  grace,  act  up 
to  their  existing  light,  God  rewards  them  by  imparting 
further  knowledge. 

(4.)  But  indeed  the  common  instinct  of  Catholics,  in 
regard  to  Saints,  implies  (I  cannot  but  think)  the  whole 
principle  which  we  have  maintained.  We  Catholics 


ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  NATURAL  RULE.     163 

are  in  the  habit  of  regarding  the  dicta  of  Saints,  as 
singularly  authoritative  in  matters  of  morality  and  piety ; 
and  this,  not  with  reference  to  their  greater  or  less 
degree  of  learning  or  ability,  but  to  the  simple  fact  of 
their  being  Saints.  What  does  this  mean,  except  that 
their  moral  perceptions  have  become  in  a  special  degree 
elevated  and  refined,  by  their  consistent  virtue?  Yet, 
on  the  other  hand,  suppose  that  through  defect  of 
their  other  intellectual  faculties  they  are  unable  rightly 
to  apprehend  any  particular  case  submitted  to  them, 
this  is  always  considered  pro  tanto  to  derogate  from 
the  authority  of  their  judgment.  Our  principle  then, 
in  both  its  leading  features,  seems  to  be  sanctioned  by 
Catholic  instinct. 

(5.)  I  cannot  but  think,  that  the  explicit  and  distinct 
admission  of  our  principle  would  make  the  vindication 
of  Catholic  doctrine  far  more  satisfactory,  in  one  or 
two  important  particulars :  specially  as  regards  the 
various  virtues  under  the  head  of  purity.  Take,  as  an 
instance,  the  offences  mentioned  in  those  two  con- 
demned propositions,  which  we  have  already  more  than 
once  considered.  (See  n.  27,  p.  63.)  We  are  required 
by  the  condemnation  of  those  propositions,  to  hold  that 
such  offences  are  in  all  possible  cases  intrinsecally  evil, 
apart  from  all  Divine  Prohibition.  Now  whether  we  turn 
to  Viva,  Milante,  or  Van  Ranst,  surely  the  reasons, 
adduced  in  behalf  of  this  conclusion,  seem  painfully 
inadequate,  to  sustain  the  weight  which  is  rested  upon 
them.  And  the  reason  of  the  fact  is  obvious.  These 
theologians  consider  themselves  bound  to  prove,  that 
the  moral  theses,  for  which  they  argue,  are  inferrible, 
by  way  of  logical  deduction,  from  those  moral  theses 
which  are  universally  admitted.  Now  this,  to  say  the 
least,  is  an  allegation  which  it  is  very  difficult  to  maintain. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  most  intelligible,  and  most  con- 
sistent with  phenomena,  to  say,  that  in  proportion  as 
any  man  grows  in  his  obedience, — his  Moral  Faculty, 
becoming  more  and  more  enlightened,  will  come  to 
elicit,  more  and  more  keenly,  a  legitimate  intuition  of 


164  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

such  inherent  pravity.  Reason  shews  at  least  that  the 
fact  very  probably  may  be  so  ;  the  Church's  decision 
might  complete  all  that  was  wanting  in  the  way  of  cer- 
tainty, and  assure  us  that  the  fact  is  so. 

And  thus  at  length  I  bring  this  arduous  Section  to 
a  close. 


165 


SECTION  VII. 
On  God's  Power  of  Interference  with  the  Natural  Rule. 

79.  By  interference  may  be  meant  either  addition 
to  the  Natural  Rule  or  subtraction  from  it.     I  do  not 
mention  of  course  change ;  for  this  is  merely  subtrac- 
tion of  one  thing  and  addition  of  another. 

80.  In  regard  to  addition,  it  must  first  be  remarked, 
that  in  a  very  true  sense,  God's  free  Will  alone  is  the 
cause,  that  this  Natural  Rule  exists  at  all;  for  it  arises 
wholly  from  His  good  pleasure,  that  free  and  rational 
creatures  have  been  called  into  existence.    Accordingly, 
every  fresh  combination  of  circumstances,  in  which  He 
places  such  creatures,  may  cause  in  a  very  true  sense 
an  addition  to  the  Natural  Rule;  for  a  certain  moral 
obligation  may  be  thereby  binding  on  a  rational  crea- 
ture,  which  otherwise  would  not  be  binding  on  any 
such  creature. 

The  chief  matter,  which  deserves  our  attention 
under  this  head,  is  the  great  increase  accruing  to 
the  Natural  Rule,  from  the  Christian  Revelation.  To 
give  instances  of  this.  It  was  perfectly  free  to  God, 
either  that  He  should,  or  should  not,  place  before  men 
a  Revelation  of  Divine  Truth.  But  when  He  has  done 
so,  it  becomes  independently  obligatory,  on  all  who  have 
means  of  knowing  this  revelation,  firmly  to  believe  the 
truths  therein  contained.  Again,  as  it  was  perfectly 
free  to  Him  that  the  Second  Person  should  be  Incarnate, 
so  it  was  also  free  to  Him  that  this  most  august  truth 
should  be  communicated  to  men.  But  when  once  it  has 
been  communicated,  there  arises  an  independent  obliga- 
tion to  adore  the  Incarnate  Saviour  with  divine  wor- 
ship. It  was  free  to  Him  whether  He  would  work, 
and  also  whether  He  would  reveal,  the  miracle  of 


166  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Transubstantiation ;  but  when  He  has  wrought  and 
revealed  it,  men  are  under  the  independent  obligation 
of  paying  divine  homage  to  that  God,  Who  lies  hid 
under  the  Sacramental  species.* 

81.  A  far  more  difficult  and  more  important  ques- 

*  "Eo  ipso  quod  mysteria  fidei  sufficienter  proponantur,  intrinsece  et  ex 
naturd  rei  sequitur  obligatio  credendi  quae  proposita  sunt 

"  Sed  instabis  ;  '  quia  in  Lege  Nova  non  tantum  est  prseceptum  cre- 
'  dendi  haec  mysteria,  quasi  ex  suppositions  revelationis  et  propositionis 

*  rerum  credendarum,  sed  etiam  est  absolution  prceceptum  ea  audiendi  et 

*  sciendi,  et  consequenter  credendi ;  quod  est  praeceptum  longd  diversum,  et 
'  simpliciter  positivum  :  ergd  quoad  hoc  negavi  non  potest,  quin  Lex  Nova  in 
'  materia  fidei  addiderit  positiva  praecepta.     Assuinptum  declaratur,  quia 

*  hoc  prseceptum  fidei,  secundum  ordinariam  legem,  applicatur  hominibus 
'  per  auditum ;  teste  Paulo  ad  Roman.  10 :  erg6  ut  homines  possint  obligari  ad 
'  credendum,  necesse  est  ut  obligentur  ad  audiendum  ;  ergo  per  aliquod  praa- 
1  ceptum,  quod  sub  nulla  consideratione  potest  dici  naturale,  sed  positivum. 
'  Et  declaratur  amplius  :  nam  fideles  tenentur  nunc  explicite  credere  mys- 
1  terium  verb.  grat.Trinitatis,vel  Incarnationis,  ex  Jure  Divino,quia  talis  fides 
'  est  mine  medium  necessarium  ad  salutem  (ut  suppono)  ;  hsec  autem  neces- 
'  sitas  involvit  prseceptum  divinum,  quod  non  potest  esse,  nisi  absolutum  et 
'  positivum :  nam  illud  prius,  quasi  condition atum,  credendi  ea  quse  reve- 
'  lantur,  non  sufficeret  ad  dictam  necessitatem  :  nam  sine  violatione  hujus 

*  praecepti  hypothetici,  ut  sic  dicam,  posset  quis  nunquam  credere  explicite* 
'  Trinitatem,  aut  Christum  ;  ergo,  ut  ad  hoc  obligentur  fideles,  necessarium 
1  est  speciale  prseceptum  positivum  et  absolutum.    Item  in  Pastoribus  Eccle- 
'  siae  est  obligatio  prsedicandi  et  docendi  hanc  fidem,  ex  prsecepto  Christi ; 
1  "Docete  omnes  gentes,  et  predicate  Evangelium  ;"  unde  est  illud  Pauli  1. 
'  ad  Corinth.  9.     "  Necessitas  enim  mihi  incumbit,  vse  enim  mihi  est,  si  non 
'  evangelizavero  :"  hoc  autem  prseceptum  positivum  etiam  est.' 

"Incipiendo  ab  hoc  ultimo,  majoris  claritatis  gratia,  respondeo,  prae- 
ceptum  illud  prsedicandi  vel  docendi,  datum  pastoribus  Ecclesise,  in  radice, 
id  est  in  institutione,  esse  positivum  ;  in  se  autem  et  formaliter  esse  naturale. 
Munus  enim  episcopale  seu  pastorale  est  in  Ecclesia  ex  positiva  institutione 
Christi,  ut  ut  per  se  constat :  supposito  autem  tali  munere,  obligatio  docendi 
aut  prcedicandi  Evangelium  de  Jure  Divino  Naturali  est.  pertinens  ad  obli- 
gationem  justiti83  et  fidelitatis,  quai  intrinsece  ex  tali  munere  nascitur;  quod 
significavit  Paulus  supra  dicens,  "  Dispensatio  mihi  credita  est."  Ad 
primum  ergo  in  primis  respondeo,  cum  proportione,  non  esse  necessarium, 
ut  ex  parte  audientium  prsecedat  speciale  prceceptum  positivum  audiendi 
doctrinam,  vel  preedicationem  fidei.  Nam  si  sit  sermo  de  hominibus  nondum 
credentibus  in  Christum,  illi  non  sunt  capaces  obligations  provenientis 
ex  prsecepto  supernatural!,  donee  illis  sufficienter  proponatur  fides  ;  quia 
propositio  supponit  auditum  :  erg6  antea  non  potest  prsecedere  obligatio 
audiendi,  proveniens  ex  supernaturali  praecepto.  Igitur  nulla  obligatio 
praecedit  ex  parte  audientium,  sed  tantum  ex  parte  prcedicantium.  Quae 
moraliter  reputari  potest  sufficiens ;  quia  si  ex  parte  evangelizantium  sit 
zelus  et  solicitudo,  non  deerunt  qui  de  facto  audiant ;  ad  quod  magis 
trahendi  sunt,  suavi  inductione  invitando  illos,  quam  rigorosa  obligatione. 
Vel  certe  quando  hsec  obligatio  incipit,  magis  est  ex  ratione  naturali, 
quam  ex  lege  supernaturali.  Quia  homo  naturaliter  tenetur  veram  Dei 
cognitionem :  veramque  felicitatem  qucerere:  unde  quomodocunque,  vel  per 
vocem  prsedicationis,  vel  per  famam,  vel  per  proprium  discursum,  inceperit 


GOD'S  POWER  OF  INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  RULE.  167 

tion,  is  God's  power  of  subtracting  from  the  Natural 
Rule.  In  treating  this,  1  shall  follow  the  doctrine, 
laid  down  by  the  immense  majority  of  Catholic  theo- 
logians and  philosophers  ;  and  I  will  sufficiently  shew 

dubitare  de  suS,  lege  vel  statu,  tenebitur  eis  attendere,  qui  viam  salutis 
docere  profitentur :  ergo  respectu  infidelium,  non  est  necessarium  ponere 
hoc  speciale  praeceptum  positivum.  Neque  enim  respectu  jam  credentium 
in  Christum  ;  turn  quia  illi  jam  obligantur  praecepto  charitatis  infusse  erga 
se  ipsos,  ad  propriain  salutem  spiritualem  quaerendam,  et  consequenter  ad 
aud.iendum  Dei  verbum,  yuando  ad  suam  salutem  fuerit  necessarium  :  neque 
enim  ex  Jure  Divino  majorem  habent  obligationem.  Et  simili  rnodo  teneri 
poterunt  ad  audiendam  doctrinam  fidei,  quando  fuerit  necessarium  ad  cre- 
dendum  quantum  oportet;  tune  autem  obligatio  nascitur  ex  ipsomet  praecepto 
fidei,  de  quo  dicendum  superest. 

"Ad  alteram  ergd  partem  respondeo,  admittendo,  in  Lege  Nova  esse 
specialem  necessitatem  fidei  explicitse,  tarn  ad  justitiam,  quam  ad  salutem 
aeternam  consequendam :  concedendo  item,  hanc  necessitatem  provenire 
ex  peculiari  institutione  Christi  Domini  ;  quae  positiva  sine  dubio  est,  cum 
non  fuerit  simpliciter  necessaria.  Unde  fit  etiam  consequens,  proeceptum 
tails  fidei,  prout  est  proprium  Legis  Novas,  et  Divinum  Positivum  censeri 
posse,  saltern  ratione  institutionis.  Positd  autem  institutione  respectu 
illius  et  status  Legis  Gratise,  tale  praeceptum  merito  existimari  potest  con- 
naturale  illi.  Primo,  quia  praeceptum  recognoscendi  Auctorem  Legis  et 
obediendi  Illi,  est  valdd  connaturale  cuicunque  legi ;  ad  hoc  autem  necessaria 
est  expressa,  et  distincta  cognitio  Ejus  :  cum  ergo  Christus  sit  Auctor 
hujus  Legis,  valde  connaturale  est  illi  prseceptum  credendi  in  Christum. 
Cum  hoc  autem  conjunctum  est  prseceptum  cognoscendi  Trinitatem,  ut  mine 
suppono ;  quia  cum  Christus  sit  Secunda  Trinitatis  Persona,  non  potest 
haberi  fides  de  Illo  sufficienter  explicita  sine  fide  explicita  Trinitatis. 
Secundo,  quia  fides  prsecipitur,  non  solum  tanquam  speculativa  cognitio,  sed 
etiam  tanquam  practica  et  operativa ;  ad  usum  autem  sacramentorum 
hujus  Legis,  necessaria  est  fides  explicita  Trinitatis,  quam  oportet  in  Bap- 
tismo  profiteri,  et  fides  explicita  Christi,  Quern  oportet  in  Eucharistia" 
recipere  et  Patri  in  sacrificium  offerre  ;  ergo  supposita  institutione  maximd 
conseutanea  perfectioni  hujus  status,  etiam  talis  fides,  et  praeceptum  ejus, 
merito  dici  potest  esse  de  Jure  Divino  connatural!  gratiae,  ut  existenti  in 
tali  statu,  in  quo  gratia  tarn  perfecto  modo  communicatur. 

"  Atque  hinc  facile  respondetur  ad  secundam  partem,  de  praecepto  spei : 
fatemur  enim,  usum  spei  multo  perfectiorem  postulari  in  lege  Evangelii, 
quam  antea ;  turn  quoad  modum  sperandi  gloriam,  turn  quoad  multa 
media  supernaturalia.  Nunc  enim  sperare  tenemur  remissionem  peccatorum 
per  Baptismum,  et  per  Absolutionem  sacerdotis ;  et  augmentum  justitiae  per 
alia  sacramenta :  turn  etiam  quoad  modum  sperandi  per  Christum,  et  pe* 
speciales  promissiones  per  Ipsum  factas.  Non  est  autem  necesse,  ut 
propter  has  et  similes  perfectiones  data  fuerint  in  hac  lege  specialia 
prcecepta  positiva  circa  materiam  spei,  quia  tota  haec  perfectio  et  obligatio 
ad  illam  ex  naturd  rei  xequitur,  supposita  perfectione  fidei  circa  Christum, 
et  redemptionem  Ejus,  et  supposita  tali  sacrameutorum  institutione.  Sicut 
etiam,  suppositd  fide  Incarnationis  et  institutione  Eucharistice  ac  fide  ejus, 
nascitur  in  hdc  Lege  obligatio  adorandi  cultu  latrice  Christum,  tam  in  Se, 
quam  in  Eucharistid :  et  iiihilominus  ilia  obligatio  non  oritur  ex  Prcecepto 
Positivo  Divino,  sed  ex  Jure  Divino  naturali,  et  connaturali  talibus  mys- 
teriis  :  ita  ergo  de  spe  dicendum  est." — SUAREZ  De  Legibus,  lib.  10,  c.  2, 
n.  6,  7,  8,  9,  10. 


168  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

that  the  fact  is  so,  by  the  quotations  which  I  hope  to 
subjoin. 

It  is  most  manifest  then,  from  the  principles  of 
Section  III.,  that  this  subtraction  can  never  be  in  the 
way  of  dispensation.  God,  having  created  free  persons, 
cannot  (as  we  have  seen)  even  4  de  potentia  absoluta' 
abstain  from  adding  the  sanction  of  His  command,  to 
the  intrinsic  obligation  of  the  Natural  Rule.  Much 
less  therefore,  can  He  remove  this  latter  obligation 
itself;  much  less  can  He  remove  by  His  will  that  in- 
trinsic character  of  evil,  which  inhered  in  this  or  that 
act  independently  of  His  will  altogether. 

But  yet  that  in  some  sense  God  can  subtract  from 
this  Natural  Rule,  is  very  certain.  Scripture  records, 
that  He  commanded  Abraham  to  slay  Isaac,  and 
the  Israelites  to  spoil  the  Egyptians.  And  even  if 
Scripture  were  silent,  it  does  seem  indeed  a  monstrous 
statement,  that  the  Lord  of  life  cannot  impart  a  com- 
mission to  take  away  life  ;  or  that  the  Lord  of  the 
whole  earth  cannot  transfer  property  from  one  man  to 
another. 

Now  this  very  statement  of  the  difficulty,  precisely 
implies  the  solution.  Reason  declares,  that  it  is  a 
sinful  act  to  take  away  my  fellow-man's  life,  without 
any  necessity  in  the  way  of  self-defence,  and  at  the 
same  time  without  express  authority.  True:  but  if 
God  commissions  me  to  take  away  life,  I  no  longer 
do  so  without  express  authority;  by  the  very  fact  of 
giving  me  that  commission,  He  totally  changes  the 
case  on  which  reason  has  to  pronounce.  In  like  man- 
ner, reason  pronounces  that  it  is  sinful,  under  ordinary 
circumstances,  to  keep  back  a  jewel  from  its  rightful 
proprietor.  But  God  is  at  last  the  Supreme  Proprietor 
of  all  the  universe ;  and  if  He  transfers  the  property  in 
this  jewel  from  my  friend  to  myself,  at  once  and  ipso 
facto  I  become  its  rightful  proprietor. 

Under  such  circumstances  as  these  then,  there 
arises  what  theologians  call  a  'mutatio  materise;'  a 
change  of  that  object-master,  whereon  a  moral  judg- 
ment has  to  be  formed.  By  means  of  that  *  mutatio 


GOD'S  POWER  OF  INTERFERENCE  WITtt  NATURAL  RULE.    1G9 

materise,'  a  certain  external  act,  which  was  intrinsecally 
wrong,  ceases  to  be  so  and  becomes  lawful.  Then  the 
Command  of  God  supervening  is  a  kind  of  positive  Com- 
mand (see  n.  25);  and  I  owe  to  it  obedience,  on  the 
same  principle  which  obliges  me  to  obey  any  other 
Positive  Precept,  imposed  by  my  Holy  Creator. 

In  the  above  cases,  the  c  mutatio  materise'  is  wrought 
by  God,  not  as  Legislator,  but  as  Supreme  Proprietor 
and  Lord  of  the  Universe.  It  is  often  said  by  theo- 
logians, that  such  '  mutationes  materiaa,'  when  they  take 
place,  are  always  wrought  by  Him  in  that  capacity; 
that  they  are  always  wrought  by  Him  as  Supreme 
Lord,  and  never  as  Legislator.  But  with  very  great 
deference  to  their  authority,  I  venture  on  this  single 
particular  to  question  their  statements.  In  order  the 
better  to  explain  the  kind  of  instance  to  which  I  allude, 
I  will  begin  with  an  illustration  of  a  purely  human  kind ; 
a  case,  where  there  is  no  interference  of  God  whatever. 

I  am  living  at  home,  with  my  wife  and  family,  quite 
free  from  any  laborious  occupation.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances, certain  acts  of  kindness,  towards  those  thus 
closely  connected,  are  intrinsecally  of  actual  obligation ; 
nay,  in  many  easily  supposable  cases,  are  obligatory 
under  mortal  sin.  But  war  breaks  out  and  my  country 
requires  my  services ;  a  command  is  issued  by  my 
sovereign,  requiring  me  to  join  the  army;  and  I  obey 
that  command.  Here  is  a  real  '  mutatio  materiae.' 
Those  services  to  my  wife  and  children,  which  were 
before  obligatory,  cease  altogether  from  being  so ;  my 
sovereign's  just  command  has  superseded  them. 

Now  if  my  temporal  superior  has  thus  the  power 
to  subtract  duties  from  the  Natural  Rule,  how  far 
more  must  God  possess  that  power !  A  real  command 
may  reach  me,  not  from  my  earthly  sovereign  but 
from  God,  requiring  me  to  give  such  service  as  I  ani 
capable  of  giving,  towards  some  holy  enterprise  in  pro- 
gress. In  such  a  case  God  works  a  real  c  mutatio 
materise;'  and  in  consequence  of  His  command,  certain 
duties,  which  were  of  intrinsic  and  independent  obliga- 
tion, cease  from  being  so.  Yet  surely  He  works  this 


170  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

4  mutatio  materise,'  not  as  Lord  of  the  Universe,  but  as 
Legislator ;  i.  e.  as  being  that  Holy  Creator,  who  has 
a  rightful  authority  to  command.  On  this  principle 
He  might  (as  Suarez  observes)  forbid  me,  e.g.  during 
some  given  period,  from  occupying  any  time  in  direct 
meditation  on  His  attributes,  or  in  special  and  explicit 
prayer.  He  might  forbid  this  directly;  or  He  might 
forbid  it  indirectly,  by  strictly  commanding  a  different 
mode  of  employing  each  successive  moment.  You  will 
object,  that  unless  I  devote  time  to  special  and  explicit 
prayer,  I  have  no  moral  power  to  avoid  mortal  sin. 
True,  '  in  praesenti  providentia ; '  but  of  course  it  would 
be  implied  in  God's  giving  such  a  command,  that  He 
would  so  far  change  His  Providence,  as  that  He  would 
furnish  me  with  amply  sufficient  grace,  without  my 
giving  myself  to  such  pious  practices. 

82.  It  is  abundantly  evident  then,  that  through  this 
'  mutatio  materise'  God  has  full  power  to  subtract,  from 
the  Natural  Rule,/ar  the  greater  number  of  its  external 
precepts.*  Such  subtraction,  I  need  not  say,  has  been 
most  rare  and  exceptional  in  the  history  of  the  world ; 
but  God  has  the  full  power  to  exercise  this  prerogative, 
as  His  Infinite  Wisdom  may  dictate.  One  important 
remark  however  must  here  be  made,  in  final  explana- 
tion. It  is  impossible  that  we  can  have  any  knowledge 
of  such  Divine  subtraction,  except  by  means  of  direct 
Revelation ;  whether  mediate  or  immediate.  Wherever 
no  such  revelation  reaches  us,  there  is  no  '  mutatio 
materisB  ;'  in  all  such  cases  therefore — in  all  cases 
where  we  receive  no  direct  revelation  to  the  contrary 
— Reason  itself  (as  we  have  already  seen)  declares,  that 
God  adds  the  sanction  of  His  Command  to  the  intrinsic 
obligation  of  the  Natural  Rule. 

The  assemblage  of  such  Commands  may  be  called 
the  c  mutable'  part  of  the  Natural  Law.  They  belong 
to  the  Natural  Law ;  for  they  are  Divine  Precepts,  com- 
manding that  which,  in  itself  and  apart  from  such  Com- 
mand, is  of  independent  obligation.  And  they  make 

*  What  is  meant  here  by  '  external '  will  be  explained  clearly  in  the 
following  number. 


GOD'S  POWER  OF  INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  RULE.    171 

up  the  mutable  part  of  that  Law;  because  (as  was  sup- 
posed) they  are  those  Precepts,  which  admit  of  being 
subtracted  by  God  from  the  Natural  Law  through 
'  mutatio  materiae,'  as  above  explained. 

Theologians  here  proceed  to  treat,  on  these  prin- 
ciples, the  various  instances  found  in  Scripture  of  God's 
subtraction  from  the  Natural  Law.  The  appropriate 
place  however  for  this  question,  is  our  theological 
course;  and  as  there  is  no  reason  of  convenience  (but 
rather  the  contrary)  for  anticipating  its  treatment,  I 
postpone  it  for  the  present.  Here  I  will  only  observe, 
that  objections  are  brought  from  Scripture,  by  two 
most  opposite  parties,  for  two  most  opposite  purposes. 
They  are  brought  by  certain  Protestants,  who  reve- 
rence the  authority  of  Scripture,  for  the  purpose  of 
proving  that  morality  is  not  independent;  and  they  are 
brought  by  certain  infidels,  who  hold  that  morality  is 
independent,  for  the  purpose  of  disparaging  the  Bible. 
By  the  help  of  the  principles  which  we  have  now  con- 
sidered, we  are  able  to  meet  both  classes  of  opposition 
with  the  most  perfect  confidence  and  security.  We 
are  able  at  once  to  hold,  in  the  fullest  extent,  that 
morality  is  independent ; — and  also  to  hold,  in  the 
fullest  extent,  the  perfect  consistency  of  this  doctrine 
with  the  statements  of  Scripture. 

83.  But  as  there  is  a  mutable  part  of  the  Natural 
Law,  so  also  there  is  an  mmutable:  and  we  should 
fall  into  the  most  frightful  misconceptions,  if  we  did 
not  carefully  master  this  truth.  We  need  not  attempt 
(what  perhaps  is  impossible)  to  make  an  exhaustive 
catalogue,  of  those  Precepts  which  cannot  be  sub- 
tracted :  the  following  will  suffice.  The  first  two  par- 
ticulars in  the  enumeration,  are  of  an  importance  which 
it  is  impossible  to  exaggerate. 

(1.)  Virtuous  ends  of  action  must  ever  and  in  all  cir- 
cumstances remain  what  they  are.  An  external  precept 
may  be  reversed ;  but  as  regards  the  movement  of  our 
will,  all  that  God  can  possibly  call  on  us  to  do,  is  to  act 
towards  one  virtuous  end  rather  than  towards  another. 
Let  us  illustrate  this,  in  the  often-repeated  instance  of 
my  friend's  jewel.  Put  the  ordinary  case,  that  God 


172  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

does  not  specially  interfere ;  I  am  under  the  obligation 
of  restoring  my  friend  his  jewel,  because  of  the  vir- 
tuousness inherent  in  Justice.  But  now  we  will  sup- 
pose that  God  does  specially  interfere,  and  commands 
me  to  retain  it.  What  then  results?  Does  He  com- 
mand me  to  regard,  as  the  motive  of  such  retention,  any 
supposed  virtuousness  inherent  in  injustice  ?  A  mon- 
strous supposition  indeed  !  It  was  my  duty  to  restore 
it  because  of  the  virtuousness  inherent  in  Justice;  it 
is  my  duty  to  retain  it,  because  of  the  virtuousness 
inherent  in  Obedience  to  my  Holy  Creator. 

It  must  ever  then,  and  in  all  circumstances,  remain 
true,  that  we  are  morally  better,  holier,  more  accept- 
able to  God,  in  proportion  as  our  will  adheres,  with 
greater  firmness  and  efficacity,  to  those  ends  of  action 
enumerated  in  the  last  Section.  God  is  not  free,  by 
means  of  any  possible  interference,  to  touch  or  affect 
in  any  way  this  essential  and  necessary  truth.  Those 
virtuous  ends,  as  we  have  seen,  are  such  as  the  follow- 
ing :  viz.  Justice,  Veracity,  Benevolence,  Love  of  God, 
Obedience  to  God,  Reverence  for  God,  Humility,  For- 
givingness,  Purity.  God,  in  virtue  of  His.  Sanctity, 
is  under  the  glorious  inability  of  proposing  any  ends 
of  action  at  variance  with  these. 

(2.)  'Negative'  precepts,  which  regard  'internal' 
acts,  are  absolutely  immutable.  Here  there  are  two 
terms  requiring  explanation ;  c  negative '  precepts  and 
6  internal '  acts. 

6  Affirmative '  precepts  command  the  performance 
of  a  duty ;  (  negative '  precepts  forbid  the  commission 
of  a  sin.  Negative  precepts  therefore  bind,  as  theo- 
logians say,  '  semper  et  pro  semper ; '  for  at  every 
moment  we  are  forbidden  to  commit  any  sin :  but 
nothing  like  this  is  true  in  regard  to  '  affirmative '  pre- 
cepts. It  is  an  affirmative  precept,  that  we  love  God; 
i.  e.  that  we  elicit  certain  acts  of  love  to  Him:  it  is  a 
negative  precept  that  we  prefer  no  creature  to  Him; 
still  more  that  we  do  not  hate  Him.  We  are  not 
always  bound  to  be  eliciting  acts  of  love  to  Him ;  but 
we  are  always  bound,  to  abstain  from  anything  con- 
trary to  that  Love  which  is  His  due :  from  preferring, 


GOD'S  POWER  OF  INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  RULE.    173 

e.g.  to  Him  any  creature  whatever.  The  negative 
precept  binds  at  every  instant  of  our  waking  lives ; 
the  affirmative  precept  binds  only  on  certain  fixed 
and  definite  occasions. 

Now  it  is  very  clear,  how  much  more  conceivable 
it  is,  that  affirmative  precepts  be  subtracted  from  the 
Natural  Law  than  negative.  God  may  command  us 
not  to  meditate  on  His  attributes  for  a  certain  given 
period ;  but  He  c&unot  command  us  to  hold  those 
Attributes  in  contempt  or  hatred.  He  may  command 
us  to  elicit  no  formal  acts  of  love  to  our  brethren ;  but 
He  cannot  command  us  to  elicit  formal  acts  of  hatred 
in  their  regard.  We  have  shewn  in  n.  81,  that  the 
former  class  of  commands  are  possible,  at  least  '  de 
potentia  absoluta ;'  that  He  can  prohibit  us  from  direct 
acts  of  love,  to  Himself  or  to  our  brethren.  On  the 
other  hand  it  is  evident,  as  soon  as  stated,  that  the 
latter  class  of  commands  are  absolutely  impossible; 
that  under  no  possible  circumstances  can  it  be  lawful 
to  despise  God  or  to  hate  our  brethren. 

Next  as  to  *  internal '  acts.  In  our  theological 
course  we  shall  have  to  enter  more  at  length  on  the 
force  of  this  term :  here  it  will  suffice  to  say,  that  '  in- 
ternal '  acts  are  those  consummated  in  the  will  itself; 
*  external'  are  free  acts  consummated  externally  to  the 
will.  That  I  restore  my  friend  his  jewel,  this  is  an 
'external'  act;  that  I  resolve  on  so  doing,  this  is  an 
'  internal.' 

Now  it  is  quite  plain,  from  what  has  been  said,  that 
as  regards  external  acts,  even  negative  precepts  may 
be  subtracted.  It  is  a  negative  precept  of  the  Natural 
Law,  that  I  shall  not  retain  a  jewel,  deposited  with  me 
by  a  friend,  when  that  friend  requires  and  seeks  it  for 
his  own  reasonable  wants.  And  yet  God  has  the  full 
power  of  reversing  this  precept,  by  '  mutatio  materise.' 
It  is  a  negative  precept  of  the  Natural  Law,  that  we 
shall  not  treat  our  children  harshly ;  and  yet  God  com- 
manded Abraham  actually  to  slay  his  son. 

You  will  object  perhaps,  that  if  the  external  act 
may  be  reversed  in  character,  so  also  may  be  the  in- 


174  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

ternal ;  if  my  retaining  the  jewel,  e.g.  may  become 
lawful,  so  also  may  my  resolving  to  retain  it.  By  con- 
sidering this  objection,  we  shall  throw  considerable  light 
on  the  statement  above  made.  Put  again  the  ordinary 
case,  that  God  does  not  specially  interfere :  what  is  that 
internal  act,  concerning  the  jewel,  which  is  strictly 
forbidden  by  the  Natural  Law?  This:  4I  resolve  to 
'  retain  unjustly  the  deposited  jewel,  because  of  the 
'  personal  or  other  advantage  which  I  shall  derive  from 
4  its  retention.'  But  this  internal  act  can  never  be 
made  lawful  by  any  '  mutatio  materise '  imaginable. 
When  God  commands  me  to  retain  the  jewel,  the 
internal  act  which  he  requires  me  to  elicit  is  totally 
different;  viz.  this:  CI  resolve  to  retain  that  jewel, 
'  which  has  now  become  mine,  because  of  the  virtuous- 
4  ness  inherent  in  Obedience  to  God's  Command.'  You 
see,  the  external  act  may  be  reversed  in  character  by  a 
Holy  God;  from  unlawful  it  may  become  even  obliga- 
tory: but  no  such  reversal  of  character  can  possibly 
take  place,  in  regard  to  that  internal  act,  which  is 
consummated  in  the  will  itself. 

(3.)  The  following  statement  is  not  to  be  found  (so 
far  as  I  know)  explicitly  made  by  theologians ;  yet  it 
is  fully  implied,  in  their  whole  doctrine  concerning  God's 
Providence.  God  cannot  4  de  potentia  absoluta '  impose 
a  Precept,  which  would  place  its  recipients  in  circum- 
stances of  moral  inability  to  avoid  mortal  sin.  What  is 
precisely  understood  by  moral  inability,  is  to  be  ex- 
plained in  our  fourth  Chapter ;  but  you  have  already, 
no  doubt,  a  sufficient  general  knowledge  of  its  meaning. 
And  as  an  instance  of  what  I  intend  by  my  statement, 
take  the  following.  Suppose  I  had  been  familiar  with 
deeds  of  cruelty;  and  suppose  God  commanded  me  to 
kill,  with  every  circumstance  of  protracted  torture,  a 
man,  who  had  inflicted  on  me  some  deadly  injury.  It  is 
plain  that,  with  no  more  than  ordinary  grace,  I  should, 
in  fulfilling  such  a  command,  be  morally  unable  to 
avoid  mortal  sin  under  the  head  of  vindictiveness.  Even 
then  if  on  other  grounds  it  were  possible  for  God  to  give 
such  a  command,  He  would  at  least  be  necessitated  by 


GOD'S  POWER  OF  INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  RULE.   175 

His  Sanctity  to  give  me  most  abundant  help,  that  I 
might  have  full  power  of  avoiding  mortal  sin. 

(4.)  Certain  more  enormous  sins  against  the  sixth 
commandment  must  always  remain  such  ;  no  c  mutatio 
materia3 '  can  possibly  affect  their  intrinsic  pravity. 

(5.)  It  is  agreed  by  all  theologians  without  excep- 
tion, that  a  lie  must  ever  remain  intrinsecally  evil,  and 
that  its  prohibition  can  in  no  possible  way  be  subtracted 
from  the  Natural  Rule.  As  this  statement  is  but  very 
indirectly  connected  with  our  general  subject,  and  as 
its  elucidation  would  require  considerable  space, — let  it 
suffice  thus  to  enunciate  this  universally  received  prin- 
ciple. 

84.  The  doctrines,  expressed  in  this  Section,  follow 
most  obviously  from  those  of  Section  III.  Having  there- 
fore in  Sect.  IV.  shewn  at  such  great  length  the  amount 
of  theological  authority  for  those  earlier  doctrines,  it 
will  not  be  necessary  to  give  more  than  a  sample,  in 
regard  to  this  their  further  development. 

From  Suarez  however,  I  will  take  a  chapter  almost 
entire;  because  he  not  only  states  his  own  judgment, 
but  gives  also  a  very  clear  account  of  the  other  opinions, 
which  have  been  maintained  in  the  Church :  — 

"  UTRUM  DEUS  DISPENSARE  POSSIT  IN  LEGE  NATURALI  ETIAM 
DE  ABSOLUT  A  POTE  STATE. 

"  Ratio  dubitandi  est,  quia  omnis  legislator  potest  in  sua  lege 
dispensare ;  quod,  in  humano  legislatore,  tarn  generaliter  et  sine 
exceptione  verum  habet,  ut  etiam  si  absque  causa  dispensat,  fac- 
tum  teneat ;  ergo  multo  magis  in  Deo  :  ergo  cum  Ipse  sit  Auctor 
Naturalis  Legis,  poterit  in  ea  dispensare..  Confirmatur,  quia  ita 
fecisse  videtur,  dispensando  cum  Abrahamo,  in  quinto  pracepto 
Decalogi,  Genes.  22  ;  et  cum  Osea  in  sexto,  quando  illi  praecipit 
accipere ;  mulierem  fbrnicariam,  Osea3  2 ;  et  cum  filiis  Israel  in 
septimo,  quando  ex  Dei  facilitate  spoliaverunt  JEgyptios,  Exod.  12. 

"  Distinguimus  tres  ordines  praBceptorum  naturalium.  Quae- 
dam  sunt  universalissima  principia,  ut'malum,  faciendum  non  est/ 
et  ( bonum  est  prosequendum : '  quaedam  vero  sunt  conclusiones 
immediate,  et  omnino  intrinsece  conjunctse  dictis  principiis;  ut 
prsecepta  Decalogi :  in  tertio  ordine  sunt  alia  prsecepta,  quae  mult6 
magis  sunt  reniota  a  primis  principiis,  imo  et  ab  ipsis  Decalogi 
prseceptis ;  de  quibus  postea  exempla  ponemus.  De  primis  non 


176  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

est  controversia  inter  auctores :  nam  certum  est,  in  ea  non  cadere 
dispensationem,  respectu  hominis  libere  et  moraliter  operantis. 
Nam  si  Deus  facial  ut  homo  careat  omni  operatione  morally  libe- 
rum  usum  rationis  et  voluntatis  impediendo,  excusaretur  homo 
ab  omni  Lege  Natural!,  quia  nee  bene,  nee  male  moraliter  operari 
posset:  tamen  ilia  non  esset  dispensatio  in  Lege  Naturse,  sed  esset 
impedire  subjectum  ne  esset  capax  obligationis  illius ;  sicut  nunc 
inf'ans  non  obligatur  proprie  Lege  Naturali.  At  vero  si  homo 
relinquitur  capax  1  iberse  operation!  s,absol'vi  non  potest  ab  omnibus 
illis  principiis  legis  naturse:  quia  positd  qudcumque  dispensation, 
necesse  est  ut  ilia  principia  sint  regula  honeste  operandi :  vel 
enim  dispensatio  facit  operationem  vel  carentiam  ejus  licitam,  vel 
non  facit :  si  non  facit,  nulla  est  dispensatio  ;  si  vero  facit,  necesse 
est  ut  ratio  judicet,  hie  et  nunc  operationem  esse  licitam :  ergo 
dispensatio  non  potest  cadere  in  illud  principium,  'bonum  est  prose- 
quendum: '  quod  amplius  ex  dicendis  constabit  Controversia  ergo 
est  de  aliis  duobus  ordinibus  prseceptorum ;  et  prsesertirn  tractatur 
a  doctoribus  de  secundo :  nam  de  tertio  pauca  dicunt,  et  ideo  in 
fine  breviter  illam  expediemus. 

"  Est  ergo  prima  sententia,  generaliter  affirmans  posse  Deum 
dispensare  in  omnibus  Prseceptis  Decalogi.  Quse  consequenter 
ait,  non  solum  posse  Deum  dispensare,  sed  etiam  abrogare  totam 
illam  Legem,  auferendo  omnino  ejus  obligationem,  vel  prohibitio- 
nem.  Quo  facto,  inquit  hsec  opinio  futura  fuisse  licita  omnia, 
qua  Lex  Naturae  prohibet,  quantumvis  mala  nunc  esse  videantur. 
Ex  quo  tandem  concludit,  non  solum  posse  Deum  hsec  non  pro- 
hibere,  sed  etiam  pracipere  ut  fiant :  quia  si  mala  non  sunt  sed 
licita,  cur  non  poterit  ilia  prsecipere  ?  Hsec  fuit  sententia  Ocham 
in  2,  q,  19,  ad.  3,  dubium ;  quern  sequitur  Petrus  de  Aliaco  in 
1.,  diet.  7,  et  Andr.  de  Castr.  Novo  in  1,  d.  48,  qusest.  1, 
Artie.  1,  et  inclinat  Gerson.  Alphabet.  61,  lit.  E.  &  F.  Almain 
etiam  3,  Moral,  capit.  15,  ut  probabilem  tractat  hanc  opinionem : 
postea  vero  illam  rejicit.  Fundantur  prsecipue,  quia  omnia,  quse 
cadunt  sub  Legem  Naturae,  non  sunt  mala,  nisi  quia  prohibentur  a 
Deo ;  et  Ipse  libere  ipsa  prohibet,  cum  sit  Supremus  Dominus  et 
Gubernator.  Item  quia  oppositum  non  implicat  contradictionem : 
ablata  enim  prohibitione,  reliqua  omnia  facile  consequuntur. 

"Haec  vero  sententia,  tanquam  falsa  et  absurda,  a  reliquis 
theologis  rejicitur:  et  a  priori  improbanda  est  ex  dictis  supra 
cap.  6.  ubi  ostendimus  Legem  Naturalem  (licet,  ut  est  proprie  Lex 
Divina,  Prsecepta  et  Prohibitionem  Dei  includat,  nihilomimis)  sup- 
ponere  in  su&  materia  intrinsecam  honestatem  vel  malitiam,  ab  ed 
prorsus  inseparabilem  :  et  pra3terea  ibi  ostendimus,  supposita 
Divina  Providentia,  non  posse  Deum  non  prohibere  mala  ilia,  quse 
ratio  naturalis  ostendit  esse  mala.  Sed  licet  fingamus,  Prohibitio- 
nem additam  per  Voluntatem  Dei  posse  auferri,  nihilorninus 


GOD'S  POWER  OF  INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  RULE.   177 

prorsus  repugnat,  ad  id,  quod  per  se  et  intrinsece  malum  est, 
desinere  esse  malum ;  quia  rei  natura  non  potest  mutari :  unde 
non  potest  talis  actus  libere  fieri,  quin  malum  sit  et  dissonum 
natures  rationali:  ut  ex  Aristot.  et  aliis  ibi  ostendimus.  Etvidetur 
per  se  notum :  qui  enim  fieri  potest,  ut  odium  Dei,  vel  mendacium, 
libere  facta,  non  sint  prava?  Fundamentum  ergb  hujus  senten- 
tice,  scilicet)  quod  omnis  malitia  humanorum  actuum  proveniat 
ex  Prohibitione  extrinsecd,  omninb  falsum  est.  Ideoque  ne  in 
aequivoco  laboremus,  separanda  est  quaestio  de  Prohibitione  ex- 
trinsecd  Dei,  an  possit  ab  Ipso  non  fieri,  vel  respectu  omnium,  vel 
respectu  alicujus.  Nam  de  hac  Prohibitione  esse  potest  res  magls 
dubia,  ut  in  dicto  cap.  6.  dixi;  probabilius  tamen  esse  ostendi, 
esse  a  Divind  Providentid  inseparabilem :  ilia  vero  quaestione 
omissa,  hie  absolute  inquirimus,  an  fieri  possit  &  Deo,  ut  actiones 
illae,  qua3  per  legem  Decalogi  prohibentur,  malae  non  sint  ullo 
modo ;  it&  ut  nee  per  legem  ostensivam  naturalis  rationis  vetentur, 
ut  malae :  et  in  hoc  sensu  dicimus,  esse  falsam  sententiam  Ochami 
et  aliorum. 

"  Unde  a  fortiori  constat,  multo  majus  absurdum  esse  dicere, 
posse  Deum  homini  praecipere,  ut  Ipsummet  Deum  odio  habeat ; 
quod  plane  sequitur  ex  ilia  sententia.  Nam  si  potest  ilium  actum 
non  prohibere,  et  ablala  Prohibitione  non  est  malus; — ergo  potest 
ilium  praecipere.  Consequens  autem  esse  absurdum  patet;  quia 
non  potest  Deus  facere,  ut  Ipsemet  sit  odio  dignus ;  nam  repugnat 
ejus  Bonitati:  neque  etiam  potest  facere,  ut  sit  rectum  et  ordi- 
natum,  habere  odio  rem  amore  dignam.  Item  esset  ibi  qtiaedam 
contradictio :  nam  obedire  Deo,  est  quidam  virtualis  amor  Ejus, 
et  obligatio  ad  obediendum  prsesertim  riascitur  ex  amore :  ergo 
repugnat  obligari  ex  Prcecepto  ad  Ipsummet  Deum  odio  habendum. 
Idem  argumentum  fieri  potest  de  inendacio :  nam  si  Deus  illud 
posset  praecipere,  etiam  posset  Ipse  mendacium  dicere ;  quod  ei*ro- 
neum  est :  sic  enim  tota  certitudo  fidei  periret.  Atque  haec  etiam 
ratio  probat  de  dispensatione :  nam  si  potest  Deus  dispensare  in 
omnibus,  ergo  in  mendacio ;  non  tantum  officioso,  sed  etiam  perni- 
cioso,  et  in  quacumque  materia :  multo  ergo  magis  poterit  (ut  ita 
dicam)  Secum  Ipse  Dispensare,  vel  potius  sine  dispensatione  men- 
tiri :  quia  respectu  Illius  nulla  est  prohibitio,  et  alias  dicitur 
actum  secundum  se  malum  non  esse. 

"  Secunda  sententia  est  Scoti  in  3  distinction.  37  quaestion. 
unica,  quern  ibi  sequitur  Gabriel  quaestione  prima  articulo  secundo, 
et  refert  etiam  ibidem  Almain.  Distinguitque  inter  praecepta 
primaa  et  secundse  tabulae.  Primae  tabulae  dicuntur,  tria  Prae- 
cepta Decalogi,  quae  versantur  circa  Deum :  de  quibus  sentit,  duo 
prima,  quae  negativa  sunt,  esse  indispensabilia ;  tertium  autem, 
quatenus  involvit  circumstantiam  Sabbati,  et  dispensabile  et 
abrogabile  fuisse  (quod  est  manifestum  apud  omnes,  quia  quoad 


178  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

id  non  fuit  Naturale,  sed  Positivum)  quatenus  vero  absolute  con- 
tinet  affirmativum  praeceptum  cultus  divini,  dubitat  an  dispensabile 
sit;  et  de  totii  hac  parte  hujus  opinionis  infra  dicam.  Praecepta 
secundae  tabulae,  dicuntur  reliqua  septem  ;  et  in  universum  omnia, 
quae  circa  proocimbs  vel  creaturas  versantur ;  de  quibus  omnibus 

sentit  Scotus  dispensabilia  esse 

"  Tertia  opinio  est  Durandi  in  1  distinct.  47  quaestione  quarta, 
et  Majoris  in  2  dist.  37  qusest.  10,  qui  distinguunt  inter 
prsecepta  negativa  et  affirmativa ;  quamvis  non  omnino  inter  se 
conveniant.  Nam  Major  dicit,  negativa  esse  indispensabilia, 
excepto  quinto  praecepto,  ( Non  occides.'  Durand.  vero  eandem 
regulam  constituens  de  exceptione,  dixit,  si  verbum,  '  Non  occides' 
generaliter  sumatur  pro  quacumque  hominis  occisione,  sic  dispen- 
sabile esse :  si  vero  sumatur  pro  occisione  hominis,  prout  earn 
prohibet  ratio  naturalis,  sic  etiam  illud  indispensabile  esse.  Sed 
profecto  distinctio  non  erat  necessaria;  quia  priori  modo  occisio 
non  cadit  sub  Prohibitione  Legis  Naturae,  quia  dicit  quid  com- 
mune, abstrahens  ab  occisione  justa  et  injusta ;  de  qua  constat, 
ut  sic,  non  prohiberi  Lege  Nature.  Igitur,  loquendo  proprie  de 
Quinto  Praecepto,  sine  causa  fit  exceptio,  ut  patebit;  et  eodem  modo 
possent  isti  auctores  excipere  Septimum  Praeceptum,  vel  in  illo  dis- 
tinguere ;  quia  etiam  acceptio  rei  alienae  potest  interdum  juste  fieri. 
"  De  affirmativis  autem  praeceptis,  Major  absolute  dicit,  omnia 
esse  dispensabilia.  Et  probat  primo,  quia  potest  Deus  non  con- 
currere  cum  homine  ad  quemcumque  actum  prseceptum.  Sed 
hoc  impertinens  est;  quia  hoc  non  est  dispensare,  sed  tollere 
potestatem  operandi.  Quis  enim  dicat,  unum  hominem  dispensare 
cum  alio  ne  audiat  missam,  violenter  ilium  detinendo,  aut  ita 
graviter  vulnerando  ut  illam  audire  non  possit  ?  Probat  deinde, 
quia  pro  quocumque  tempore  signato  potest  Deus  prsebere  facul- 
tatem  non  exercendi  actum  prseceptum,  vel  etiam  prosdpere  facere 
aliud;  ergo  hoc  modo  poterit  pro  toto  tempore  vitas  dispensare. 
Sed  neque  hoc  urget:  si  consideremus,  prceceptum  affirmativum 
non  obligare  pro  semper;  et  stando  in  pura  Lege  Naturae,  non 
habere  aliud  tempus  pro  quo  determinate  obliget,  nisi  illud,  quod 
necessaria  occasio  vel  opportunitas  definierit.  Unde,  quamvis 
contingat  totum  vitce  tempus  transigi  sine  tali  occasione  vel  oppor- 
tunitate,  et  ideo  numquam  occurrere  obligationem  Prcecepti,  non 
proptere^i  interveniat  dispensatio;  nam  hoc  etiam  naturaliter  et 
sine  miraculo  contingere  potest.  Ratio  ergo  ilia  ad  summum 
probat,  posse  Deum  facere,  ut,  in  singulis  temporibus,  Prsecepti 
necessitas  non  occurrat;  vel  quia  urget  aliud  Prceceptum  magis, 
vel  quia  rerum  circumstantiae  mutantur.  Quod  si  Major  velit, 
stantibus  eisdem  circumstantiis  cum  quibus  obligat  Naturale  Pr&cep- 
tum,  posse  Deum  dare  licentiam  ne  impleatur, — illud  non  probat, 
sed  assumit  tantum. 


GOD'S  POWER  OF  INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  RULE.    179 

"  Dnrandus  autem  distinguit  inter  prceceptum  prirnce ;  et 
secundce  tabulcz,  et  prius  dicit  esse  indispensabile,  postering  autem 
dispensari  posse.  Probat  h&c  ratione,  quia  omnis  materia,  k  qua 
potest  auferri  ratio  debiti,  dispensabilis  est;  ilia  vero  quse  habet 
debitum  inseparable,  est  indispensabilis :  sed  materia  illorum 
prseceptorum  ita  se  habet :  ergo.  Minorem  probat  hac  analogia : 
quia  dependentia  k  Deo  est  inseparabilis  ab  nomine ;  dependentia 
vero  unius  hominis  ab  alio  est  separabilis  &  quocumque :  sic  ergo 
a  cultu  Dei  est  inseparabile  debitum  ;  ab  honore  autem  parentum 
feparari  potest :  unde  non  potest  Deus  facere  quin  illi  credendum 
sit,  et  reverentia  exhibenda :  potest  autem  facere,  ne  parentes 
honorentur.  Sed  quoad  neutram  partem  videtur  mihi  ratio 
efficax,  nee  distinctio  constans.  Primum  probo,  quia  longe  aliud 
est  de  dependenti&  &  Deo  in  esse ;  hrec  enim  essentialis  est,  quia 
sine  ill&  non  potest  homo  subsistere:  sine  actione  autem  morali 
ergo,  Deum  potest  existere ;  imo  et  bene  operari  circk  alia  objecta. 
Item  quamvis  potuerit  Deus  facere,  ut  Petrus  v.  g.  non  habuerit 
esse  a  suis  parentibus,  tamen  hoc  non  esset  dispensare  in  Prsecepto 
de  honorandis  parentibus :  supposito  autem  quod  ab  illis  habuit 
esse,  jam  intervenit  dependentia,  k  qua  inseparabile  est  debitum 
honorandi  parentes;  sicut  &  dependentia  &  Deo  inseparabile  est 
debitum  colendi  Ipsum.  Et  hinc  patet  secunda  pars;  nam  si  sit 
sermo  de  debito,  seque  inseparabile  est  sumptum  cum  proportione, 
seu  supposita  emanatione  k  tali  causa :  si  vero  sit  sermo  de  actibus, 
quibus  solvitur  hoc  debitum, — sicut  potest  Deus  facere,  ut  homo 
sine  peccato  nunquam  in  tot£  vita  exerceat  actum  honoris  circa 
parentes,  ita  potest  etiam  facere,  ut  numquam  exerceat  actum 
cultus  divini ;  ergo  vel  neutra  est  dispensatio,  vel  in  utroque 
Praecepto  dispensari  potest. 

"  Est  igitur  quarta  opinio,  quse  absolute  et  simpliciter  docet, 
hac  pracepta  Decalogi  esse  indispensabilia  etiam  per  potentiam 
Dei  absolutam.  Tenet  D.  Th.  q.  100,  Artie.  8,  et  ibi  Cajetan.  et 
alii ;  Sotus  lib.  2,  de  just.  q.  3,  Articul.  8  ;  Victor,  relect.  de 
homicid;  Viguer.  in  Instit.  Theolog.  cap.  15,  §  1,  versu  7;  Vin- 
cent, in  Speculo  Moral,  lib.  1,  par.  2,  distinct.  6  ;  Altisiodor.  in 
Summa,  lib.  3,  tract  7,  cap.  1,  qu.  5;  Richard,  in  3,  distinct.  37, 
articul.  1,  question.  5,  et  ibi  Paludan.  Bassolis,  et  alii;  Abulen. 
in  20  caput  Exodi,  q.  35,  et  Molin.  torn.  6,  tractat.  5,  disputat. 
57,  num.  6.  Fundamentum  D.  Thomse  est,  quia  ea  qua?  con- 
tinent intrinsecam  rationem  justitise  et  debiti,  indispensabilia  sunt ; 
sed  hujusmodi  sunt  prsecepta  Decalogi ;  ergo.  Major  patet,  quia 
implicat  contradictionem,  esse  debitum  et  non  esse  debitum ; 
quod  autem  dispensatur,  eo  ipso  fit  indebitum;  si  autem  habet 
debitum  inseparabile,  necessario  illud  retinet ;  ergo  repugnat  dis- 
pensare quod  hujusmodi  est.  Et  ideo  ait  Divus  Thomas,  nee 
Deum  dispensare  posse,  quia  non  potest  agere  contra  Suam  Jus- 


1  80  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

titiam;  quod  tamen  ageret,  si  licentiam  daret  f'aciendi  id,  quod 
per  se  et  intrinsece  injustum  est. 

"  Hanc  vero  rationem  impugnant  auctores  aliarum  opi- 
nionum,  quia  vel  petit  principium,  vel  seque  procedit  in  omni 
prsecepto  et  dispensatione  ejus.  Probatur,  quia  si  sit  sensus, 
stante  et  raanente  debito,  non  posse  dispensationem  habere  locum, 
hoc  in  omni  lege  locum  habet ;  quia  repugnat  dispensare,  ut 
manente  debito  legis  liceat  agere  contra  legem ;  nam  ratio  dispen- 
sationis  consistit  in  hoc,  ut  auferat  debitum  legis,  et  ideo  in  illis 
terminis  contradictio  involvitur :  vel  est  sensus,  hoc  debitum  non 
posse  auferri  in  prseceptis  naturalibus ;  et  hoc  probandum  est ;  cum 
hoc  ergo  assumitur,  principium  petitur. 

"  Respondetur,  duplex  esse  debitum.  Aliud  procedens  ab  ipsfi 
lege,  tanquam  efFectus  ejus;  et  de  hoc  procedit  aperte  objectio: 
tamen  Divus  Thomas  in  dicta  ratione  non  loquitur  de  hoc  debito. 
Aliud  est  debitum,  proveniens  ex  intrinseca  proportione  inter 
objectum  et  actum  comparatum  ad  rectam  rationem,  seu  naturam 
rationalem ;  et  de  hoc  debito  procedit  ratio  Div.  Thomse.  Nam  (ut 
sa3pe  dictum  est)  Lex  Naturalis  prohibet  ea,  quse  secundum  se  mala 
sunt,  quatenus  talia  sunt;  et  ideo  supponit  in  ipsis  objectis  seu 
actions  intrinsecum  debitum,  ut  non  amentur  seu  non  fiant ;  et  e 
contrario  praBcipit  bona,  quatenus  intrinsecam  connexionem  et 
necessitatem  habent  cum  natura  rationali.  Hoc  autem  debitum 
inseparabile  est,  non  quia  non  sit  dispensabile  (sic  enim  peteretur 
principium),  sed  quia  intrinsece  supponitur  in  ipsis  rebus,  ante 
omnem  legem  extrinsecam ;  et  ideo,  stantibus  eisdem  rebus  auferri 
non  potest,  quia  non  pendet  ex  extrinseca  voluntate,  neque  est  res 
aliqua  distincta,  sed  quasi  modus  omnino  intrinsecus,  seu  quasi 
relatio,  quse  impediri  non  potest,  posito  fundamento  et  termino: 
et  hanc  rationem  confirmant,  quse  circa  alias  opiniones  dicta 
sunt,  et  quse  in  cap.  6,  diximus. 

"H&c  igitur  sententia,  formaliter  et  proprie  loquendo,  vera 
est.  Quia  vero  negare  non  possumus,  Deum  aliquando  efficere, 
ut  actus  illi  materiales  liceant,  qui  alias,  non  interveniente  Deo 
Ipso  et  Ejus  Potestate,  licite  fieri  non  possint,  ideo  (ut  intelli- 
gatur  quomodo  hoc  fiat,  et  cur  ilia  non  sit,  nee  appelletur, 
dispensatio,)  oportet  distinguere  in  Deo  varias  ration es.  Est  enim 
Supremus  Legislator;  unde  habet,  ut  possit  nova  et  varia  prse- 
cepta  imponere :  est  etiain  Supremus  Dominus,  quia  potest  dominia 
mutare  vel  concedere :  est  item  Supremus  Judex,  Qui  potest 
ptmire,  vel  unicuique  reddere  quod  ei  debetur.  Dispensatio  ergo 
proprie  pertinet  ad  Deum  sub  primd  considerations ;  quia  ejus- 
dem  potestatis  est,  tollere  et  condere  legem :  itaque  ut  intelligatur 
Deus  dispensare,  oportet  ut  utendo  sold  ilia  jurisdictione,  et  non 
adjungendo  potestatem  dominativam  per  quam  res  ipsas  immutet, 
licere  faciat,  quod  antea  non  licebat,  Nam  si  per  Dominium  Suum 


GOD'S  TOWER  OF  INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  RULE.    181 

mutet  humanum  [officium?],  hoc  non  erit  dispensare,  sed  tollere 
materiam  Lcgis  ;  ut  ex  snperioribus  constat.  Quoties  ergo  Deus 
f'acit  licituin  actum,  qui  Jure  Naturae  videbatur  prokibitus,  ntm- 
(jiiam  id  facit  ut  purus  Legislator,  sed  utendo  alia  potestate :  et 
ideo  non  dispensat. 

"Hoc  videre  licet  in  exemplis  positis.  Quando  enim  Deus 
pra-cepit  Abrahse  interficere  filium,  id  fecit  tanquam  Dominus 
vitee  et  mortis :  si  enim  Deus  Ipse  per  Seipsum  voluisset  inter- 
ficere Isaac, — non  indiguisset  dispensatione,  sed  ex  Suo  Dominio 
id  facere  posset;  eodem  ergo  modo  potuit  uti  Abrahamo  ut  in- 
strumento :  et  Quintum  Prseceptum  non  prohibet  esse  instrumentum 
Dei  in  occisione,  si  Ipse  prseceperit.  Idem  sent  it  Divus  Thomas 
de  facto  Osese  in  assumenda  muliere  fornicaria;  ut  patet  dicto 
art  8,  ad  4,  et  2,  2,  qusest.  154.  Potest  enim  Deus  transferre  in 
virum  dorninium  mulieris  sine  consensu  ejus,  et  ita  efficere  vincu- 
lum  inter  illos,  ratione  cujus  ilia  copula  jam  fornicaria  non  sit. 
Sed  licet  hoc  sit  verum  de  potentia  absoluta,  locus  Osese  non  cogit 
ad  hanc  interpretatiouem :  jussit  enim  Deus  assumere  earn,  quse 
prius  fornicaria  fuerat,  non  solum  ad  usum,  sed  etiam  ad  matrimo- 
nium  et  in  conjugem ;  ut  Hieronym.  Theodor.  et  alii  interpretan- 
tur,  et  Irenseus  lib.  4,  contra  Hsereses,  cap.  37,  et  August.  22, 
contra  Faust,  cap.  80  et  85,  et  lib.  contra  Secundinum  Munich, 
cap.  21.  Simili  modo  non  dispensavit  cum  Hebraeis  quando 
jEgyptiorum  spolia  illis  concessit,  sed  vel  tanquam  Supremus 
Dominus  donavit,  vel  saltern  tanquam  Supremus  Judex  reddidit 
eis  mercedem  laborum  suorum ;  ut  dicitur  Sapient,  10.  Ita 
ergo  in  similibus  omnibus  intelligendum  est ;  neque  potest  aliter 
fieri,  propter  rationem  adductam.  Idemque  applicari  potest 
ad  prcecepta  affirmativa;  in  quibus  est  res  facilis,  quia  non 
obligant  pro  semper,  sed  stante  opportunitate,  quse  circa  tale 
objectum  inducat  necessitatem.  Potest  autem  Deus  aut  objec- 
tum  mutare,  cedendo  Juri  Suo  vel  hominum  jura  immutando, 
aut  etiam  necessitatem  potest  auferre,  addendo  novas  circum- 
stantias,  quae  illam  impediant:  et  nihilominus  Praeceptum  in- 
tegrum  manet,  ut  ex  se  semper  obliget  pro  debitd  opportunitate; 
quod  est  sign  urn,  non  fuisse  factam  dispensationem. 

"Unde  colligit  D.  Thomas  in  dicta  solut.  ad  3,  hunc  mo- 
dum  immutationis  non  solum  Deo,  sed  etiam  hoinini,  interdum 
esse  possibilem.  In  negativis  quidem  praeceptis,  quando  materia 
illorum  cadit  sub  dominio  humano,  et  per  homines  immutari 
potest,  quomodo  nos  suprk  explicuimus  legem  praescriptionis :  in 
affirmativis  autem,  quando  per  homines  possunt  immutari  circum- 
stantiae,  quse  inducebant  necessitatem  operandi,  ve;  quandb  p~sswit 
homines  gravius  prceceptum  vnponere :  ut  si  ret  prcedpiat  filio  non 
succurrere  parenti  extreme  indigenti,  ut  subveniat  reipt'blicce  peri- 
clitanti.  Deus  autem  ob  Singularem  Excellentiam  potest,  quando 


182  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

vult,  uti  absoluta  Potestate  et  Dominio.  Unde  etiam  intelligitur 
ratio,  ob  quam  non  in  omnibus  Prseceptis  negativis  potest  talis 
mutatio  fieri  per  homines  ex  parte  materise,  in  quibus  potest  fieri 
a  Deo ;  ut  v.  g.  in  praecepto  non  fornicandi :  quia  nimirum  non  habet 
homo  illam  potestatem  in  personam  foeminse,  quam  habet  Deus,  ut 
possit  alteri  tradere  in  suam  prout  voluerit ;  et  ideo  etiam  potuerunt 
leges  humanse  per  usucapionem  mutare  dominia  rerum,  non  tamen 
ita  potuerunt  mutare  dominia  uxorum.  Et  ita,  stante  lege 
humana,  potest  desinere  esse  furtum  quod  antea  fuisset;  non  tamen 
potest  desinere  esse  adulterium,  quod  per  se  tale  existit. 

"  Praeterea  ex  his  obiter  intelligitur,  quotiescumque  ma- 
teria  Praecepti  talis  fuerit,  ut  honestas  vel  turpitudo  ejus  non 
pendeat  ex  Dominio  Divino,  tune  non  solum  indispensabile  esse 
tale  Prseceptum,  sed  etiam  ita  immutabile,  ut  non  possit  ulld  ratione 
licitum  fieri  id  quod  prohibet ;  solum  enim  in  negativis  Prce- 
cepti-s  hoc  proprti  invenitur.  Hujusmodi  est  primum  praeceptum 
Decalogi,  quatenus  negativum  est,  et  prohibet  habere  vel  colere 
plures  Deos :  hoc  enim  nullo  modo  potest  immutari ;  quia  est 
contra  rationem  Ultimi  Finis,  et  Excellentiam  Dei,  ac  Unitatem 
Ejus,  quam  Ipse  mutare  non  potest.  Nee  enim  potest  vel  alium 
Deurn  constituere,  vel  aliquid  facere  quod  sit  asquali  honore 
dignum ;  mutatio  ergo  talis  praacepti  seu  materise  ejus,  non  cadit 
sub  Divinum  Dominium.  Idem  estde  Secundo  Prsecepto  Decalogi : 
turn  quia  involvit  prohibitionem  mendacii,  quod  nulla  ratione 
honestari  potest,  si  mendacium  manet ;  turn  maxime,  quia  prohibet 
facere  Deum  Auctorem  mendacii,  quod  etiam  includit  irreveren- 
tiam  Dei,  adeo  repugnantem  Divinae  Auctoritati,  ut  non  possit  in 
hoc  cedere  Juri  Suo  (ut  sic  dicam).  Atque  in  hoc  sensu  verum 
est  quod  intendebat  Scotus,  haec  aliis  esse  immutabiliora. 

"  De  tertio  autem,  cum  sit  affirmativum,  certum  est  posse 
a  Deo  fieri,  ut  ssepe  non  obliget,  quando  alias  secundum  com- 
munem  cursum  rerum  obligaret.  An  vero  possit  homini  licen- 
tiam  dare,  ut  per  totum  vitae  tempus,  et,  quod  dimcilius  est,  per 
totam  aeternitatem,  nullum  bonum  motum  circa  Ipsum  exerceat, 
neque  cultum  aliquem  proximum  et  directum  exhibeat,  non  im- 
merito  dubitavit  Scot.  Nonnulli  vero  ex  Thomistis  censent  hoc 
non  posse  fieri,  nee  per  propriam  dispensationem,  neque  etiam 
per  rnutationem  materiae.  Si  tamen  consideremus  absolutam  ac 
nudam  potentiam,  non  apparet  in  hoc  implicatio  contradictionis : 
quia  inde  non  sequitur,  non  posse  talem  hominem  bonos  actus 
morales  circa  objecta  creata  exercere;  quia  eorum  bonitas  non 
pendet  ex  praBvio  actu  formali  circa  ultimum  finem,  et  natura  su^ 
tendunt  in  Ipsum,  et  ita  mediate  et  remote  vel  quasi  materialiter, 
possunt  dici  continere  cultum  Dei.  At  vero  considerando  Di- 
vinam  Potentiam,  ut  conjunctam  Infinite  Sapientias  et  Bonitati 
Dei,  atque  adeo  loquendo  moraliter  (ut  sic  dicam),  credibilius 


GOD'S  POWER  OF  INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  RULE.    183 

est,  non  posse  Deum  in  hoc  cedere  Juri  Suo;  quia  esset  veluti 
prodigalitas  quaedam  irrationabilis :  maxime  respectu  creaturae  ra- 
tionabilis,  et  pro  tota  seternitate.  In  aliis  autem  Praeceptis  non 
invenio  hujusmodi  immutabilitatem  ex  parte  materiae;  solo  ex- 
cepto  mendacio,  ut  jam  dixi,  in  quo  fortasse  est  specialis  ratio, 
vel  quia  etiam  respectu  ipsius  Dei  malum  est,  vel  quia  de  se  non 
limitatur  ad  materiam  creatam,  nee  pendet  ex  dominio  Dei  in 
ilia  in  vel  in  personam,  sed  in  quacumque  materia  et  de  qua- 
cumque  persona  dici  potest;  vel  denique  quia  ejus  deformitas 
non  pendet  ex  alio  dominio,  vel  Divino  Jure,  sed  statim  oritur  ex 
dissonantia  verborum  ad  mentem. 

"  Tandem  ex  dictis  intelligitur,  quo  sensu  dixerit  Bernard, 
in  lib.  citato  de  praecept.  et  dispensat.  ca.  5,  ea,  qua?  pertinent 
ad  Praecepta  secundae  tabulae,  mutari  posse  auctoritate  Dei 
praecipientis :  loquitur  enim  non  de  Prceceptis  ipsis  formaliter 
sumptie,  ut  sic  dicam,  sed  de  actiorribus  circa  </uas  ilia  prcecepta 
versantur.  De  quibus  ait,  cum  per  se  nunquam  liceant,  auctori- 
tate Dei  praecipientis  posse  licere.  Quod  verum  est  in  sensu 
explicate:  ilia  tamen  non  est  dispensatio  in  Praecepto  secundae 
tabulae,  sed  est  mutatio  materice  ejus ;  ut  diximus.  Tamen  quia 
haec  mutatio,  quando  fit  ex  peculiari  Dominio  et  Potestate  Dei, 
est  (ut  sic  dicam)  extra  cursum  naturae  et  praeter  leges  ordinariae 
Providentiae,  ideo  interdum  dispensatio  appellatur;  non  quidem 
proprie  Pracepti  Naluralis  (neque  hoc  dixit  Bernard,  si  attente 
legatur)  sed  ordinarii  cursus  et  legis  Providentice,  quae  a  divina 
voluntate  pendet:  et  in  eodem  sensu  videtur  loquutus  Bona- 
vent. ;  nam  sententiam  Bernardi  imitatur.  Dices :  '  ergo  nulla 
'  erit  tune  differentia  inter  Praecepta  primae  et  secundae  tabulae, 
'  quam  Bonavent.  constituit3  et  favet  Bernard,  nam  statim  cap.  6, 
*dicit,  quaedam  ita  esse  immutabilia,  ut  nee  a  Deo  Ipso  mutari 
( valeant.'  Respondetur  facile  ex  dictis,  in  hoc  esse  difFerentiam, 
quod  Prsecepta  primae  tabulae  talia  sunt,  ut  non  solum  ipsa  for- 
maliter dispensari  non  possint,  verum  etiam  neque  in  actionibus 
quas  prohibent  possit  talis  mutatio  fieri,  ut  liceant  vel  honestae 
sint;  ac  subinde,  ut  neque  etiam  materialiter  sumptae  honestari 
possint  Auctoritate  Dei  praecipientis.  Odium  enim  Dei  nullo 
modo  potest  honestari,  nee  adoratio  idoli,  nee  cultus  alterius  dei 
praeter  Deum  Verum ;  quia  ab  his  actionibus  secundum  se  sumptis 
inseparabilis  est  deformitas,  si  libere  fiant :  quod  non  ita  semper  est 
in  actionibus  pertinentibus  ad  Prsecepta  secundae  tabulae.  Quod 
non  universaliter,  sed  indefinite,  accipiendum  est :  aliqua  enim 
Praecepta  secundae  tabulae,  possunt  esse  immutabilia  etiam  hoc 
modo;  ut  aperte  fatetur  Bernard,  dicto  cap.  6,  et  in  superioribus 
satis  explicatum  est."  —  SUAREZ,  De  Legibus,  lib.  ii.  cap.  15. 

Viva  takes  the  same  view  of  the  case  with  Suarez. 


184  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

"  Ex  quibus  deducitur,  in  quo  sensu  verum  sit  axioma 
illud  theologorum,  Deum  scilicet  dispensare  non  posse  in  Jure 
Naturae;  cum  tamen  et  Abrahse  dispensarit,  ut  vellet  occidere 
filium  innocentein  ;  et  Israelitis,  ut  jEgyptios  spoliarent;  et  Osese, 
ut  sumeret  sibi  uxorem  fornicationum ;  et  Hebrseis,  ut  plures 
uxores  ducerent ;  necnon  ut  possent  dare  ex  rationabili  causa 
libellum  repudii,  et  vinculum  matrimonii  dissolvere.  Etenim  ex 
D.  Th,  1,  2,  qusest.  100,  art.  8,  in  hisce  actionibus  non  dis- 
pensavit  Deus  sub  iis  circumstantiis,  sub  quibus  sunt  contra  Jus 
Natures  et  ab  intrinseco  mala ;  non  enim  dispensavit  in  furto,  ut 
fieret  invito  Domino;  nee  in  homicidio,  ut  fieret  invito  Domino 
vita,  qui  est  Deus ;  nee  in  fornicatione,  ut  fieret  per  accessum  ad 
?io?i  suam  ;  sed  dispensavit,  tollendo  ab  iis  circumstantiam  illam, 
per  quam  essent  intrinsece  et  esseritialiter  malae ;  et  hoc  pacto 
dispensavit  etiam  in  polygamia  et  dissolubiiitate  matrimonii. 
Non  potest  tamen  hoc  pacto  dispensare  in  iis,  quse  sunt  contra 
Jus  Naturae  primo  modo ;  puta  in  odio  Dei,  in  mendacio,  in  mollitie, 
in  peccato  contra  naturam,  &c.,  quia  hsec  sunt  intrinsece  mala,  et 
essentialiter  exigunt  prohiberi  simpliciter ;  eo  quod  in  qudcumque 
circumstantid  sint  contra  Jus  Naturse,  et  illicita." — De  Matrimonio, 
qusest.  3,  art.  3,  n.  6. 

And  Billuart  :— 

"  Potest  tamen  Lex  Natural  is  nmtari  improprie,  quatenus  ejus 
materia  sic  potest  mutari,  quod  desinat  esse  materia  et  objeetum 
Legis :  v.g,  quam  vis  Lex  dicat  depositum  esse  reddendum,  si  tamen 
petatur  in  perniciem  patrise,  redditio  depositi  desinit  esse  materia  et 
objeetum  Legis ;  quia  Lex  intelligitur  de  deposito  reddendo  circum- 
specte  et  prudenter.  Et  de  ist£  mutatione  legis  impropria  loquiter 
S.  Th.  durn  hie  dicit  Legem  Naturalem,  quantum  ad  secunda 
PraBcepta,  posse  mutari  propter  aliquas  causas  impedientes  eorum 
observantiam.  Similiter,  dum  a.  4,  prsecedenti  dicit  Legem  Natu- 
ralem, quantum  ad  principia  propria  qua3  sunt  quasi  conclusiones 
communium,  non  esse  unam  apud  omnes  secundum  rectitudinem, — 
S.  Doctorem  intelligere  de  mutatione  Legis  Naturalis  ex  parte 
matericB,  patet  ex  lectione  utriusque  articuli,  et  ab  exemplo  quod 
profert  de  lege  depositi  reddendi,  quod,  si  repetatur  irrationabiliter, 
desinit  esse  materia  legis. 

"  Ad  cujus  et  sequentiuni  elucidationem  observandum  est,  esse 
quasdam  leges  naturales,  quse  exprimuntur  terminis  tarn  restrictis, 
ut  a  re  per  eos  significata  impossibile  sit  abesse  turpitudinem  vel 
honestatem  ;  ut  ista  :  (  Non  mentieris/  Sunt  autem  alise,  qua3  ter- 
minis latioribus  exprimuntur,  ita  ut,  quamvis  rem  per  eos  sig- 
nificatam  plerumque  comitetur  turpitudo  vel  honestas,  potest 
tamen  ab  ilia  abesse;  ut  in  his:  ( Depositum  reddes/  *  Non 
occides.'  Ratio  enim,  seu  Lex  Naturalis,  nihil  aliud  dictat,  dictavit 


GOD'S  POWER  OF  INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  RULE.    185 

unqnam,  aut  dictare  potuit,  quam  quod  f  depositum  reddes'  pru- 
denter  seu  rationabiliter  repetenti;  et 'non  occides'  privatd  aicc- 
toritate  seu  indebiti ;  et  id  facile  apprehendit  quisquis  prudens  et 
intelligens :  ex  quo  inferes,  non  in  omnibus  Praeceptis  Legis  Naturae 
posse  fieri  mutationem  ex  parte  materiae. 

"  Est  itaque  tantum  quaestio  de  mutatione  Legis  Naturalis  per 
dispensationem  ;  an  scilicet  aliqua  potestas,  huraana  vel  saltern 
Divina,  possit  in  e&  dispensare  ? 

"  Dispensatio,  sicut  dixi  de  mutatione,  est  duplex ;  proprie  et 
improprie  dicta.  Dispensatio  proprie  dicta,  est  relaxatio  legis  seu 
ejus  obligationis,  in  aliquo  particulari,  facta  ab  habente  potestatem, 
manente  materia  legis  sic  immutata,  ut  ejus  obligatio  remaneret  si 
non  accideret  auctoritas  dispensantis.  Unde,  quamvis  dispensatio 
supponat  aliquam  legis  interpretationem,  ab  e&  tamen  differt, 
quod  ad  interpretationem  non  requiratur  auctoritas,  sed  sufficit 
prudentia  et  scientia. 

"  Dispensatio,  improprie  dicta,  est  quando  legislator  vel  alter 
sic  mutat  materiam  legis,  ut  desinat  comprehendi  sub  lege. 

"  Hinc  dispensatio  propria  spectat  legislatorem  seu  superiorem ; 
dispensatio  autem  impropria  spectat  dominum  materice,  sive  sit 
legislator  et  superior,  sive  non.  Sic  Deus,  concedendo  spolia 
^Egyptiorum  Israelitis,  egit  ut  Dominus,  non  ut  Legislator.  Sic 
privatus,  qui  remittit  mini  debitum  centum  florenorum,  agit  ut 
dominus  istius  debiti,  non  ut  superior.  E  contra,  si  Deus  aut 
papa  eximeret  aliquem  a  lege  jejunii  vel  sanctificationis  Sabbati, 
ageret  ut  Superior  et  Legislator.  Et  inde  sequitur  aliud  discrimen : 
quod  dispensatio  propria  directe  cadat  supra  legem;  impropria 
autem  directe  cadat  supra  materiam  seu  debitum :  ita  ut  qui  dis- 
pensatur  proprie,  v.g.  in  jejunio,  non  teneatur  amplius  lege 
jejunandi  sicut  tenentur  alii :  qui  vero  dispensatur  improprie,  v.g. 
in  redditione  debiti  quod  remittitur,  vel  in  ablatione  alieni  quod 
ipsi  conceditur  h,  domino,  semper  tenetur,  sicut  omnes  alii,  lege 
naturali  non  furandi,  aut  solvendi  debita.  Quod  si  hie  et  nunc 
licite  aut  alienum  auferat,  aut  debitum  non  solvat,  non  est  quia 
eximitur  ab  istis  legibus,  sed  quia  non  remanet  vel  alienum,  vel 
debitum,  nee  consequenter  legis  materia.  Hsec,  si  bene  perpen- 
dantur,  tollunt  sequivocationes,  quibus  multi  decipiuntur  in  ha^ 
material 

"  Circa  propositam  itaque  quaestionem,  Okam,  Gerson,  Petrus 
de  Alliaco  et  pauci  quidam  antiqui  opinati  sunt,  Deum  posse 
absolute  dispensare  in  omnibus  prseceptis  Legis  Naturae;  imo  totam 
illam  legem  abrogare;  ita  ut  etiam  odium  Dei  non  esset  peccatum. 
Sed  haec  opinio  merito  rejicitur  ab  aliis  theologis  et  nunc  inolevit. 

"  Scotistae,  cum  suo  duce,  tenent  Deum  posse  dispensare  in 
Praeceptis  secundae  tabulae  tantum ;  excepto  Praecepto  de  mendacio. 

"  Communior  aliorum  theologorum  sententia  est,  neque  Deum 


186  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

posse  proprie  dispensare  in  ullo  Prcecepto  Legis  Naturae,  sed  tantum 
improprie :  cum  quibus 

"Dico,  Neque  Deus  ipse  absolute  potest  dispensare  proprie  in 
Lege  Naturali,bene  tamen  improprie."  (De  Legibus,  diss.2.  art.  4.) 

Without  further  extending  our  quotations,  the  fol- 
lowing passage  from  St.  Bernard,  to  which  Suarez 
refers  in  his  above-quoted  chapter,  deserves  our  careful 
attention.  St.  Bernard  indeed  appears  to  be  one  of 
those,  who  hold  that  there  can  be  dispensation,  pro- 
perly so  called,  in  regard  to  some  external  precepts  of 
the  Natural  Law.  Suarez,  it  is  true,  in  the  last  number 
of  the  above  chapter,  denies  that  this  is  his  real 
meaning;  and  at  all  events,  if  it  be,  so  far  of  course 
I  am  unable  to  follow  the  Saint's  authority.  But 
what  appears  particularly  deserving  of  notice,  is  his 
most  clear  and  emphatic  statement,  as  to  the  abso- 
lutely immutable  character  of  inward  morality;  of  that 
type  of  virtue,  which  the  Christian  religion  has  publicly 
exhibited  to  the  world : 

"  Necessarium  ...  in  tria  hsec  subdividatur,  stabile,  invio- 
labile,  incommutabile.  Et  quidem  stabile  dixerim,  quod  ita  est 
necessarium,  ut  non  cuilibet  hominum  illud  mutare  fas  sit,  nisi 
solis  dispensatoribus  mysteriorum  Dei,  id  est  Prsepositis :  ut,  verbi 
gratia,  regulse  Sanctorum  Basilii,  Augustini,  Benedicti,  necnon 
et  authentic!  Canones,  et  si  quse  sunt  alia  ecclesiastica  instituta 

digna?  auctoritatis Necessarium  deinde,  quod  inviolabi  e 

nominavi,  illud  intelligo,  quod  non  ab  nomine  traditum,  sed  di- 
vinitus  promulgatum,  nisi  a  Deo  qui  tradidit  mutari  omnino  non 
patitur :  ut,  exempli  causa,  Non  occides,  Non  moechaberis,  Non 
furtum  facies,  et  reliqua  illius  tabula?  legisscita ;  qua?  etsi  nullam 
prorsus  humanam  dispensationem  admittunt,  nee  cuiquam  homi- 
num ex  his  aliquid  aliquo  modo  solvere  aut  licuit  aut  licebit, — 
Dominus  tamen  horum  quod  voluit,  quando  voluit,  solvit;  sive 
cum  ab  Hebrseis  ^Egyptios  spoliari,  sive  quando  Prophetam  cum 
muliere  fornicaria  misceri  praecepit.  Quorum  utique  alterum  quid 
nisi  grave  furti  facinus,  alterum  quid  nisi  flagitii  turpitude  repu- 
taretur,  si  non  excusasset  utrumque  factum  Auctoritas  Imperantis  ? 
Sane  ubi  simile  aliquid  aliquarido  a  sanctis  hominibus  fuisse  legi- 
tur  usurpatum,  Scriptura  non  indicante  quod  Deus  ita  praeceperit, 
—  aut  eos  pecc&sse  f'atendum  est,  sicut  homines ;  aut  certe,  sicut 
prophetas,  familiare  Dei  Consilium  accepisse.  Unde  et  unum 
exemplum  pono  quod  occurrit  de  Samsone,  qui  seipsum  una  cum 
hostibus  opprimens  interfecit.  Quod  utique  factum  si  defenditur 


GOD'S  POWER  OF  INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  RULE.    187 

non  fuisse  peccatum,  privatum  habuisse  consilium  indubitanter 
credendus  est,  etsi  de  Scriptura  hoc  non  habemus. 

"  Jam  vero  necessarium  incommutabile  quid  accipi  velim  ? 
Equidem  nil  congruentius,  quam  quod  Divina  ita  constat  et  atemd 
ratione  firmatum,  ut  mil  la  ex  causa  possit,  vel  ab  ipso  Deo,  aliqua- 
tenus  immutari.  Sub  hoc  genere  est  omnis  ilia  sermonis  Dominici 
in  monte  habiti  spiritualis  traditio ;  et  quicquid  de  dilectione,  humili- 
tate,  mansuetudine,  cceterisque  virtutibus,  tarn  in  Novo  quam  in  Veteri 
Testamento  spiritualiter  observandwn  contraditur.  Ha3C  quippe 
talia  sunt,  quae  nee  liceat  nee  expediat  aliquando  non  haberi.  E6 
siquidem  immobiliter,  quo  et  naturaliter  bona,  numquam  nisi  inno- 
center,  numquam  nisi  salubriter,  aut  imperantur  aut  observantur. 
Omni  tempore,  omni  persona,  mortem  contempta,  custodita  salu- 
tem,  operantur.  Primam  ergo  necessitatem  sua  cuique  f'acit  in 
promittendo  voluntas,  secundam  prsecipientis  Auctoritas,  tertiam 
pracepti  dignitas. 

"  Differunt  autem,  ut  jam  dictum  est,  quibusdam  a  se  invicem 
gradibus  tres  istse  necessitates,  nee  una  omnes  sequitur  immutabili- 
tatis  firmitas.  Nam  ex  prima  quidem  quod  efficitur,  etsi  non 
penitus  immutabile,  tamen  vix  mutabile  esse  constat:  dum  solis 
illud  liceat  mutare  prelatis ;  et  hoc  nonnisi  fideli  et  provida  dis- 
pensatione.  Quod  vero  fit  ex  sequenti,  quse  et  major  ista,  est 
pene  jam  incommutabile ;  soli  quippe  Deo  esse  mutabile  superius 
demonstratum  est.  Porro  quod  de  novissima  fit,  tamquam  omnium 
maxima,  omnino  incommutabile  est,  utpote  quod  ne  Ipsi  quidem 
Deo  mutare  liberum  est.  Quod  igitur  nulli  hominum  fas  est,  nisi 
solis  mutare  prselatis,  dici  vix  mutabile  congrue  potest;  quod 
soli  constat  licere  Deo,  dicatur  pene  immutabile;  quod  ne  Ipsi 
quidem,  penitus  immutabile  nominetur." — S.  BERNARDI,  De  Pre- 
cept, et  Dispensati,  pp.  425,  426. 

85.  In  the  present  Section  we  have  spoken,  almost 
exclusively,  on  that  part  of  the  l  Natural  Rule,'  which  is 
precisely  co-extensive  with  the  Natural  Law ;  that  part, 
viz.  which  is  concerned  with  the  independent  sinfulness 
of  acts  or  their  independent  obligation.  But  we  have 
used  this  phrase  '  Natural  Rule'  in  a  wider  sense  (see 
n.  52,  p.  117);  we  have  used  it  to  express,  not  merely 
the  fact  that  such  or  such  acts  are  independently  evil, 
but  that,  among  those  which  are  not  independently  evil, 
this  is  independently  better  than  that,  or  less  good  than 
the  other.  Our  theory  therefore  will  not  be  complete, 
unless  we  include  in  it  this  part  also  of  the  Natural 
Rule.  The  principles,  however,  which  are  here  applic- 


188  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

able,  are  most  obvious  and  most  simple.  How  far,  and 
in  what  way,  they  may  ever  be  reduced  to  practice,  it 
is  not  here  our  business  to  consider. 

(1.)  Suppose  A  and  B  are  two  acts,  incompatible 
with  each  other,  between  which  I  can  now  choose. 
Neither  of  them  is  independently  evil ;  but  subjectively 
speaking  (see  n.  57,  pp.  124,  5)  A  is  independently 
better  than  B.  Under  all  ordinary  circumstances,  I  shall 
act  more  virtuously,  I  shall  more  please  my  All-holy 
Creator,  by  eliciting  A  than  B.  But  suppose  God  to 
command  B  :  then  not  only  would  A  cease  to  be  in- 
trinsecally  better,  it  would  be  intrinsecally  evil,  as  being 
incompatible  with  act  B,  which  has  become  of  actual 
obligation.  This  change  of  moral  relation  between  these 
two  acts,  comes  of  course  from  'mutatio  niaterise;'  the 
fact  of  God  giving  a  Command,  changes  entirely  the  cir- 
cumstances of  that  question  which  reason  has  to  decide. 

(2.)  Suppose  God,  without  giving  a  Command,  inti- 
mated to  me  His  Preference  '  hie  et  mine*  for  act  B :  act 
A  would  not  in  this  case  be  an  actual  sin ;  but  act  B 
would  be,  to  an  indefinite  extent,  intrinsecally  better. 
The  'mutatio  materiae'  would  effect  a  total  change  of 
relation,  between  the  intrinsic  character  of  these  acts. 

86.  I  have  said  that  under  such  circumstances  B  is 
intrinsecally  better.  In  like  manner,  if  God  commanded 
me  to  retain  the  deposited  jewel,  or  to  keep  the  Jewish 
Sabbath,  obedience  to  such  command  would  be  of  '  in- 
trinsic' obligation.  This  word  c  intrinsic'  may  appear  to 
you  superficially  as  somewhat  perplexing,  when  so 
used  ;  as  tending  to  overthrow  that  very  distinction 
which  it  has  been  my  purpose  to  advocate,  between 
the  Natural  and  the  Divine  Positive  Law.  It  will 
conduce  then  to  clearness,  if  I  explicitly  answer  any 
such  objection. 

A  Precept  belongs  to  the  Natural  Law,  when  the 
thing  commanded  is  of  independent  obligation ;  or  (in 
other  words)  of  intrinsic  obligation,  apart  from  God's 
Command :  but  the  Precept  belongs  to  the  Positive  Law, 
when  the  thing's  intrinsic  obligation  arises  entirely  from 
God's  Command. 


GOD'S  POWER  OF  INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  RULE.    189 

In  other  words,  the  Precepts  of  the  Natural  Law  do 
but  add  a  fresh  obligation,  to  one  which  exists  apart 
from  any  such  Precept;  but  the  Precepts  of  the  Divine 
Positive  Law  oblige  to  some  act  or  acts,  which,  without 
those  Precepts,  would  not  be  obligatory  at  all. 

In  other  words  again,  God  is  necessitated  by  His 
Sanctity  to  impose  those  Precepts  which  belong  to  the 
Natural  Law ;  but  those  which  belong  to  the  Positive 
Law,  flow  wholly  from  His  free  choice. 

I  have  reserved  the  phrase  '  independent  obligation/ 
to  express  exclusively  an  obligation  which  exists  '  in- 
dependently' of  God's  Will.  But  it  is  important  (I 
think)  from  time  to  time  to  use  the  word  '  intrinsic/ 
as  applying  to  either  case  of  obligation  ;  and  this,  for 
the  purpose  of  keeping  vividly  in  our  minds  the  great 
truth,  that  God  acts,  as  Moral  Governor,  in  a  way 
removed  to  the  greatest  possible  extent  from  reckless- 
ness or  caprice.  He  does  not,  and  cannot  consistently 
with  His  Sanctity,  praise  or  censure,  reward  or  punish, 
anything  except  what  is  intrinsecally  good  or  evil 
respectively.  His  gratuitous  gifts  He,  of  course,  im- 
parts far  more  largely  to  this  man  than  to  that,  on 
grounds  often  wholly  irrespective  of  moral  desert. 
But  He  cannot  praise  or  reward,  except  that  which  is 
intrinsecally  good;  He  cannot  blame  or  punish,  except 
that  which  is  intrinsecally  evil.  Suppose  e.  g.  He 
commands  all  men  (as  He  does)  to  submit  themselves 
to  the  Catholic  Church.  If  I  have  no  means  of  knowing 
that  Command,  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  fundamental 
notion  of  Sanctity,  that  He  should  punish  me  for 
disobeying  it.  If  I  have  the  means  of  knowing  and 
wilfully  omit  to  use  them,  He  punishes  me  for  the 
4  intrinsic'  sinfulness  of  such  omission.  If  I  know  the 
Command  and  refuse  to  comply,  He  punishes  me  for  the 
'intrinsic'  sinfulness  of  such  disobedience. 

And  so,  as  to  relative  degrees  of  virtuousness ;  I 
cannot  render  my  conduct  more  acceptable  to  Him, 
except  by  doing  that  which  is  intrinsecally  better.  A 
truth  this,  which  is  of  course  perfectly  consistent  with 
that  other  stated  in  the  last  number ;  viz.  that  in 


190  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

various  cases  my  knowledge  of  His  preference  renders 
an  act  intrlnsecally  better,  which  would  otherwise  be 
less  good.  This  arises  (as  we  have  seen)  simply  from 
4  mutatio  materiae : '  it  arises  from  the  fact,  that  such 
expression  of  His  Preference  changes  the  circumstances 
of  the  case  ;  in  other  words,  changes  the  matter,  on 
which  reason  has  to  pronounce. 

87.  I  will  beg  you  now  to  study  the  Appendix  to 
this  Chapter ;  which,  for  mere  reasons  of  physical  con- 
venience, is  printed  at  the  end  of  the  book  instead  of 
here.  You  will  find  that  the  various  propositions,  dis- 
cussed in  the  three  last  Sections,  and  also  those  con- 
tained in  the  Appendix  to  which  I  have  referred,  throw 
great  additional  light  on  the  principles  and  arguments 
contained  in  Sections  II.  and  III.  I  will  beg  you  there- 
fore, after  having  read  the  Appendix,  once  more  to  study 
those  two  Sections,  from  your  new  standing  ground; 
for  you  will  thus  obtain  a  far  more  complete  and  syste- 
matic grasp  of  those  truths,  which  it  has  been  my  object 
in  this  Chapter  to  set  before  you. 

The  importance  of  the  truths  in  question  is  ex- 
tremely great.  The  one  main  category,  under  which 
we  regard  men's  acts  in  Theology,  is  as  being  right  or 
wrong ;  more  or  less  right ;  more  or  less  wrong.  Nor 
is  it  a  small  part  of  Theology,  but  more  extensive  than 
all  the  rest  put  together,  which  at  every  turn  refers, 
both  to  human  acts  and  to  these  their  intrinsic  qualities. 
Unless  therefore  you  have  most  carefully  studied  the 
subject,  you  will  fall  for  certain  into  one  of  the  very 
worst  intellectual  habits,  which  can  possibly  come  upon 
a  philosophical  or  theological  student ;  the  habit  of 
unconsciously  using  words,  without  precise  correspond- 
ing ideas. 

The  principles  which  have  here  been  established, 
will  receive,  as  we  proceed  in  our  Theology,  a  con- 
stantly increasing  development ;  and  in  this  develop- 
ment we  shall  be  very  greatly  assisted,  by  the  Church's 
definitions,  and  by  the  labours  of  her  greatest  theolo- 
gians. But  I  think  (with  the  exception  of  one  or  two 
other  truths  which  are  to  be  comprised  in  our  third 


GOD'S  POWER  OF  INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  RULE.  191 

Chapter)  all  has  here  been  stated,  which  is  requisite 
as  a  philosophical  basis,  whereon  that  subsequent  struc- 
ture may  be  reared. 

I  will  only  remark  in  conclusion,  that  the  matters 
handled  in  theological  works  under  the  head  '  de 
principiis  moralitatis,'  are  altogether  different  from 
those  which  we  have  been  considering.  This  incon- 
venience however  has  not  deterred  me  from  using  a 
title,  which  seemed  more  appropriate  than  any  other  I 
could  think  of,  for  expressing  the  contents  of  this 
Chapter. 


192 


CHAPTER  II. 

ON  ETHICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

88.  HITHERTO  we  have  been  regarding,  under  various 
aspects,  those  Precepts  and  Counsels,  which  God,  as 
being  All-holy,  could  not  but  propose  to  mankind. 
He  is  perfectly  free,  as  we  have  so  often  remarked,  not 
to  create  men;  He  is  not  free,  having  created  them, 
to  place  before  them  Precepts  or  Counsels  essentially 
different  from  these.  We  now  turn  our  attention  to 
His  constitution  of  our  own  nature  ;  we  proceed  to 
enquire,  under  what  circumstances  of  advantage  or 
disadvantage  He  has  placed  us  men,  by  giving  us  that 
nature,  towards  the  fulfilment  of  those  Precepts  and 
Counsels.  The  present  Chapter  then,  however  closely 
connected  it  may  be  in  one  sense  with  the  former,  yet 
belongs  to  a  different  part  of  Philosophy  altogether. 
The  former  Chapter  treated  of  necessary  truth,  this  is 
to  treat  of  contingent ;  the  former  was  wholly  meta- 
physical, this  is  to  be  wholly  psychological.  Let  me 
explain  my  meaning  in  this  statement,  a  little  more 
at  length. 

Those  truths,  which  were  the  object  of  our  con- 
sideration in  the  previous  Chapter,  are  truths  of  such 
a  character,  that  it  is  intrinsecally  impossible  they 
should  be  other  than  they  are :  but  those  which  are 
now  to  occupy  us,  are  simply  due  to  God's  free  ap- 
pointment. There  are  various  sciences,  as  you  very 
well  know,  occupied  with  such  truths ;  Astronomy, 
Chemistry,  Botany,  and  the  like.  Just  then  as  Botany 
contemplates  the  various  properties  which  God  has 
given  to  flowers,  so  Psychology  contemplates  the  vari- 


ON  ETHICAL  PSYCHOLOGY.  193 

ous  properties  which  He  has  given  to  the  human  soul. 
In  our  former  Chapter,  we  were  not  concerned  at  all 
Avith  the  phenomena  of  our  soul,  except  so  far  as  those 
phenomena  enabled  us  to  apprehend  various  truths 
wholly  external  to  the  soul ;  but  here  the  phenomena 
of  our  soul  are  our  direct  object  of  enquiry.  In  every 
branch  of  human  study,  I  need  not  say,  our  soul  is  the 
contemplating  subject ;  but  in  Psychology,  alone  of  all 
sciences  whether  necessary  or  contingent,  it  is  also  the 
contemplated  object. 

I  make  no  profession  however  of  carrying  you 
through  all  Psychology.  A  very  large  proportion  of 
mental  phenomena,  have  no  direct  bearing  on  man's 
moral  or  spiritual  action  at  all ;  and  with  these  we  do 
not  here  concern  ourselves.  What  are  the  laws  which 
regulate  memory — or  what  is  the  true  account  of  the 
sublime  and  beautiful — or  what  are  the  phenomena  of 
the  poetical  temperament — these,  and  a  thousand  other 
psychological  questions,  may  be  of  great  moment  to 
the  philosopher  as  such ;  but  they  do  not  subserve  the 
purposes  of  Theology.  I  call  our  present  study  then 
'Ethical  Psychology;'  and  include  under  it  those  facts 
of  human  nature,  which  are  directly  concerned  with 
ethical  truths.  What  means  are  given  to  each  of  us 
by  nature,  for  knowing  right  and  wrong? — what  are 
the  various  impulses  which  lead  in  one  direction  and 
the  other? — is  it  possible  to  do  evil  for  the  sake 
of  evil,  'male  agere  propter  inalitiam?' — are  we  so 
constituted  that  on  the  whole  virtue  and  happiness 
coincide? — which  is  the  stronger  motive,  and  in  what 
cases,  desire  of  happiness  or  desire  of  virtue? — these, 
and  many  other  enquiries  of  a  similar  kind,  fall  under 
our  treatment.  We  may  call  it  in  one  word  the  map  of 
our  moral  nature.  A  historian,  before  he  begins  his 
narrative,  prefixes  an  account  of  the  country  to  which 
it  refers.  Here  is  a  chain  of  mountains — there  a 
rapidly-flowing  river — here  the  soil  has  one  important 
peculiarity,  there  another.  And  in  like  manner,  before 
considering  in  order  those  various  wonders  of  which 
man's  moral  nature  is  the  theatre, — it  is  very  con- 

o 


194  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

ducive  to  clearness,  that  we  first  investigate  the  con- 
formation of  that  nature  itself,  as  it  came  from  its 
Creator's  hands. 

Such  then  is  the  character,  such  the  limitation,  of 
that  portion  of  science  which  we  here  undertake.  We 
must  begin  our  treatment  of  it  however,  by  stating 
various  facts,  which  underlie  the  whole  science  of 
Psychology  in  its  fullest  extent. 


195 


SECTION  I. 
On  the  Three-fold  Classification  of  Mental  Phenomena. 

89.  I  assume,  from  the  ordinary  philosophical  books, 
a  truth  which  is,  I  believe,  pretty  generally  recognized. 
The  soul  is  a  perfectly  simple  substance.     When  this 
is  said,  it  is  very  far  from  being  meant  (of  course)  that 
the  soul  is  simple,  as  God  is  Simple.    He  is  intrinsecally 
incapable  of  change;  existing   'extra  tempus;'   u  the 
Same  yesterday,  to-day,  and  for  ever:"  while  the  soul 
on  the  other  hand,  I  need  not  say,  is  at  every  moment 
undergoing  great  changes  or  modifications.     If  I  may 
use  the  expression  then,  I  do  not  mean  that  the  soul 
is  ' extensively'  simple,  but  that  it  is  'intensively'  so; 
that  it  is  incapable,  from  its  nature,   of  any  physical 
division.     We  may  imagine  a  table  or  a  chair,  divided 
into   its  various  constituent  parts;  we  could  imagine 
this,  even  though  we  were  wholly  unable  to  effect  that 
division.     But  if  we  could  see  the  soul,  we  should  see 
that   such   division   is   wholly   wmmaginable,    because 
there  are  no  constituent  parts  into  which  it  could  be 
divided.* 

90.  It  is  also,  I  believe,  universally  recognized,  that 
we  have,  and  can  have,  no  direct  knowledge  whatever 
of  that  substance  which  we  call  the  soul.     We  know,  and 
can  know,  no  more  of  it,  than  those  various  successive 
modifications  of  which  we  are  conscious.     Here  how- 

*  For  a  recital  of  authorities  on  this  doctrine  of  the  soul's  simplicity,  see 
Sir  W.  Hamilton's  "  Lectures  on  Metaphysics  and  Logic,"  vol.  ii.  pp.  5-9. 
Among  theologians,  he  considers  that  St.  Augustine,  Scotus,  and  also  the 
Nominalists  held  this  view  ;  while  St.  Thomas  and  his  followers  denied  it. 
I  may  add  that  Suarez  considers  it  far  the  more  probable  opinion,  that  there 
is  no  real  distinction,  between  the  soul  on  the  one  hand  and  the  intellect  or 
will  on  the  other  ;  and  I  think  the  later  scholastics  take  the  same  opinion 
for  granted.  I  imagine  no  one  in  the  present  day  doubts  it. 


196  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

ever,  lest  this  word  '  conscious'  be  unduly  contracted  in 
its  sense,  I  will  anticipate  one  remark,  which  we  shall 
have  to  make  again  and  again  hereafter.  Among  the 
various  mental  phenomena  whereof  we  are  conscious, 
it  is  but  a  very  small  part  on  which  we  ordinarily 
reflect.  Hence  it  follows,  that  by  carefully  examining 
what  passes  in  our  mind,  we  are  able  to  discover  a  very 
far  greater  number  of  phenomena  than  we  had  at  all 
suspected.  My  grounds  for  making  this  statement,  will 
come  before  us  as  we  proceed ;  but  I  make  it  here,  lest 
the  word  '  conscious '  should  be  misunderstood,  and 
limited  to  a  sense  far  narrower  than  that  which  I  intend. 

91.  Now  these  various  mental  phenomena  or  modi- 
fications of  the  soul,  fall  most  obviously  and  irresistibly 
under  three  classes ;  intellectual  acts,  which  I  will  call 
cognitions  ;  volitions  ;  emotions.  I  say  they  fall  into 
these  three  classes,  obviously  and  irresistibly.  Any 
emotion,  e.  g.  most  strikingly  resembles  any  other  emo- 
tion, in  the  various  laws  to  which  it  is  subject;  and 
no  less  strikingly  differs  in  this  respect  from  every 
cognition  or  volition.  Any  volition  again  most 
strikingly  resembles  any  other  volition  in  the  various 
laws  to  which  it  is  subject;  and  no  less  strikingly  differs 
in  this  respect  from  every  cognition  and  emotion.  Cog- 
nitions are  bound  together  precisely  in  the  same  way ; 
by  mutual  agreement  with  each  other,  and  by  distinction 
from  all  other  phenomena. 

It  is  of  the  very  greatest  importance,  that  this 
fundamental  classification  should  be  constantly  kept 
before  us  in  our  psychological  enquiries;  and  it  will 
be  a  very  great  advantage  therefore,  if  our  very  mode 
of  speech  constantly  reminds  us  of  its  existence.  This 
service  science  has  performed,  by  adopting  the  terms 
4  intellect,'  c  will,'  c  sensitive  appetite.'  All  volitions 
are  spoken  of,  as  proceeding  from  the  will ;  all  cognitions, 
as  elicited  by  the  intellect;  all  emotions,  as  experienced 
by  the  sensitive  appetite.  We  must  not  of  course 
suppose  for  an  instant,  that  there  is  any  such  thing  as 
intellect,  will,  or  sensitive  appetite ;  that  the  soul,  e.  g. 
is  compounded  of  those  three  elements,  as  a  chair  is 
compounded  of  legs,  seat,  and  back.  They  are  but 


THREE-FOLD  CLASSIFICATION  OF  MENTAL  PHENOMENA.    197 

abstractions,  used  by  science  for  the  purpose  of  keeping 
constantly  before  our  minds  the  great  fact  I  have  just 
explained— the  threefold  classification  of  mental  phe- 
nomena. 

92.  Let  us  consider  in  order  these  various  classes 
of  phenomena.     And  first  for  emotions. 

By  emotions,  as  you  well  know,  are  signified  all 
those  modifications  of  the  soul,  wherein  it  experiences 
pleasure  or  pain  of  whatever  character.  All  emotions 
therefore  are  either  (1)  pleasurable,  or  (2)  painful,  or 
(3)  uniting  both  in  various  degrees.  It  is  implied  in  our 
definition,  that  we  include  under  the  general  term  *  emo- 
tions,' what  are  commonly  called  *  bodily  appetites/  And 
very  conveniently ;  for  it  will  be  seen,  as  we  proceed,  that 
these  are  governed,  in  all  essential  respects,  by  the  same 
laws  which  regulate  mental  emotions.  It  follows  also, 
from  what  has  been  said,  that  all  emotions  are  concerned 
necessarily  with  some  object;  the  possession  or  thought 
of  which  causes  pleasure  or  pain  as  the  case  may  be. 
They  move  moreover  towards  such  pleasurable  object, 
or  from  such  painful  object,  in  this  or  that  various 
manner.  He  who  should  enumerate  every  object,  the 
possession  or  thought  of  which  causes  pleasure  or  pain; 
— and  who  should  enumerate  also  our  various  feelings 
in  regard  to  any  such  given  object;  —  would  tell  us  all 
that  it  is  possible  to  know  of  the  sensitive  appetite. 

93.  I  will  use  the  word  '  propension'  to  express  our 
susceptibility  of  pleasure  or  pain  from  the  thought  or 
possession  of  this  or  that  object.    Thus  my  love  of  men's 
esteem,  —  or  in  other  words  my  susceptibility  of  pleasure 
from  a  belief  that  men  esteem  me, — is  a  *  propension.' 
Again  my  love  of  food, — or  in  other  words,  my  suscepti- 
bility of  pleasure  from  the  reception  of  food  when  I  am 
hungry, — is  a  'propension.'     Once  more;  my  hatred  of 
bodily  lesion, — in  other  words  my  susceptibility  of  pain 
from  my  flesh  being  in  any  way  lacerated, — this  is  a 
'  propension.'   And  our  various  propensions  are  gratified, 
so  far  as  we  possess  in  some  sense  the  various  objects 
which  give   pleasure,    or  are    free   from   those   which 
give  pain. 

Now  the  very  wording  of  the  last  paragraph,  will 


198  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

suggest  a  somewhat  important  classification  of  the 
propensions.  Many  of  these,  derive  all  the  gratification 
of  which  they  are  capable,  from  the  mere  belief  that 
their  object  exists.  Take,  as  an  instance  of  this,  the 
propension  which  we  call  love  of  approbation.  If  I 
firmly  believe  that  my  fellow-creatures  regard  me  with 
feelings  of  admiration,  my  propension  enjoys  its  full 
satisfaction ;  the  actual  fact  that  they  do  so,  literally 
adds  nothing  to  that  satisfaction.  My  enjoyment,  I 
say,  would  be  no  whit  the  less,  even  though  they  held 
me  in  execration,  so  long  as  I  confidently  and  un- 
doubtingly  believe  the  opposite.  In  like  manner,  the 
pleasure  derived  by  a  vindictive  man  from  his  enemy's 
misery,  requires  for  its  full  existence  nothing  more  than 
a  confident  belief  that  such  misery  exists :  the  sight  of 
it  only  increases  the  pleasure,  as  making  the  belief 
itself  more  vivid.  And  there  are  very  many  other 
cases  of  a  similar  kind.  But  this  is  far  from  being  true 
of  all  the  propensions.  I  believe,  e.  g.  that  this  is 
tender  and  nutritious  food,  having  never  tasted  any 
better :  but  who  will  say  that  my  appetite  is  as  satisfac- 
torily appeased  by  eating  such  food,  as  it  would  be  if  its 
quality  were  really  what  I  think  it?  Still  more,  who 
will  say  that  my  appetite  is  satisfied,  by  a  mere  belief 
that  the  food  is  before  me  ?  Plainly  a  far  closer  contact 
with  the  object  is  here  necessary,  than  is  implied  in  the 
mere  belief  of  its  existence. 

Who  can  hold  a  fire  in  his  hand, 
By  thinking  of  the  frosty  Caucasus  ? 
Or  cloy  the  hungry  edge  of  appetite, 
By  bare  imagination  of  the  feast  ? 

This  distinction  is  of  sufficient  importance,  to  require 
a  distinct  name  for  the  two  classes.  Some  of  our  pro- 
pensions,  we  have  seen,  possess  their  object,  by  the  mere 
fact  of  our  belief  th^t  it  exists;  but  others  require  a  far 
closer  contact.  For  want  of  a  better  name,  let  us  call 
the  latter  'physical  propensions'  and  the  former  'non- 
physical.7 

St.  Thomas,  in  one  part  .of  his  "  Surnma,"  seems 
to  imply,  that  the  physical  propensions  are  precisely 


THREE-FOLD  CLASSIFICATION  OF  MENTAL  PHENOMENA.    199 

identical  with  the  bodily  appetites;  at  least  in  that 
more  extended  sense  of  the  word,  which  would  include, 
e.  g.  love  of  music  in  that  category.*  I  am  not  meaning 
to  imply  that  there  are  many  exceptions  to  this  state- 
ment ;  but  a  very  little  thought  will  shew  that  there  are 
some.  Let  us  take  what  with  some  minds  is  among  the 
strongest  propensions  they  have, — love  of  adequate 
intellectual  scope :  to  some  minds,  I  say,  the  absence  of 
such  scope  is  among  the  keenest  of  miseries ;  the  yoke 
of  a  false  and  narrow  philosophy  is  a  worse  than  Egypt- 
ian slavery.  Now  we  may  ask,  are  these  men  exempted 
from  such  suffering,  simply  by  believing  that  their  present 
philosophy  is  true  and  sufficient?  Or  rather  is  not 
the  very  opposite  the  fact?  Never  are  they  so  miserable, 
as  when  (through  misplaced  reverence  for  authority) 
they  undoubtingly  believe  in  this  false  system ;  and  their 
daring  to  doubt  it  is  their  first  step,  towards  emancipa- 
tion from  this  misery  of  intellectual  bondage.  Nothing 
then  can  be  more  certain,  than  that  this  propension  is 
'  physical-/  yet  who  can  say  that  it  is  a  bodily  appetite, 
even  in  the  most  extended  possible  sense  of  that  term  ? 
Which  of  our  propensions  are  physical,  and  which 
non -physical,  is  a  question  to  be  treated  in  a  later 
Section,  when  we  enter  on  a  systematic  consideration 
of  our  various  propensions.  This  systematic  con- 
sideration will  lead,  I  think,  to  conclusions  of  much 
interest  and  importance ;  but  before  beginning  it,  it  will 
be  better  to  treat  one  or  two  preliminary  subjects, 
which  may  be  far  more  briefly  despatched. 

*  '  Respondeo  dicendum,  quod,  sicut  dictum  est  (a  prec.)  peccata  reci- 
piunt  speciem  ab  objectis.  Omne  autem  peccatum  consistit  in  appetitu 
alicujus  commutabilis  boni,  quod  inordinate  appetitur  ;  et  per  consequens, 
in  eo  jam  habito  inordinate  aliquis  delectatur.  Ut  autem  ex  superioribus 
patet  (qu.  31,  art.  3.)  duplex  est  delectatio.  Una  quidem  animalis,  ques 
consummatur  in  sold  apprehensions  alicujus  rei  ad  votum  habitso  ;  et  haec 
etiam  potest  dici  delectatio  spirituals  :  sicut  cum  aliquis  delectatur  inlaude 
humand,  vel  in  aliquo  hujusmodi.  Alia  vero  delectatio  est  corporate,  sive 
naturalis,  quse  in  ipso  tactu  corporali  perficitur ;  quse  potest  etiam  dici 
delectatio  carnalis.' — 1,  2  qu.  72,  art.  2.  0. 


200 


SECTION  II. 
On  the  Passions. 

94. 1  observed  just  now,  that  he  who  should  enunciate 
every  object  which  causes  pleasure  or  pain ; — and 
should  enumerate  also  our  various  feelings  in  regard  to 
any  such  given  object; — would  tell  us  all  that  can  be 
known  of  the  sensitive  appetite.  Now  to  enumerate 
every  object  which  causes  pleasure  or  pain,  is  to 
enumerate  our  various  c  propensions '  (n.  93).  To 
enumerate  our  various  feelings  in  regard  to  any  such 
given  object,  is  to  enumerate  our  various  *  passions.' 
This  latter  is  a  far  easier  task  than  the  former,  and 
we  at  once  proceed  with  it. 

I  say  then,  firstly,  by  way  of  definition,  that  what- 
ever pleasurable  or  painful  object  be  in  question, — the 
passions  are  the  various  modes,  in  which  my  emotions 
tend  to  that  pleasure,  or  recede  from  that  pain.  We 
must  be  on  our  guard  here,  against  associations  arising 
from  the  ordinary  use  of  the  term.  In  common  par- 
lance, the  word  c  passion '  implies  something  violent  and 
extreme :  but  in  theological  language  the  faintest  emo- 
tion is  a  c  passion ; '  it  is  one  or  other  passion,  directed 
to  one  or  other  pleasurable  object,  or  from  one  or  other 
painful  object.* 

*  The  following  passages  from  St.  Thomas  will,  I  think,  sufficiently 
shew,  that  he  intends  to  include,  under  the  name  of  passion,  every  kind  of 
emotion. 

'  Motus  appetitus  sensitivi  proprie  passio  nominatur  ;  sicut  supra  dictum 
<  est.'— 1,  2,  queest.  22,  art.  3. 

'  Affectio  autem  qucecumque,  ex  apprehensione  sensitiva  procedens,  est 
'  motus  appetitus  sensitivi.' — Qusest.  31,  art.  1. 

Again — '  Stoici,  sicut  ponebant  omnem  passionem  animse  esse  malam, 
'  ita  ponebant  consequeiiter  omnem  passionem  animse  diminuere  actus 
'  bonitatem  :  omne  enim  bonum,  ex  permixtione  mali,  vel  totaliter  tollittir, 
'  vel  fit  minus  bonum. 

1  Et  hoc  quidem  verum  est,  si  dicamus  passiones  animse  solum  inordi- 


ON  THE  PASSIONS.  201 

95.  The  Aristotelic  enumeration  of  the  passions, 
which  the  scholastic  theologians  have  followed,  seems 
to  me  extremely  good  on  the  whole,  though  open  to 
some  criticism.  I  will  first  place  it  before  you  as  it 
stands,  and  afterwards  proceed  to  the  requisite  com- 
ments. 

To  fix  our  ideas  by  an  instance.  Let  us  suppose  the 
particular  propension  before  us  to  be  love  of  approba- 
tion; or  (mother  words)  let  us  suppose  the  pleasurable 
object,  towards  which  the  various  passions  are  directed, 
to  be  the  applause  of  our  fellow-men.  If  I  think  of  the 
fact  that  I  am  unpopular,  I  experience  a  painful  emotion ; 
'  how  I  long  to  be  more  admired :'  this  is  '  Desiderium,' 
desire  or  longing.  On  the  other  hand,  if  I  think  of  the 
fact  that  I  am  popular,  I  experience  a  pleasurable 
emotion ;  my  spirits  rise  (as  it  were)  and  dance ;  I  say 
to  myself,  '  How  very  delightful:'  here  is  ' Delectatio.' 
I  may  think  however  of  human  applause,  without  par- 
ticularly considering  whether  I  do  or  do  not  possess  it : 
and  so  I  experience  a  much  fainter  emotion;  'what  a 
pleasant  thing  to  have:'  this  is  'Amor.'  So  here  we 
have  our  three  first  passions ;  '  Amor,'  '  Desiderium,' 

*  Delectatio.'     Let  us  write  them  down,  and  place  under 
them  their  three  opposites.     Thus 

1.  Amor.  2.  Desiderium.         3.  Delectatio. 

4.  Odium.          5.  Fuga.  6.  Tristitia. 

These  latter  three  passions  are  concerned  with  the 
corresponding  painful  object,  unpopularity.  If  I  think 
of  unpopularity,  without  considering  whether  I  am  un- 
popular or  not,  I  experience  a  faint  emotion,  '  Odium ; ' 
'  what  a  disagreeable  thing ! '  If  I  reflect  that  there  is 
great  danger  of  my  becoming  unpopular,  I  experience 
the  emotion  'Fuga;'  'oh  that  I  might  escape  from  that 

*  natos  modes  sensitivi  appetites ;  prout  sunt  perturbationes  seu  segritudines. 
'Sed  si  passiones  simpliciter  nominenms  omnes  motus  appetites  sensitivi, 

*  sic  ad  pcrfectionem  humani  boni  pertinet,  qu6d  etiam  ipsse  passiones  sint 
'  moderatse  per  rationem.' — Ibid,  qusest.  24,  art  3,  0. 

And  he  repeats  the  same  statement  almost  verbatim  qusest.  59,  art.  5, 0. 
Suarez  again — 'Omnis  actus  appetites  sensitivi  est  et  dicitur  animae 
'  passio.' 


202  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

calamity.'  If  I  reflect  that  I  am  already  very  unpopular, 
'  Tristitia'  or  'Dolor:'  grief  at  the  depressing  fact. 

96.  So  far,  I  have  no  unfavourable  comment  whatever 
to  offer ;  nothing,  I  think,  can  be  clearer  or  more  satisfac- 
tory. I  must  add  however  one  or  two  somewhat  im- 
portant facts ;  and  firstly  on  the  passion  '  Delectatio.' 

In  the  case  of  'physical'  propensions  (seen.  93), 
the  passion  '  Delectatio '  may  be  experienced,  without 
our  thinking  in  any  way  (explicitly  or  implicitly)  of 
its  object.  Thus  (if  it  be  not  thought  too  trivial  an 
instance)  there  are  many,  to  whom  the  process  of 
digestion  is  exhilarating ;  and  who  are  consequently 
(under  ordinary  circumstances)  specially  cheerful,  im- 
mediately after  dinner.  This  cheerfulness  is  none  the 
less  experienced,  though  the  mind  is  not  thinking  in 
any  way,  either  of  the  present  digestion  or  the  past 
dinner.  The  keen  and  active  thinker  again,  who  has 
found  adequate  intellectual  scope,  enjoys  exquisite  plea- 
sure in  consequence,  even  though  he  has  never  once 
adverted  to  the  fact. 

From  this  it  follows,  that  from  these  physical  pro- 
pensions,  '  Delectatio '  may  be  experienced  in  three  dif- 
ferent ways.  If,  e.g.  I  hear  beautiful  music,  the  sounds 
give  me  great  pleasure.  If,  in  addition,  I  advert  to  the 
fact  '  what  beautiful  music  I  am  hearing,'  the  thought 
gives  me  further  pleasure.  Lastly,  when  it  is  all  over, 
I  may  fancy  myself  in  imagination  hearing  the  same 
sweet  sounds ;  and  a  real,  though  somewhat  faint,  '  De- 
lectatio' then  also  ensues.  Even  in  the  case  of  non- 
physical  propensions,  a  twofold  '  Delectatio'  is  possible. 
Thus,  though  I  know  myself  unpopular,  I  may  indulge 
in  a  day -dream  of  popularity ;  I  may  draw  vivid  pic- 
tures of  the  imaginary  cheers  which  I  receive ;  I  may 
sketch  out  in  fancy  addresses  of  admiration  which  are 
to  be  voted  me,  and  which  are  really  to  do  some  justice 
at  last  to  my  admirable  qualities.  And  so  perhaps, 
not  unfrequently,  a  weak-minded  man  pursues  this 
very  foolish  course  of  thought,  '  atque  animum  pictura 
pascit  inamY  Or  the  native  of  a  Southern  clime  again, 
when  unable  to  reach  his  enemy,  may  imagine  him  in 


ON  THE  PASSIONS.  203 

his  power; — gloat  over  every  detail  of  the  ideal  ven- 
geance which  he  inflicts; — count  the  victim's  supposed 
sufferings,  and  rejoice  in  his  fancied  groans. 

These  various  distinctions  of  'Delectatio'  are  suf- 
ficiently important,  to  deserve  special  names.  First 
then,  in  all  the  propensions  we  may  distinguish  between 
4  Delectatio  Apprehensiva'  and  *  Delectatio  Imaginativa,' 
4  the  delight  of  possession'  and  c  of  imagination.'  4  De- 
lectatio Apprehensiva'  will  be  the  delight,  which  we  ex- 
perience, in  actually  possessing the  object:  in  the  case  of 
non-physical  propensions,  it  will  be  the  delight  which 
we  experience  in  firmly  believing  that  it  exists  ;  in  the 
others,  it  will  be  the  delight  obtained  by  that  far  closer 
contact,  which  in  their  case  is  possible.  'Delectatio 
Iinaginativa'  will  be  the  far  fainter  delight  which  we 
may  derive,  even  when  knowing  the  object  to  be  absent, 
by  fancying  ourselves  to  possess  it. 

Then  in  the  case  of  physical  propensions,  the  c  De- 
lectatio Apprehensiva'  will  be  subdivided  into  4  Delec- 
tatio Physica,'  the  delight  of  contact  with  the  object; 
and  4  Delectatio  Reflexiva,'  the  delight  which  ensues, 
from  adverting  to  the  circumstance  that  we  are  thus 
in  contact.  But  there  will  be  no  such  distinction  as 
this  latter,  in  the  case  of  non-physical  propensions. 

There  is  another  fact  connected  with  this  same  pas- 
sion, which  a  very  little  observation  will  suffice  to 
establish.  The  pleasure  caused,  whether  by  the  contact 
of  a  pleasurable  object,  or  by  the  thought  of  its  exist- 
ence, often  lasts  for  a  much  longer  period  than  that 
during  which  such  contact  or  thought  continues.  Let 
us  take  an  instance  already  given  of  a  physical  propen- 
sion  ;  the  delight  of  a  keen  intellect,  which  has  found 
its  adequate  field  of  speculation.  It  is  not  merely  that 
this  pleasure  is  enjoyed,  while  the  mind  is  engaged  on 
that  field ;  its  possession  diffuses  enjoyment  through 
the  whole  day.  The  pain  which  preceded  was  a  con- 
stant pain,  affecting  the  whole  current  of  life;  so  also 
is  the  pleasure.  The  same  truth  equally  holds  in  the 
case  of  non-physical  propensions.  The  vain-glorious 
man,  who  has  made  a  great  hit  in  Parliament,  or  written 


204  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

a  first-rate  book,  not  merely  enjoys  the  delight  of 
praise  while  he  is  thinking  of  it ;  but  has  his  whole 
life  sweetened  by  it  for  some  weeks  to  come. 

The  distinction,  expressed  in  the  respective  words 
*  Apprehensiva'  and  c  Imaginativa,'  is  peculiar  to  the 
passion  c  Delectatio  ; '  but  the  other  two  remarks  just 
made  apply  to  all  the  passions.  For  (1)  every  passion, 
in  the  case  of  physical  propensions,  may  be  divided  into 
'  physica'  and  'reflexiva;'  and  (2)  it  is  true  of  all  the 
passions,  that  they  often  continue  to  possess  us,  long 
after  the  object  which  caused  them  has  passed  away. 
As  an  instance  of  the  first  remark,  take  a  case  of  the 
passion  c  Tristitia.'  There  is  no  more  common  remark,  in 
reference  to  one  who  labours  chronically  under  weak 
health,  than  this — how  greatly  his  suffering  is  increased, 
if  he  indulges  in  the  habit  of  thinking  much  on  his  own 
ailments;  thus  adding  to  c  Tristitia  Physica'  'Tristitia 
Reflexiva.'  The  second  remark  may  be  illustrated  by 
another  passion.  I  may  be  wrought  into  a  great  access 
of  rage,  from  the  infliction  of  some  stinging  insult :  this 
passion  (as  we  shall  soon  see)  is  in  fact  '  Desiderium/ 
directed  to  the  pleasurable  object  of  vindictive  retribu- 
tion. Now  it  is  evident,  that  this  emotion  of  anger  often 
continues,  and  unconsciously  influences  the  whole  cur- 
rent of  my  ideas,  for  a  considerable  period  after  all 
thought  of  vindictive  retribution  has  ceased. 

There  is  no  need  of  pursuing  the  subject  further, 
in  its  general  shape  ;  but  there  are  particular  reasons 
for  saying  a  few  words  on  the  particular  passion 
'  Desiderium,'  and  on  its  distinction  (in  the  cases  of 
physical  propensions)  into  'Desiderium  Physicum'  and 
4  Reflexivum.' 

Thus  take  the  phenomena  of  hunger.  The  bodily 
yearning  for  food  may  continue,  and  seriously  affect 
the  spirits,  at  times  when  we  are  not  thinking  of  food 
at  all.  Here  is  '  Desiderium  Physicum.'  If,  in  addition, 
I  turn  my  thoughts  to  my  need  of  food,  and  begin 
mentally  longing  for  the  time  when  I  shall  get  it,  here 
is  '  Desiderium  Reflexivum ;'  a  further  suffering,  and  a 
very  considerable  one,  in  addition  to  the  former. 


ON  THE  PASSIONS.  205 

To  this  statement  perhaps  exception  may  be  taken ; 
and  it  may  be  thought  an  improper  expression,  to  say 
that  I  experience  *  Desiderium'  for  a  thing  which  has 
perhaps  never  entered  my  thoughts.  This  however  is 
a  purely  verbal  question  ;  on  the  fact,  there  is  and  can 
be  no  difference  of  opinion.  I  experience  that  uneasy 
sensation  which  we  call  hunger;  a  sensation  which 
arises  simply  from  the  absence  of  food.  Moreover  the 
sensation  is  such,  that  simply  in  consequence  of  it,  the 
sight  or  the  thought  of  food  leads  me  instinctively  and 
at  once  to  press  towards  the  attainment  of  that  object.  I 
think  that  'Desiderium  Physicum  cibi,'  is  not  an  unsuit- 
able way  of  expressing  this  phenomenon ;  and  therefore 
I  use  the  expression.  Those  who  differ  from  me,  differ 
not  on  any  question  of  facts,  but  on  this  mere  question 
of  verbal  propriety. 

Similiter  et  de  motibus  illis  pudendis  philosophan- 
dum  est,  qui  saepe  in  corpore  insurgunt,  dum  intellectus 
ab  omni  turpi  cogitatione  penitus  liber  est  et  immunis. 
Hi  motus  ad  '  Desiderium'  referri  debent ;  ' Desiderium7 
autem  'Physicum'  et  non  ' Reflexivum.' 

And  so  in  the  other  instance  we  have  so  often  given : 
the  longing  for  freedom  from  the  bondage  of  a  false 
philosophy.  A  sense  of  intellectual  misery,  and  a 
yearning  desire  of  escape,  will  often  exist,  when  we  are 
actually  ignorant  what  is  that  evil  which  distresses  us ; 
what  is  that  relief  which  we  seek. 

Finally,  it  will  be  convenient  if  we  here  recapitulate, 
what  are  those  cases  in  which  an  emotion  may  exist, 
without  any  thought  of  its  object.  We  have  found  that 
these  cases  are  of  two  kinds.  First,  in  the  case  of  phy- 
sical propensions,  when  the  passion  has  not  been  in  any 
sense  caused  by  a  thought  of  the  object;  nay,  when 
that  thought  perhaps  has  never  existed.  Secondly,  in 
the  case  of  ail  the  propensions,  when  the  passion  has 
been  caused  indeed  by  a  thought  of  the  object,  but  con- 
tinues long  after  such  thought  has  ceased. 

97.  But  there  are  five  more  passions  in  the  Aris- 
totelic  catalogue;  and  to  them  I  now  proceed.  The 
pleasurable  object,  says  Aristotle,  may  perhaps  not 


206  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

only  be  simply  a  '  bonum  delectabile,'  but  a  '  bonum 
arduum;'  an  object  winch  cannot  be  possessed  without 
danger  or  effort.  That  we  may  derive  our  illustration 
from  the  same  propension  as  before,  let  us  take  the  case 
of  military  fame.  Here  there  will  be  scope  for  further 
passions.  Thus  there  may  be  '  Spes,'  hope  of  obtaining 
this  great  prize  ;  and  '  Audacia,'  boldness  in  pursuing  it : 
there  may  be  also  the  contraries  to  these ;  '  Despera- 
tio,'  despair  of  achieving  so  difficult  an  object,  and 
'  Timor,'  fear  of  the  surrounding  dangers.  Thus : 

Spes.  Audacia. 

Desperatio.  Timor. 

Further,  he  adds,  there  may  be  '  Ira ;'  rage  against  any 
one,  who  seeks  to  deprive  me  of  this  much-desired  pos- 
session. 

These  last  five  passions  are  called  '  irascible,'  and 
so  distinguished  from  the  others  which  are  called  'concu- 
piscible.'  For  what  reason?  Because  men  of  sanguine 
and  ardent,  in  other  words  of  '  irascible,'  temper,  are 
quite  specially  disposed  to  'Spes,'  'Audacia,'  and  'Ira;' 
are  disposed  to  them  quite  differently  in  degree  from 
other  men :  whereas  there  is  no  such  broad  distinction 
among  mankind,  as  to  those  who  experience  '  Amor,' 
'  Desiderium,'  and  the  rest. 

To  complete  the  Aristotelic  theory  of  passions,  I 
should  add  one  further  statement.  When  I  wish,  in 
behalf  of  another,  those  very  things  which  I  wish  in  my 
own  behalf; — dread  for  another  those  which  I  dread 
for  myself;  —  delight  in  the  possession  by  another  of 
those  very  things  which  I  delight  myself  in  possessing ; 
—  I  am  said  to  experience  for  that  other  man  the 
passion  called  '  Amor  Amicitia3,'  or  more  generally 
'  Amor  Benevolentia3.'  The  passion  which  I  called 
simply  'Amor'  in  n.  95,  is  called  in  full  'Amor  Con- 
cupiscentiae.'  Opposed  to  '  Amor  AmicitiaB'  is  '  Odium 
InimicitiaB;'  which  I  experience  towards  a  person,  for 
whom  I  desire  those  very  things  which  I  regard  in  my 
own  case  as  evils.  Opposite  to  '  Amor  Concupiscentiae ' 
is  '  Odium  Abominationis :'  such  as  a  vain-glorious  man 


ON  THE  PASSIONS.  207 

feels  for  unpopularity  ;  or  a  musical  man  for  harsh  and 
discordant  sounds. 

98.  All  this  latter  part  of  Aristotle's  theory  is 
open  (I  think)  to  much  criticism  ;  though  the  whole 
matter  is  of  small  moment.  But  first  I  will  mention  a 
little  error,  which  is  rather  a  blunder  or  hastiness  of 
expression,  than  a  philosophical  mistake.  He  classes 
'fear'  and  'despair'  among  the  'irascible'  passions: 
whereas  of  course  they  af  e  of  a  precisely  opposite  cha- 
racter ;  they  are  experienced  less,  in  proportion  as  our 
temperament  is  more  'irascible.'  But  now  for  more 
important  remarks. 

(2.)  It  is  surely  an  undeniable  mistake,  to  speak  of 
'  Hope'  as  peculiar  to  the  pursuit  of  <  bonum  arduum,' 
or  as  specially  appertaining  to  men  of  '  irascible '  tem- 
perament. Hope,  in  its  various  degrees,  is  common  to 
every  kind  of  'bonum'  and  every  kind  of  character. 
It  may  be  said  indeed  with  truth,  that  where  the  'bonum' 
is  '  arduum,'  irascible  men  will  be  far  more  given  to  Hope 
than  others  :  but  there  are  numberless  cases  of  '  bona 
non  ardua'  being  very  fervently  hoped  for,  by  very 
weak-spirited  and  ordinary  men.* 

(3.)  Then  the  opposite  to  'Hope'  should  rather  (I 
think)  be  '  Fear'  than '  Despair.'  '  I  hope  for  popularity : ' 

*  Since  writing  the  above,  I  have  been  interested  in  finding  that  Bipalda 
makes  this  same  remark  (de  Virtutibus  Theologicis,  d.  21,  sec.  4.)  He  is 
speaking  indeed  directly  of  '  Spes  voluntatis?  but  we  shall  see  in  the  next 
Section,  that  whether  the  question  be  of  Hope- the  emotion,  or  Hope  the 
volition,  the  true  answer,  as  to  the  arduousness  of  its  object,  must  be  pre- 
cisely the  same.  Indeed  Ripalda's  arguments  as  often  refer  to  the  emotion 
as  to  the  volition.  I  will  extract  a  small  portion  of  his  remarks : — 

"  Ex  quibus  colligitur,  Spem  genericd  sumptam  non  distingui  a  Desiderio 
arduitate  objecti.  Prim6,  quia  non  apparet  in  quo  haec  arduitas  object! 
consistat.  Secund6  quia  possumus  desiderare  bona  ardua,  quin  ea  spere- 
mus ;  quia  ea  non  occurrunt  [ut]  futura :  tune  autem  datur  Desiderium 
boni  ardui,  sine  ulla  Spe  et  interdum  cum  Desperatione.  Tertio  quia  saepe 
arduitate  objecti  crescit  Desiderium  et  decrescit  Spes  :  conditio  autem  objec- 
tiva  Spei,  dividens  ipsum  a  Desiderio,  non  potest  augere  Desiderium  et 
minuere  Spem. 

"  Hinc  crediderim  S.  Thomam,  vendicantem  arduitatem  ad  Spem  et  ex 
ipsa  distinguentem  a  Desiderio,  non  agere  de  Spe  genericd,  sed  de  Spe  per- 
tinente  ad  partem  irascibilem,  excitante  bilim  ad  superandas  dimcultates 

objecti  ardui Unde  spes  non  constituit  in  parte  irascibili,  quia  ex 

conceptu  generico  Spes  respicit  determinate  bonum  arduum,  sed  quia  capax 
est  ex  tali  conceptu  bonum  arduum  expetere." — nn.  34,  35. 


208  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

what  corresponds  to  this  on  the  opposite  side?  Surely 
this;  'I  fear  unpopularity.'  And  this  statement  is 
sanctioned  by  common  usage  ;  for  Hope  and  Fear  are 
always  mentioned  as  opposed  to  each  other. 

(4.)  If  '  Audacia'  is  to  be  made  parallel  to  the  other 
passions,  we  must  translate  it  '  Boldness  in  pursuit.' 
We  have  had  '  Love'  for  such  a  '  bonum ;'  '  Longing'  for 
it;  'Hope'  of  it:  plainly  then  'Audacia'  will  be  'Bold- 
ness in  pursuit'  of  it. 

(5.)  My  chief  comments  however  must  be  made  on 
'  Ira.'  And  here  I  will  begin  with  a  small  criticism. 
It  is  not  true  (I  think)  that  'Ira,'  in  its  prominent 
development,  is  peculiar  to  men  of  '  irascible'  tempera- 
ment. Anger  exists  quite  as  prominently  and  per- 
vasively in  the  feeblest  minds  ;  though  with  them  it 
takes  a  different  shape,  that  of  ill-humour,  ill-temper, 
or  peevishness.  "  That  which  in  a  more  feeble  temper," 
says  Butler,  "  is  peevishness,  and  languidly  discharges 
itself  on  everything  which  comes  in  its  way,  this  same 
principle,  in  a  temper  of  greater  force  and  stronger  pas- 
sions, becomes  rage  and  fury.  In  one  the  humour  dis- 
charges itself  all  at  once  ;  in  the  other  it  is  continually 
discharging." 

Next  I  make  a  remark,  which  goes  more  deeply  in 
opposition  to  the  Aristotelic  enumeration  of  passions. 
It  is  obvious  at  once  that '  Ira'  does  not  appertain  to  the 
various  'bona,'  or  even  the  various  'bona  ardua,'  in  the 
sense  in  which  the  other  passions  appertain  to  them.  I 
experience  'Love'  of  military  fame  ;  'Longing' for  it; 
'Hope'  of  it;  'Boldness  in  pursuit'  of  it;  but  not 
4  Anger'  of  it.  Anger  surely  does  not  appertain  to 
every  '  bonum  delectabile,'  or  even  to  every  '  bonum 
arduurn ;'  but  only  to  one  single  '  bonum  delectabile,' 
viz.  'vindictive  retribution.'  Anger  then  is  no  separate 
passion  ;  but  is  one  or  other  of  the  passions  above 
named,  exercised  on  that  propension,  which  we  may  call 
for  the  present  c  love  of  vindictive  retribution.'  The 
'longing'  for  vindictive  retribution;  the  'hope'  of  it; 
'boldness  in  pursuit'  of  it;  finally,  the  'delight'  in  it 
when  attained; — all  these  represent  the  various  phases 


ON  THE  PASSIONS.  209 

of  anger ;  they  represent  those  phases,  beginning  with 
its  commencement,  and  ending  with  its  final  result, 
where  it  vents  itself  in  acts  of  vindictive  infliction. 

What  was  it  then  which  led  Aristotle  to  class  it  as  a 
passion  ?  I  imagine  the  following  was  his  reason.  Sup- 
pose I  experience  an  emotion  of  *  Desiderium '  for  wealth, 
or  power,  or  knowledge, — there  is  no  very  marked 
peculiarity,  distinguishing  the  passion  in  one  of  these 
cases  as  compared  with  any  other.  Now  on  the  con- 
trary, no  states  of  mind  can  be  more  signally  distinct  as 
phenomena,  than  'Desiderium.'  of  wealth  or  power  on  the 
one  hand  and  'Desiderium'  of  vindictive  retribution  (i.  e. 
Anger)  on  the  other  hand.  Hence  probably  it  is,  that 
Aristotle  was  induced  to  count  the  'Desiderium'  of  vin- 
dictive retribution  as  a  different  passion  from  ordinary 
'  Desiderium.'  But  if  this  principle  were  to  be  acted  on 
consistently — viz.  of  naming  a  distinct  passion,  wherever 
the  emotion  has  a  very  distinct  phenomenal  character  of 
its  own, — the  list  of  passions  would  be  marvellously  in- 
creased. Those  emotions  which  we  call  Envy,  and 
Pride,  and  Vain-glory ^  have  quite  as  undeniably  distinct 
characteristics  of  their  own,  as  the  emotion  which  we 
call  Anger ;  and  those  emotions  which  relate  to  the  Sixth 
Commandment,  have  still  more  peculiar  characteristics. 
It  is  very  far  better  then  on  every  ground,  that  we  keep 
once  for  all  to  the  very  plain  and  intelligible  distinction, 
between  passions  and  propensions. 

(6.)  And  now  we  come  to  that  part  of  Aristotle's 
theory,  which  represents  'Amor  AmicitisB'  as  a  distinct 
passion.  Plainly,  like  Anger,  it  is  no  passion,  but  a 
propension  ;  viz.  my  susceptibility  of  pleasure  from  my 
friend's  interest  being  promoted.  To  this  pleasurable 
object,  or  from  the  opposite  pain,  all  the  various  pas- 
sions may  be  directed ;  '  Longing '  for  the  promotion  of 
those  interests ;  '  Hope '  of  their  promotion ;  '  Boldness 
in  pursuit '  of  their  promotion  ;  and  the  rest. 

(7.)  Lastly,  at  a  later  period  of  this  Chapter,  I  hope 
to  shew  that  the  passion  '  Amor '  is  equally  distinct  from 
'  Amor  Concupiscentise.' 

99.  Summing  up  the  results  of  our  criticism,  we 

p 


210  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

may  suggest  the  following  re-arrangement  of  the  *  pas- 
sions.' We  will  drop  the  distinction  between  irascible 
and  concupiscible ;  which  is  indeed  a  very  important 
distinction  in  regard  to  the  temperament  of  different 
men,  but  cannot  (I  think)  without  inconvenience  be 
introduced  into  the  enumeration  of  the  passions.  We 
retain  ten  passions,  and  may  state  them  in  the  following 
order : — 

1.  Positive.     Amor,     Desiderium,  Spes,      Audacia,      Delectatio. 

2.  Negative.  Odium,  Fuga,  Timor,  Desperatio,  Tristitia. 

On  this  arrangement,  one  only  remark  is  necessary 
in  conclusion.  c  Desperatio '  is  opposed  to  4  Audacia,' 
in  a  way  differing  from  that  in  which  the  other  negative 
passions  are  opposed  to  their  corresponding  positives. 
4  Desperatio '  and  4  Audacia '  are  both  exercised  upon 
the  same  pleasurable  object;  whereas  in  the  other  cases 
the  positive  passion  is  directed  to  the  pleasurable  object, 
and  the  negative  is  directed  from  the  corresponding 
pain.  Thus  4  Desiderium '  may  be  a  longing  for  popu- 
larity ;  and  if  so,  '  Fuga '  will  be  a  shrinking  from  the 
opposite  pain,  c  unpopularity/  But  if  '  Audacia '  be 
boldness  in  pursuit  of  that  fame  which  is  to  be  acquired 
by  confronting  danger,  *  Desperatio  '  will  be  despair  of 
any  such  fame. 


211 


SECTION  III. 
On  the  Relation  between  Will  and  Sensitive  Appetite. 

100.  Whenever  a  passion  exists,  accompanied  by  a 
thought  of  the  pleasurable  or  painful  object,  then  if  no 
special  effort  be  put  forth,  a  corresponding  act  of  the 
will  is  also  elicited.  You  will  at  once  observe  the 
qualification,  '  accompanied  by  a  thought  of  the  object.' 
For  emotions,  as  we  have  seen,  frequently  exist,  without 
our  thinking  in  any  way  of  the  object  which  produces 
them;*  but  no  act  of  the  will  (as  we  shall  see  clearly 
in  due  time)  can  ever  be  elicited  without  an  accompany- 
ing thought.  And  now  to  explain  my  general  meaning, 
in  the  statement  which  I  just  made. 

I  am  by  nature  very  susceptible  of  pleasure,  from 
being  generally  liked  ;  yet  in  fact  I  am  but  little  known, 
and  not  particularly  attractive  to  those  who  do  know 
me.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  thought  of  popu- 
larity arises  in  my  mind.  Forthwith  the  emotion  of  c  I)e- 
siderium '  is  excited ;  that  longing,  yearning,  emotion, 
which  we  all  so  well  know  by  experience.  I  make  no 
effort  whatever  to  interfere  with  the  spontaneous  course 
of  mental  phenomena ;  but  allow  my  mind  to  pursue  its 
natural  course.  Under  these  circumstances,  I  shall 
find  on  examination,  that  the  first  modification  of  the 
soul,  which  we  call  the  passion  '  Desiderium,'  has  been 
immediately  succeeded  by  another.  This  second  modi- 
fication is  an  act  of  the  will :  and  it  is  truly  analysed 
in  some  such  way  as  the  following;  c  I  would  go  through 
a  good  deal,  in  order  to  obtain  popularity ;'  or  '  my  will 
cleaves  to  the  absent  pleasure  of  popularity,  with  a  con- 
siderable degree  of  efficacity.' 

*  The  two  cases  in  which  this  may  happen  are  enumerated  at  the  close 
of  11.  96. 


212  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

That  this  is  in  truth  a  second  modification  of  the 
soul,  and  quite  distinct  from  the  former, — would  be 
quite  evident,  were  it  only  for  the  following  reason.  I 
have  the  power,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  to  separate  the 
two  in  fact;  by  putting  forth  an  effort,  I  can  prevent 
the  act  of  will  from  following  the  emotion.  But 
even  if  this  were  not  the  case,  I  have  still  the  strongest 
grounds  possible  for  recognizing  the  two  as  distinct; 
viz.  a  careful  examination  of  my  own  consciousness. 
In  this  branch  of  philosophy,  it  is  simply  unmeaning  to 
ask  for  any  proof  of  a  statement,  except  simply  this : 
all  that  a  teacher  can  do,  is  to  lead  you  (as  best  he 
may)  to  fix  your  attention,  each  for  himself,  on  those 
particular  facts  of  experience,  of  which  he  may  wish  to 
obtain  the  recognition.  Now  a  very  little  of  careful 
self-inspection  will  sufficiently  shew  us,  how  totally 
distinct  are  these  two  things;  viz.  (1)  an  emotion,  and 
(2)  an  act  of  the  will.  'I  am  in  high  spirits'  or  'in 
grief ; '  '  I  feel  this  pleasure '  or  4  that  pain  ;'  '  I  am  in 
violent  alarm  at  that  danger'  or  '  I  am  yearning  for  that 
enjoyment  ;' — those  various  modifications  of  the  soul, 
which  are  thus  truly  analysed,  are  emotions;  and  apper- 
tain to  the  sensitive  appetite.  On  the  other  hand,  '  I 
am  resolved  on  this,'  4 1  choose  that,'  c  I  intend  the 
other  with  this  or  that  degree  of  efficacity' — those 
modifications  of  the  soul,  which  are  thus  truly  analysed, 
appertain  to  the  will. 

It  is  important,  in  a  degree  which  it  is  impossible  to 
exaggerate,  that  we  should  be  most  familiarly  con- 
versant with  this  distinction,  between  the  will  and 
sensitive  appetite.  We  will  therefore  enlarge  on  this 
part  of  our  subject  more  than  would  otherwise  be 
necessary,  simply  for  this  purpose;  viz.  that  we  may 
obtain  of  it  the  fullest  and  most  familiar  grasp. 

101.  Whenever  an  act  of  will  follows  any  emotion 
in  the  way  which  we  have  described,  the  will  is  said  to 
consent  to  that  emotion ;  and  the  act  or  affection  of  the 
will  has  commonly  the  same  name  with  the  passion 
itself.  Thus  the  act  of  will  already  mentioned,  — c  I 
cleave  to  the  absent  pleasure  of  popularity  with  such  or 


RELATION  BETWEEN  WILL  AND  SENSITIVE  APPETITE.     213 

such  a  degree  of  efficacity ' —  this  is  called  an  act  of 
*  Desiderium ;'  or  more  fully,  of  'Desiderium  voluntatis.' 

I  may  here  add,  that  an  '  act  of  the  will,'  and  an 
4  affection  of  the  will,'  are  in  Theology  precisely  equi- 
valent. On  the  other  hand,  a  ^disposition  of  the  will'  is 
more  commonly  used,  and  by  me  will  always  be  used, 
not  to  express  a  present  act,  but  a  tendency  or  pro- 
clivity;  such  as  is  generated  by  habit.  Further,  those 
acts  or  affections  of  the  will,  which  correspond  with 
the  passions  in  the  way  we  have  described,  may  be 
called  perhaps  4  modal  affections  ;'  though  I  have  not 
found  them  called  by  that,  or  indeed  by  any  other, 
generic  name. 

102.  Let  us  now  go  through  some  more  of  the 
passions,  and  see  what  the  corresponding  acts  of  the 
will  will  be.  Thus  the  passion  '  Spes '  (let  us  suppose) 
is  experienced  in  regard  to  the  pleasure  of  popularity ;  I 
think  of  popularity  as  attainable,  and  a  lively  emotion  of 
Hope  ensues.  Well — I  put  forth  no  special  effort;  and 
we  ask  what  then  will  be  the  corresponding  act  of  my 
will?  The  intellect,  as  we  have  seen,  proposes  the 
pleasure  of  popularity,  as  absent  indeed,  but  practically 
attainable ;  the  act  of  will  then  must  be, '  I  cleave  to  that 
pleasure,  so  proposed,  with  such  a  degree  of  efficacity.' 

Next  take  *  Audacia.'  I  think  of  the  fame  which  I 
may  acquire  by  confronting  danger ;  and  my  spirits  rise 
high  and  swell  for  the  encounter.  Here  is  the  passion 
'Audacia.'  What  will  be  the  corresponding  act  of  will 
— the  '  Audacia  voluntatis  ?'  The  intellect  proposes  to 
me  this  pleasure  of  fame,  as  attainable  by  these  arduous 
means ;  and  my  will  cleaves  to  that  'bonum,'  so  proposed, 
with  a  degree  of  efficacity,  sufficient  (so  long  as  it  con- 
tinues undiminished)  to  carry  me  through  no  small 
amount  of  trial  and  adventure. 

Lastly,  l  Delectatio.'  I  have  at  length  gained  that 
popularity  which  I  so  longed  for ;  and  my  spirits 
dance,  my  heart  beats  with  rapture,  accordingly.  Here 
is  the  passion  'Delectatio.'  What  will  be  the  corre- 
sponding act  of  will  ?  My  intellect  presents  to  me  my 
popularity,  as  at  length  existing ;  and  my  will  elicits  an 


214  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

act,  of  which  the  true  analysis  is  the  following ;  4 1 
would  endure  many  evils  rather  than  lose  this  popu- 
larity at  last  acquired ; '  or  c  I  cleave  to  the  thought  of 
popularity,  thus  presented  to  me  as  existing,  with  such 
or  such  a  degree  of  efficacity.'  This  affection  of  the 
will  however  is  commonly  called  c  Gaudium '  and  not 
'  Delectatio.' 

I  might  in  like  manner  go  through  the  other  '  modal 
affections ;' c  Odium  voluntatis,' '  Fuga  voluntatis,' c  Timor 
voluntatis,'  'Desperatio  voluntatis,'  'Tristitia  voluntatis,' 
and  the  rest.  But  after  what  has  been  said,  you  will 
find  no  possible  difficulty  in  explaining  their  various 
significations. 

In  illustration  of  these  remarks  on  the  *  modal  affec- 
tions '  of  the  will,  three  condemned  propositions  may  be 
quoted  :  for  these  propositions  contain  mention  of  three 
modal  affections;  viz.  '  Tristitia,'  'Gaudium,'  and  4De- 
siderium.' 

Si  cum  debita  moderatione  facias,  potes  absque 
peccato  mortali  de  vita  alicujus  tristari,  et  de  illius 
morte  natural!  gaudere  ;  illam  inefficaci  affectu 
petere  et  desiderare  ;  non  quidem  ex  displicentia 
personse,  sed  ob  aliquod  temporale  emolumentum. 

Licitum  est  absolute  desiderio  cupere  mortem 
patris,  non  quidem  ut  malum  patris,  sed  ut  bonum 
cupientis ;  quia  nimirum  ei  obventura  est  pinguis 
hsereditas. 

Licitum  est  filio  gaudere  de  parricidio 
parentis,  a  se  in  ebrietate  perpetrate,  propter 
ingentes  divitias  inde  ex  hsereditate  consecutas. 
(Denz.,  prop.  13-15,  p.  325.) 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say,  that  the  '  gaudere,' 
e.  g.  in  the  first  of  these  propositions,  does  not  refer  to 
the  passion  '  Delectatio,'  but  to  that  affection  of  the  will 


RELATION  BETWEEN  WILL  AND  SENSITIVE  APPETITE.     215 

which  we  call  '  Gaudium.'  There  is  a  certain  act  of 
will,  which  the  condemned  writer  declares  is  no  mortal 
sin,  and  is  condemned  for  so  declaring.  What  is  that 
act  ?  It  would  be  elicited  thus :  ( 1 )  my  intellect  would 
represent  to  me  the  death  of  such  a  person,  as  beneficial 
for  the  sake  of  some  temporal  gain;  and  (2)  my  will 
would  simply  and  absolutely  cleave  to  the  object  thus 
represented.  My  act  might  be  truly  analysed  thus; 
4 1  would  choose,  had  I  the  power,  that  this  man  should 
have  died,  rather  than  that  I  should  lose  the  temporal 
gain.'  Any  act,  different  from  this,  is  not  the  'gaudere' 
spoken  of  in  the  proposition.  And  a  precisely  similar 
analysis  may  be  applied,  to  those  other  modal  affections, 
4  Tristitia'  and  '  Desiderium,'  which  are  spoken  of  in 
the  three  propositions. 

Let  us  now  take  a  few  rather  more  complicated 
cases ;  where  both  propensions  and  passions  are  to  be 
considered.  Thus  (1)  what  is  meant  by  the  will  con- 
senting to  an  emotion  of  Envy?  or,  in  other  words,  what 
is  'Invidia  voluntatis  ?'  The  emotion  of  Envy  is  the 
passion  *  Desiderium/  directed  towards  some  certain 
pleasurable  object.  What  is  precisely  that  object? 
Clearly,  the  bringing  down  A.  B.  somewhat  more 
nearly  to  my  own  level.  The  emotion  of  Envy  is  a 
longing  desire  for  the  attainment  of  this  pleasure. 
That  act  of  the  will  then,  which  is  rightly  called  *  In- 
vidia  voluntatis, '  may  be  thus  analysed  ;  4 1  would 
gladly  choose,  if  I  could,  that  A.  B.  should  be  brought 
down  more  nearly  to  my  own  level.'  Or  again :  '  My 
will  cleaves  with  such  a  degree  of  efficacity  to  the 
pleasure,  which  my  intellect  represents  to  me  as 
imaginable,  of  knowing  that  A.  B.  were  brought  down 
more  nearly  to  my  own  level.' 

What  will  be  'consent  to  the  emotions  of  ill- 
humour,1  or  c ill-humour  of  the  will?'  We  must  here 
consider  in  the  first  place,  what  are  precisely  emotions 
of  ill-humour ;  a  question  perhaps  not  quite  so  easy,  as 
it  appears  on  the  surface.  The  phenomena  of  ill- 
humour,  we  may  suppose,  are  such  as  the  following.  I 
rise  up  in  a  trying  state  of  health,  such  as  makes  every- 
thing appear  through  an  unpleasant  medium ;  I  feel  in 


216  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

fact  restless  and  uncomfortable.  Or  again,  little  things  go 
provokingly  wrong;  I  am  just  too  late  for  the  train,  and 
have  to  wait  two  hours  for  another,  with  nothing  to  do ;  or 
the  like.  I  receive  the  monstrous  practical  impression,* 
that  I  am  shamefully  injured;  and  I  consequently  long 
for  retaliation.  This  state  of  mind  leads  me  to  feel,  as 
though  every  one  I  meet  were  a  partaker  in  inflicting 
this  injury.  The  mere  sight  of  a  happy  face  is  a  suffi- 
cient excitement  for  wrath :  '  How  unfeeling  towards 
me  !  what  a  disregard  to  my  feelings  is  displayed  in 
the  fact,  that  this  man  should  be  happy,  when  I  have 
received  such  a  trying  annoyance ! '  In  fact,  I  long  to 
relieve  my  uneasiness,  by  making  every  one  I  meet 
uncomfortable  so  far  as  I  dare.  In  one  word  then, 
perhaps  the  emotions  of  ill-humour  consist  of  the  sour, 
angry,  desire  which  I  experience  (while  the  ill-humour 
lasts)  of  inflicting  small  annoyance  on  every  one  I  meet; 
and  again,  of  the  pleasure  which  I  feel  in  actually  doing 
so :  all  under  the  monstrous  practical  impression,  that 
they  have  in  some  way  injured  me.  By  consent  to  these 
emotions,  we  express  those  acts  of  the  will,  which  must 
invariably  be  found  in  their  company,  unless  I  exert 
myself  to  prevent  such  a  result.  It  will  consist  therefore 
of  such  acts  as  the  following.  '  I  would  annoy  A.  B. 
in  such  a  way  if  I  could.'  1 1  choose  to  make  C.  D. 
uncomfortable  in  such  another  way.'  '  The  thought  of 
the  small  disaster,  which  E.  F.  is  now  experiencing,  is 
a  pleasurable  thought ;  my  will  cleaves  to  the  pleasure, 
thus  proposed,  with  such  a  degree  of  efficacity.'  All 
these  acts  being  elicited,  under  the  practical  impression, 
that  A.  B.  and  C.  D.  and  E.  F.  are  in  a  conspiracy  to 
treat  me  with  neglect  or  contumely. 

It  is  so  very  important  rightly  to  grasp  this  dis- 
tinction between  emotions  and  volitions,  that  I  will 
give  yet  another  instance  for  practice.  Let  us  con- 
sider then,  what  is  that  act  of  the  will,  which  we  may 
call  a  murmuring  against  God's  Providence.  And 
here,  as  before,  let  us  first  consider  the  emotion  itself. 

*  The  precise  nature  of  this  difference,  between  a  practical  impression 
and  a  speculative  opinion,  will  be  considered  later  ;  but  the  general  meaning 
of  my  statement  is  (I  hope)  sufficiently  obvious. 


RELATION  BETWEEN  WILL  AND  SENSITIVE  APPETITE.     217 

No  two  emotions  are  more  distinct  from  each  other, 
than  the  two  following.  On  the  one  hand,  there  is 
a  loving  and  submissive  desire  that  God  may  in  some 
respects  change  the  course  of  His  Providence ;  save  me 
from  this  or  that  temptation,  from  this  or  that  calamity ; 
or  avert  from  His  Church  this  or  that  impending  evil. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  that  emotion  which  we  all 
know  so  well, — the  repining  and  murmuring  against 
God's  appointments.  From  the  first  of  these  proceeds 
that  loving  spirit  of  prayer,  which  is  always  so  welcome 
a  sound  to  Almighty  God,  and  which  He  often  very 
signally  rewards;  but  from  the  last  (if  unresisted)  no- 
thing issues,  except  sin  of  various  kinds.  I  suppose 
that  the  acts  of  will  corresponding  to  these  two  emo- 
tions,—  and  which  will  necessarily  be  elicited  in  their 
company  unless  we  exert  ourselves  to  prevent  it, — may 
be  thus  respectively  analysed.  Act  1.  '  I  would  choose 
*  this  course  of  events  rather  than  that,  had  I  the  power, 
'  if  God  fully  approved  such  a  change.''  Act  2.  '  Even 
'  though  God  continued  to  approve  the  present  course 
'  of  events,  yet  I  would  most  certainly  choose  another, 
4  had  I  the  power.'  In  the  former  act,  the  intellect 
proposes  the  object  to  the  will,  as  only  desirable  under 
the  condition  of  God's  Approval ;  in  the  latter  case  such 
condition  is  wholly  absent.  It  is  the  latter  act,  I  need 
not  say,  and  not  the  former,  which  is  an  act  of  dis- 
content with  God's  Providence. 

103.  These  will  suffice  as  mere  instances  of  the 
sympathy  between  will  and  sensitive  appetite.  But 
there  is  one  particular  case,  which,  on  its  own  account, 
and  not  as  a  mere  illustration,  demands  our  direct  and 
most  careful  attention. 

The  first  remark  which  I  wish  here  to  make  is  the 
following.  If  my  will  cleaves  to  a  pleasurable  object 
as  such,  it  is  not  for  its  own  sake,  but  for  the  sake  of 
the  pleasure  of  possessing  it,  that  we  make  it  our 
choice.  This  is,  in  fact,  a  mere  tautology;  a  simple 
truism.  I  choose  then  these  pleasurable  objects,  for 
the  sake  of  possessing  them  in  their  appropriate 
manner ;  in  the  case  of  non  -  physical  propensions 


218  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

(see  n.  93),  for  the  sake  of  believing  that  they  exist; 
in  the  case  of  physical  propensions,  for  the  sake  of 
some  closer  contact.  In  the  case  then  of  non-phy- 
sical propensions,  that  very  statement,  which  we  have 
just  seen  to  be  a  mere  truism,  almost  assumes  the  form 
of  paradox ;  yet  of  course  it  is  literally  true.  Why  do 
I,  who  yield  myself  up  to  vain-glory,  seek  popularity? 
That  I  may  have  pleasure  from  it.  How  do  I  derive 
pleasure  from  it?  by  thinking  that  it  exists,  and  dwell- 
ing on  that  thought.  The  very  end  then,  which  the 
vain-glorious  man  has  in  view  when  he  seeks  popu- 
larity, is  not  that  he  may  be  popular,  but  that  he  may 
think  himself  so.  It  is  immensely  easier  to  think  him- 
self popular  if  he  is  so,  than  if  he  is  not ;  and  for  that 
reason  alone  he  seeks  popularity. 

I  now  proceed  to  a  further  remark.  We  have 
already  seen,  that  in  the  case  of  every  propension,  there 
are  two  different  delights;  Delight  of  possession,  and 
Delight  of  imagination — 'Delectatio  apprehensiva '  and 

*  Delectatio  imaginativa.'    (See  n.  96.)     Take  first  De- 
light of  possession.    The  vindictive  savage,  who  has  his 
enemy  under  his  power,  orders  the  most  exquisite  tor- 
ments to  be  inflicted ;  and  gloats,  though  at  a  distance, 
over  the  thought,  that  this  or  that  part  of  his  command 
is  being  at  this  moment  executed.     Here  we  have  de- 
light of  possession,  exercised  on  that  pleasurable  object 

*  vindictive  retribution.'     The  will,  as  we  have  seen, 
by  not  specially  exerting  itself  on  the  occasion,  elicits 
of  course  a  corresponding  act;    called  however,  as  I 
stated,  an  act  not  of  '  Delectatio,'  but  of  '  Gaudium.' 
'  I  cleave,  with   such   a   degree   of  efficacity,  to  that 
pleasure  which  is  derived  from  the  thought,  that  my 
enemy  at  this  moment  is  being  tormented.'     The  more 
he  thinks  of  this   fact,  that  his   enemy  is  being  tor- 
mented,— the  more  keenly  he  derives  from  it  that  very 
pleasure,  which  was  the  end  he  aimed  at  in  bringing 
that  fact  to  pass. 

But  now,  secondly,  suppose  I  am  such  a  savage, 
and  that  my  enemy  is  dead  or  is  otherwise  out  of  my 
reach;  still  I  may  enjoy  a  subordinate  and  secondary 


RELATION  BETWEEN  WILL  AND  SENSITIVE  APPETITE.     219 

pleasure.  I  may  fancy  him  at  my  mercy ;  I  may  de- 
light in  the  visionary  conception,  that  I  am  inflicting 
the  most  exquisite  torments ;  I  paint  to  myself  the  ex- 
pression of  anguish,  exhibited  in  his  countenance;  I 
fancy  him  appealing  for  mercy,  and  I  fancy  myself  an- 
swering every  such  appeal  by  a  fresh  insult  and  a  fresh 
wound.  Now,  suppose  my  soul  puts  forth  no  special 
effort  —  suppose,  in  other  words,  my  will  consents  to  this 
emotion — what  would  the  act  of  will  be  called,  which  in- 
evitably ensues  ?  You  see,  my  sensitive  appetite  here  is 
not  soliciting  me  at  all  to  any  resolve;  it  is  not  solicit- 
ing me,  e.g.  to  meditate  any  future  plan  of  vengeance. 
If  such  were  the  emotion,  it  would  be  c  Desiderium,'  a 
painful  passion ;  *  Oh,  that  I  could  punish  my  enemy ! ' 
Whereas  this  is  4  Delectatio ; '  a  self-satisfied  passion  ;  a 
passion  which  desires  nothing  at  all,  unless  it  be  its 
own  continuance.  The  will's  consent  therefore  will 
be  simply  an  act  of  this  kind ;  c  I  choose  the  continuance 
4  of  the  thoughts  which  I  am  now  eliciting,  because  of 
4  the  pleasurable  emotion  which  I  thence  derive :'  or  in 
other  words,  '  my  will  cleaves,  with  such  a  degree  of 
c  efficacity,  to  the  pleasure  which  I  am  now  experi- 
'  encing.'  Yet  this  is  not  a  case  of  c  Gaudium  ;*  for 
'  Gaudium  '  is  the  will's  consent  to  '  Delectatio  appre- 
hensiva.J  '  Gaudium '  was  analyzed  in  our  very  last 
paragraph,  where  we  were  supposing  a  real  vengeance 
inflicted.  What  then  is  the  theological  phrase  for  the 
phenomenon  we  are  now  considering — the  will's  con- 
sent to  '  Delectatio  imaginativa  ? '  Where  the  act  of 
consent  (as  in  the  supposed  case)  is  sinful,  it  goes  by 
the  name  '  Morose  Delectation ; '  otherwise  it  has  no 
special  name. 

You  may  be  surprised  perhaps  at  the  length  to 
which  I  have  gone,  in  this  picture  of  the  vindictive 
man.  My  reason  is  the  extremely  important  part 
(alas!)  held  among  sins,  by  this  one  of  Morose  Delec- 
tation, in  matters  of  impurity.  I  could  not  go  fully 
into  particulars  under  that  particular  head;  and  yet  I 
wished  you  clearly  to  understand  the  nature  of  the 
sin.  In  fact  its  consideration  is  an  absolutely  indis- 


220  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

pensable  part  of  the  subject  which  we  are  treating ; 
viz.  the  relation  which  exists  between  will  and  sen- 
sitive appetite. 

After  all  that  has  been  said  in  this  Section,  you 
will  naturally  ask  ;  *  Supposing  some  emotion  to  be 
'  experienced  which  solicits  to  sin,  —  what  is  the  most 
4  available  way  for  us  to  avert  the  will's  consent  and 
4  avoid  sin  ? '  This  question  will  very  shortly  come 
before  us,  in  detail  and  at  length. 

104.  Before  leaving  however  this  earlier  part  of 
our  subject,  one  final  remark  should  be  made.  We 
have  seen  that  whenever  the  pleasurable  object  is 
thought  of,  and  no  special  resistance  is  put  forth,  every 
emotion  of  the  sensitive  appetite  is  invariably  accom- 
panied by  a  corresponding  modal  affection  of  the  will. 
But  the  converse  by  no  means  follows;  and  this  is 
carefully  to  be  observed.  Acts  of  the  will  are  frequently 
enough  elicited,  without  any  corresponding  emotions 
at  all.  Thus  (to  take  a  trivial  instance),  if  I  have 
been  accidentally  rude  to  a  man,  I  say  very  naturally 
*I  am  extremely  sorry  for  what  I  have  done.'  I  don't 
mean  by  this,  that  I  experience  the  passion  '  Tristitia;' 
that  I  am  at  all  out  of  spirits ;  that  which  I  elicit,  is 
simply  the  4  Dolor  voluntatis.'  My  intellect  represents 
to  me  the  alternative  of  not  having  been  guilty  of  this 
rudeness,  as  a  very  desirable  alternative ;  and  my  will 
cleaves  to  the  alternative,  so  represented,  with  this  or 
that  degree  of  efficacity.  In  like  manner  (to  go  from 
the  least  important  to  the  most  important  instance)  the 
4  Dolor,'  required  for  Absolution,  is  not  depression  of 
spirits,  even  the  very  slightest.  My  intellect  repre- 
sents the  having  offended  God  as  a  present  evil ;  it 
represents  simultaneously  the  alternative  of  being  free 
from  that  present  evil,  as  a  very  desirable  alternative. 
My  will  cleaves  to  that  alternative,  so  represented, 
with  this  or  that  degree  of  efficacity.  All  this  you 
will  understand  far  more  fully,  when  we  come  to  that 
extremely  important  subject,  the  relation  between 
intellect  and  will. 

This  statement  then  is  undoubtedly  true,  and  very 


RELATION  BETWEEN  WILL  AND  SENSITIVE  APPETITE.     221 

important ;  viz.  that  there  are  often  acts  of  the  will,  with- 
out any  corresponding  emotions.  Yet  this  very  fact, 
undoubted  as  it  is,  is  often  most  unduly  pressed,  and 
made  the  occasion  of  great  self-deceit.  Suppose  I  hear 
the  lowest  principles  of  life  deliberately  advocated ;  or 
I  hear  of  acts  wantonly  done,  most  grossly  injurious 
to  the  cause  of  God; — and  suppose,  in  hearing  such 
things,  I  experience  no  emotion  at  all  of  holy  resent- 
ment. Well,  it  may  be  that  I  am  none  the  less  eliciting 
most  efficacious  acts  of  the  will ;  that  I  am  prepared 
at  this  moment  to  go  through  indefinite  labour  and 
exertion,  if  by  such  means  I  could  avert  those  outrages 
against  God's  Majesty.  I  say,  it  may  be  so  ;  but  how 
probable  is  it  that  it  is  so  ?  How  should  we  judge  of 
such  probability,  in  any  case  where  God  is  not  thus 
directly  concerned?  If  my  mother  for  instance  were 
grossly  libelled,  and  I  experienced  no  emotion  what- 
ever,— how  far  would  you  think  it  probable  that  my 
will  is  eliciting  most  efficacious  acts  of  love  towards 
her  and  zeal  for  her  good  fame?  It  is  of  course  just 
as  probable  in  one  case  as  in  the  other. 

I  remember  that  I  was  once  venturing  to  express 
an  opinion,  how  odious  and  despicable  is  the  character 
of  those,  who  are  content  with  avoiding  Hell  (as  they 
hope)  for  themselves,  and  have  no  generous  regard 
for  God's  interests,  no  zeal  for  promoting  His  general 
service.  An  objector  replied;  *  Oh,  all  that  is  a  mere 
'  matter  of  sensitive  emotion ;  men  have  no  controul 
'  over  that;  it  is  most  unjust  to  blame  them  for  being 
'  without  it.'  The  reply  is  obvious.  Shew  us  men, 
of  whom  you  will  seriously  state,  that  their  will 
is  most  efficaciously  directed  to  such  ends  ; — that 
they  are  prepared  to  sacrifice  this  or  that  most  im- 
portant part  of  their  worldly  interest,  in  order  that 
God  may  be  the  more  honoured  and  served.  Let  this 
fact  be  admitted  in  regard  to  them,  and  the  further 
fact,  of  their  being  destitute  of  sensitive  emotion  in 
the  same  direction,  will  but  increase  our  admira- 
tion. Noble,  heroic,  souls,  under  the  fearful  chastise- 
ment of  aridity !  Surely  the  fact  is,  that  in  most  cases, 


222  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

with  these  cold-hearted  men,  there  seems  but  little  sign 
of  their  will  being  in  any  degree  more  fervent  than 
their  emotions. 

It  is  true  no  doubt,  that  some  emotions  are  far  more 
wayward  and  capricious  than  others  in  their  visitation ; 
and  something  will  be  said  on  this  subject  in  our  theo- 
logical work.  A  man,  e.  g.  may  be  interior,  mortified 
and  unworldly,  who  yet,  from  time  to  time,  will  think 
of  his  Saviour's  sufferings  with  little  or  no  sensible 
compassion.  Yet  if  this  were  anything  like  a  per- 
manent habit,  it  would  surely  be  a  clamorous  warning 
for  him,  to  enter  carefully  into  himself  and  see  how 
things  stand.  It  is  very  possible,  that  there  is  no  fault 
of  his  in  the  matter ;  but  the  presumption  would  be  all 
the  other  way.  And  this  the  rather,  because  (accord- 
ing to  the  common  opinion)  none  but  Saints  are  ordi- 
narily visited  with  long-continued  and  enduring  aridity. 
And  the  same  principle  holds,  on  the  grief  involved  in 
repentance  of  our  sins.  If  we  find, — not  sometimes 
and  exceptionally,  but  always  and  habitually, — that 
the  reflection  on  our  past  sins  produces  no  emotion  of 
grief, — it  may  be  without  fault  of  ours ;  and  our  '  Dolor 
voluntatis '  may  be  very  genuine :  but  we  should  care- 
fully look  into  the  question,  and  see  if  it  really  be  so. 

105.  So  much  on  the  relation,  between  the  passions 
and  the  modal  affections  of  will.  Now  the  questions  of 
liberty  and  sinfulness  cannot  be  considered  in  detail, 
till  we  come  to  our  theological  work ;  but  it  is  very 
plain,  and  has  been  implied  throughout,  that  no 
emotions  can  possibly  be  in  themselves  sinful,  because 
they  are  not  in  our  own  power.  On  the  other  hand, 
those  acts  of  will,  which  follow  in  the  wake  of  such 
emotions,  are  very  often  sins  ;  and  in  that  case  the 
emotions  themselves  become  temptations.  Yet  there 
are  some  acts  of  the  will  which  so  far  resemble 
emotions;  viz.  that  they  cannot  be  sinful,  because  the 
will  has  no  power  of  withholding  them.  This  shall 
be  our  next  matter  of  consideration. 

It  is  a  remarkable  fact  in  the  constitution  of  our 
nature,  that  the  action  of  our  sensitive  appetite 


RELATION  BETWEEN  WILL  AND  SENSITIVE  APPETITE.      223 

greatly  anticipates  that  of  our  will.  My  whole  emo- 
tions are  on  fire,  before  my  will  has  any  real  power 
of  interfering  in  the  matter  ever  so  slightly.  These 
first  movements  of  the  sensitive  appetite  last  an  ex- 
tremely small  portion  of  time;  as  we  may  say,  for  a 
single  instant :  and  they  are  called  '  motus  primo- 
primi.'  The  scholastics  are  in  the  habit  of  saying, 
that  in  that  single  instant  '  voluntas  attrahitur  quasi 
natura;'  the  will  is  drawn  down  by  the  sensitive 
appetite,  like  a  piece  of  inanimate  matter.  Though 
you  were  the  greatest  of  Saints,  and  though  that 
emotion  were  the  foulest  of  temptations,  in  that  brief 
instant  your  will  most  unreservedly  consents:  most 
unreservedly,  and  yet  necessarily  (not  freely)  and  so 
without  culpability.  Then  follow  a  further  number  of 
instants,  during  which  the  emotions  are  called  '  motus 
secundo  -  primi ;'  when  the  will  has  some  little  power 
to  resist,  but  has  no  opportunity  for  collecting  its  full 
powers.  In  no  case,  as  we  shall  afterwards  see,  can 
consent  to  the  f  motus  secundo-primi '  exceed  venial 
sin,  however  grave  be  the  matter  in  which  temptation 
takes  place. 

Bellarmine  very  ingeniously  draws  out  this  whole 
doctrine,  from  St.  James,  c.  i.  v.  14,  15.  "  Every  one 
"  is  tempted,"  says  the  Apostle,  "  being  drawn  away 
"  and  enticed  by  his  Concupiscence :"  here,  says  Bellar- 
mine, is  consent  to  '  motus  primo-primi.'  "  But  Con- 
cupiscence conceives  and  brings  forth  sin  : "  here  is 
consent  to  the  '  motus  secund6-primi,'  which  is  venial 
sin.  "  And  sin  when  consummated  brings  forth  death :" 
here  the  Apostle  represents  that  consent  as  become 
complete  and  consummated ;  as  become  perfectly  de- 
liberate; and  so  as  bringing  forth  death,  or  becoming 
mortal* 

*  Accedat  his  testinionium  S.  Jacob!  Apostoli,  qui  in  1  cap.  v.  14,  15. 
suae  epistolee,  distinguit  tentationem  a  peccato,  et  peccatum  a  crimine : 
'  Unusquisque,'  inquit,  *  tentatur  a  Concupiscentia  sua  abstractus  et  illectus. 
*  Concupiscentia  verd,  cum  conceperit,  parit  peccatum  ;  peccatum  verd  cum 
'  consummatum  fuerit,  generat  mortem.'  Ubi  S.  Jacobus  non  distinguit 
motus  concupiscentise  in  involuntarium  et  voluntarium  ;  nee  dicit,  omnem 
motum  voluntarium  esse  peccatum  mortale,  omnem  involuntarium  esse 


224  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

106.  It  will  be  very  useful  to  use  a  phrase,  when 
speaking  of  intellect  and  will,  parallel  to  that  which 
we    have    just    been    considering ;    and    to   speak   of 
'  actus  primd-primi '  and  '  secundo-primi.'     By  c  actus 
primd-primi'    then,    we    will    designate    those    acts, 
which  come  as  it  were  upon  the  intellect  or  will  (as  a 
heathen  would  say)  by  mere  chance;  those  which  the 
faculty  elicits,  before  the  will  has  the  slightest  power 
of  interfering.      By    c  actus   secundo-primi'   we   will 
designate  those  acts  which  the  faculty  elicits,  before 
the   will    has    opportunity   of  putting   forth   its  full 
power. 

107.  Having  now  then  mentioned  those  cases,  where 
the   will  has  either  no  power  whatever,   or  very  in- 
sufficient power,  of  resisting  the  sensitive  appetite,— 
let  us  finally  consider  by  what   means   the  will  can 
resist,  when   it  has  arrived  at  the  period  of  mature 
deliberation.     This  question  is  far  most  commonly  met 
with  in  a  somewhat  narrower  form  ;  viz.  Avhat  power 
has  the  will  of  resisting  temptation  ?      And  as  this  is 
not  only  the  more  common   form  but  immeasurably 
the  more  important,  I  will  treat  the  question  at  length, 
under   that   particular   point   of  view.     We  shall   be 
afterwards  able,  with  great  ease,  so  to  state  the  prin- 
ciples  we    shall    have    evolved,    that    they    shall   be 
applicable  to  the  whole  general  question  above  stated. 

Aristotle  has  stated  an  extremely  important  psycho- 
logical fact,  when  he  says  that  the  will  governs  other 
parts  of  us  '  despotically ;'  but  that  it  governs  the 

veniale,  ut  Philippus  Melancthon  voluisset ;  sed  distinguit  tres  motus  Con- 
cupiscentise.  Unum  involuntarium,  quo  quis  ad  peccatum  incitatur,  sine 
ullo  suo  consensu  ;  cum  ait :  '  Unusquisque  tentatur  a  concupiscentia  sua 
'  abstractus  et  illectus.'  Et  tune  motum  non  dicit  Apostolus  esse  pec- 
catum, sed  causam  peccati ;  si  nimirum  accedat  consensus.  Alterum  motum 
vult  esse  imperfecte  voluntarium,  cum  addit, '  Concupiscentia  verb,  cum 
1  conceperit,  parit  peccatum.'  Esse  autem  hunc  motum  imperfecte  volun- 
tarium, et  proinde  peccatum,  sed  veniale,  patet,  quia  nominatur  peccatum, 
et  tamen  distinguitur  a  peccato  consummate  et  mortem  generante.  Ex 
quo  intelligimus,  hunc  secundum  motum  non  esse  peccatum  consummatum ; 
nee  generare  mortem  ;  ac  per  hoc  non  esse  peccatum  mortale.  Tertium 
denique  adjungit  perfecte  voluntarium  :  et  hunc  motum  esse  peccatum 
mortale  declarat  Apostolus,  dicens,  '  Peccatum  verb,  cum  consummatum 
fuerit,  generat  mortem.' — BELLARMINE,  De  Amiss.  Grat.  lib.  i.  cap.  9.  n.  12. 


RELATION  BETWEEN  WILL  AND  SENSITIVE  APPETITE.     225 

sensitive  appetite  '  politically.'  Let  us  draw  out  the 
meaning  of  this  statement. 

First  then,  in  regard  to  every  other  part  of  our 
soul  and  body,  the  will  governs,  either  despotically  or 
not  at  all.  If  I  say  'hand,  move  up;'  '  finger,  move 
down  ; '  '  foot,  walk  ; '  the  result  straightway  ensues. 
If  I  say,  4  intellect,  turn  yourself  from  thinking  on  ma- 
*  thematical  subjects,  to  dwelling  on  this  parliamentary 
'  speech;'  —  so  long  as  I  continue  the  command,  the 
desired  act  also  continues.  On  the  other  hand,  if  I 
say,  '  body,  become  thin ;'  or  '  hair,  grow  more  quickly ;' 
or  '  stomach,  digest  more  agreeably ; '  no  result  ensues 
of  any  kind.  Or  if,  without  having  studied  mathe- 
matics, I  say,  '  intellect,  contemplate  the  properties  of 
4 conic  sections; ' — again  no  result  ensues.  In  all  these 
cases,  you  see,  the  will  either  commands  despotically, 
or  commands  not  at  all. 

What  is  the  difference  between  despotical  and  poli- 
tical government?  Without  attempting  complete  pre- 
cision, it  may  be  said  perhaps  that  the  distinction  turns, 
rather  on  the  character  and  circumstances  of  the  people, 
than  on  the  form  of  government.  If  the  people  are 
barbarians,  trained  to  be  mere  passive  tools  in  their  go- 
vernors' hand,  the  government  is  despotic  ;  otherwise  it 
is  political.  The  difference  which  we  mean  to  express 
is  of  the  following  kind.  If  a  despot  once  obtains  a 
clear  view,  that  such  a  measure  is  important  for  the 
well-being  of  his  country, — nothing  remains,  but  to 
enact  that  measure  and  execute  it.  How  different  with 
a  '  political '  sovereign  !  He  sees  clearly  that  a  measure 
is  very  good  and  important ;  but  it  will  shock  public 
opinion.  c  I  must  exercise  management  here,'  he  says ; 
'  I  must  conceal  my  ultimate  projects  ;  I  must  veil  what 
4  I  do  under  an  acceptable  appearance ;  nay,  I  must 
4  cease  from  attempting  what  is  best,  that  I  may  secure 
4  what  is  practicable.'  Or  to  go  in  my  illustrations,  from 
one  extreme  of  human  life  to  another,  look  at  the  angler 
who  has  hooked  a  large  fish.  His  power  over  it  is 
4  political '  and  not  despotic.  If  he  tries  by  main  force 
to  land  him,  the  line  will  break  and  the  fish  escape 

Q 


226  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

altogether.  Yet  he  has  a  very  real  power  over  the  fish, 
if  he  will  only  understand  that  it  is  '  political.'  He 
draws  the  fish  quietly  backward  and  forward,  till  its 
strength  is  exhausted  ;  if  it  struggles  a  good  deal  for 
deliverance,  he  allows  it  a  little  free  play  for  a  few 
moments,  and  then  begins  again.  At  length  his  efforts 
are  crowned  with  success,  and  the  fish  is  safely  depo- 
sited in  his  basket. 

Now  this  is  a  model  for  the  fit  way  of  dealing  with 
our  sensitive  appetite,  when  we  wish  to  controul  it. 
I  am  frantic  with  an  emotion  of  rage,  at  some  stinging 
insult  which  I  have  received.  By  help  of  prayer 
indeed  and  God's  answering  grace,  I  keep  my  will  most 
firmly  fixed  in  the  right  direction  ;  but  can  I  compel 
my  inflamed  passions  to  be  suddenly  cool  ?  can  I  say, 
'  violent  emotions,  cease  and  leave  me  to  repose?'  I 
might  as  profitaJDly  address  my  command  to  the 
swelling  and  raging  ocean.  Am  I  powerless  then  in 
quelling  the  storm  ?  Very  far  indeed  from  it ;  I  may 
govern  it  to  a  very  great  extent,  if  I  will  only  be 
content  to  do  so  '  politically.'  For  instance,  I  fix  my 
thoughts  in  a  careful  and  sustained  way  on  the  fact, 
how  immeasurably  fouler  and  baser  are  those  outrages 
which  God  has  received  at  my  hand,  than  are  any 
which  I  have  been  called  on  to  endure.  Or  I  think 
of  the  very  many  extenuating  circumstances  attending 
the  injury  I  have  received.  Or  I  think  how  far  more 
deserving  of  pity  than  of  anger,  is  the  poor  man  who 
has  inflicted  on  me  this  blow.  And  so,  in  the  very 
process  of  such  thoughts,  a  gradual  change  takes  place 
in  my  emotions ;  my  sensitive  appetite  comes  into 
harmony  with  my  will ;  and  God  remains  master  of 
the  whole  field. 

This  being  understood,  I  proceed  to  answer  the 
question  before  us,  In  every  case,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  will  consents  to  the  emotion,  if  it  elicit  one  par- 
ticular act:  strictly  speaking  therefore,  it  resists,  if 
instead  of  that  one  act  it  elicits  any  other  act  whatever. 
Thus  it  often  happens,  as  St.  Augustine  says,  that 
4  vitia  vitiis  vincuntur;'  a  temptation  to  sloth,  e.g.  is 


RELATION  BETWEEN  WILL  AND  SENSITIVE  APPETITE.     227 

overcome  on  the  motive  of  avarice.  Yet  in  the  or- 
dinary theological  sense  we  are  not  said  to  resist 
temptation,  unless  we  elicit  some  virtuous,  or  at  least 
indifferent  act,  in  place  of  that  sinful  act  to  which  the 
temptation  solicits. 

What  kind  of  act  we  may  in  each  particular  case 
most  profitably  choose,  is  a  matter  of  spiritual  pru- 
dence ;  and  to  decide  it  is  an  important  portion  of  the 
ascetical  art.  But  more  commonly,  I  suppose,  it  is 
better  to  fix  our  own  mind  on  thoughts  of  the  most 
opposite  character.  So,  if  we  are  suffering  under 
strong  emotions  of  ill-humour  (see  n.  102),  a  very 
good  way  of  resistance  will  be,  to  work  particularly  at 
doing  good  turns  to  the  various  persons  on  whom  our 
ill-humour  seeks  to  vent  itself;  or  if  we  have  no 
opportunity  for  that,  wishing  them  definite  blessings. 
Under  an  emotion  of  envy,  it  may  be  well  to  pray 
earnestly  that  this  or  that  definite  good  may  befall  the 
object  of  our  envy  ;  and  to  do  what  may  lie  in  our 
power,  towards  promoting  that  good.  Under  the  tempt- 
ation of  vain-glory,  it  will  always  be  useful  to  ponder 
carefully  and  in  fullest  detail,  on  various  circumstances 
in  my  past  life,  under  which  I  have  cut  a  most  con- 
temptible figure ;  nay  sometimes  perhaps  to  pray  for 
still  further  humiliations.  If  the  emotion  be  of  pride, 
let  me  dwell  on  some  fact  of  my  life  so  humiliating, 
that  I  should  be  crushed  at  the  very  thought  of  the 
world  knowing  it;  in  order  that  I  may  sufficiently 
taste  my  own  contemptibleness.  Yet,  though  this  is 
perhaps  the  more  common  rule,  there  may  be  occa- 
sions often  enough,  when  we  shall  act  more  prudently 
in  turning  our  thoughts  to  matters  altogether  hetero- 
geneous ;  to  mathematical  studies,  or  to  a  game  at 
cricket. 

But  this  truth  also  must  be  carefully  observed.  We 
may  be  really  and  truly  refusing  our  consent  to  the 
emotion,  while  we  are  taking  no  steps  whatever  to- 
wards diminishing  or  subduing  it.  This  is  evident  on 
the  surface,  from  what  has  been  said.  So  long  as  my 
will  refuses  to  elicit  that  act  to  which  the  temptation 


228  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

solicits  it,  so  long  I  am  resisting  the  temptation.  Here 
then  again  is  a  question  of  spiritual  prudence.  Gene- 
rally, no  doubt,  it  is  better  to  adopt  measures  of  one 
kind  or  another,  towards  removing  the  dangerous  emo- 
tion altogether ;  yet,  sometimes  we  shall  do  more 
wisely,  in  despising  it  (as  it  were)  and  leaving  it  to 
itself.  So  long  as  the  emotion  be  not  accompanied 
with  the  thought  of  an  evil  object,  no  effort  at  all  will 
be  necessary  (as  we  have  seen)*  to  prevent  the  will's 
consent ;  but  even  when  the  thought  is  present,  much 
less  exertion  is  required  for  merely  averting  that  con- 
sent, than  would  be  requisite  if  we  attempted  the 
further  task  of  subduing  the  emotion.  And  this  very 
question  is  often  asked  and  thus  answered  in  books  of 
Moral  Theology.  Thus,  St.  Alphonsus  (de  peccatis  in 
genere,  c.  i,  n.  6,)  enquires,  *  An  peccet  graviter  qui 
'  negative  se  habet,  et  positive  non  resistit  motui 
4  appetitus  sensitivi  circa  objectum  sub  mortali  pro- 
4  hibitum.'  He  takes  for  granted,  either  that  there  is 
no  thought  of  this  mortally  sinful  object,  and  so  (for 
the  moment)  no  temptation;  or  else,  that  at  all  events 
the  will  is  firm  in  refusing  to  elicit  that  act,  to  which 
it  is  solicited.  And,  supposing  this,  he  asks,  whether 
a  man  is  further  bound  to  aim  at  subduing  the  emotion 
itself. 

One  thing  however  is  evident,  and  has  a  very  im- 
portant bearing  on  the  question  immediately  before  us. 
So  long  as  the  emotion  remains  unsubdued,  there  is  a 
constant  and  most  imminent  danger,  of  an  evil  thought 
entering  the  mind,  and  of  the  active  temptation  thus 
recurring.  Suppose,  e.g.  the  emotion  be  one  of  fiery 
rage,  occasioned  by  some  galling  insult.  There  is 
most  imminent  danger,  lest  '  actus  primo-primi '  of  the 
intellect  make  continual  incursions,  representing  how 
pleasurable  it  would  be  to  punish  our  foe.  If,  in- 
deed, we  are  faithful  to  grace,  these  thoughts,  con- 
stantly recurring,  are  constantly  put  away;  but  then, 
perhaps,  as  constantly  they  return  again.  Under 
a  very  violent  emotion,  there  may  be  an  almost  un- 

*  (n.  100.) 


RELATION  BETWEEN  WILL  AND  SENSITIVE  APPETITE.     229 

broken  series  of  intellectual  c  actus  primo-primi:'  like 
those  curves  of  which  we  read  in  mathematics,  abound- 
ing in  what  are  called  conjugate  points ;  in  other 
words,  made  up  to  a  great  extent  (as  one  may  say)  of 
a  number  of  points,  which  are  infinite  in  number,  and 
yet  no  two  of  them  exactly  in  contact  with  each  other. 
Nay,  there  may  be  an  absolutely  unbroken  continuation 
of  foul  images;  specially  where  diabolical  agency  is  at 
work.  The  will,  at  every  instant,  is  occupied  in  reject- 
ing the  intellectual  '  actus-primo  -  primus  '  of  the 
former  instant,  while  suffering  in  this  very  new  instant 
from  a  fresh  intellectual  incursion.  Such  miserable 
facts  as  these,  often  make  it  difficult  for  a  holy  man  to 
know,  whether  he  is  firmly  resisting  temptation;  and 
such  facts  accordingly  have  from  time  to  time  caused 
most  bitter  anguish  to  the  highest  Saints.  '  Viri  timo- 
rati '  are  tempted  to  regard  the  very  continuance  of  this 
intellectual  picture,  as  a  proof  that  they  have  in  some 
degree  consented ;  whereas  the  fact  has  very  probably 
been,  that  they  have  been  simply  acquiring  great  trea- 
sures of  merit. 

On  the  particular  case  then  of  resisting  temptation, 
the  sum  of  our  remarks  will  appear  to  be  this : — 

(1)  In  the  great  majority  of  cases^  it  will  be  very 
desirable  to  aim,  by  such  ingenious  devices  as  have 
been  illustrated  at  length,  to  subdue  the  emotion. 
(2)  The  temptation,  however,  may  be  faithfully  re- 
sisted, without  any  attempt  to  subdue  the  emotion;  if  we 
take  pains  to  elicit  some  good  or  indifferent  act  at  each 
instant,  in  place  of  that  evil  act  to  which  we  are  soli- 
cited. (3)  However  highly  inflamed  be  the  emotion, — 
so  long  as  there  is  no  thought  of  the  evil  object,  there 
is  no  present  temptation;  though  we  are  in  most  im- 
minent and  momentary  danger  of  temptation  arising. 

And  on  the  more  general  question,  of  the  will's 
power  to  withstand  the  sensitive  appetite,  two  pro- 
positions will  state  all  that  is  important. 

(1.)  At  every  moment  the  will  possesses  the  phy- 
sical power,  of  resisting  those  solicitations  which  arise 
from  the  sensitive  appetite;  or  in  other  words,  of 


230  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

putting  forth  some  different  act,  from  that  to  which 
those  solicitations  invite  him.  The  will  possesses  this 
power,  through  its  despotic  government  of  the  intellect; 
by  means  of  turning  the  thoughts,  with  an  effort,  into 
this  or  that  totally  distinct  direction.  How  far  this  power 
is  always  a  moral  (as  well  as  physical)  power — as,  for 
instance,  where  the  emotion  is  a  strong  temptation  and 
there  is  no  recourse  to  prayer — this  is  quite  a  separate 
consideration,  and  belongs  to  a  much  later  portion  of 
our  work.  We  have  not  yet  treated  on  the  difference 
between  moral  and  physical  power;  and  (though  we  had 
done  so)  the  question  just  stated  does  not  appertain  to 
the  relation  between  will  and  sensitive  appetite,  but 
turns  rather  on  the  intrinsic  strength  or  weakness  of 
the  will  itself.  There  is  no  question  of  more  vital  im- 
portance; but  it  does  not  find  its  fit  place  here. 

(2.)  To  resist  the  solicitations  of  the  sensitive 
appetite  is  one  thing;  to  aim  at  subduing  those  emo- 
tions themselves,  is  quite  a  different  and  a  further  thing. 


231 


SECTION  IV. 
On  Certain  other  Phenomena  of  the  Will. 

108.  Here  we  close  this  series  of  enquiries,  con- 
cerning the  relation  which   exists   between    will  and 
sensitive  appetite.     There  are  other  enquiries,  which 
are  even  much  more  important,  concerning  the  will's 
relation  to  the  intellect.     But  these  are  so  indissolubly 
mixed  up  with  the  great  doctrine  of  Liberty, — and  this 
again   with   the   most   controverted    portions    of    the 
c  Grace'  treatise, — that  we  must  defer  their  methodical 
investigation  till  we  enter  on  Theology.    Several  truths, 
indeed,  which  are  then  to  be  fully  and  methodically 
considered,  will  by  necessity  be  partially  implied  and 
taken  for  granted  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  course ;  as, 
in  fact,  they  have  been  already.     But  the  full  state- 
ment and  development  of  those  truths  must  come  later. 

There  are  certain  propositions  however,  in  regard  to 
the  will,  over  and  above  those  treated  in  the  last  Section, 
which  even  at  this  early  stage  require  to  be  stated  with 
some  degree  of  definitiveness  and  clearness.  To  do 
this  will  be  our  purpose  in  this  present  Section. 

The  '  modal  affections'  of  the  will,  '  Amor,'  4  Deside- 
rium,1  and  the  rest,  are  comparatively  seldom  spoken 
about,  I  think,  eo  nomine  in  Theology;  except  when 
the  relation  between  will  and  sensitive  appetite  is 
being  considered.  Different  phrases  are  commonly 
used,  whether  to  express  the  same  or  other  phenomena; 
such  phrases  I  mean,  as  l  Intentio  finis,'  '  Fruitio  finis,' 
'Electio  mediorum.' 

109.  By  'Intentio  finis'  is  signified  something  more 
than  c  Amor  finis;'  it  is  more  nearly  analogous  perhaps 
to  the  modal  affection  c  Spes.'     The  intellect  proposes 
the  end,  not  merely  as  desirable,  but  as  in  some  degree 


232  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

*  hie  et  mine'  attainable.     To  the  pursuit  of  this  end, 
the   will    cleaves   with   greater  or   less  efficacity ;   in 
other  words,  I  resolve  at  once  to  aim  in  some  way  or 
other  at  some  attainment  of  the  desirable  end.     Then 
comes  *  Electio  mediorum ; '  out  of  the  various  means 
conducive  to  that  end,  I  choose  this  or  that  according 
to  my  innate  freedom.     Lastly,   so  far  as  I  succeed, 
comes  the  '  Fruitio  finis.'     This,  precisely  and  in  every 
respect,  corresponds  to  the  modal  affection  '  Gaudium.' 
My  intellect  represents  the  pleasurable  end,  as  in  greater 
or  less  degree  attained;  and  my  will  cleaves  to  that 
end,  so  represented,  with  greater  or  less  efficacity.     In 
other  words,  I  elicit  an  act  of  which  this  is  the  true 
analysis ;  c  I  would  go  through  this  or  that  amount  of 

*  exertion,  rather  than  lose  this  pleasure  which  I  have 
'  thus  attained.' 

The  whole  of  this  statement,  which  we  find  in  the 
books,  must  be  understood  in  a  sense,  not  inconsistent 
with  the  following  undoubted  fact.  It  happens  again 
and  again,  that  it  is  the  suggestion  of  media,  which 
changes  the  ''Amor  finis'  into  an  ''Intentio  finis;'  that 
the  thought  of  the  means  comes  in  fact  first,  and  the 
intention  of  the  end  is  later.  For  instance,  I  am  a  very 
vain-glorious  man  :  so  often  therefore  as  I  think  of 
popularity,  I  elicit  a  very  energetic  act  of  the  will, 
under  the  head  'Amor  finis.'  A  particular  means  of 
acquiring  fresh  popularity  offers  itself;  the  going  up 
to  town,  to  speak  at  a  public  meeting  in  favour  of  some 
popular  question.  Immediately  I  elicit  an  c  intentio 
finis;'  a  resolve  to  increase  my  popularity  in  the  way 
suggested :  and  I  adopt  the  requisite  means  accordingly. 

110.  In  order  to  attain  my  end,  a  connected  chain 
of  means  is  often  necessary.  I  live  four  miles  from 
a  railway -station,  and  that  station  is  eighty  miles  from 
London.  I  walk  to  the  railway,  that  I  may  be  carried 
to  London.  Here  then  (1)  I  walk  to  the  railway,  in 
order  that  I  may  obtain  the  convenience  of  the  train. 
(2)1  desire  the  convenience  of  the  train,  that  I  may 
more  comfortably  go  to  London.  (3)  I  desire  to  go 
to  London,  in  order  that  I  may  attend  a  meeting  which 


ON  CERTAIN  OTHER  PHENOMENA  OF  THE  WILL.   233 

will  beheld  there.  (4)  I  desire  to  attend  that  meeting, 
in  order  that  I  may  be  the  more  popular.  (5)  I  desire 
to  be  more  popular,  in  order  that  I  may  think  myself 
so.  (6)  I  desire  to  think  myself  so,  because  of  the 
great  pleasure  which  that  thought  gives  me. 

In  this  connected  chain  of  ends,  the  last  named  is  that 
which  we  call  the  '  absolute'  end ;  viz., '  that  I  may  enjoy 
the  pleasure  of  thinking  myself  more  popular/  The 
other  ends  are  'relative'  or  l  intermediate.'  Instead  of 
'absolute  end/  the  phrase  *  ultimate  end'  is  more  com- 
monly adopted ;  but  there  is  such  very  great  variety  of 
usage,  as  to  the  sense  of  this  phrase  '  ultimus  finis,'  that 
I  must  prefer  '  absolute  end.'  I  propose  therefore  uni- 
versally to  adopt  that  phrase. 

On  '  Fruitio  finis'  and  *  Electio  mediorum,'  nothing 
more  need  be  said ;  but  '  Intentio  finis '  must  be  con- 
sidered under  some  further  aspects. 

111.  If  I  am  really  doing  or  resolving  on  A  for  the 
sake  of  end  B,  I  am  at  this  moment  desiring  and  in- 
tending end  B.  This  is  so  very  obvious,  that  no 
explanation  or  argument  can  make  it  more  so.  If  I 
am  not  at  this  moment  desiring  B  at  all,  how  can  I  be 
resolving  on  A  for  its  sake  ?  I  may  be  desiring  A ;  but 
my  reason  for  doing  so  at  this  moment  will  be  some- 
thing else,  and  not  my  desire  of  B,  if  I  am  not  desiring 
B  at  this  moment  at  all.* 

It  is  most  important  however  to  observe,  that  I 
may  be  most  really  desiring  B,  and  yet  not  consciously 
thinking  of  B.  The  full  consideration  of  this  most  im- 
portant fact,  belongs  of  course  to  the  general  question 
of  the  relation  between  intellect  and  will ;  yet  even  at 
this  early  stage,  some  general  notion  of  what  is  meant 
seems  indispensable.  "Take  then  the  following  hints, 
from  the  illustration  already  given,  where  I  am  walking 
to  the  next  town  to  catch  the  train.  Suppose  a  friend 

*  "  Impossibile  est  aliquid  actu  appeti  prout  utile  est,  et  noil  ex  volun- 
tate  aliqua  quce  actu  maneat  circa  finem,  saltern  confuse  apprehensum. 
Quod  si  nee  maneat  voluntas  finis  confuse  apprehensi,  jam  medium  non 
poterit  appeti  prout  utile  [sc.  ut  medium],  sed  quatenus  honestum  aut 
jucundum  seu  aelectabile  secundum  se  [sc,  ut  foiis]" — VASQOE^,  in  1m  2ae, 
d.  4,  c.  2. 


234  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

is  with  me,  in  whose  conversation  I  am  very  greatly 
interested.  I  will  suppose  that  there  are  a  great 
number  of  different  turns  in  the  road,  which  I  am 
quite  as  often  in  the  habit  of  taking,  as  that  particular 
route  which  leads  to  the  town.  My  friend  and  myself 
pursue  our  walk,  quite  engrossed  in  the  interesting 
matters  which  we  are  discussing ;  and  we  are  quite 
surprised  to  find  how  quickly  the  time  has  passed,  and 
that  here  we  are  at  the  station.  Now  it  is  plain  (com- 
pletely as  we  seem  to  have  been  engrossed  by  our 
conversation,  little  as  we  have  explicitly  been  thinking 
about  town  or  railway,)  that  the  intention  of  going  to 
the  town  has  really  and  actively  influenced  us  through- 
out. How  otherwise  can  you  possibly  account  for  the 
fact,  that  we  have  steadily  pursued  that  one  road, 
neglecting  the  innumerable  turns  which  I  have  sup- 
posed to  exist?  Will  you  say  that  the  habit  of  going 
to  the  town  is  enough  to  account  for  it?  Not  at  all; 
for  I  have  supposed  that  there  is  none  of  the  turns, 
which  I  have  not  equally  been  in  the  habit  of  taking. 
There  must  have  been  an  intention,  really  inflowing 
into  my  acts  ;  really,  practically,  energetically,  in- 
fluencing me; — and  yet  such,  that  I  have  not  been 
reflecting  or  thinking  of  it  at  all. 

This  unconscious  intention  may  be  very  definite ; 
or  it  may  be  vague  to  almost  any  imaginable  extent. 
In  the  above  case  evidently  it  is  most  definite.  So 
definitely  are  my  intentions  fixed  on  that  particular 
town,  that  in  every  single  instance, — without  so  much 
hesitation  as  would  reinstate  a  conscious  reflection  on 
what  I  am  doing, — I  choose,  as  a  matter  of  course,  the 
one  road  thither  leading,  in  preference  to  any  other 
alternative.  But  why  do  I  wish  to  catch  the  railway 
and  go  to  town?  It  may  well  be  that  this  consideration 
is  not  at  all  definitely  before  my  mind.  It  may  well 
be,  that  I  am  not  definitely  aiming  at  all  at  the  pleasure 
of  popularity  to  be  gained  at  the  public  meeting. 
It  may  well  be,  that  I  have  no  more  definite  thought 
of  my  motive  for  going  to  London,  than  that  it  is 
for  the  sake  of  some  end  or  other,  vaguely  remembered, 


ON  CERTAIN  OTHER  PHENOMENA  OF  THE  WILL.   235 

as  having  been  thought  by  me  pleasurable  when  I 
formed  the  intention.  But  if  this  be  so,  then  it  is  not 
strictly  true  to  say  that  I  am  at  this  moment  desiring 
to  go  to  town  for  the  sake  of  acquiring  popularity- 
The  act,  whereby,  during  my  walk  to  the  town,  I  desire 
to  reach  the  train,  will  be  truly  analyzed  thus  ;  'I 
'  desire  to  catch  the  train,  for  the  sake  of  some  end,  of 
'  which  I  merely  remember  that  I  thought  it  pleasurable 
'  when  last  I  distinctly  thought  of  it  at  all.' 

It  will  be  in  accordance  with  theological  usage,  if 
we  call  the  intention  'implicit7  while  it  remains  (with* 
out  our  thinking  of  it)  in  a  <fe/£mfe  shape ;  and  'virtual7 
when  it  is  only  the  vague  memory  of  it  which  continues. 
Meanwhile  we  may  keep  the  term  '  unconscious '  in- 
tention for  the  present,  as  a  common  term  ;  as  including 
both  'implicit'  and  'virtual/ 

The  statements  of  theologians  on  this  subject  will 
be  more  suitably  introduced,  when  we  treat  the  subject 
itself  at  length  ;  i.  e.  when  we  treat  definitively  the 
relation  between  intellect  and  will.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  facts,  here  stated,  have  their  appropriate  evi- 
dence of  course  in  our  own  consciousness. 

112.  We  have  hitherto  spoken,  as  though  I  aimed 
but  at  one  absolute  end  in  the  same  instant.  But  this 
is  most  rarely  the  case;  and  in  general  a  considerable 
number  of  absolute  ends  are  simultaneously  inflowing 
into  the  Will.  If  1  go  to  town,  it  will  probably  not  be 
merely  for  the  sake  of  attending  that  meeting:  there 
will  be  some  interesting  matters  to  talk  over  with  my 
lawyer ;  and  some  old  friend  to  see,  from  whom  I  have 
long  been  separated.  Even  when  these  are  most 
vaguely  represented,  my  will  will  be  aiming,  not  at 
'  one  end'  but  at  various  ends  ;  of  which  I  remember 
that  I  thought  them  pleasurable,  when  I  last  distinctly 
thought  of  them  at  all. 

The  common  theological  usage  is  to  consider  only 
one  absolute  end  as  appertaining  to  one  '  actus  humanus.' 
Hence  in  those  very  numerous  cases  where  more  than 
one  absolute  end  is  influencing  my  will,  as  many  dif- 
ferent acts  are  considered  to  be  simultaneously  proceed- 


236  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

ing,  as  there  are  different  absolute  ends.  Suppose,  e.  g. 
that  I  help  a  poor  man,  through  a  mixed  motive  of 
virtuousness  and  vain-glory :  it  will  be  considered  that 
two  acts  of  mine  are  simultaneously  proceeding ;  one 
virtuous,  the  other  vicious  under  the  head  of  vain-glory. 

113.  You  will  at  first  be  more  than  a  little  sur- 
prised, at  the  notion  that  intellectual  acts,  so  important 
and  so  influential,  can  proceed  in  the  mind  with  so  little 
reflection.     This  fact  indeed  is  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant in  all  Psychology  ;  and  when  we  treat  on  the 
relations  of  intellect  and  will,  it  must  receive  our  most 
careful  attention. 

This  will  be  a  convenient  place  for  stating  more 
distinctly,  that  the  phrase  '  Intentio  finis '  is  used  quite 
as  properly,  in  regard  to  a  '  relative  or  intermediate'  end, 
as  in  regard  to  an  '  absolute'  end.  Thus  in  the  instance 
of  walking  with  a  friend  to  catch  the  railway,  the  end 
was  merely  '  relative  or  intermediate ; '  yet  we  have  said 
that  the  '  implicit  intention '  of  that  end  influenced  me 
throughout  the  walk. 

114.  We  have  considered  hitherto  two  kinds  of  in- 
tention, directed  towards  an  end;  'explicit'  and  'uncon- 
scious.'    There  is  a  third  kind  very  frequently  met 
with  in  Theology  ;    viz.   c  habitual.'     The  habitual  in- 
tention of  an  end  which  has  once  been  proposed,  is 
considered  to  continue  so  long,  as  it  is  not  explicitly  or 
implicitly  revoked.     Thus  suppose  a  priest  forms  the 
intention  to-day,  of  offering  all  his  masses  for  the  next 
mouth  for  some  definite  object.     He  thinks  no  more 
about  it ;  the  intention  in  no  sense  inflows  further  into 
his  acts,  neither  explicitly  nor  unconsciously ;  but  still 
his  'habitual  intention'  is   not  on  that  account  con- 
sidered to  cease.     But  suppose,  at  the  end  of  a  week, 
totally   forgetful   of  his   former   intention,    he   makes 
the  intention   of  offering  all   his  masses  of  the  next 
week  for  a  purpose  altogether  different.     This  is  an 
implicit  revocation   of  his  former  intention  ;    because, 
though  he  has  lost  all  memory  of  that  intention,  the 
latter  intention  is  directly  inconsistent  with  the  former. 
The  former  intention  then  is  said  to  be  implicitly  re- 


ON  CERTAIN  OTHER  PHENOMENA  OF  THE  WILL.   237 

yoked ;  the  habitual  intention  is  said  no  longer  to  remain. 
The  former  intention  may  also  of  course  be  explicitly 
revoked ;  but  this  is  too  plain  to  need  illustration. 

Now  this  theological  use  of  the  word  c  habitual/  is 
very  different  from  that  which  ordinarily  obtains.  In 
ordinary  parlance,  the  phrase  c  habitual  intention '  would 
be  considered  as  implying  a  far  closer  connection  with 
present  action  than  it  does  in  Theology.  For  instance, 
I  should  naturally  say  c  I  have  an  habitual  intention  of 
avoiding  mortal  sin;'  but  this  would  mean  a  great 
deal  more  than,  '  I  once  intended  it,  and  have  not  since 
intended  the  contrary.'  It  would  mean  nothing  less 
than  this ;  i  so  soon  as  I  am  for  a  moment  tempted  to 
'  mortal  sin,  that  intention  of  avoiding  it,  which  was 
'  latent,  becomes  apparent ;  that  which  was  dormant  is 
'  roused  into  action.'  Or  consider,  if  it  be  not  too  light 
an  example,  the  kind  of  intention  which  I  have  to  wind 
up  my  watch  at  night.  I  should  naturally  call  it  an 
'habitual  intention;'  yet  plainly  it  is  much  more,  than 
that  merely  I  once  intended  to  do  so,  and  have  never 
revoked  that  intention.  As  soon  as  the  ordinary  time 
for  the  process  arrives,  by  a  sort  of  habit  or  instinct,  the 
actual  intention  is  awakened,  and  the  act  succeeds  as  a 
matter  of  course.  Or  take  the  kind  of  intention  which 
is  engendered  by  any  virtuous  habit ;  the  habit  of  tem- 
perance, for  instance.  Suppose  that  by  long  self- 
discipline  I  have  become  temperate  in  a  high  degree. 
Well,  I  am  not  eliciting  acts  of  temperance  all  day 
long;  yet  all  day  long  I  do  possess  a  certain  quality 
of  soul,  in  virtue  of  which,  so  soon  as  the  opportunity 
of  temperance  arises, — so  soon  as  I  sit  down  to  table, 
— various  temperate  intentions  actually  influence  and 
direct  my  will. 

I  think  it  is  of  great  importance  for  various  theologi- 
cal purposes,  that  this  particular  kind  of  intention  should 
be  carefully  recognized ;  and  in  order  that  it  may  be  so 
recognized,  it  will  be  far  better  to  give  it  a  separate 
name.  Let  us  call  it  therefore  a  i  prevalent'  intention. 
I  am  said  accordingly  to  have  a  'prevalent'  intention 
of  doing  this  or  that,  when  I  have  no  intention  indeed 
of  the  kind  (explicitly  or  unconsciously)  at  this  mo- 


238  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

ment  influencing  my  will;  but  when  my  soul  is  in 
fact  so  constituted,  (whether  by  nature  or  habit,)  that 
on  the  suitable  occasion  such  an  intention  ivould  quite 
certainly  and  spontaneously  arise.  A  '  prevalent  inten- 
tion '  then  is,  in  fact,  one  particular  species  of  *  habitual ' 
intention ;  but  a  species  possessing  many  important  pro- 
perties of  its  own.  A  '  prevalent  intention '  implies  that 
some  certain  quality  exists  at  this  moment  in  the  will ;  but 
a  '  merely  habitual '  intention  by  no  means  implies  this. 

We  had  better  (to  prevent  confusion  of  ideas),  sum 
up  here,  and  place  in  one  view  the  various  subdivi- 
sions of 'intention'  which  have  been  suggested.  There 
is  at  first  starting  a  three-fold  division;  viz.  into  'ex- 
plicit/ 'unconscious,7  and  '  habitual' intention.  Then 
'  unconscious'  is  further  subdivided  into  '  implicit'  and 
'  virtual ; '  while  '  habitual '  is  also  subdivided  into 
6 merely  habitual'  and  'prevalent/  Lastly,  going  back 
to  the  original  threefold  division,  'real'  includes  both 
'explicit'  and  'unconscious,'  as  distinct  from,  'habitual.' 

115.  I  must  not  close  for  the  present  this  matter  of 
intention,  without  begging  you  again  carefully  to  dis- 
tinguish 'Intentio'  from  'Amor'  or  ' Desiderium.'  'In- 
tentio'  always  implies  (as  we  have  already  observed) 
that  we  propose  to  aim  at  the  end.  Whenever  our 
will  cleaves  to  the  end  as  desirable,  without  any  pur- 
pose or  notion  of  ourselves  aiming  at  it,  our  act  is 
either  one  of  'Amor'  or  'Desiderium.'  Look,  for  in- 
stance, at  the  two  first,  out  of  those  three  condemned 
propositions  already  quoted  in  n.  102:  — 

Si  cum  debita  moderatione  facias,  potes,  absque 
peccato  mortali,  de  vita  alicujus  tristari,  et  de  illius 
morte  naturali  gaudere,  illam  inefficad  affectu  petere 
et  desiderare,  non  quidem  ex  displicentia  personse, 
sed  ob  aliquod  temporale  emolumentum. 

Licitum  est  absolute  desiderio  cupere  mortem 
patris,  non  quidem  ut  malum  patris,  sed  ut  bonum 
cupientis  ;  quia  nimirum  ei  obventura  est  pinguis 
hsereditas. — DENZ.  prop.  13,  14,  p.  325. 

In  the  second  of  these  occurs  the  phrase,  'absolute 


ON  CERTAIN  OTHER  PHENOMENA  OF  THE  WILL.    239 

desiderio  cupere  mortem  patris.'  The  question  is  not 
at  all,  in  regard  to  the  least  thought  of  murdering  his 
father;  but  simply  of  his  will  cleaving  to  his  father's 
death,  as  to  a  desirable  object.  And,  in  the  first  propo- 
sition, the  words  '  inefficaci  affectu  petere  et  desiderare ' 
do  not  refer  at  all  to  what  is  called  4  Intentio  inefficax,' 
but  simply  to  4  Desiderium ; '  as  the  very  words  shew. 
The  same  remark  applies  to  the  '  absoluto  desiderio 
cupere'  of  the  second  proposition.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  distinction  between  '  Intentio  efficax '  and  '  ineffi- 
cax '  cannot  possibly  be,  that  in  the  latter  case  we  do 
not  aim  at  the  end ;  that  '  Intentio  inefficax'  does  not 
ordinarily  result  in  action ;  for  if  it  did  not,  it  would  not 
be  '  Intentio '  at  all.  No :  the  distinction  between  '  In- 
tentio efficax  '  and  '  inefficax '  turns  on  the  greater  or 
less  degree  of  firmness  or  tenacity  with  which  the  will 
resolves  on  aiming  at  the  end.  As  this  distinction  is 
one  of  no  slight  importance,  I  hope  carefully  to  consider 
it  in  our  work  c  de  actibus  humanis.5 

116.  This  will  be  a  convenient  place,  for  stating  an- 
other very  important  proposition  in  regard  to  the  will. 
This  proposition  is  so  obvious,  when  stated,  that  you 
will  wonder  at  me  for  taking  the  trouble  to  enunciate 
such  a  truism ;  and  yet  I  hardly  know  one  doctrine  so 
frequently  neglected.  It  is  this: — Good  and  bad  acts 
of  the  will  are  what  they  are,  and  not  what  we  reflect 
on  them  as  being.  Notwithstanding  the  obvious  un- 
deniableness  of  this  proposition,  I  will  add  a  few  words 
to  explain  its  meaning. 

In  order  that  any  act  of  the  will  may  take  place,  a 
certain  object  must  be  represented  by  the  intellect,  as 
possessing  this  or  that  combination  of  qualities ;  as  in- 
vested with  these  or  those  accompanying  circumstances. 
To  the  object,  thus  presented,  the  will  freely  tends  in  a 
certain  intrinsic  mode;  and  thus  the  act  is  complete. 
Many  such  acts  take  place,  without  the  intellect  re- 
flecting on  them  in  the  slightest  degree.  But  it  often 
happens  that  the  case  is  otherwise;  that  the  intellect 
does  reflect  on  the  act  itself,  and  analyzes  it  truly  or 
falsely  as  the  case  may  be.  My  thesis  is  this :  that  the 


240  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

act  is  what  it  is ;  and  that,  supposing  the  intellect  were 
to  analyze  it  ever  so  mistakenly,  such  an  intellectual 
error  could  in  no  possible  way  affect  the  real  character 
of  the  act  itself. 

Now  the  neglect  of  this  very  plain  truth,  often  leads 
us  to  think  our  acts  better,  and  often  worse,  than  they 
really  are.  For  instance,  we  desire  to  make  acts  of 
faith,  hope,  and  charity ;  and  many  men  unaffectedly 
think,  that  if  we  have  recited  (with  seriousness  and 
attention)  the  words  put  down  for  us  in  our  prayer- 
book,  we  have  accomplished  our  end.  I  will  give  you 
at  once  a  *  reductio  ad  absurdum '  of  this  most  wild 
misconception.  It  is  theologically  certain  (as  we  shall 
see  in  due  time)  that  every  sinner,  even  the  foulest, 
who  elicits  a  real  theological  act  of  c  Amor  super  omnia,' 
is  at  once  justified  4  extra  sacramentum.'  Now  from  the 
notion  which  I  am  attacking,  this  strange  result  would 
follow ;  that  the  foulest  sinner,  who  should  with  serious- 
ness and  attention  recite  the  words  put  down  in  the 
prayer-book  for  a  theological  act  of  love,  would  be 
ipso  facto  justified  without  a  moment's  delay ;  an 
adopted  son  of  God;  an  heir  of  Heaven.  A  short  and 
easy  road  indeed  to  that  happy  abode  !  * 

You  will  ask  at  once,  what  conditions  are  necessary, 

*  So  the  most  lenient  Francolinus — '  Peccatoribus,  ut  facile  est  ore 
pronunciare  formulam  contritionis,  ita  perdifficile  est  vere  et  ex  corde  talem 
actum  facere.'  De  Dolore  requisite,  1.  1,  c.  1,  n.  38.  He  draws  attention 
to  the  same  distinction,  in  regard  to  attrition  also,  between  reciting  the  due 
formula  and  eliciting  the  due  act.  De  Pcen.  Disc.,  1.  3,  c.  3,  sub  finem. 
Lugo,  '  Quis  certo  scit  veram  fuisse  contritionem  quam  habuit?'  De 
Pcenitentia,  d.  7,  n.  266.  Turlot, '  Nolirn  putes  contritionis  actum  consistere 
aut  perfici  verbis  quibuqdam  studiose  conceptis;  v.  g.  dicendo, '  Domine  Deus 

doleo,'  &c sed  in  cordiali  affectu  sub  ejusmodi  verbis  supposito.' 

Catech.,  pars  4,  c.  5,  lee.  2.  F.  Vaubert,  S.  J.,  '  La  premiere  chose  dont  il 
faut  se  garder,  c'est  de  s'imaginer  avoir  fait  un  acte  de  foi  ou  d'esperance 
ou  de  quelqu'autre  vertu  que  ce  soit,  lorsqu'on  en  a  prononce  du  bout  des 
tivres  quelque  formule,  ou  qu'on  F  a  seulement  repassee  dans  sa  memoire. 

II  y  a  autant  de  difference  entre  un  acte  de  vertu,  et  ces  formules 

qu'on  sait  par  coeur  ou  qu'on  lit  dans  les  livres,  qu'il  y  en  a  entre  le  roi  et 
son  portrait?  Traite  de  la  Communion,  par.  4,  n.  2.  Ripalda,  *'  jtEgre 
potest  homo  discretionem  facere  rationum  formalium  qua  ipsum  movent  ad 
suos  actus.  Ego  experiment©  cerno  id  haud  facile  fieri.'  De  Ente  Super. 
d.  45,  n.  13.  Ripalda  quotes  Suarez  to  the  same  effect:  'Nunquam 
homo  scit  evidenter,  an  ex  pura  supernaturali  ratione  moveatur  et  opere- 
tur  1 '  De  Gratid,  1.  2,  c.  11,  n.  35, 


ON  CERTAIN  OTHER  PHENOMENA  OF  THE  WILL.   241 

that  our  acts  may  really  be  acts  of  faith,  hope,  and 
love.*  It  is  impossible  of  course  to  exaggerate  the  im- 
portance of  this  question;  both  that  you  may  your- 
selves elicit  such  acts,  and  that  you  may  hereafter 
teach  your  people  how  to  do  so.  We  shall  consider  it 
therefore  in  its  due  place,  with  a  care  and  completeness, 
not  disproportioned  (I  hope)  to  its  most  vital  practical 
moment. 

So  much  on  the  case,  where  we  think  our  acts 
better  than  they  really  are.  But  we  often  think  them 
worse.  A  good  man,  again  and  again,  elicits  real  acts 
of  faith,  hope,  and  love,  from  the  very  depths  of  his 
believing,  hoping,  and  loving  heart,  without  reflection 
of  any  kind.  And  here  non-theological  men  are  con- 
tinually apt  to  fancy,  that  these  are  not  true  acts  of 
faith,  hope,  and  love  at  all.  Having  in  the  former  case 
said  of  an  act,  that  it  is  what  it  is  not; — here  they  begin 
to  say,  that  it  is  not  what  it  is:  just  as  if  a  lion  were 
not  a  lion,  nor  a  tiger  a  tiger,  unless  ticketed  and 
labelled  as  they  might  be  in  a  menagerie !  Among  all 
the  various  acts  of  love,  which  our  Blessed  Lady  was 
eliciting  without  intermission  in  via,  I  should  like  to 
know  how  many  she  reflected  upon  or  analyzed.  Of 
course,  her  thoughts  were  so  absorbed  in  God,  that  she 
had  neither  leisure  nor  inclination  to  turn,  from  the 
thought  of  Him,  to  the  thought  of  herself  and  her  own 
acts. 

Our  proposition,  however,  must  be  carefully  guarded 
against  misconception.  Any  act  of  will  depends  of 
course  essentially,  for  its  character,  on  that  intellectual 
act  which  preceded  it;  I  am  only  saying,  that  it  does 
not  depend  for  its  character  in  the  slightest  degree  on 
any  intellectual  act  which  follows  it.  It  depends,  for  its 
character,  essentially  on  the  mode  in  which  its  object 
was  intellectually  represented ;  I  am  but  saying  that  it 
does  not  depend  at  «//,  for  its  character,  on  any  other  in- 
tellectual act,  except  this.  Take  two  instances  in  illus- 

*  Acts  of  faith,  being  intellectual,  might  appear  as  not  strictly  in  point : 
but  the  '  pia  affectio  voluntatis'  is  of  course  an  act  of  will ;  and  the  act  of 
faith  follows  from  that '  pia  affectio '  as  a  matter  of  course. 

R 


242  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

tration.  Suppose  acts  A  and  B  are  precisely  similar,  in 
regard  to  the  thing  externally  done ;  for  instance,  eat- 
ing meat  on  a  Friday :  but  that  they  differ  totally  in 
the  preceding  intellectual  representation.  In  perform- 
ing act  A,  I  remembered  the  Church's  prohibition ;  but 
in  performing  act  B  I  totally  forgot  it.  Or  more  gene- 
rally, in  one  case  the  thing  done  was  intellectually  pro- 
posed as  sinful ;  in  the  other  case  not.  It  is  plain  that 
these  two  acts  are  as  different  from  each  other  in  cha- 
racter, as  any  one  act  can  well  be  from  any  other. 

But  now  suppose  (and  it  is  the  case  contemplated 
by  the  proposition  we  are  considering)  that  you  and  I 
both  commit  an  act,  which  we  perfectly  knew  at  the 
time  we  did  it  to  be  mortally  sinful ;  which,  in  both 
cases,  the  intellect  represented  as  such  at  the  time  of  its 
commission.  You  and  I,  however,  are  most  different  in 
character  and  habits.  You  are  a  novice  in  sin ;  and  for 
that  very  reason,  the  remembrance  of  what  you  have 
done  haunts  you  through  the  day.  But  for  myself,  I 
am  from  long  habit  callous  and  obdurate;  I  am  con- 
stantly in  the  habit  of  doing  things  which  I  know  to  be 
mortally  sinful ;  and  the  result  is,  since  this  particular 
act  had  nothing  specially  to  distinguish  it  from  a  hun- 
dred others  done  in  the  day,  that  I  have  never  reflected 
on  it  for  a  moment,  either  as  being  sinful  or  otherwise. 
It  is  obvious  on  the  very  surface,  that  this  distinction 
between  you  and  me,  a  distinction  wholly  external  to 
the  act,  cannot  by  possibility  be  a  ground  for  any  dis- 
tinction, between  the  respective  character  of  these  two 
acts  themselves* 

117.  We  are  now  in  a  position  to  draw  out  the 
various  kinds  of  '  bonum.'  To  enter  on  the  full  mean- 

*  I  am  not  here  meaning  to  imply  an  opinion,  that  for  mortal  sin 
it  is  always  necessary,  that  the  object  should  be  explicitly  proposed 
by  the  intellect  as  sinful.  This  is  a  question  much  controverted  in 
the  schools ;  and  my  own  opinion  on  it  is,  that  in  the  case  of  obdurate 
sinners  such  explicit  proposition  is  not  requisite  for  mortal  sin.  This 
opinion  I  shall  defend  to  the  best  of  my  power,  in  its  proper  theological 
place,  by  such  arguments  as  appear  to  me  cogent.  Still  it  must  always 
remain  true,  that  an  act,  in  which  the  object  was  not  proposed  by  the  intel- 
lect as  sinful,  possesses  a  very  important  intrinsic  difference  from  one  in 
which  it  was. 


ON  CERTAIN  OTHER  PHENOMENA  OF  THE  WILL.   243 

ing  of  the  word  'bonum,'  would  lead  us  to  philo- 
sophical enquiries,  which  are  important  indeed,  but 
somewhat  complicated.  This  is  in  no  sense  requisite, 
for  the  sake  of  that  part  of  Theology,  to  which  our 
present  work  is  an  introduction.  We  may  answer 
all  our  necessary  purposes  here,  by  defining  'bonum' 
simply  as  *  that  at  which  the  human  will  can  aim.7 
Of  how  many  kinds  then  are  'bona?' 

118.  First,  as  we  have  already  seen  in  many  in- 
stances, the  human  will  can  aim  at  pleasure;  or  in 
other  words,  one  class  of  'bonuni'  will  be  '  bonum 
delectabile.'  We  may  aim  either  at  'positive'  or  at 
4  negative  '  pleasure  ;  by  4  negative  pleasure,'  meaning 
4  relief  from  pain.'  Moreover  we  can  pursue  pleasure, 
whether  positive  or  negative,  in  two  different  stages; 
we  may  pursue  present  or  future  pleasure.  And  now 
to  give  examples  of  these  different  phenomena. 

If  I  eat  of  some  attractive  dish,  which  I  know  will 
make  me  ill  next  day,  I  am  pursuing  4  present  positive ' 
pleasure.  If,  when  next  day  comes,  I  refuse  to  take 
the  medicine,  which  has  been  rendered  necessary  by 
that  indulgence,  I  again  pursue  present  pleasure;  but 
here  it  is  negative.  If  I  rise  early,  and  go  to  bed  late, 
and  deny  myself  sufficient  food  and  recreation, — all  for 
the  purpose  of  amassing  vast  wealth,  in  order  that  I 
may  derive  therefrom  every  kind  of  comfort  and  in- 
dulgence— I  am  pursuing  'future  positive'  pleasure. 
You  will  say  perhaps,  that  the  prospect  of  that  future 
pleasure  is  itself  present  pleasure.  During  great  part 
of  my  labour  it  is  so ;  but  even  then,  a  very  little  con- 
sideration will  shew  that  this  accounts  only  for  part  of 
my  will's  energy  (see  n.  112).  One  absolute  end  may 
be  the  present  pleasure  of  looking  forward  to  future 
wealth ;  but  another  absolute  end,  quite  as  influential 
or  probably  much  more  so,  is  the  future  pleasure, 
which  I  consider  as  promoted  by  this  present  toil. 
Indeed  there  are  commonly  periods,  not  inconsiderable 
in  duration,  when  the  present  pleasure  quite  ceases ; 
periods  which  correspond,  in  the  Devil's  service,  to 
times  of  aridity  in  the  service  of  God:  during  these 


244  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

periods  we  are  working  exclusively  for  future  positive 
pleasure.  Lastly,  perhaps  I  work  hard  day  and  night, 
to  get  up  my  defence  in  some  trial,  which  threatens  my 
fortune  or  my  life:  in  such  case  I  am  working  for 
future  negative  pleasure.  So  far  indeed  as  I  labour 
for  the  purpose  of  appeasing  my  present  emotion  of 
fear,  so  far  no  doubt  I  am  pursuing  a  present  negative 
pleasure;  but  when  this  emotion  of  fear  is  for  the 
moment  away,  I  am  still  able  to  work  very  energeti- 
cally and  consistently  ;  and  I  am  thus  pursuing  l  future 
negative '  pleasure. 

So  we  see  that  the  human  will  can  pursue  bona 
delectabilia  in  four  different  shapes:  (1)  present  posi- 
tive pleasure;  (2)  present  negative  pleasure;  (3) 
future  positive  pleasure;  (4)  future  negative  pleasure. 

Again,  we  may  further  subdivide  l  bonum  delec- 
tabile,'  according  to  the  particular  nature  of  that  pro- 
pension,  to  which  any  such  '  bonum'  respectively  ap- 
pertains. Some  propensions,  as  we  have  seen,  are 
satisfied  by  our  merely  thinking  that  their  object 
exists  ;  others  require  a  far  closer  contact  (see  n.  93). 
Those  *  bona  delectabilia '  which  belong  to  the  latter 
class,  we  may  call  *  bona  physice  delectabilia;'  the  rest 
'  mentaliter  delectabilia.' 

118.  Secondly,  we  are  able  (in  some  degree  at  least) 
to  pursue  virtuousness  for  its  own  sake;  or  in  other 
words,  a  second  kind  of  'bonum'  will  be  'bonum  ho- 
nestum.'  This  will  be  most  evident  by  giving  a  few 
instances. 

Take  that  case  of  the  deposit,  which  we  had  so 
constantly  before  us  in  the  last  Chapter.  Plainly  I 
have  the  full  power  of  giving  back  my  friend  his  jewel, 
for  no  reason  in  the  world,  except  simply  because  I  am 
under  the  obligation  of  doing  so.  Or  if  I  have  con- 
tracted a  small  debt,  the  payment  of  which  is  in  no  way 
inconvenient,  I  am  fully  able  to  make  such  payment 
on  demand,  for  no  reason  in  the  world  except  because 
it  would  be  dishonest  to  refuse. 

Now  take  a  further  instance.  Suppose  I  am  as- 
sailed by  a  violent  temptation  against  the  Sixth  Com- 


ON  CERTAIN  OTHER  PHENOMENA  OF  THE  WILL.   245 

mandment;  suppose  all  my  emotions,  the  whole  of  my 
sensitive  nature,  enlisted  for  the  moment  on  the  side 
of  sin.  I  kneel  before  a  crucifix;  and  while  praying 
earnestly  to  my  Saviour  for  help,  I  ponder  at  the  same 
time  with  so  much  earnestness  on  the  baseness  of  re- 
paying His  bounteous  love  with  ingratitude,  that  I  am 
sustained  for  a  while  against  temptation  simply  by 
this  prayer  and  this  thought.  Presently  perhaps,  in 
order  to  strengthen  my  resolution,  I  call  before  my 
mind  such  further  thoughts,  as  the  fearfulness  of  Hell 
suffering,  and  the  various  appalling  torments  which 
would  there  await  me ;  and  when  I  have  done  this,  my 
emotions  no  doubt  are  in  some  degree  helping  me  on 
the  side  of  virtue.  But  let  us  confine  our  attention  to 
the  earlier  part  of  this  resistance;  to  the  part  which 
elapsed,  before  this  appeal  to  sensitive  fear.  During 
that  earlier  part,  I  was  performing  an  admirable  act, 
under  the  head  of  purity :  and  for  what  end  ?  Simply 
the  virtuousness  of  shewing  gratitude  for  my  Re- 
deemer's love.  What  other  end  can  be  named?  It 
was  in  no  degree  for  the  sake  of  any  devotional  sweet- 
ness ;  for  my  whole  sensitive  appetite  was  at  the  time 
playing  the  Devil's  game,  and  acting  directly  against 
the  cause  of  virtue.  I  repeat,  the  end  was,  and  could 
be,  no  other,  than  the  virtuousness  of  shewing  gratitude 
for  my  Redeemer's  love. 

Here  you  may  make  the  objection,  that  this  act  of 
virtue  was  (1)  supernatural  and  (2)  rendered  possible 
only  by  prayer.  As  to  its  being  supernatural,  this  plainly 
does  not  affect  the  question.  Reason  shews  us  that 
the  act  above  described  is  good ;  and  experience  shews 
us  that  it  may  exist.  These  two  truths  are  in  no  way 
interfered  with  by  a  third  truth ;  viz.  that  this  act  is 
not  good  only,  but  supernatural  also.  Indeed  it  may 
be  well  here  to  state  briefly  a  fact,  on  which,  under  the 
head  of  Grace,  we  shall  have  to  enlarge.  God  takes 
care  always  to  adjust  His  grace  to  the  fixed  and  re^ 
cognized  laws  of  our  nature;  according  to  that  well- 
known  maxim  of  the  schools,  '  Gratia  se  accommodat 
Naturae.'  Why  does  He  so  act?  Because  the  whole 


246  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Christian  religion  is  based  on  faith ;  and  if  we  could 
experience  the  Supernatural,  there  would  be  no  room 
for  faith. 

Now  for  the  second  supposed  objection:  viz.  that 
the  act  was  only  rendered  possible  by  prayer ;  that 
by  prayer  only  was  I  able  thus  manfully  to  acquit 
myself  in  the  conflict ;  that,  had  prayer  (at  least  im- 
plicit prayer)  ceased,  my  will  would  soon  have  sur- 
rendered to  my  bitter  enemy.  This  fact  undoubtedly 
is  an  observed  fact  of  human  nature,  and  not  known 
merely  by  Revelation  ;  viz.  that  when  I  make  use  of 
prayer,  I  am  able  to  do  ten  thousand  good  acts,  which 
without  prayer  I  could  not  do.  No  more  important 
fact  than  this  can  be  named  in  all  Psychology ;  and  it 
is  one,  on  which  we  shall  lay  the  very  greatest  stress  in 
all  our  work.  Still  this  fact  in  no  way  interferes  with 
our  conclusion.  It  was  a  fact  undoubtedly,  that  I  was 
praying  ;  but  it  was  no  less  a  fact,  that  I  was  eliciting  a 
most  energetic  act  of  purity,  from  the  pure  end  of 
gratitude  to  my  Saviour. 

You  will  ask,  as  I  can  aim  simply  at  a  future 
4  bonum  delectabile,'  can  I  also  aim  simply  at  a  future 
4  bonum  honestum?'  The  question  is  of  some  nicety, 
and  shall  be  treated  under  '  de  actibus  humanis.'  But 
it  is  of  no  practical  importance  ;  for  no  act  can  be 
virtuous,  unless  it  be  done  for  the  sake  of  present 
6  bonum  honestum ;'  for  the  sake  of  that  virtuousness 
which  is  inherent  in  the  act  itself.  (See  n.  56,  p.  123.) 

In  the  catalogue  then  of  c  bona,'  we  are  fully 
warranted  in  adding  c  honestum '  to  '  delectabile.' 

120.  Before  going  further,  it  may  be  asked,  can 
there  be  an  unconscious  intention  of  '  bonum  honestum,' 
as  we  have  seen  there  so  often  is  of  l  bonum  delectabile?' 
A  very  little  observation  of  what  passes  in  our  mind, 
will  shew  that  this  is  a  most  common  phenomenon. 
Perhaps  the  following  illustration  will  help  us  in 
making  the  necessary  introspection. 

Some  fifty  years  ago,  men  of  the  world  were  in  the 
habit  of  using  most  foul  and  obscene  language,  in 
conversation  with  each  other ;  yet  they  always  thought 


ON  CERTAIN  OTHER  PHENOMENA  OF  THE  WILL.    247 

it  most  ungentlemanly  to  use  such  expressions  in  the 
presence  of  ladies.  I  will  suppose  two  gentlemen  of 
the  period  to  be  most  busy  in  conversation  with  each 
other,  while  ladies  are  present.  They  are  wholly 
engrossed,  so  far  as  they  are  themselves  conscious, 
with  the  subjects  which  they  are  upon  ;  politics,  or  the 
stock-exchange,  or  sporting.  They  are  not  explicitly 
thinking  of  the  ladies  at  all ;  and  yet,  if  they  are  really 
gentlemen,  the  presence  of  the  ladies  exercises  upon 
them  a  most  real  and  practical  influence.  It  is  not 
that  they  find  themselves  to  fall  into  bad  language,  and 
then  apologize.  No  ;  they  are,  during  the  whole  time, 
so  restrained  by  the  presence  of  the  ladies,  that  they 
don't  dream  of  such  expressions.  Yet  on  the  other 
hand,  no  one  will  say,  that  the  freedom  of  their  thought 
and  conversation  is  perceptibly  influenced  at  all. 

If  it  be  so  common  a  thing  to  preserve  an  uncon- 
scious remembrance  of  our  fellow-men's  presence,  how 
abundantly  practicable  must  it  be,  to  preserve  a  remem- 
brance, precisely  similar  in  kind,  of  our  Creator  !  And 
interior  men,  by  reflecting  on  their  daily  life,  will  find 
that  this  is  altogether  so  with  them ;  that  they  preserve 
a  practical  impression  of  God's  presence,  which  really 
inflows  into  their  thoughts  and  powerfully  influences 
them.  They  know  at  the  same  time  that  this  is  no 
matter  of  conscious  reflection  ;  nor  does  it  in  any  per- 
ceptible degree  affect  their  power,  of  applying  freely 
and  without  encumbrance  to  their  various  duties  as 
they  successively  arise. 

It  will  be  further  asked,  is  there,  in  the  case  of 
'honestum,'  the  same  distinction  between  'implicit' 
and  4  virtual,'  which  we  have  recognized  in  the  case  of 
'delectabile  ?'  The  question  is  of  no  great  practical 
moment,  but  I  think  that  there  is  this  distinction.  By 
one  illustration,  I  shall  be  able  both  to  explain  my 
statement,  and  sufficiently  to  evince  its  truth. 

Suppose  I  set  myself  carefully  to  elicit  that  im- 
portant act,  which  is  called  one  of '  Amor  super  omnia,' 
or  'sovereign  Love.'  What  the  necessary  requisites 
are  for  such  an  act,  is  a  question  of  extreme  moment, 


248  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

to  be  considered  in  our  theological  course  ;  but  we  will 
suppose  that  they  have  been  attained.  While  my  mind 
remains  in  this  posture,  or  (in  other  words)  while  this 
act  proceeds,  I  apply  myself  to  the  performance  of 
various  incumbent  duties.  For  some  little  time,  in  all 
probability,  the  act  remains  unchanged ;  the  various 
duties  are  performed  on  the  highest  of  all  possible 
motives.  By  degrees  however,  my  remembrance  of 
God  becomes  more  vague,  though  still  most  real ;  this 
special  act  of  sovereign  Love  is  changed  into  a  com- 
bination of  other  acts,  of  which  God  is  more  or  less 
directly  the  Object ;  such  as  those  which  we  shall  con- 
sider in  Theology,  under  the  name  'acts  of  obedience,' 
4  religion/  and  the  like.  So  soon  as  this  is  the  case, 
there  ceases  to  be  an  intention  of  that  peculiar  end 
which  is  appropriate  to  sovereign  Love;  for  that  special 
end  (by  hypothesis)  no  longer  inflows  into  the  will. 
And  yet  that  very  end  virtually  remains  ;  for  the  ends, 
which  now  actuate  my  will,  are  but  the  present  effect 
and  echo  of  that  former  end. 

121,  Returning  now  to  our  catalogue  of  'bona' — 
are  there  any  other  absolute  ends  at  which  the  human 
will  can  aim,  besides  those  two  which  we  have  consi- 
dered, viz.  virtue  and  pleasure  ?  For  instance — can  we 
ever  act  '  propter  malitiamj  for  the  mere  wickedness  of 
an  act  ?  It  is  agreed  by  all  Catholic  theologians  and 
philosophers,  that  we  cannot;  according  to  the  phrase  so 
constantly  quoted  by  St.  Thomas,  '  nemo  intendens  ad 
malum  operatur.'  And  this  statement  is  undeniable. 
Take  the  very  wickedest  man  in  the  whole  world,  and  get 
him  to  fix  his  thoughts  carefully  on  such  topics  as  these  : 
c  what  foul  ingratitude  to  neglect  my  Redeemer ;' — c  how 
exquisitely  base  and  mean  to  ruin  the  friend  that  trusts 
me.'  Will  it  be  found  that  such  considerations  spur  him 
on  to  evil  action?  that  his  spirits  rise  with  the  con- 
templation ?  that  he  enters  with  increased  vigour  and 
refreshment,  into  further  acts  of  sin  ?  On  the  contrary, 
he  knows  most  thoroughly,  to  the  very  depth  of  his 
heart,  that  the  reverse  will  take  place ;  and  for  that  very 
reason,  we  cant  get  him  to  dwell  on  such  thoughts  at  all. 


ON  CERTAIN  OTHER  PHENOMENA  OF  THE  WILL.    249 

We  all  of  us  know, — he  knows  and  we  know, — that 
if  we  can  only  get  him  duly  to  ponder  on  such  thoughts, 
our  success  in  reclaiming  him  will  be  secure. 

Man  then  is  physically  unable  to  act  wrongly 
'  propter  malitiam  ;'  quite  as  unable  as  he  is  to  cross  a 
bridge  of  paper  or  fly  up  into  the  moon. 

It  may  be  said  perhaps,  '  Surely  there  are  cases  of 
4  very  abandoned  sinners,  where  the  mere  fact  of  dis- 
'  obeying  God  is  found  to  imbue  sinful  pleasure  with 
4  quite  a  peculiar  zest.'  No  doubt  this  is  true ;  and 
there  is  something  indeed  of  the  same  kind,  even  in  men 
who  are  very  far  from  abandoned  sinners.  But  these 
cases  present  no  kind  of  difficulty  in  the  way  of  my 
statement.  In  such  cases,  let  us  grant,  men  act  simply 
for  the  pleasure  of  defying  God.  Still  it  is  a  pleasure. 
Put  the  case  that  there  were  no  pleasure  in  disobeying 
God — could  a  person  then  act  for  the  mere  motive  of 
disobedience;  ^ propter  malitiam?'  Clearly  not.  But 
you  see,  on  the  other  hand,  men  do,  again  and  again,  act 
against  the  whole  current  of  present  pleasure,  4  propter 
honestatem;'  for  the  sake  of  the  virtuousness  of  so 
acting. 

No  one  then  can  act  simply  for  the  sake  of  wicked- 
ness :  nor  is  there  any  need  to  occupy  any  time  in 
shewing,  that  neither  can  any  one  act  for  the  sake  of 
pain,  simply  as  such,  and  as  an  absolute  end.  We  con- 
clude therefore,  that  'bonum'  is  rightly  and  exhaustively 
divided,  as  it  always  is  in  Theology,  into  three  kinds; 
'honestum,'  '  delectabile,'  'utile.'*  Whenever  we  act 
for  any  end  at  all,  we  act  either  '  propter  bonum  hones- 
turn,9  for  the  sake  of  virtue;  or  else  'propter  bonum 
delectabile]  for  the  sake  of  pleasure ;  or  else  '  propter 
bonum  utile,1  for  the  sake  of  some  object  which  is 
useful  as  a  means,  towards  one  or  other  absolute 
'bonum.'  Our  absolute  end  will  invariably  be  either 
4  honestum '  or  4  delectabile ;'  our  relative  or  interme- 
diate end  will  be  'bonum  utile.' 

*  See,  e.  g.  St.  Thomas'  Summa,  1,  q.  5,  a.  6. 


250 


SECTION  V. 
On  the  Adaptation  of  our  Nature  to  Virtue* 

123.  You  may  regard  this,  if  you  please,  as  the  cul- 
minating truth  of  this  Chapter;  as  the  truth,  to  which 
every  earlier  remark  is  prefatory  and  subservient.  In  the 
first  Chapter  we  established,  that  by  intrinsic  necessity 
such  and  such  acts  are  virtuous,  such  and  such  vicious. 
It  will  be  very  suitable  then,  if  we  establish  in  the  second, 
that  God  by  His  free  Will  has  so  created  us,  that  our 
nature  is  adapted  to  the  practice  of  what  is  intrinsecally 
virtuous  and  'the  avoidance   of  what   is   intrinsecally 
vicious.    At  the  same  time,  in  point  of  fact  many  of  the 
phenomena,  which  we  shall  adduce  in  behalf  of  this  pro- 
position, are  far  more  important  in  other  respects,  than 
in  their  bearing  on  our  conclusion.     Still,  by  adducing 
them  in  this  shape,  we  shall  have  (as  it  were)  a  thread  to 
string  them  together ;  and  we  shall  be  able  to  remember 
them  much  more  distinctly,  than  might  be  otherwise  pos- 
sible.   Here  then  is  our  thesis,  to  be  argued  in  the  present 
Section.     It  is  plain  that  the  eye  was  formed  for  the 
purpose  of  seeing,  and  the  ear  for  the  purpose  of  hearing ; 
yet  it  may  often  happen,  that  the  very  organ,  given  for 
the  purpose  of  seeing  or  hearing,  not  only  fails  in  effecting 
that  purpose,  but  is  the  occasion  of  severe  and  terrible 
suffering.    In  like  manner,  we  maintain  that  our  nature 
was  formed  for  the  practice  of  virtue ;  and  yet  to  main- 
tain this,  is  quite  consistent  with  the  admission,  that  mul- 
titudes have  perverted  their  nature  to  the  practice  of  vice. 

124.  The  first  argument  for  our  thesis,  shall  be  a 

*  Those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  '  Sermons '  of  Butler,  the  great 
Anglican  philosopher,  will  observe  how  many  thoughts  in  this  Section 
are  taken  from  them.  I  have  annexed  a  few  quotations  from  him ;  but 
these  will  give  no  adequate  idea  of  the  amount  of  matter  due  wholly  to 
that  great  work. 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       251 

very  remarkable  fact  which  we  have  already  established 
(see  n.  121).  We  can,  and  frequently  do,  pursue  virtue, 
because  it  is  virtue ;  but  the  wickedest  man  alive  has 
not  so  much  as  the  physical  power,  of  pursuing  vice 
because  it  is  vice.  Here  is  a  most  striking  superiority 
allotted,  in  our  moral  nature,  to  virtue  over  vice. 

125.  Secondly.    The  only  absolute  ends,  which  the 
will  can  pursue,  are  '  bonum  honestum'  and  'delecta- 
bile:'  now  observe  the  circumstance  that  these  are  also 
the  only  two  legitimate  ends  of  action.   That 4  honestum' 
is  a  legitimate  end  of  action,  is  self-evident ;  that '  delec- 
tabile'  is  so,  will  be  made  clear  (I  hope)  in  '  de  actibus 
humanis;'  meanwhile,  to  a  Christian  at  least,  the  prin- 
ciple  is  conclusively   established,  so   soon   as  he   re- 
members how  very  virtuous  are  such  motives  as  these, 
— hope  of  Heaven  and  fear  of  Hell.     It  is  a  metaphy- 
sical truth  then,  that  these  two  ends  'honestum'  and 
4  delectabile '  are  the  two  legitimate  ends  of  action.    And 
we  have  the  psychological  fact,  corresponding  to  that 
metaphysical  truth,  that  they  are  the  only  two  ends, 
which  have  the  physical  power  of  influencing  our  will. 

126.  Another  psychological  fact,  most  strongly  to 
our  present  purpose,  has  been  mentioned  in  the  First 
Chapter.    (See  n.  51,  p.  116.)     God  has  so  constituted 
our  nature,  and  so  arranged  the  circumstances  in  which 
we  have  been  placed, — that  there  is  no  one  class  of 
thoughts,  brought  more  constantly  before  the  minds  of 
all,  even  the  most  hardened  sinners,  than  those  of  moral 
obligation  and  moral  prefer  ableness.  But  these  thoughts, 
from  their  very  nature,  claim  to  be  the  ruling  thoughts 
of  our  whole  life.     (See  n.  66,  p.  133,  4.)     With  such 
clamorous  urgency  does  God,  in  the  constitution  of  our 
nature,  summon  us  to  virtue. 

127.  Already  then  I  have  put  before  you  three  argu- 
ments for  our  thesis :  our  fourth  shall  be  the  following. 
The  pleasures  of  reflection  are  all  on  the  side  of  virtue. 
To  explain. 

The  good  man  derives  great  enjoyment,  from  pur- 
suing a  virtuous  course ;  as  we  shall  see  fully  established 
in  the  remaining  part  of  this  Section,  On  the  other 


252  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

hand,  the  vicious  man  carries  on  his  evil  course,  simply 
for  the  sake  of  that  pleasure,  which  is  thence  to  be 
derived.  So  far  then,  let  it  be  conceded  for  argument's 
sake,  both  are  equal  in  point  of  enjoyment ;  the 
virtuous  man  deriving  pleasure  from  the  thought  of 
virtuous  objects,  and  the  vicious  man  of  vicious.  But 
how  as  to  the  pleasures  of  reflection  ?  The  thought  of 
vicious  objects  is  pleasurable  to  the  bad  man;  but  is 
the  thought  of  his  love  for  them  pleasurable  ?  Is  it  a 
happy  thought,  e.  g.  to  the  voluptuary,  that  he  is  the 
mere  slave  of  sensual  enjoyment  ?  So  very  far  other- 
wise,— the  exact  opposite  holds  so  very  universally,— 
that  spiritual  writers  use  the  phrase,  '  to  enter  into  one's 
self,'  as  simply  expressing  the  idea  c  to  lead  a  virtuous 
life.'  '  Peccator  odit  animam  suam ;'  the  sinner  is  unable 
to  bear  the  thought  of  his  own  interior,  and  shrinks 
from  the  very  idea  of  steadily  contemplating  its  state. 
On  the  other  hand,  so  far  as  the  good  man  has  reason 
to  believe  that  he  is  really  advancing  in  the  interior 
life,  really  growing  in  the  love  of  God, — the  thought  of 
this  fact  is  among  the  sweetest  pleasures  which  nature 
affords. 

In  one  word.  The  good  man  loves  good  objects, 
and  the  bad  man  bad  objects;  but  the  good  man  loves 
his  own  love  of  good  objects,  whereas  the  evil  man  hates 
his  own  love  of  things  which  are  evil. 

128.  Our  fifth  argument  may  be  introduced  as 
follows. 

Every  separate  'bonum  delectabile'  corresponds  of 
course  to  a  separate  propension.  The  propension  '  Love 
of  Knowledge'  turns  on  that  'bonum  delectabile,'  the 
pleasure  of  knowledge;  the  propension  ''Love  of  Praise,' 
on  the  pleasure  derived  from  praise.  Now  (1)  if  we 
never  aimed  at  '  bonum  delectabile,'  we  should  always 
aim  at  *  bonum  honestum;'  we  should  lead  lives  of  (lan- 
guid perhaps  but  of)  faultless  virtue.  And  (2)  were  it 
not  for  our  propensions,  we  could  never  aim  at  '  bonum 
delectabile.'  The  logical  conclusion  is,  that  the  propen- 
sions are  the  one  disturbing  force  in  our  nature;  that 
were  it  not  for  them,  a  deflection  from  virtue  would  be 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       253 

physically  impossible.  It  becomes  then  a  matter  of 
great  interest,  to  examine  carefully  the  nature  of  these 
propensions. 

(1.)  First  we  have  to  make  on  them  one  most  ob- 
vious remark.  No  reason  can  be  given,  except  God's 
free  appointment,  why  we  have  these  propensions 
rather  than  those.  We  derive  pleasure  in  fact  from 
acquiring  knowledge ;  but  God  might  (had  He  so 
pleased)  have  made  that  process  simply  painful :  and 
so  with  the  rest. 

(2.)  Further,  happiness  of  course  is  only  obtainable, 
through  gratification  of  the  propensions;  it  is  simply 
unmeaning  to  make  any  contradictory  statement.  Sup- 
pose then  God  had  so  acted,  that  the  circumstances, 
under  which  He  has  placed  us,  should  afford  no  object, 
capable  of  gratifying  those  propensions  which  He  has 
given  us.  It  is  plain  that,  on  such  a  supposition,  all 
happiness,  even  the  very  slightest,  would  be  impossible. 
Nay, — if  our  propensions  had  been  such  as  to  make 
themselves  felt  and  clamour  for  gratification, — then,  in 
the  supposed  case,  misery,  awful  and  unmitigated,  must 
have  been  our  unavoidable  doom.  Now  various  argu- 
ments, as  you  well  know,  have  been  drawn  with  great 
force  from  the  visible  world,  as  proving  an  Intelligent 
and  Benevolent  Creator  through  the  plain  marks  of 
benevolent  design.  Here  is  another  most  important 
addition  to  such  arguments  ;  viz.  the  fact  that  every 
propension,  which  makes  itself  felt,  has  in  fact  an  object 
suited  to  its  gratification,  in  those  circumstances  under 
which  God  has  placed  us.  The  proof  of  this  statement 
will  be  found,  in  what  is  immediately  to  follow. 

But  (3)  much  more  than  this  may  be  said.  Every 
propension,  of  whose  existence  we  are  aware,  has  a  real 
and  legitimate  place  in  helping  us  forward  to  virtue. 
Christian  mortification  consists  on  the  whole, — not  in 
thwarting,  in  checking,  in  endeavouring  to  root  out,  our 
various  propensions, — but  rather  the  very  contrary. 
Mortification,  I  say,  on  the  whole,  with  exceptions  pre- 
sently to  be  mentioned  in  detail,  consists  not  in  stinting 
our  various  propensions,  but  in  giving  them  fuller  and 


254  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

wider  scope;  in  directing  them  to  those  Objects,  which 
yield  them  a  far  higher  and  deeper  satisfaction,  than  any 
other  objects  can  give.  And  our  propensions,  when 
they  are  thus  directed,  become  (as  I  said)  an  invaluable 
help  to  us,  in  our  attempts  to  practise  virtue. 

This  then  is  my  fifth  argument  for  the  thesis  of  our 
present  Section.  To  sustain  and  illustrate  it,  will  occupy 
a  very  much  longer  space,  than  will  the  united  treat- 
ment of  all  our  other  arguments.  But  it  will  (in  my 
humble  opinion)  amply  repay  such  lengthened  con- 
sideration, by  the  extreme  importance  of  those  results  to 
which  it  will  lead.  My  first  business  will  be,  to  establish 
the  above  statement;  viz.  that  every  propension,  of  whose 
existence  we  are  aware,  has  a  real  and  legitimate  place 
in  helping  us  forward  to  virtue.  When  the  truth  of 
this  statement  is  made  clear  and  undeniable,  it  will  be 
a  very  simple  and  easy  matter  to  shew  its  cogency,  as 
an  argument  for  our  immediate  thesis. 

129.  Now  here,  that  I  may  the  better  explain  my 
meaning,  let  us  suppose  an  objection.  '  How  can  the 
4  path  of  virtue  be  rendered  easier,7  asks  the  objector, 
4  by  becoming  more  pleasurable  ?  A  good  act  must  be  di- 
'  rected  to  the  virtuousness  of  its  end;  (see  n.  56,  p.  123), 
'  whereas  a  propension  can  only  draw  us  towards  the 
4  pleasure  of  that  end.  A  propension,  then,  may  help 
'  us  indeed  in  the  performance  of  that  external  act, 
6  which  is  virtuous;  but  not  in  its  virtuous  perforin- 
4  ance.  Take,  for  instance,  that  propension  already 
4  mentioned,  our  love  of  knowledge.  We  are  virtuous 
4  in  studying,  only  so  far  as  we  study  for  the  sake  of 
4  that  virtue ;  whereas  the  propension,  love  of  know- 
4  ledge,  inclines  us  to  study  on  quite  a  different  motive, 
4  viz.,  the  act's  pleasurableness? 

Certainly  it  cannot  be  denied,  that  when  an  emotion 
of  pleasure  is  excited  by  the  thought  of  study,  and 
I  put  forth  no  special  resistance, — my  will  also  tends 
to  such  pleasurableness  as  an  immediate  end.  But 
does  it  at  all  follow,  that  my  will's  whole  energy  tends 
towards  this  end  ?  There  is  one  act  undoubtedly, 
directed  to  *  bonum  delectabile ;'  but  does  it  follow,  does 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       255 

it  tend  ever  so  remotely  to  follow,  that  there  is  not  an- 
other act  (and  possibly  one  far  more  energetic  and  effi- 
cacious) directed  to  i  bonum  honestum  ?'  In  the  case 
before  us,  I  am  plainly  not  studying  merely  for  plea- 
sure ;  for  I  see  from  my  window  that  a  game  of  cricket 
is  proceeding,  which  would  give  me  much  greater  en- 
joyment. I  refrain  from  that  pleasure,  because  I  be- 
lieve study  to  be  that  employment,  in  which  God  at  this 
moment  prefers  that  I  should  engage.  The  objection, 
then,  does  not  tend  ever  so  remotely  to  overthrow  that 
statement,  against  which  it  is  directed.  We  admit  most 
fully,  that  an  act  is  elicited  at  this  moment,  wherein  my 
will  tends  towards  '  bonum  delectabile  ;'  we  only 
maintain  in  addition,  that  the  existence  of  this  pleasure 
gives  my  will  the  power,  of  eliciting  simultaneously  a 
far  more  energetic  act  than  would  otherwise  be  pos- 
sible, in  the  direction  of 'bonum  honestum.1 

Before  proceeding  to  defend  this  allegation,  one 
word  maybe  useful,  (in  order  to  avoid  misconception,) 
on  the  concomitant  act  directed  to  4  bonum  delectabile/ 
It  by  no  means  follows,  nor  is  it  by  any  means  pro- 
bable, that  this  act  is  sinful;  though  it  is  impossible 
fully  to  explain  our  meaning  on  this  head,  till  we 
come  to  the  theological  treatment  of  c  actus  kumani.' 
Firstly,  the  4  bonum  delectabile '  need  not  be  its  abso- 
lute end ;  the  pleasure  itself  may  be  directed,  uncon- 
sciously indeed  yet  most  really,  to  some  further  c bonum 
honestum.'  The  act  may  be  of  this,  or  some  cognate, 
kind ;  '  I  choose  the  pleasure  of  study,  as  a  means  of 
4  serving  God  more  cheerfully  and  more  effectually.' 
Whenever  I  am  deeply  impressed  with  the  thought  of 
God,  whenever  the  implicit  remembrance  of  His  pre- 
sence is  acting  powerfully  on  my  will,  it  is  probable 
that  most  acts  of  mine,  which  are  directed  immediately 
to  pleasure,  are  directed  absolutely  to  some  such  vir- 
tuous end ;  a  truth,  which  I  hope  to  defend  and  illus- 
trate at  sufficient  length,  in  our  theological  course. 
But  secondly,  even  though  pleasure  were  the  act's  ab- 
solute end,  the  act  need  not  be  sinful;  it  might  be  simply 
indifferent.  Nay  lastly,  and  to  take  the  most  extreme 


256  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

case,  though  my  act  were  directed  to  pleasure  with  that 
degree  of  inordination  which  constitutes  venial  sin,— 
(you  must  allow  me  to  use  these  expressions,  though 
you  cannot  yet  understand  their  meaning;)  —  still  this 
evil  might  be  most  abundantly  counterbalanced,  by  the 
simultaneous  good  which  I  obtain  the  power  of  effect- 
ing. To  the  consideration  of  this  good  then,  let  us  next 
proceed. 

The  immense  advantage,  gained  for  the  practice 
of  virtue  through  the  pleasure  which  accompanies  it, 
consists  ordinarily  in  two  principal  particulars.  First, 
the  lessening  of  temptation.  Under  the  head  of  Con- 
cupiscence, we  shall  treat  in  detail  the  effect  pro- 
duced by  temptation  on  the  will :  but  it  may  here 
be  assumed,  as  sufficiently  obvious  on  the  surface,  that 
temptation  acts  upon  the  will  like  a  heavy  weight, 
drawing  it  in  the  wrong  direction ;  thwarting  and  im- 
peding it,  to  an  indefinite  extent,  in  its  struggles  to- 
wards good.  Everything  which  lessens  temptation, 
strengthens  pro  tanto  the  will's  actual  power  to  good 
at  the  moment.  Now  taking  the  particular  instance  we 
have  chosen,  and  which  is  indeed  a  sample  of  number- 
less others,  see  how  vastly  temptation  is  diminished,  by 
the  pleasure  which  accompanies  the  virtuous  act.  It 
is  God's  Preference,  that  at  this  moment  I  shall  sit 
down  and  study;  but  how  urgent  and  violent  would 
be  my  temptation  to  engage  rather  in  the  game  of 
cricket,  if  the  study  were  simply  a  dry,  dreary,  and 
disgusting  occupation.  And  this  temptation  would 
increase  in  strength  every  instant ;  until  at  length 
(and  indeed  before  very  long)  it  would  reach  that  de- 
gree, which  an  ordinary  man's  will  has  not  the  moral 
power  of  resisting.  The  pleasurableness,  which  accom- 
panies virtuous  practice,  is  often  in  fact  a  most  impor- 
tant part  of  that  grace  given  us  by  God,  (part  of  what 
is  called  'exterior  grace,')  enabling  us  to  fight  manfully 
against  temptation,  in  His  service  and  for  His  sake. 

The  second  benefit,  which  we  derive  from  the  ac- 
companying pleasure,  is  connected  with  an  important 
phenomenon  of  the  human  will.  Except  in  the  case  of 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       257 

men  who  are  practised  and  disciplined  in  austere  virtue, 
the  will  has  not  the  moral  power  of  tending  for  any 
length  of  time  to  '  bonum  honestumj  while  the  sensitive 
appetite  remains  without  gratification.  In  a  state  of 
long- continued  and  simple  '  tristitia,'  its  powers  to  good 
are  withered  and  paralyzed.  It  is  not  at  all  too  much 
to  say,  that  if  other  phenomena  of  our  nature  remained 
as  they  are  now,  the  consistent  practice  of  virtue  would 
be  simply  and  absolutely  impossible,-^morally  impos- 
sible in  the  strictest  and  completest  sense  of  that  word, — 
were  it  not  for  the  various,  and  frequently  keen  pleasures, 
which  our  Holy  and  Merciful  Creator  has  strewed  in 
our  path. 

Here  we  are  able  to  see  the  force  of  a  phrase,  fre- 
quently used  by  St.  Thomas  and  the  Thomists  ;  '  delec- 
tationes  propter  operationes,  non  contra.'  These  plea- 
sures, so  mercifully  imparted  by  God,  should  be  used 
for  the  purpose  intended  by  Him  ;  for  the  purpose  of 
more  strenuously  and  virtuously  performing  those  acts 
to  which  they  are  annexed.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we 
engaged  in  these  operations  for  the  sake  of  the  plea- 
sures, we  should  invert  the  order  of  nature.  Suppose 
I  sit  down  to  study  in  a  quasi-gluttonous  way ;  simply 
seeking  the  pleasure  of  that  intellectual  treat  which  it 
affords,  without  considering  at  all  whether  God  at  this 
moment  prefers  it; — here  is  the  quasi-sensuality  of  a 
highly  intellectual  man. 

130.  But  there  is  another  case  of  virtue  being 
assisted  by  concomitant  pleasure,  which  has  so  very 
special  and  distinct  an  importance  of  its  own,  as  to 
require  separate  treatment.  I  refer  to  the  case  of 
what  is  commonly  called  sensible  devotion;  i.e.  when 
the  accompanying  pleasure  arises  directly  from  a  con- 
templation of  those  Objects,  which  should  be  the  pole- 
stars  of  our  Christian  course.  This  pleasure,  I  need 
hardly  say,  reaches  very  different  degrees  in  different 
men  ;  or  in  the  same  men  at  different  times.  It  ranges 
from  that  cheering  consolation  which  is  so  often  felt  by 
an  ordinary  Christian,  up  to  those  high  degrees  of 
rapture  and  delight,  which  are  the  frequent  heritage 


258  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

of  Saints;  such  as  made  St.  Francis  Xavier  exclaim, 
c  It  is  too  much,  O  God,  it  is  too  much ! ' 

A  false  mystic,  of  whom  you  may  have  heard, 
named  Molinos,  has  been  condemned  for  the  following 
proposition  :— 

Qui  desiderat  et  amplectitur  devotionem  sen- 
sibilem,  non  desiderat  nee  quserit  Deum,  sed 
seipsum. — DENZ.  p.  337,  prop.  27. 

And  this  condemnation  surely  gives  no  slight 
sanction,  on  the  Church's  part,  to  the  great  importance 
of  sensible  devotion  in  the  interior  life.  We  are  not 
of  course  denying,  that  there  may  be  abuse  of  this  ; 
spiritual  writers  are  loud  in  saying  that  there  may  be, 
and  that  there  often  is.  But  it  is  an  extremely  trite 
remark,  that  a  thing's  abuse  is  no  argument  against 
its  use;  and  our  own  present  argument  leads  us  rather 
to  consider  its  inestimable  service  in  the  promotion  of 
true  piety. 

Observe  then  that  sensible  pleasure,  i.  e.  emotion  of 
an  intense  kind,  unless  we  strenuously  resist  its  ten- 
dency, penetrates  the  intellect  with  a  most  vivid  appre- 
hension of  its  object.  Now  the  objects  which  produce 
sensible  devotion  are  such,  that  in  proportion  as  the 
intellect  contemplates  them  more  keenly,  the  will 
elicits  higher  and  nobler  acts  of  virtue.  What  are  the 
kind  of  thoughts  which  constitute  the  very  life  of 
sensible  devotion  ?  I  suppose  such  as  these  :  the 
wonderful  and  unwearied  love  of  God,  as  contrasted 
with  man's  ingratitude  and  insensibility  ; — the  trea- 
sures of  tenderness  stored  up  in  the  Sacred  Heart;— 
the  rapturous  joys  reserved  for  us  in  Heaven  ; — and  so 
with  many  others.  As  our  emotions  rise  more  highly 
from  such  thoughts  as  these,  the  thoughts  themselves 
take  a  far  deeper  and  more  powerful  hold  of  the  in- 
tellect, and  thus  lead  to  the  highest  and  choicest  acts 
of  the  will.  In  other  words,  the  sensitive  appetite  acts 
on  the  will,  in  the  way  of  rendering  its  acts  far  more 
efficacious,  through  the  intermediate  agency  of  the 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       259 

intellect.  This  will  be  made  still  clearer,  when  we  con- 
sider the  relation  between  intellect  and  will ;  mean- 
while I  would  earnestly  recommend  you  to  study 
Father  Faber's  chapter  on  the  subject,  which  makes 
part  of  his  '  Growth  in  Holiness.'* 

131.  We  have  now  gone  through  our  preliminary 
enquiry  ;  we  have  sufficiently  seen  how  perfectly  con- 
ceivable it  is,  that  the  propensions  may  be  of  invaluable 
service  to  the  cause  of  virtue.  We  now  come  to  our 
direct  and  immediate  statement,  that  they  are  so ;  inso- 
much that,  of  those  various  propensions  which  are  the 
sole  occasion  of  sin,  there  is  not  one  which  may  not  in 
its  way  importantly  promote  the  glory  of  God.  It 
will  of  course  be  impossible  for  us  to  enumerate  all  the 
propensions  ;  but  I  am  confident  we  shall  be  able  to 
establish  so  large  an  induction,  that  no  doubt  will 
remain  in  your  minds  on  the  truth  of  what  we  affirm. 
Indeed  if  not  sufficiently  satisfied,  you  have  but  to 
task  your  ingenuity, —  to  think  of  any  propension 
which  I  shall  not  have  named, — and  call  on  me  to 
prove  my  point  in  regard  to  that  propension.  BuV, 
first,  of  course,  you  must  hear  patiently  to  an  end  my 
own  enumeration. 

I  will  begin  with  the  propension  of  Duty.  It  is 
a  plain  fact  in  human  nature,  that  we  derive  plea- 
sure from  the  mere  consciousness  of  doing  what  is 

*  P.  422-451.  The  following  passage  particularly  deserves  attention. 
"  [During  periods  of  sensible  devotion],  all  trains  of  thought  which  concern 
heavenly  things  display  a  copiousness  and  exuberance  which  they  never  had 
before.  Meditations  are  fluent  and  abundant.  The  virtues  no  longer  bring 
forth  their  actions  in  pain  and  travail,  but  with  facility  and  abundance, 
and  their  offspring  are  rich,  beautiful,  and  heroic.  There  are  provinces 
of  temptations  always  in  discontented  and  smouldering  rebellion.  But 
[now]  we  have  a  power  over  them,  which  is  new,  and  which  is  growing.  We 
have  such  a  facility  in  difficulties  as  almost  to  change  the  character  of  the 
spiritual  life  ;  and  a  union  of  body  and  spirit,  which  is  as  great  a  revolution 
as  agreement  and  peace  in  a  divided  household.  All  these  blessings 
are  the  mutations  of  the  Right  Hand  of  the  Most  High.  Even  to  beginners, 
God  often  vouchsafes  to  give  them,  not  merely  as  sugar-plums  to  children, 
as  some  writers  have  strangely  said,  but  to  do  a  real  work  in  their  souls, 
and  enable  them  to  hold  their  way  through  the  supernatural  difficulties 
proper  to  their  state.  But  proficients  should  ardently  desire  them,  for  they 
fatten  prayer ;  and  the  perfect  can  never  do  without  them,  as  they  can 
never  cease  augmenting  their  virtues  and  rendering  the  exercise  of  them 
pleasant."— Pp.  428,  429.  » 


260  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

right.  This  is  so  undoubted,  that  many  Protestants, 
who  fully  hold  the  intuitiveness  of  moral  truth,  have 
introduced  great  error  into  their  speculations,  by  con- 
fusing these  two  totally  distinct  facts  :  (1)  our  intui- 
tion of  what  is  right;  and  (2)  our  pleasure  in  prac- 
tising it.  Now  it  is  remarkable  that  their  opponents, 
those  who  deny  altogether  our  intuition  of  moral  truth, 
yet  never  deny  the  other  fact ;  viz.  the  pleasurable- 
ness  of  moral  practice.  They  never  deny,  I  mean, 
that  we  do  derive  a  real  gratification,  from  the  simple 
belief  that  we  are  doing  our  duty. 

The  strength  however  of  this  propension,  appears 
to  be  very  far  greater  on  the  negative  than  on  the 
positive  side.  The  misery  of  doing  what  we  know 
to  be  evil,  is  far  keener  and  more  poignant,  than  the 
pleasure  of  doing  what  we  know  to  be  good.  It  has 
sometimes  happened,  that  even  the  most  wicked  men, 
having  committed  some  extraordinary  crime,  have  felt 
a  remorse  so  bitter  that  life  has  been  intolerable.  In 
the  case  of  all  newly  plunged  in  sin,  the  pain  of 
remorse  accompanies  and  sullies  all  those  enjoyments 
which  their  sin  may  purchase.  But  much  more,  as 
men  grow  in  goodness,  does  this  propension  increase 
in  strength.  To  a  Saint,  the  deliberate  commission 
of  one  venial  sin  is  anguish  almost  unsupportable. 

It  needs  no  argument  to  shew  how  extremely  im- 
portant is  this  propension  in  the  cause  of  virtue. 

132.  The  next  propension  I  will  name,  shall  be 
that  of  '  Self-charity ;'  the  propension  whereby  we  feel 
pleasure  at  the  thought  that  our  happiness  is  being  pro- 
moted, and  pain  at  the  thought  that  it  is  being  lessened. 
How  far  this  is  a  strong  and  unintermitting  propension, 
we  shall  consider  in  the  next  chapter ;  but  so  far  as 
it  exists,  its  effect  on  all  Theists  must  be  simply  and 
greatly  good.  Nay  take  even  the  exceptional  instance 
of  those  who  believe  in  no  punishment  after  death — 
even  on  them  this  propension  has  one  beneficial 
effect ;  it  will  often  cause  vicious  pleasure  to  be  accom- 
panied with  a  pang,  which  arises  from  the  remembrance, 
that  their  permanent  happiness  even  on  this  earth  suffers 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       261 

from  their  wicked  courses.  But  in  all  who  believe 
a  future  state  of  retribution,  it  is  plain  that  this  pro- 
pension  works  constantly  and  uniformly  on  the  side  of 
man's  highest  good. 

133.  I  must  now  call  your  attention  to  an  ex- 
tremely strong  propension,  or  rather  union  of  pro- 
pensions  ;  the  treatment  of  which  will  occupy  some 
little  time :  we  may  call  it  the  propension  of  c  Personal 
Love.'  Following  St.  Thomas's  language,  we  may  sub- 
divide this  into  three  propensions  ; — '  Amor  Concupis- 
centiae,'  'Amor  Amicitiae,'  and  '  Amor  Benevolentise  :' 
though  St.  Thomas  is  speaking  of  them  as  virtues, 
and  not  as  propensions.  We  shall  find  indeed,  as 
we  advance,  that  two  of  these  three  are  more  properly 
counted  as  the  same ;  but  we  will  begin  by  explaining 
the  three,  as  St.  Thomas  understands  them.  First 
then  for  'Amor  Benevolentiae.' 

It  frequently  happens,  that  I  may  hear  anecdotes  of 
some  living  man,  or  read  his  life,  or  in  some  other  way 
come  to  a  knowledge  of  his  character; — and  I  may  feel 
my  affections  drawn  to  the  subject  of  these  anecdotes, 
in  a  way  quite  unlike  that,  in  which  they  are  drawn  to 
any  one  else.  I  may  most  fully  recognise  that  others 
are  as  good  men,  or  better ;  but  there  is  some  quality 
in  this  man's  goodness,  which  specially  finds  an  echo 
in  my  own  breast ;  some  inexplicable  sympathy  on  my 
part  towards  him,  which  it  is  quite  hopeless  to  analyse. 
He  for  his  part  (we  will  suppose)  knows  nothing  of  me 
whatever ;  nor  has  he  so  much  as  heard  of  my  exist- 
ence. Still  what  singular  pleasure  I  receive,  in  con- 
templating the  success  he  meets  with  in  his  various 
undertakings  !  How  overjoyed  I  am  to  know  of  his 
well-doing !  What  delight  should  I  experience,  in 
going  through  indefinite  effort  and  privation,  for  the 
sake  of  promoting  his  interests !  Or  again,  suppose  that 
(without  knowing  me  personally)  he  expressed  some 
wish  or  preference,  as  to  the  conduct  to  be  pursued 
by  his  friends  and  well-wishers, — how  keen  would  be 
my  pleasure  in  conforming  my  conduct  to  the  wishes 


262  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

so  expressed!  The  propension,  which  makes  me  sus- 
ceptible of  these  various  pleasures,  and  of  their  oppo- 
site pains,  may  be  called  'Amor  Benevolentiae.' 

But  now  put  a  further  case.  Let  us  suppose,  that 
the  object  of  my  affections  becomes  acquainted  with 
me.  Let  us  suppose,  that  just  as  his  peculiarities  of 
character  have  attracted  my  affections  towards  him 
with  such  singular  warmth, — so  he  should  become 
acquainted  with  corresponding  peculiarities  of  mine, 
which  draw  him  with  equal  tenderness  towards  myself. 
What  then  ensues  ?  My  feeling  of  Amor  Benevolentige 
to  him  becomes  at  once  indefinitely  stronger;  or  in 
other  words,  the  pleasure  which  I  feel,  in  promoting 
his  interests  or  conforming  to  his  wishes,  becomes  in- 
definitely greater.  Here  is  'Amor  Amicitite;1  c  amatio 
et  redamatio : '  —  that  disinterested  love  for  another, 
which  is  accompanied  and  intensified  by  the  conscious- 
ness that  I  am  loved  in  return.  We  can  hardly  find  a 
more  suitable  instance  of  this  feeling,  than  the  rela- 
tions between  a  widowed  mother  and  me  her  only  child. 
Our  characters  were  in  no  small  degree  similar;  and 
her  education  of  me  has  rendered  that  similitude  closer 
and  more  exquisite.  Consider,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
keen  appreciation  with  which  I  dwell  on  those  many 
loveable  points  of  her  character,  which  speak  so  pecu- 
liarly to  my  feelings.  Consider,  on  the  other  hand,  my 
deep  abiding  consciousness,  how  tenderly  she  loves  me ; 
how  open  to  her  is  my  whole  character ;  how  fully  she 
understands  its  various  peculiarities.  Is  it  not  plain 
that  all  this  will  produce  in  me  the  liveliest  and  deepest 
emotions  of  disinterested  attachment?  With  actual 
delight  and  joy  would  I  go  through  a  world  of  labour, 
if  I  could  save  that  dear  heart  one  single  pang. 

At  the  same  time,  and  as  the  necessary  companion 
of  this  propension,  I  have  another  quite  different  in 
kind,  'Amor  Concupiscentise.'  I  delight  in  my  know- 
ledge of  her  love;  her  praise  is  among  my  sweetest 
rewards ;  that  we  shall  exchange  unrestrained  con- 
fidences and  grow  in  knowledge  of  each  other,  is 


ON  THE  ADAFPATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       263 

among  my  happiest  active  employments ;  to  gaze  on  her 
sweet  smile  and  loving  countenance,  is  like  entering  into 
a  tranquil  and  secure  harbour  from  the  storms  of  life. 

You  will  at  once  see,  from  what  has  been  said, 
that  '  Amor  Amicitise'  is  but  one  species  of  'Amor 
Benevolentia3 ; '  whereas  '  Amor  Concupiscentiae '  is 
wholly  different  in  character.  'Amor  Benevolentiae ' 
and  '  Amicitiae'  derive  their  respective  gratifications 
from  precisely  the  same  objects  ;  viz.  the  well-being 
and  well-doing  of  the  beloved  person :  whereas  'Amor 
Concupiscentiae'  is  satisfied  by  objects  totally  different 
from  the  former.  Without  as  yet  accurately  defining 
our  terms,  we  may  say  that  '  Amor  Benevolentise'  is  a 
*  disinterested'  propension  ;  '  Amor  Concupiscentiae'  an 
'interested'  one.  What  is  meant  by  this?  The  plea- 
sures, which  I  derive  in  virtue  of  my  propension  '  Amor 
Benevolentise'  or  '  Amicitiae,'  result  from  the  well-being 
of  its  object  in  himself;  but  those  which  I  derive  from 
'  Amor  Concupiscentiae,'  result  from  his  demeanour  to- 
wards me.  The  knowledge  that  my  friend  is  happy,  or 
that  his  interests  are  being  promoted,  suffices  in  itself  to 
cause  all  those  delights  which  result  from  the  former 
propension;  whereas  the  latter  propension  derives  its 
satisfaction  from  a  knowledge  of  my  own  position  in 
that  friend's  favour  and  affection.  Indeed  the  '  Amor 
Concupiscentiae'  often  clashes  more  than  a  little  with 
the  'Amor  Benevolentise:'  I  am  far  from  feeling  that 
pleasure  which  I  otherwise  should,  in  my  friend's  well- 
being  or  the  promotion  of  his  highest  interests,  because 
I  long  for  more  of  his  society  or  warmer  manifestations 
of  his  regard. 

The  following  quotation  from  Billuart,  St.  Thomas's 
most  approved  commentator  in  his  own  school,  may 
suffice  to  shew,  that  I  have  accurately  stated  the  An- 
gelic Doctor's  use  of  these  expressions ;  with  only  the 
qualification  already  mentioned,  that  he  speaks  of  them 
as  virtues,  not  as  propensions. 

"  Observandum    1°.    cum   eruditissimo   magistro   nostro   P. 
Henneguier,  in  suo  opuscule  De  Absolutione  Sacramental!,  du- 


264  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

plicem  attend!  posse  in  nobis  erga  Deum  amorem :  scilicet  amorem 
concupiscentise,  quo  volumus  Deum  nobis  bonum  Ejusque  beati- 
tudinem  nobis  appetimus ;  et  amorem  amicitise,  quo  Deo  bonum 
Ejusque  beatitudinem  et  perfectionem  volumus.  Hie  iterum  est 
duplex :  unus  secundum  quid  et  inchoatus,  alter  simplex  et  abso- 
lutus.  Primus  dicitur  benevolentise  simplicis,  alter  benevolentiae 
amicabilis.  Neque  enim  idem  sunt,  ut  plerique  existimant,  bene- 
volentia, et  amicitia  seu  charitas :  benevolentia  est  alterius  prin- 
cipium  seu  effectus;  nam  ex  eo  quod  alicui  volumus  bonum, 
disponimur  ut  ipsum  amemus  et  ad  ipsum  amicitiam  habeamus ; 
inde  etiam  quod  aliquem  amemus  et  ad  ipsum  amicitiam  ha- 
beamus, fit  ut  ipsi  bonum  velimus:  unde  S.  Th.  2,  2,  q.  27,  art 
2,  ad.  1,  dicit  quod  cum  philosophus  definit  amare,  quod  est 
velle  alicui  bonum,  f  definiat  amorem,  non  ponens  totam  rationem 
6  ipsius,  sed  aliquid  ad  ejus  rationem  pertinens,  in  quo  maxime 
(  manifestatur  dilectionis  affectus.' 

"  Est  igitur  hoc  discrimen,  secundum  D.  Th.,  inter  bene- 
volentiam  et  amorem  amicitise,  quod  benevolentia  sit  simplex 
actus  voluntatis,  quo  volumus  alicui  bonum  sine  redamatione  ex 
parte  ejus;  ut  dum  videmus  duos  pugiles  in  certamine  aliunde 
nobis  ignotos,  quorum  unum  vellemus  vincere;  est  exemplum 
S.  Thomae  loco  citato:  amor  autem  seu  amicitia  addit  benevo- 
lentise  redamationem,  seu  unionem  affectuum  ad  invicem  ;  amicus 
enim  est  amico  amicm,  ut  fert  commune  adagium.  Placet  verba 
S.  Doctoris  referre  loco  citato  in  corpore  articuli ;  ubi  inquirens 
utrum  amare,  prout  est  actus  charitatis,  (quam  paulo  ante  de- 
finierat  esse  amicitiam,  ut  dicam  modo),  sit  idem  quod  benevo- 
lentia, sic  respondet :  6  Dicendum  quod  benevolentia  proprie 
6  dicitur  actus  voluntatis,  quo  alteri  bonum  volumus.  Hie  autem 
(  voluntatis  actus  differt  ab  actuali  amore,  tarn  secundum  quod 
(  est  in  appetitu  sensitive,  quam  etiam  secundum  quod  est  in 
(  appetitu  intellective,  quod  est  voluntas.'  Turn  paucis  inter- 
jectus  prosequitur :  (  Amor  (seu  amicitia)  importat  quamdam 
6  unionem  secundum  affectum  amantis  ad  amatum,  in  quantum 
6  scilicet  amans  aestimat  amatum  quodam  modo,  ut  unum  sibi 
(  vel  ad  se  pertinens,  et  sic  movetur  in  ipsum ;  sed  benevolentia 
(  est  simplex  actus  voluntatis,  quo  volumus  alicui  bonum,  etiam 
(  non  praBsupposita  praedicta  unione  affectus  ad  ipsum.  Sic  ergo 
e  in  dilectione  secundum  quod  est  actus  charitatis  (hoc  est  ami- 
(  citias,  ut  mox  dicam),  includitur  aliqua  benevolentia  ;  sed  dilectio, 
'  sive  amor,  addit  unionem  affectus ;  et  propter  hoc  philosophus 
c  dicit  ibidem,  quod  benevolentia  sit  principiurn  amicife.' 

"  Unde  vulgo  &  theologis  assignantur  tres  conditiones  requi- 
sitae  ad  amicitiam :  prima,  quod  sit  amor  benevolentiaa,  non  con- 
cupiscentiaa ;  secunda,  quod  sit  mutuus ;  tertia,  quod  fundetur  in 
aliquli  communicatione,  sive  bonorum,  sive  secretorum,  &c.  inter 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       265 

amicos  :  sicque  benevolentia  et  amicitia  conveniunt  in  prima  con- 
ditione,  differunt  in  secunda  et  tertia." — BILLUART,  De  Payi.  diss. 
4.  art.  7.  par.  1. 

I  may  also  add  however  the  following  references : 
2,  2,  q.  23,  a.  1,0;  q.  27,  a.  2,  0,  ad  finem. 

Some  few  Catholic  writers,  Bossuet  being  one,  main- 
tain that,  according  to  St.  Thomas,  even  in  'Amor  Ami- 
citiae'  we  are  aiming  at  our  own  advantage:  but  the 
more  suitable  place  for  refuting  this  strange  opinion, 
will  be  found  under  the  head  of  the  theological  virtues 
in  the  subsequent  part  of  our  course. 

134.  This  will  be  the  proper  opportunity  for  shew- 
ing (see  n.  98.)  how  totally  distinct  is  the  passion 
1  Amor,'  whether  from  'Amor  Benevolentise'  or  'Amor 
Concupiscentiee ;'  though  I  admit  that  St.  Thomas  seems 
in  some  sense  to  identify  it  with  the  latter. 

The  passion  'Amor'  is  that  emotion  which  I  ex- 
perience, whenever  the  thought  enters  my  mind  of  any 
object  which  is  to  me  at  this  moment  a  '  bonum  delec- 
tabile.' On  the  other  hand  it  is  simply  in  virtue  of  my 
propensions,  that  this  object  rather  than  that,  is  to  me 
a  c  bonum  delectabile.'  To  say  that  the  propension 
4  Amor  Benevolentise'  has  been  called  out  in  me  towards 
A.  B.  is  simply  to  say  in  other  words,  that  the  well- 
being  and  well-doing  of  A.  B.  is  to  me  ordinarily  a 
'  bonum  mentaliter  delectabile.'  To  say  that  the  pro- 
pension  c  Amor  Concupiscentige'  has  been  called  out  in 
me  towards  him,  is  to  say  that  the  possession  of  his 
favour  and  love  is  to  me  ordinarily  a  c  bonum  mentaliter 
delectabile.'  When  I  think  indeed  on  either  of  these 
objects,  I  ordinarily  experience  the  passion  '  Amor ;'  but 
I  experience  it  in  no  other  sense,  and  in  no  other  degree, 
than  when  I  think  of  any  other  'bonum  delectabile'  in 
the  whole  world.  There  is,  I  say,  literally  no  more  con- 
nection between  the  passion  '  Amor'  and  the  propension 
'  Amor  Concupiscentiae,'  than  between  the  said  passion 
and  the  propension,  'Love  of  Praise,'  '  Love  of  Acquisi- 
tion,' or  any  other  which  can  possibly  be  named. 

And  the  same  remark  may  be  made,  mutatis  mu- 
tandis, on  the  modal  affection  '  Amor.'  This  is  simply 


266  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

that  act  of  Will  which,  unless  I  make  special  resistance, 
infallibly  accompanies  the  passion  '  Amor,'  when  I 
think  of  any  'bonum  delectabile.'  (See  n.  100.) 

135.  Returning  to  the  two  propensions  before  us, 
we  may  call  their  union  by  the  name  c  Personal  Love ; ' 
and  it  is  plain  at  once,  how  great  an  assistance  they  give 
in  many  respects  to  the  cause  of  virtue,  even  if  lavished 
on  human  objects.  They  raise  the  heart  above  low  and 
grovelling  desires ;  they  open  to  the  mind  ideas  of  far 
higher  and  more  exalted  pleasures,  than  would  other- 
wise be  dreamt  of ;  they  tend  to  form  the  character  in 
habits  of  generosity  and  disinterestedness. 

But  are  our  fellow-men,  specially  our  fellow-men  in 
this  visible  world,  objects  at  all  adequate  to  this  pro- 
pension,  as  God  has  implanted  it  in  our  hearts  ?  Surely, 
though  we  had  no  more  than  unaided  reason  to  guide 
us,  we  never  could  think  so.  The  following  most  beau- 
tiful passage  may  serve  here  to  express  my  meaning. 

"  The  thought  of  God,  and  nothing  short  of  it,  is  the  hap- 
piness of  man;  for  though  there  is  much  besides  to  serve  as 
subject  of  knowledge,  or  motive  for  action,  or  instrument  of 
excitement,  yet  the  affections  require  a  something  more  vast  and 
more  enduring  than  any  tiling  created.  What  is  novel  and 
sudden,  excites,  but  does  not  influence ;  what  is  pleasurable  or 
useful,  raises  no  awe ;  self  moves  no  reverence ;  and  mere  know- 
ledge kindles  no  love.  He  alone  is  sufficient  for  the  heart  who 
made  it.  I  do  not  say,  of  course,  that  nothing  short  of  the 
Almighty  Creator  can  awaken  and  answer  to  our  love,  reverence, 
and  trust.  Man  can  do  this  for  man ;  man  doubtless  is  an 
object  to  rouse  his  brother's  love,  and  repays  it  in  his  measure. 
Nay,  it  is  a  great  duty,  one  of  the  two  chief  duties  of  religion, 
thus  to  be  minded  towards  our  neighbour.  But  I  am  not  speak- 
ing here  of  what  we  can  do,  or  ought  to  do,  but  what  it  is  our 
happiness  to  do;  and  surely  it  may  be  said,  that  though  the 
love  of  the  brethren,  the  love  of  all  men,  be  one-half  of  our 
obedience,  yet  this  love  exercised  by  itself,  were  that  possible, 
(which  it  is  not)  were  no  part  of  our  reward.  And  for  this 
reason,  if  for  no  other,  that  our  hearts  require  something  more 
permanent  and  uniform  than  man  can  be.  We  gain  much  for  a 
time  from  fellowship  with  each  other.  It  is  a  relief  to  us,  as 
fresh  air  to  the  fainting,  or  meat  and  drink  to  the  hungry,  or 
a  flood  of  tears  to  the  heavy  in  mind.  It  is  a  soothing  comfort 
to  have  those  whom  we  may  make  our  confidants;  a  comfort 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       267 

to  have  those  to  whom  we  may  confess  our  faults;  a  comfort 
to  have  those  to  whom  we  may  look  for  sympathy.  Love  of 
home  and  family  in  these  and  other  ways  is  sufficient  to  make 
this  life  tolerable  to  the  multitude  of  men,  which  otherwise  it 
would  not  be;  but  still,  after  all,  our  affections  exceed  such 
exercise  of  them,  and  demand  what  is  more  stable.  Do  not 
all  men  die?  are  they  not  taken  from  us?  are  they  not  as 
uncertain  as  the  grass  of  the  field  ?  We  do  not  give  our  hearts 
to  things  inanimate,  because  these  have  no  permanence  in  them. 
We  do  not  place  our  affections  in  sun,  moon,  and  stars,  or  this 
rich  and  fair  earth,  because  all  things  material  come  to  nought, 
and  vanish  like  day  and  night.  Man,  too,  though  he  has  an 
intelligence  within  him,  yet  in  his  best  estate  is  altogether  vanity. 
If  our  happiness  consists  in  our  affections  being  employed  and 
recompensed,  '  man  that  is  born  of  a  woman'  cannot  be  our 
happiness ;  for  how  can  he  stay  another,  who  (  continueth  not 
in  one  stay'  himself? 

"  But  there  is  another  reason  why  God  alone  is  the  happiness 
of  our  souls,  to  which  I  wish  rather  to  direct  attention.  The  con- 
templation of  Him,  and  nothing  but  it,  is  able  fully  to  open  and 
relieve  the  mind,  to  unlock,  occupy,  and  fix  our  affections.  We 
may  indeed  love  things  created  with  great  intenseness ;  but  such 
affection,  when  disjoined  from  the  love  of  the  Creator,  is  like  a 
stream  running  in  a  narrow  channel,  impetuous,  vehement,  turbid. 
The  heart  runs  out,  as  it  were,  only  at  one  door ;  it  is  not  an  ex- 
panding of  the  whole  man.  Created  natures  cannot  open  to  us,  or 
elicit,  the  ten  thousand  mental  senses  which  belong  to  us,  and 
through  which  we  really  live.  None  but  the  presence  of  Our 
Maker  can  enter  us ;  for  to  none  besides  can  the  whole  heart  in  all 
its  thoughts  and  feelings  be  unlocked  and  subjected.  f  Behold/  he 
says.,  '  I  stand  at  the  door  and  knock  ;  if  any  man  hear  my  voice 
and  open  the  door,  I  will  come  unto  him,  and  will  sup  with  him, 
and  he  with  me.'  c  My  Father  will  love  him,  and  We  will  come 
unto  him,  and  make  our  abode  with  him.'  '  God  hath  sent  forth 
the  Spirit  of  His  Son  into  your  hearts/  '  God  is  greater  than  our 
heart,  and  knoweth  all  things.'  It  is  this  feeling  of  simple  and 
absolute  confidence  and  communion,  which  soothes  and  satisfies 
those  to  whom  it  is  vouchsafed.  We  know  that  even  our  nearest 
friends  enter  into  us  but  partially,  and  hold  intercourse  with  us 
only  at  times ;  whereas  the  consciousness  of  a  perfect  and  endur- 
ing presence,  and  it  alone,  keeps  the  heart  open.  Withdraw  the 
object  on  which  it  rests,  and  it  will  relapse  again  into  its  state  of 
confinement  and  constraint;  and  in  proportion  as  it  is  limited, 
either  to  certain  seasons  or  to  certain  affections,  the  heart  is 
straitened  and  distressed.  If  it  be  not  over-bold  to  say  it,  He 
who  is  Infinite  can  alone  be  its  measure ;  He  alone  can  answer  to 


268  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

the  mysterious  assemblage  of  feelings  and  thoughts  which  it  has 
within  it.  (  There  is  no  creature  that  is  not  manifest  in  His 
sight,  but  all  things  are  naked  and  opened  unto  the  eyes  of  Him 
with  whom  we  have  to  do.'" — Newman's  Parochial  Sermons, 
vol.  v.  pp.  357-361. 

The  fact  which  we  are  considering,  is  one  of  such 
extreme  importance  in  a  great  number  of  ways,  that  I 
must  ask  your  indulgence  for  what  might  seem  an 
impertinence.  It  might  seem,  I  say,  an  impertinence, 
if  I  ventured  to  add  anything  of  my  own,  when  your 
memories  are  filled  with  that  beautiful  passage  which 
I  have  just  quoted;  and  yet  it  will  serve  (I  hope)  to 
give  us  a  still  firmer  and  deeper  possession  of  the  truth 
before  us,  if  we  consider  in  some  detail  those  various 
particulars,  which  Father  Newman  has  united  in  his 
most  attractive  picture.  Let  us  consider  then  the 
warmest  mutual  affection,  that  can  exist  towards  a 
visible  human  friend.  And  in  order  to  fix  our  ideas  by 
one  instance,  let  us  compare  that  affection,  with  the 
friendship  which  may  be  sustained,  between  the  Sacred 
Humanity  of  Our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  and  a  soul  which 
gives  itself  generously  to  God/ 

First  consider  devotion  to  the  cause  of  that  friend. 
Who  could  dare  make  it  the  chief  wish  of  his  life,  to 
promote  the  cause  or  desires  of  any  earthly  friend? 
Who  might  even  surrender  himself  for  one  moment 
without  restraint  to  such  a  purpose?  You  see  then 
that  our  devotion  to  any  earthly  friend  (1)  must  be 
occasional,  and  not  pervasive  of  our  whole  life ;  while 
(2)  it  must  be  measured  and  not  unreserved. 

Next,  consider  the  foundation  of  the  friendship, 
according  to  that  theory  on  Personal  Love  which  we 
have  drawn  out ;  in  other  words,  those  particular  quali- 
ties of  heart  and  character,  which  specially  attract  our 
love.  In  studying  the  mysteries  of  our  Saviour's  life 
on  earth,  or  the  various  aspects  under  which  His 
different  offices  towards  us  are  represented  by  the 
Church, —  one  man  is  drawn  specially  to  one  class  of 
such  exhibitions,  another  to  another.  One  man  is 
singularly  affected  by  His  Infancy;  another  by  His 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       269 

Passion ;  a  third  by  the  Sacred  Heart ;  a  fourth  by  the 
Precious  Blood.  One  Christian  dwells  with  tenderest 
devotion  on  His  acts,  another  on  His  words  ;  one  is 
more  affected  by  His  compassionate  love  towards  the 
worst  sinners,  another  by  His  most  tender  familiarity 
with  the  beloved  Apostle.  And  so  we  might  indefi- 
nitely proceed.  But  we  may  safely  assert  that  there 
is  no  one  human  being,  among  all  the  inexhaustible 
varieties  of  character,  but  will  find  more  than  one 
feature  specially  to  win  and  attract  him.  It  matters 
not  to  our  argument  what  that  special  feature  may  be : 
for  in  all  there  is  the  same  Divine  Saviour ;  in  all  there 
is  a  certain  quality,  unparalleled  and  unapproachable ; 
in  all  (I  need  not  say,  for  to  doubt  it  were  blasphemy; 
in  all)  there  is  that,  to  which  no  development  of  our 
earthly  friend's  character  can  bear  the  most  distant 
comparison. 

Thirdly,  consider  that  important  ingredient  in  friend- 
ship, mutual  confidence  and  appreciation.  With  earthly 
friends  I  can  exchange  but  half  confidences  ;  to  the 
most  sympathetic  and  congenial  friend  I  can  open  but 
a  small  part  of  myself,  and  should  only  be  misunder- 
stood if  I  attempted  more.*  But  the  Soul  of  Christ 
views  my  whole  character  in  all  its  lights  and  shades; 

*  "And  even  with  our  fellowmen^ — are  they  adequate  objects  for  our 
thoughts  and  affections  ?  Practically,  it  is  a  plain  matter  of  fact,  that  they 
are  not.  How  are  our  affections  and  sympathies  broken  up  and  given  away 
in  fragments  !  We  do  not  trust  our  whole  heart  to  our  nearest  friend. 
We  give  part  of  our  confidence  to  one  man,  part  to  another ;  we  cannot 
give  more,  and  should  be  stared  at  if  we  tried.  When  we  wish  really  to 
sympathise  with  another's  deep  feelings,  or  to  explain  our  own,  how  hope- 
lessly do  we  fall  short ;  and  by  what  a  chance  does  it  seem  to  be  that  we 
succeed  at  all !  Those  burnings  of  the  heart  which  we  occasionally  experi- 
ence, on  having  sure  signs  that  others  do  thoroughly  feel  what  we  do,  or 
when  a  great  system  opens  upon  us,  or  when  one  whom  we  love  performs 
a  noble  action,  or  when  one  whom  we  revere  shews  us  unexpected  affection, 
at  once  shew  us  the  emptiness  of  our  ordinary  sympathies,  and  are  earnests 
of  something  greater.  Such  passing  emotions  betray  to  us  capacities  for  a 
state  of  habitual  feeling,  in  which  must  be  the  highest  happiness,  and  which 
we  are  as  yet  as  unable  and  unworthy  to  feel  as  our  friends  are  to  excite. 
Is  it  conceivable  that  this  union  of  high  capability  with  actual  unworthi- 
ness  should  be  meant  merely  to  point  us  forward  to  a  future  life  ?  Surely, 
rather  it  sanctions  those  present  desires  which  it  causes  ;  that  blind  craving 
after  the  supernatural,  that  worshipping  of  the  unknown  God,  of  which  the 
highest  and  the  lowest  minds  give  common  witness." — British  Critic,  1838, 
p.  217. 


270  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

sees  in  every  particular  my  difficulties,  my  sorrows,  my 
temptations ;  understands  the  cause  of  this  peculiarity, 
which  repels  my  dearest  earthly  friend;  does  justice 
to  my  conduct  under  that  emergency,  when  my  nearest 
intimates  felt  themselves  bound  to  condemn  me.  You 
will  object  at  once,  that  my  faults  also  and  imperfections 
are  exposed  with  fearful  openness  to  His  piercing  gaze. 
Ah !  we  do  little  justice  to  His  loving  tenderness,  if  we 
regard  this  as  an  objection.  If  there  be  but  the  real  wish 
of  doing  right,  if  there  be  but  a  true  desire  of  dealing 
generously  with  Him,  it  may  be  said  in  a  most  true 
sense  that  our  miserable  short-comings  and  infirmities 
are  even  incentives  to  his  love.  In  our  theological 
course  this  most  touching  truth  will  be  handled  at 
length. 

Fourthly,  friendship  with  our  Lord  is  a  friendship, 
which,  if  I  am  but  faithful  to  myself  and  to  His  grace, 
is  sure,  steadfast,  and  eternal.  If  my  dearest  friends 
in  many  things  misunderstand  me  now,  what  constant 
danger  there  is  lest,  under  some  future  contingency, 
they  may  far  more  grievously  misunderstand  me !  If  St. 
Paul  and  St.  Barnabas,  among  the  most  holy  of  God's 
servants,  and  endeared  to  each  other  by  common  labour 
in  their  Redeemer's  service — if  these  holy  Apostles 
could  cool  and  separate,  what  earthly  friendship  can  be 
accounted  secure?  Here  then  is  one  mode  in  which 
earthly  friendships  may  be  dissolved;  and  another  is 
the  very  condition  of  this  life.  My  tastes  may  change, 
nay  they  are  ever  changing ;  my  friend's  tastes  change ; 
circumstances  remove  us  from  all  active  communication 
with  each  other ;  till  we  meet  again  after  a  long  interval, 
and  find  that  our  mutual  sympathy  is  gone.  But  look 
at  the  opposite  picture.  Jesus  Christ  is  '  the  same 
yesterday,  to-day,  and  for  ever;'  and  for  myself,  as  I 
advance  in  piety,  I  do  but  increase  in  sympathy  with 
Him.  Nay,  as  Father  Newman  most  justly  remarks, 
His  very  greatness  keeps  me  back  from  that  rude 
familiarity,  which  sometimes  brings  earthly  friendships 
to  a  speedy  end.* 

*  "  Fear  is  allayed  by  the  love  of  Him,  and  our  love  sobered  by  our  fear 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       271 

Fifthly,  in  earthly  friendships,  as  we  have  already 
remarked,  the  c  Amor  Concupiscentiae'  is  ever  clashing 
with  the  c  Amor  Benevolentise : '  in  heavenly  friendships 
alone  are  they  fully  harmonious  and  complementary  of 
each  other.  In  proportion  as  I  enjoy  with  greater  zest 
that  one  pleasure,  of  working  for  my  dearest  Lord  and 
consulting  His  Preference  in  all  things, — in  that  very 
proportion  do  I  the  more  enjoy  that  other  pleasure,  of 
basking  in  the  sunshine  of  His  presence,  and  rejoicing 
in  the  thought  of  His  approbation  and  love. 

Then  lastly,  friendship  presses  towards  union  with 
the  beloved  object;  almost,  as  it  were,  towards  cor- 
poral union;  as  the  very  marks  of  friendship  which 
we  spontaneously  exhibit,  embracing  and  the  like,  suf- 
ficiently testify.  But  what  other  union  of  friendship 
can  bear  a  moment's  comparison,  to  that  miraculous 
union  which  we  enjoy  with  the  Sacred  Humanity,  in 
the  Sacrament  of  our  Saviour's  love,  the  pledge  of  His 
undying  tenderness? 

So  here  are  six  points  of  contrast.  First,  the  love 
to  our  Saviour  is  more  pervasive  and  ungrudging; 
secondly,  those  qualities  which  are  its  foundation  are 
more  attractive ;  thirdly,  the  mutual  confidence  is 
greater ;  fourthly,  the  friendship  is  more  permanent 
and  stable ;  fifthly,  in  this  friendship  alone  the  '  Amor 
BenevolentisB '  and  '  Concupiscentiae'  are  brought  into 
harmony  ;  sixthly,  the  union  is  closer.  In  every  one 
of  these  particulars  the  superiority  of  Divine  friendship 
is  vast  and  incalculable. 

It  may  unthinkingly  be  urged,  in  objection  to  all 

of  Him.  Thus  He  draws  us  on  with  encouraging  voice  amid  the  terrors  of 
His  threatenings.  As  in  the  young  ruler's  case,  He  loves  us,  yet  speaks 
harshly  to  us,  that  we  may  learn  to  cherish  mixed  feelings  towards  Him. 
He  hides  himself  from  us,  and  yet  calls  us  on,  that  we  may  hear  His  voice 
as  Samuel  did,  and  believing,  approach  Him  with  trembling.  This  may 
seem  strap ge  to  those  who  do  not  study  the  Scriptures,  and  to  those  who 
do  not  know  what  it  is  earnestly  to  seek  after  God.  But  in  proportion  as 
the  state  of  mind  is  strange,  so  is  there  in  it,  therefore,  untold  and  surpass- 
ing pleasure  to  those  who  partake  it.  The  bitter  and  the  sweet,  strangely 
tempered,  thus  leave  upon  the  mind  the  lasting  taste  of  Divine  truth,  and 
satisfy  it ;  not  so  harsh  as  to  be  loathed  ;  nor  of  that  insipid  sweetness 
which  attends  enthusiastic  feelings,  and  is  wearisome  when  it  becomes 
familiar." — Par.  Serm.  vol.  i.  p.  350. 


272  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

this,  that  friendship  requires  for  its  perfection  a  certain 
exclusiveness ;  and  that  He  who  loves  all  mankind  with 
such  exuberant  tenderness,  can  be  no  sufficient  object 
for  this  propension.  A  moment's  thought  gives  the 
reply.  In  human  friendship  exclusiveness  is  neces- 
sary, simply  because  the  will,  the  intellect,  the  affec- 
tions of  men  are  in  themselves  so  limited  and  confined : 
we  have  not  enough  of  our  friend's  thoughts,  if  his 
friendship  be  shared  with  multitudes.  In  Divine  friend- 
ship this  holds  not  in  the  slightest  degree.  So  the 
Protestant  poet  answers  this  very  objection:  — 

"  Thou  art  as  much  His  care,  as  though  beside 
Nor  man  nor  angel  lived  in  heaven  or  earth  ; 

Thus  sunbeams  shed  alike  their  glorious  tide, 
To  light  up  worlds  or  wake  an  insect's  mirth  : 

They  shine  and  shine  in  unexhausted  store  ; 

Thou  art  thy  Saviour's  darling,  ask  no  more." 

The  sun,  Mr,  Keble  implies,  puts  forth  its  whole 
influence  towards  enlivening  a  poor  worm,  just  as 
though  there  were  no  gorgeous  palaces,  or  majestic 
scenes  of  natural  beauty,  to  receive  its  gladdening  light. 
And  so  the  Sun  of  Justice  sheds  His  whole  rays  on  me, 
a  miserable  worm  of  the  earth,  as  fully,  as  absolutely, 
as  though  there  were  no  mortified  priests  or  holy 
ascetics,  who  look  to  His  light  as  their  very  life.  That 
human  soul  of  His,  as  we  shall  see  when  we  study  the 
Incarnation  treatise,  is  occupied,  at  every  instant,  as 
simply,  as  intently,  in  reading  my  heart  and  consider- 
ing my  thoughts,  as  though  there  were  no  other  object 
to  engage  it.  The  objection  then  is  not  merely  an- 
swered; it  is  actually  retorted.  One  chief  prerogative 
of  Divine  Love  as  compared  with  human,  is  the  con- 
stant thought  and  consideration  which  we  receive  from 
the  Beloved  Object. 

Another  objection  may  be  ingeniously  raised,  against 
part  at  least  of  the  above  argument.  Who  would  ven- 
ture, I  asked,  to  throw  himself  unreservedly  and  per- 
vasively into  any  human  friendship  ?  4  Certainly,'  re- 
plies the  objector,  'no  good  man  could  do  so;  but 
4  might  not  a  bad  man  ?  And  why  may  not  he  so  far 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       273 

'  obtain  the  very  same  pleasure>  which  the  pious  man 
'  gains  by  his  friendship  with  our  Lord?'  Now  there 
have  been  from  time  to  time  various  men,  with  hearts 
far  removed  from  God,  who  have  more  or  less  at- 
tempted thus  to  make  idols  of  their  fellow-men:  and 
what  has  been  the  result  ?  The  very  attempt  shews 
weakness  of  character,  as  all  would  admit;  that  love, 
which  can  be  a  strong-minded  man's  one  object,  must 
be  a  divine  and  not  a  human  love.  But  look  at  this 
weak-minded  idolator  of  a  fellow-man,  and  see  what  is 
the  course  of  his  history.  He  is  in  constant  alterna- 
tions, flux  and  reflux,  of  rapture  and  despondency. 
To-day  he  has  found  the  very  idol,  for  which  he  has 
so  long  been  seeking  in  vain;  he  is  in  transports  of 
delight.  Next  week  he  finds  that  his  idol  is  but  an 
ordinary  man,  and  he  falls  into  an  agony  of  disappoint- 
ment. These  men,  in  fact,  more  signally  than  any 
others,  illustrate  the  truth  which  I  am  putting  before 
you ;  they  display  every  imaginable  symptom,  of  lavish- 
ing a  strong  propension  on  objects  utterly  and  con- 
temptibly unable  to  afford  it  gratification. 

We  now  proceed  to  further  illustrations  of  our 
principle.  My  love  for  my  Redeemer  viewed  in  His 
human  nature,  leads  me  (in  proportion  to  its  growth) 
to  a  constantly  increasing  love  for  the  Triune  God  ; 
for  God  contemplated  in  His  own  Original  and  Infinite 
Nature.*  Here  is  indeed  an  adequate  object  for  my 
keen  affections. 

Again,  the  love  of  Mary  is  an  ever  fresh  and  in- 
exhaustible well  of  joy  and  delight.  Love  to  her  in- 
deed, such  as  we  find  it  in  the  greatest  Saints,  is  that 
very  reality,  of  which  the  highest  (perhaps)  and  purest 
among  human  affections, — a  child's  love  to  his  mother 
— is  but  the  faint  and  inadequate  type. 

Then  again,  from  among  the  Saints  I  choose  this 

or  that  one  in  particular ;  not  from  believing  him  to  be 

the  holiest  in  that  blessed  assemblage,  but  because  his 

.  is  that  particular  exhibition  of  sanctity,  to  which  (from 

*  u  Ut  dum  visibiliter  Deum  cognoscimus  per  hunc  in  invisibilium 
amorem  rapiamur™ 

T 


274  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

some  occult  sympathy)  I  am  instinctively  drawn.  It  is 
not  merely  one  indeed,  but  a  certain  small  number, 
towards  whom  for  this  reason  I  cherish  a  special  and 
tender  devotion. 

Lastly,  love  for  my  Guardian  Angel  has  something 
in  it  which  reminds  me  of  human  friendship;  for  this 
loved  being  stands  to  me  in  a  relation  which  he  holds 
to  'no  other  creature,  and  loves  me  therefore  with  a 
certain  exclusiveness  of  affection. 

And  thus  we  see,  in  strong  corroboration  of  our 
general  thesis,  a  very  important  fact,  as  to  those  who 
are  called  by  the  Holy  Spirit  to  the  noble  vocation,  of 
steadily  and  systematically  renouncing  all  particular 
attachments  on  earth.  These  men,  we  see,  are  in  no 
sense  called  upon  to  subdue  this  propension  of  Personal 
love,  but  the  very  contrary.  Their  love  is  directed 
with  all  the  more  intensity  and  delight  to  its  legitimate 
Objects;  who  belong  indeed  to  the  Invisible  World,  but 
whom  the  eye  of  faith  so  keenly  and  lovingly  discerns. 

136.  The  next. propension  which  deserves  our  notice, 
is  General  Love  of  our  fellow-men,  as  distinct  from 
Personal:  and  this  again  exists  under  the  same  two 
divisions,  c  Benevolentiae,'  and  4  Concupiscentia?.'  I  say 
we  have  a  certain  love  to  our  fellow-men  as  such :  this 
propension  may  be  thwarted  by  various  causes  ;  such 
as  a  sense  of  injury  received,  or  some  special  antipathy; 
but  where  such  disturbing  influences  are  absent,  the 
propension  shews  itself  unmistakeably.  Man,  as  is  so 
constantly  remarked,  is  a  social  animal.  We  seek  the 
society  of  our  fellow-men  as  such,  by  a  tendency  quite 
distinct  from  that,  which  leads  us  to  seek  the  society 
of  our  personal  friends.  And  when  we  are  in  this 
general  society,  we  feel  a  certain  genial  cordiality 
as  our  normal  attitude  of  mind.  In  other  words  (1) 
we  experience  a  certain  feeling  of  general  goodwill  to 
our  companions;  —  'Amor  BenevolentiaB :'  and  (2)  we 
take  for  granted,  and  have  pleasure  in  the  thought, 
that  they  respond  to  that  feeling ; — '  Amor  Concupis- 
centiae.'  *  That '  Amor  Concupiscentiae '  indeed  towards 

*  "  Mankind  are  by  nature  so  closely  united,  there  is  such  a  correspond- 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUH  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       275 

our  fellow-men  is  negatively  a  most  strong  propension, 
is  manifest  from  this.  I  suppose  no  man  could  live 
(unless  supported  by  most  singular  supplies  of  grace) 
under  the  impression  that  all  his  fellow-men  regarded 
him  as  a  monster  of  depravity.  And  this  misery  would 
evidently  be  totally  distinct  from  any  fear  for  his  per- 
sonal safety ;  it  would  arise  simply  from  believing 
himself  an  object  of  universal  detestation. 

This  propension,  even  in  its  rudimental  state,  is  of 
manifest  advantage  to  the  cause  of  virtue  ;  in  that  it 
directs  our  thoughts,  from  purely  selfish  ends,  to  the 
promotion  of  the  common  good.  In  holy  men  it  assumes 
far  greater  prominence ;  and  develops  into  that  intense 
feeling  of  brotherly  love,  so  characteristic  of  the  saintly 
character.  The  holy  missionary  or  parish  priest  is  no 
doubt  chiefly  animated  by  personal  love  for  his  Creator 
and  Saviour ;  yet  no  slight  support  is  afforded  him  in 
his  holy  enterprises,  by  this  burning  love  of  the  brethren. 
A  remark  has  often  been  made,  sometimes  indeed  by 
the  enemies  of  Christianity  as  a  reproach  to  it,  but  it 
seems  certainly  just:  it  is  this.  The  tendency  on  the 
whole  of  growth  in  sanctity  is,  that  our  personal  love 

ence  between  the  inward  sensations  of  one  man  and  those  of  another,  that 
disgrace  is  as  much  avoided  as  bodily  pain,  and  to  be  the  object  of  esteem 
and  love  is  as  much  desired  as  any  external  goods  :  and  in  many  particular 
cases,  persons  are  carried  on  to  do  good  to  others,  as  the  end  their  affection 
tends  to  and  rests  in ;  and  manifest  that  they  find  real  satisfaction  and 
enjoyment  in  this  course  of  behaviour.  There  is  such  a  natural  principle 
of  attraction  in  man  towards  man,  that  having  trod  the  same  tract  of  land, 
having  breathed  in  the  same  climate,  barely  having  been  born  in  the  same 
artificial  district  or  division,  becomes  the  occasion  of  contracting  acquaint- 
ances and  familiarities  many  years  after  :  for  anything  may  serve  the  pur- 
pose. Thus  relations  merely  nominal  are  sought  and  invented,  not  by 
governors,  but  by  the  lowest  of  the  people  ;  which  are  found  sufficient  to 
hold  mankind  together  in  little  fraternities  and  copartnerships  :  weak 
ties  indeed,  and  that  may  afford  fund  enough  for  ridicule,  if  they  are 
absurdly  considered  as  the  real  principles  of  that  union  :  but  they  are 
in  truth  merely  the  occasions,  as  anything  may  be  of  anything,  upon 
which  our  nature  carries  us  on  according  to  its  own  previous  bent  and  bias  ; 
which  occasions  therefore  would  be  nothing  at  all,  were  there  not  this  prior 
disposition  and  bias  of  nature.  Men  are  so  much  one  body,  that  in  a 
peculiar  manner  they  feel  for  each  other,  shame,  sudden  danger,  resentment, 
honour,  prosperity,  distress  ;  one  or  another,  or  all  of  these  ;  from  the  social 
nature  in  general,  from  benevolence,  upon  the  occasion  of  natural  relation, 
acquaintance,  protection,  dependence  ;  each  of  these  being  distinct  cements 
of  society." — Butler's  Sermons. 


276  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

shall  more  and  more  be  taken  from  our  visible  com- 
panions here  below,  and  fixed  on  the  Invisible  World.  I 
am  far  from  meaning  by  this,  that  all  men,  or  more  than 
a  comparatively  small  portion,  are  called  by  God  to  a 
state  in  which  particular  earthly  friendships  are  to  cease. 
But  I  do  think  it  true,  that,  as  we  advance  towards 
perfection,  such  friendships  become  less  absorbing  and 
less  engrossing ;  we  grow  more  and  more  towards 
regarding  our  friend,  as  in  some  way  a  special  repre- 
sentative to  us  of  our  brethren  in  general. 

137.  The  next  propension  to  be  noticed  is  'Miseri- 
cordia' — Compassion.  In  addition  to  this  General  Love 
of  our  fellow-men  which  we  have  just  considered — a 
propension  which,  in  its  rudimental  state,  and  on  its 
positive  side,  must  be  regarded  as  somewhat  faint — in 
addition  to  this  General  Love  (I  say)  we  have  a  propen- 
sion, far  keener,  far  more  irrepressible,  far  more  power- 
fully influential,  which  draws  us  to  the  relief  of  misery 
as  such.  We  meet  a  fellow -man  whom  we  never  before 
saw  ;  and  experience  (it  may  be)  some  calm  emotion 
of  general  benevolence.  Let  him  unfold  a  tale  of  bitter 
distress,  and  give  us  ample  means  for  knowing  its  truth, 
far  different  is  our  emotion.  The  most  hard-hearted 
men  can  only  save  themselves  from  this  pain,  by  reso- 
lutely shutting  their  ears  to  the  melancholy  story;  it  is 
not  in  human  nature,  that  we  shall  know  our  brother's 
griefs,  and  not  grieve  ourselves.* 

*  "  Of  these  two,  delight  in  the  prosperity  of  others,  and  compassion  for 
their  distresses,  the  last  is  felt  much  more  generally  than  the  former. 
Though  men  do  not  universally  rejoice  with  all  whom  they  see  rejoice,  yet. 
accidental  obstacles  removed,  they  naturally  compassionate  all,  in  some 
degree,  whom  they  see  in  distress  ;  so  far  as  they  have  any  real  perception 
or  sense  of  that  distress  :  insomuch  that  words  expressing  this  latter,  pity, 
compassion,  frequently  occur ;  whereas  we  have  scarce  any  single  one,  by 
which  the  former  is  distinctly  expressed.  Congratulation,  indeed,  answers 
condolence  :  but  both  these  words  are  intended  to  signify  certain  forms  of 
civility,  rather  than  any  inward  sensation  or  feeling.  This  difference  or 
inequality  is  so  remarkable,  that  we  plainly  consider  compassion  as  itself 
an  original  distinct  particular  affection  in  human  nature  ;  whereas  to 
rejoice  in  the  good  of  others,  is  only  a  consequence  of  the  general  affection 
of  love  and  goodwill  to  them.  The  reason  and  account  of  which  matter  is 
this  :  when  a  man  has  obtained  any  particular  advantage  or  felicity,  his  end 
is  gained  ;  and  he  does  not  in  that  particular  want  the  assistance  of  another  : 
there  was  therefore  no  need  of  a  distinct  affection  towards  that  felicity  of 
another  already  obtained  ;  neither  would  such  affection  directly  carry  him 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       277 

Now  it  is  quite  unnecessary  to  remark  in  detail,  on 
the  powerful  assistance  given  by  this  propension  to  the 
cause  of  virtue,  and  its  powerful  tendency  against  sel- 
fishness and  indolent  sensuality.  It  is  more  pertinent, 
to  point  out  the  singular  suitableness  of  this  propension 
in  a  world  like  ours.  In  a  world  where  sorrow  is  so 
general,  what  plain  mark  of  benevolent  design  is  seen 
in  the  fact,  that  God  has  given  us  a  propension  which 
tends  so  powerfully  to  alleviate  sorrow  ! 

One  of  you  has  here  interposed  a  very  ingenious 
objection ;  let  me  state  and  answer  it.  '  God  created  us 
4  in  a  perfectly  happy  state ;  excluding  all  possibility 
4  (except  through  sin)  of  pain  or  grief.  Hence,'  argues 
the  objector,  'a  Catholic  philosopher  is  precluded  from 
4  such  a  line  of  argument  as  the  above ;  he  is  precluded 
4  from  supposing,  that  God  created  our  nature  with 
4  express  reference  to  the  circumstance  of  our  being 
*  encompassed  with  grief.'  I  reply  as  follows.  Catholic 
doctrine  teaches,  as  you  will  see  in  due  time,  that  Adam 
was  preserved  in  his  state  of  happiness,  not  by  any 
peculiarity  of  his  nature,  but  by  a  series  of  constant  and 
watchful  operations  exercised  by  God  upon  that  nature. 
Two  alternatives  were  put  before  him ;  and  for  that 
very  reason,  his  nature  was  so  created  as  to  suit  either 
alternative,  and  inclusively  therefore  the  less  happy  one. 
Since,  on  that  alternative,  misery  was  to  abound, — it  was 
suitable  that  our  nature  should  include  this  special 
propension  of  Mercy  or  Compassion.  More  will  be  said 
in  this  very  Section,  on  the  relation  between  Adam's 
original  state  and  our  fallen  condition. 

It  is  a  fact  by  no  means  to  be  forgotten,  and  which 
no  one  to  be  sure  could  antecedently  have  imagined, 
that  under  the  Gospel  God  Himself  becomes  an  Object 

on  to  do  good  to  tbat  person  :  whereas  men  in  distress  want  assistance  ;  and 
compassion  leads  us  directly  to  assist  them.  The  object  of  the  former  is 
the  present  felicity  of  another  ;  the  object  of  the  latter  is  the  present  misery 
of  another.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  latter  wants  a  particular  affection  for 
its  relief,  and  that  the  former  does  not  want  one,  because  it  does  not  want 
assistance.  And  upon  supposition  of  a  distinct  affection  in  both  cases,  the 
one  must  rest  in  the  exercise  of  itself,  having  nothing  further  to  gain  ;  the 
other  does  not  rest  in  itself,  but  carries  us  on  to  assist  the  distressed."— 
Butler's  " Sermon  on  Compassion" 


278  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

to  this  propension.  In  contemplating  our  Blessed 
Lord's  sufferings,  and  particularly  the  various  stages  of 
His  Passion,  the  feeling  of  Compassion  occupies  a  very 
prominent  place. 

138.  The  last  propension  of  this  class  which  I  shall 
mention,  is  '  Gratitude ;'  the  peculiar  pleasure  we  derive, 
from  requiting  in  kind  any  favours  we  have  received. 
A  mere  allusion  will  suffice,  on  so  plain  a  matter,  (1)  to 
the  great   assistance  derived  from  this  propension  to 
various   acts  of  social  virtue  ;  and   (2)   to    the    great 
degree  in  which  it  cheers  and  consoles  all  work  done  for 
His  sake,  4  Who,  being  rich,  for  our  sake  became  poor.' 

139.  We  have  now   recited  six   propensions;  (1) 
Duty;  (2)  Self-charity;  (3)  Personal  Love;  (4)  General 
Love;  (5)  Compassion;  (6)  Gratitude:  and  we  have 
seen  the  immense   assistance  which  they   give  us  in 
living  for  Almighty  God.       Our   general  thesis,   you 
remember,  is  this  ;  that  all  our  propensions  without  ex- 
ception are  calculated,  each  in  its  own  way,  to  give  us  help 
and  support  in  that  holy  enterprise.     As  yet  certainly 
we  have  done  very  little  to  demonstrate  that  thesis. 
'  No  one  ever  doubted,'  an  objector  may  reply,   4  that 
c  many  of  our  propensions  lead  towards  good;  the  only 
4  question  worth  considering  is,  whether  there  are  not 
1  others  which  with  equal  force  lead  towards  evil.     On 
'  this,  the  only  important  question,  nothing  has  yet  been 
*  said.'      I  reply,  by  fully  admitting  the  force  of  the 
objection.     My  object  hitherto  has  chiefly  been,  to  put 
before  you  a  map  (as  it  were)  of  these  essentially  bene- 
ficial propensions,  and  of  the  place  which  they  occupy 
in  the  interior  life ;  thus  shewing  the  careful  provision 
made  by  our  Creator,  for  giving  us  rest  and  joy  in  His 
service.     My  object,  I  say,  as  yet  has  been  this  rather 
than  any  very  strong  controversial  argument  in  behalf 
of  our  thesis.     Our  next  step  however  will  advance  us 
considerably  in  the  way  of  proof.     For  I  proceed  to 
ask,  what  are  those  propensions,  which  on  the  whole 
are  most  widely  and  deeply  influential — have  put  forth 
the  most  permanent  and  sustained  power — in  leading 
men   away   from   God.     I  will   shew  you  that   those 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       279 

very  propensions  are  capable  of  rendering  most  impor- 
tant assistance  towards  His  love  and  service. 

You  will  at  first  perhaps  answer,  that  the  propension 
of  the  flesh  (as  I  may  call  it), — the  propension  which 
tempts  us  to  violate  the  Sixth  Commandment, — is  the 
most  pervasive  and  powerful  enemy  to  virtue.  I  do 
not  think  that  would  be  a  true  answer ;  for  fearful  as 
have  been  the  effects  produced  by  that  propension,  it 
cannot  from  its  very  nature  have  that  constant,  unre- 
lenting, pervasive  power,  which  is  exercised  by  certain 
other  propensions.  We  will  not  of  course  leave  it 
unnoticed ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  we  will  consider  it  in  its 
due  place,  with  a  care  proportioned  to  its  importance. 
But  first  we  will  direct  our  attention  to  those  propen- 
sions, which  often  become  the  main-spring  of  a  man's 
whole  conduct  of  life-,  which  often  colour  the  whole 
tissue  of  his  existence.  Of  this  kind,  spiritual  writers 
prominently  mention  three  :  (1)  Love  of  Honour  or 
Fame;  (2)  Love  of  Power;  (3)  Love  of  Wealth.  I 
commence  then  with  the  Love  of  Honour. 

140.  This  propension  certainly  acts,  with  a  con- 
stancy and  intensity  which  perfectly  amazes  one,  in 
leading  men  to  direct  their  conduct  towards  an  end 
quite  distinct  from  their  Creator's  service.  It  is  often 
remarked,  how  miserably  impurity  clouds  the  intellect ; 
but  this  propension  clouds  it  immeasurably  more.  Men 
will  tell  you,  as  of  quite  an  honourable  fact,  that  they 
look  on  infamy  as  the  greatest  of  evils,  and  that  the 
approbation  of  their  fellow-creatures  is  their  one  para- 
mount end  of  action.  Well  do  I  remember  a  veteran 
Protestant  politician,  writing  a  letter  to  the  newspapers, 
which  professed  quite  a  tone  of  conscious  and  indignant 
virtue.  It  ran  in  substance  thus :  '  True,  I  am  an 
'  old  man ;  I  must  soon  leave  this  visible  scene  ;  but 
1  for  that  very  reason,  it  is  a  more  sacred  duty  that  I 
'  leave  my  reputation  intact.'  He  was  a  man  who  firmly 
believed  in  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state;  and  he  was  (I 
take  for  granted)  fully  confident,  of  being  pretty  sure 
after  death  to  be  admitted  into  Heaven  and  the  com- 
pany of  Saints  and  Angels.  And  yet,  for  that  very  reason 


280  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

forsooth,  it  was  the  more  his  sacred  duty,  to  leave  his 
reputation  intact  on  this  sinful  and  miserable  earth.  It 
is  just  as  though  a  crawling  worm  were  on  the  point  of 
being  raised  by  God  to  the  dignity  and  privilege  of  a 
rational  creature ;  and  were  to  say,  'for  that  very  reason 
it  is  the  more  a  sacred  duty,  to  preserve  my  reputation 
among  my  fellow  crawlers  unsullied  and  intact.'  But 
the  same  motive  animates  all  classes  and  all  professions. 
So  a  soldier  will  go  through  deeds  of  fabulous  daring, 
and  (which  is  more  strange)  will  undergo  sufferings  of 
most  fearful  severity, — sustained  throughout  by  one 
sweet  hope,  that  of  his  fellow-countrymen's  applause,  Or, 
(going  to  an  extremely  opposite  instance)  a  philosopher 
will  give  his  whole  energy  to  the  working  out  of 
some  grand  intellectual  system,  in  the  hope  of  one 
principal  reward — posthumous  fame.  It  is  related,  I 
believe,  of  that  profound  thinker  Kant,  that  he  was 
quite  thrown  off  his  balance  with  anxiety  and  distress, 
when  some  danger  appeared,  lest  he  should  lose  with 
posterity  his  fair  claim  to  originality  of  discovery. 

A  more  monstrous,  more  frantic,  antagonism  to  God, 
than  this  idolatry  of  human  honour,  cannot  well  be 
imagined.  He  placed  us  men  on  earth,  that  we  might 
make  His  Will  and  Preference  the  ruling  principle  of 
our  lives.  We,  the  creatures  of  His  hand,  give  hardly 
so  much  as  a  passing  thought  through  the  day  to  that 
Will  and  Preference.  So  far  as  we  are  slaves  to  this  pro- 
pension,  our  main  motive  of  action  is  avowedly,  profes- 
sedly, the  approbation  of  our  fellow-worms,  our  fellow- 
sinners.  The  whole  world  is  seated  in  wickedness ;  and 
yet  we  do  not  blush  to  make  the  applause  of  that  world 
the  incentive  to  our  whole  conduct.  The  extensiveness 
of  this  idolatry,  is  as  amazing  as  its  intensity.  It  ex- 
tends from  such  cases  as  the  great  soldier  or  illustrious 
philosopher,  through  all  intermediate  ranks,  down  to 
the  very  school-boy  ;  who  is  ashamed  to  express  his 
own  sense  of  what  is  due  to  God,— not  from  fear  of  being 
molested  by  his  fellow-boys,  for  the  same  thing  takes  place 
where  there  is  no  danger  of  molestation ; — no ;  but  from 
simple  alarm  at  the  thought  of  their  sneers,  their  deri- 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       281 

sion.  And  long  after  we  have  ceased  to  be  school-boys, 
how  often  have  we  felt  (some  of  course  more,  others 
less,)  that  before  the  sneer  and  derision  of  our  fellow- 
men,  we  become  almost  ashamed  of  our  strongest  prin- 
ciples, almost  distrustful  of  our  highest  aspirations. 
Even  men  aiming  at  perfection,  during  the  lower  stages 
of  their  growth  at  least,  are  infested  by  this  deadly  foe ; 
which  forces  itself  as  it  were  into  companionship  with 
their  best  ends,  and  sullies  with  its  foul  presence  many 
of  their  highest  actions.* 

*  On  some  of  the  more  ordinary  and  petty  manifestations  of  this  vice, 
how  accurate  is  Surin's  description  ;  and  how  amusing  if  it  were  not  so 
sad  !  "  Le  second  effet  de  la  vanit6  est  1'amour  et  le  desir  des  louanges. 
Quand  un  homme  est  occupe  de  lui-me'me,  et  que  ses  propres  perfections 
sont  1'entretien  ordinaire  de  son  esprit,  il  desire  que  ses  perfections  soient 
connues  et  loupes.  La  complaisance  qu'il  a  en  lui-meme  ne  manque  point 
de  produire  ce  desir ;  et  quand  on  le  loue,  il  se  repait  de  cettefumee.  L' appro- 
bation du  monde,  1'applaudissement,  les  louanges,  sont  pour  lui  un  breuvage 
delicieux,  qui  1'enivre  de  1'amour  de  lui-meme.  II  est  toujours  aupres  a 
ecumer  les  jugemens  qu'on  fait  de  lui,  et  quand  il  a  fait  quelque  action 
publique,  quand  il  a  compose  quelque  pi£ce,  il  est  toujours  en  ardeur  de 
savoir  ce  qu'on  en  dit.  Si  Ton  n'en  parle  pas  avantageusement,  il  en  sent 
une  vive  douleur,  qui  vient  de  sa  vanite.  Si  Ton  en  juge  favorablement,  il  se 
fera  dire  et  redire  sans  cesse  ce  qui  flatte,  pour  se  repaUre  de  ce  vent.  II  se 
blame,  pour  s'attirer  de  louanges,  a/in  qu'en  le  contredisant,  on  lui  verre 
plus  abondamment  de  cette  liqueur  qu'il  boit  avec  tant  de  plaisir  dans  la 
coupe  de  la  vanite. 

"Mais  quand  deux  esprits  vains  se  rencontrent  ensemble,  et  se  met- 
tent  a  se  louer  a  Venvi,  c'est  alors  que  vous  voyez  la  vanite"  dans  son 
triomphe.  Ecoutez  deux  poe'tes  qui  se  louent :  ils  se  placent  1'un  auprea 
de  1'autre  dans  le  temple  de  m^moire  ;  ils  se  donnent  de  1'encens  a  pleines 
mains,  et  se  traitent  comme  des  dieux.  S'ils  louent  leurs  heros,  ils  en  font 
des  divinites. 

"  C'est  la  coutume  de  natter  ainsi  les  grands  par  des  louanges  excessives 
pour  leur  complaire  ;  car  rien  ne  touche  plus  les  esprits  foibles  des  gens  du 
monde  que  les  louanges.  Les  femmes  sont  ravies  d'etre  louees  de  beaute  ; 
les  courtesans  de  politesse,  et  de  galanterie  ;  les  guerriers,  de  bravoure  ;  les 
ministres  d'etat,  de  grand  genie.  On  leur  represente  la  posterite  occupee  d. 
les  admirer.  Tous  ces  vains  discours  vont  a  leur  persuader,  que-ce  souvenir 
avantageux  qu'on  aura  d'eux,  est  la  plus  douce  chose  qu'il  y  ait  au  monde. 
Et  cela,  n'est-ce  pas  une  vanite  deplorable  ?  Pendant  que  les  homines  les 
loueront  sur  la  terre,  ils  seront  peut-Stre  dans  les  flammes  etemelles. 
1  Laudantur  ubi  non  sunt,  torquentur  ubi  sunt.'  (S.  August.)  L'amour 
propre  les  enchante  tellement,  qu'encore  qu'ils  soient  malheureux  en  eux- 
memes,  ils  se  font  un  plaisir  imaginaire  des  louanges  qu'on  leur  promet 
apres  leur  mort. 

"  Quels  efforts  ne  fait-on  pas  pour  avoir  place  dans  1'histoire  ?  On  sent 
une  agreable  satisfaction  de  voir  son  nom  dans  une  Gazette.  C'est  un 
plaisir  bien  mince  qui  tournera  peut-etre  a  votre  confusion :  mais  enfin 
cela  contente  ;  et  en  merne  temps  qu'il  contente,  il  fait  d'etranges  ravages 
dans  1'ame  :  il  eloigne  de  la  verite ;  il  bannit  Vhumilite  chretienne.  Aussi 
ceux  qui  marchent  dans  la  lumi^re  de  la  vraie  sagesse,  fuient  cela  comme  le 
poison  qui  fait  mourir  toutes  le  virtus" — Dialogues  Spirituels,  vol.  2,  pp.  3-5. 


282  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Yet  consider  well  this  very  remarkable  fact.  We 
have  seen  that  this  propension,  as  usually  directed,  more 
than  almost  any  other  is  God's  deadly  foe.  We  may 
now  add,  that  in  that  very  degree  it  is  among  the  most 
unmistakable  illustrations  of  our  general  principle. 
We  are  maintaining,  that  all  our  propensions  have  an 
important  place  in  the  cause  of  virtue  :  and  that,  in 
regard  to  most  of  them,  our  work  here  below  is,  not  to 
aim  at  lessening  their  force  in  the  very  slightest  degree ; 
but  singly  and  exclusively  to  aim  at  fixing  them  on 
their  proper  objects.  In  the  present  case,  is  there  not 
an  Object  ready  at  hand,  which  is  as  manifestly,  as  un- 
deniably, adequate  to  the  intense  strength  of  this  pro- 
pension,  as  its  ordinary  objects  are  grotesquely  ^ade- 
quate? Our  Creator  is  more  closely  present  to  us, 
than  we  are  to  each  other ;  the  Soul  of  our  most  loving 
Saviour  penetrates  every  hidden  corner  of  our  hearts ; 
Mary  sees  in  God  all  that  most  closely  concerns  us; 
Our  Guardian  Angel,  the  Blessed  Saints,  all  know  in 
various  degrees  what  we  do,  and  what  we  think.  How 
can  we,  who  have  the  approbation  of  the  whole  Court 
of  Heaven  as  a  prize  to  contend  for,  so  demean  our- 
selves, as  to  open  our  hearts  mainly  to  the  vain,  transi- 
tory, delusive,  praise  of  our  fellow-men  ? 

Here  we  see  an  ascetical  truth  of  some  little  im- 
portance. If  I  am  at  this  moment  fluttering  with  vain 
glory;  my  emotions  highly  enflamed;  my  very  body 
throbbing,  as  it  were,  under  the  magnetic  influence  of 
human  applause ;  I  am  not  called  to  aim  at  lessening 
that  emotion.  No :  let  me  contemplate,  with  the  eye  of 
faith,  my  Creator,  my  Kedeenier,  my  Heavenly  Mother, 
the  whole  blessed  Company  of  Angels  and  Saints, 
looking  down  on  me,  and  prepared  to  approve  or  cen- 
sure me  as  my  conduct  may  deserve.  In  that  vision 
of  faith  I  am  wrapped  securely.  That  very  propension, 
which  was  the  devil's  chief  engine  of  attack,  becomes 
the  Holy  Ghost's  most  powerful  weapon  in  putting  Him 
to  flight. 

This  contrast  is  from  time  to  time  expressed  in  the 
New  Testament.  Thus  John,  c.  xii.  v.  43.  "  Dilexerunt 
"  enim  gloriam  hominum  magis  quam  gloriam  Dei ;" 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.      283 

and  Romans,  c.  ii.  v.  29,  "  Sed  qui  in  abscondito, 
"  Judaeus  est :  circumcisio  cordis  in  spiritu,  non  littera  ; 
"  cujus  laus  non  ex  hominibus,  sed  ex  Deo  est" 

You  will  not  of  course  suppose  ine  to  deny  for  a 
moment,  that  the  approbation  of  good  men  in  all  ordi- 
nary cases  is  to  be  greatly  prized ;  and  specially  in  this 
point  of  view,  as  the  pledge  and  representative  to  us 
of  God's  approbation.  In  this,  as  on  so  many  other 
matters,  it  will  appertain  to  our  later  course  to  complete 
what  our  earlier  begins.  When  we  come  to  consider  the 
morality  of  human  acts,  we  shall  be  led  to  some  definite 
and  important  results,  on  the  principles  of  judgment 
here  to  be  adopted ;  on  the  principles  whereby  we  may 
distinguish,  that  idolatry  of  human  applause  which  is  so 
dangerous  and  detestable,  from  that  love  of  good  meris 
approbation,  which  is  in  itself  perfectly  legitimate,  and 
in  its  results  inestimably  valuable. 

141.  The  next  propension  to  be  treated  is  Love  of 
Power.  This  does  not  seem  comparable  to  the  former, 
either  in  intensity  or  pervasiveness ;  indeed  it  is  but  a 
comparatively  small  portion  of  mankind,  who  are  in  a 
position  to  gratify  it  at  all  in  the  more  ordinary  sense. 
It  is  quite  plain  however,  that  every  man  who  is  in  a 
position  to  gratify  it  by  influencing  others  to  his  own 
private  ends,  may  equally  gratify  it  by  influencing  them 
towards  public  ends  and  towards  their  Creator  s  service. 
The  propension  before  us  is  gratified,  in  proportion  as 
we  know  that  we  are  able  to  move  at  will  a  large 
number  of  our  fellow-men  :  it  is  plain  then  that  the 
gratification  is  precisely  the  same,  whether  that  power 
be  exerted  in  this  or  in  that  direction.  He  who  fulfils 
his  duty,  by  using  the  full  influence  of  his  station  or 
circumstances  to  the  promotion  of  God's  Glory,  is  in  no 
slight  degree  assisted  and  cheered  in  that  holy  work, 
by  the  propension  which  we  are  considering.  Certainly 
there  is  great  need  of  watchfulness,  lest  this  gratification 
be  tainted  with  pride  ;  still  in  itself  it  is  undeniably 
legitimate. 

But  a  further  remark  is  still  more  in  point.  The 
Gospel  assures  us,  of  what  reason  alone  would  render 


284  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

very  probable,  the  great  efficacy  of  intercessory  prayer. 
And  it  is  most  important  that  we  should  perform  this 
duty,  not  in  a  dry  perfunctory  way,  but  with  a  keen 
and  lively  interest.  Now  such  keen  and  lively  interest 
must  necessarily  arise,  in  proportion  as  we  have  a 
practical  and  living  persuasion,  that  our  prayer  will 
as  really  and  truly  promote  God's  Glory,  tend  to  the 
salvation  of  souls,  affect  the  course  of  events,  redress 
ecclesiastical  evils,  move  the  whole  fortunes  of  the 
Church,  as  the  most  lively  and  energetic  work  can 
possibly  do.  It  is  plain  then  how  very  desirable  it  is, 
that  we  cherish  in  ourselves  this  practical  and  living 
persuasion ;  and  it  is  no  less  plain,  that  we  are  indefinitely 
assisted  in  doing  so,  by  the  keen  pleasure  which  the 
propension  before  us  experiences  from  that  persuasion. 
This  I  take  to  be  the  primary  and  truly  legitimate 
scope  of  this  propension; — the  stimulating  us  to  inter- 
cessory prayer. 

142.  There  remained  Love  of  Money.  This  however 
must  be  decomposed  into  two  separate  elements. 
Money  is  chiefly  sought  as  a  mere  c  bonum  utile  ;'  as 
serviceable  towards  further  ends.  There  is  an  inde- 
finitely large  number  of  pleasurable  or  serviceable 
things,  of  which  I  have  learnt  by  experience  that  they 
are  purchaseable  by  money.  The  desire  of  all  these 
things  inflows  virtually  (see  n.  Ill)  into  those  various 
acts  of  mine,  whereby  I  desire  money  ;  and  (to  come 
more  immediately  to  our  present  subject)  the  thought 
of  money  is  made  pleasurable,  by  the  combined  and 
confused  thought  of  these  various  pleasures.  This  it 
is  no  doubt,  which  chiefly  causes  the  intensity  and 
universality  of  money-hunting  :  it  is  a  sort  of  com- 
pound propension,  uniting  the  force  and  strength  of  so 
many  simple  ones. 

This  is  the  sense  in  which  love  of  riches  is  de- 
nounced by  our  Lord  in  terms  of  such  astounding 
severity.  It  is  most  important,  that  we  should  preserve 
a  clear  and  constant  memory  of  these  denunciations  ; 
and  I  will  therefore  say  some  little  to  remind  you  of 
them.  At  the  same  time  you  must  understand,  that  I 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       285 

have  neither  leisure  nor  (indeed)  ability  to  do  them 
anything  like  justice. 

Three  different  Evangelists  have  recorded  our 
Lord's  saying,  that  it  is  easier  for  a  camel  to  go  through 
a  needle's  eye  than  for  a  rich  man  to  enter  the  kingdom 
of  Heaven  (Matt.  c.  xix.  v.  24.  Mark,  c.  x.  v.  25. 
Luke,  c.  xviii.  v.  25)  ;  and  all  three  record  that  He 
proceeded  to  declare,  '  with  man  it  is  impossible,  but 
with  God  all  things  are  possible.'  A  rich  man's  salva- 
tion tests  (if  we  so  express  ourselves)  the  Omnipotence 
of  God.  Again  (Luke,  c.  vi.  v.  24,  25),  '  Verumtamen 
'  V93  vobis  divitibus,  quia  habetis  consolationem  vestram. 
1  Vae  vobis  qui  saturati  estis,  quia  esurietis.  Yse  vobis 
'  qui  ridetis  nunc,  quia  lugebitis  et  flebitis.' 

Observe  also,  as  has  been  frequently  remarked,  in 
the  parable  of  Dives  and  Lazarus,  how  closely  con- 
nected with  eternal  perdition  is  the  mere  possession  of 
wealth.  Nothing  more  is  said  of  Dives,  than  that  he 
was  clothed  in  purple  and  fine  linen,  and  feasted 
splendidly  every  day  (Luke,  xvi.  v.  19).  Then  as  the 
natural  result  of  this  we  are  told  (v.  22)  that  after  his 
death  he  was  buried  in  Hell. 

In  all  such  passages,  our  Blessed  Saviour  is  speak- 
ing ("no  doubt)  of  riches  in  their  natural  tendency.  He 
who  is  abundantly  supplied  with  all  the  necessaries 
and  many  superfluities  of  life; — who  seems  to  be  so 
circumstanced,  that  the  slightest  wish  or  whim  can  be 
readily  gratified ; — what  is  the  state  of  mind  into  which 
such  a  man  will  naturally  fall?  He  will  become, 
unless  he  makes  very  special  resistance,  proud,  self- 
satisfied,  luxurious  ;  above  all,  and  characteristically, 
he  will  look  on  this  world  as  his  home.  There  can 
hardly  be  a  character  more  deeply  hateful  in  the  eyes 
of  God.  Consider  in  this  connection,  Apoc.  c.  iii. 
v.  17,  18,  '  Quia  dicis  :  Quod  dives  sum,  et  locu- 
c  pletatus,  et  nullius  egeo ;  et  nescis  quia  tu  es  miser,  et 
'  miserabilis,  et  pauper,  et  csecus,  et  nudus ;  Suadeo 
4  tibi  emere  a  me  aurum  igniturn  probatum,  ut  locuples 
'  fias,  et  vestimentis  albis  induaris,  et  non  appareat 


286  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

6  confusio  miditatis  tuse;  et  collyrio  inunge  oculos  tuos, 
4  ut  videas.' 

On  the  other  hand,  a  poor  man  feels  at  every  step 
his  utter  and  abject  dependence ;  and  having  little 
solace  in  this  world,  he  is  the  rather  disposed  to  seek 
such  solace  in  the  things  of  God.  Of  course  the  rich 
man  may  contend  against  his  special  temptations,  and 
the  poor  man  may  throw  away  his  special  advantages  ; 
but  the  tendency  of  the  two  conditions  respectively 
is  as  above  stated. 

Elsewhere  indeed  our  Lord  explains  His  words. 
He  explains  them,  as  applying  not  so  much  to  the 
wealthy  or  poor  person,  as  to  what  may  be  called  the 
wealthy  or  poor  spirit.  Thus  in  St.  Mark,  immediately 
before  his  statement  on  the  camel's  eye,  he  explains 
what  he  means  by  the  rich  man  ;  viz.  one  who  trusts 
in  riches  (c.  x.  v.  24) :  *  Discipuli  autem  obstupes- 
4  cebant  in  verbis  ejus.  At  Jesus  rursus  respondens 
4  ait  illis  ;  Filioli,  quam  difficile  est,  confidentes  in 
'  pecuniis  in  regnurn  Dei  introire.'  Again,  whereas 
in  Luke,  c.  vi.  v.  20,  He  says,  4  Blessed  are  ye  poor ;' 
in  Matt.  c.  v.  ver.  3,  it  is,  *  Blessed  are  the  poor  in 
spirit?  And  whereas  in  Luke,  c.  vi.  v.  21,  He  says, 
4  Blessed  are  ye  who  now  hunger,'  in  Matt.  c.  v. 
v.  6,  it  is  4  Blessed  are  they  who  hunger  and  thirst 
after  justice:1  those,  e.g.  who,  from  the  very  fact  of 
being  without  comfort  and  rest  here,  are  led  to  seek 
them  in  the  service  of  God. 

On  the  whole  however,  we  cannot  surely,  in  any 
fairness,  draw  from  these  awful  statements  a  milder 
conclusion  than  the  following.  If  there  be  any  rich 
man,  who  is  not  sensitively  alive  to  the  special  tempta- 
tions of  his  state; — who  does  not  carefully  examine  how 
far  he  is  exposed  to  them; — who  does  not  (if  he  be  so 
exposed)  carry  out  carefully  some  special  discipline  in 
regard  to  those  temptations; — such  a  man  has  reason 
to  be  in  most  serious  alarm,  as  to  his  attaining  final 
perseverance.  Even  though  he  be  in  Habitual  Grace 
now,  he  has  reason  for  the  most  anxious  doubts,  whether 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUB  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       287 

this  will  continue  to  the  last.  To  this  subject  we  shall 
have  more  than  once  to  recur. 

There  is  another  form  taken  by  this  compound 
propension,  love  of  money  :  it  not  only  leads  those 
who  have  money  in  abundance,  to  be  proud  and 
worldly ;  it  leads  those  who  have  it  not,  to  seek  it  in  a 
restless,  feverish,  absorbing,  spirit.  Against  this  also 
Our  Blessed  Lord  directs  his  strongest  warnings.  Thus 
Matt.  c.  v.  ver.  25,  26.  6  Ide6  dico  vobis,  ne  solliciti 
'  sitis  animse  vestrae  quid  manducetis,  nee  corpori  vestro 
'  quid  induamini.  Nonne  anima  plus  est  quani  esca? 
4  et  corpus  plus  quam  vestimentum  ?  Respicite  vo- 
'  latilia  coeli,  &c.'  And  the  same  thought  is  pursued 
for  several  further  verses  to  the  end  of  the  chapter. 
Again,  Matt.  c.  xiii.  v.  22  :  c  Qui  autem  seminatus  est 
4  in  spinis,  hie  est,  qui  verbum  audit,  et  sollicitudo 
4  saeculi  istius,  et  fallacia  divitiarum,  suffocat  verbum, 
'  et  sine  fructu  efficitur.' 

This  exercise  of  the  propension  before  us, — the 
laborious  and  unrestrained  working  for  wealth, — pro- 
duces in  the  spiritual  life  effects,  not  less  disastrous 
perhaps  than  the  former,  but  plainly  of  quite  a  different 
kind.  The  restless  occupation,  the  breathless  anxiety, 
the  feverish  excitement,  all  these  present  as  broad  a 
contrast  as  can  well  be  imagined,  to  that  tranquil, 
recollected,  interior,  spirit,  which  is  the  atmosphere 
wherein  alone  prayer  and  meditation  can  breathe.  The 
great  majority  of  mankind  undoubtedly  are,  from  cir- 
cumstances, obliged  to  labour  in  weariness  and  uncer- 
tainty for  their  daily  bread.  What  is  that  kind  of 
spiritual  discipline,  whereby  they  may  best  be  pre- 
served from  these  terrible  spiritual  dangers — this  is 
one  of  the  most  important,  and  perhaps  one  of  the  most 
difficult,  questions,  on  which  Ascetic  Theology,  has  to 
treat. 

As  one  of  my  chief  objects  in  this  Section,  is  to  give 
the  best  map  I  can  of  our  various  propensions,  it  was 
of  course  out  of  the  question  that  I  should  omit  one,  so 
vitally  important  in  its  bearing  on  spirituality  as  this 
compound  propension.  It  is  equally  plain  however, 


288  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

that  it  cannot  come  within  the  scope  of  our  immediate 
argument ;  not  being  an  original  propension  at  all.  So 
far  as  we  have  yet  treated  it,  it  is  not  a  propension 
which  God  has  implanted  in  our  nature,  but  one  which 
we  form  for  ourselves,  by  our  mode  of  exercising  those 
which  He  has  implanted.  Our  thesis  only  calls  on  us 
to  prove,  that  all  those  which  He  has  implanted  are 
capable  of  most  virtuous  use ;  and  as  this  is  not  one  of 
their  number,  it  is  not  included  in  the  statement.  In 
proportion  as  we  shall  have  exercised  our  original  pro- 
pensions  according  to  God's  wish  and  desire,  this  com- 
pound and  derived  propension  will  not  have  been  called 
into  existence. 

It  is  commonly  held  however  by  psychologians,  and 
I  think  with  truth,  that  the  desire  of  money  is  not 
wholly  analyzed,  by  ascribing  it  to  the  desire  of  those 
various  gratifications  which  money  can  purchase.  It 
is  held  that  there  is  a  propension,  implanted  by  God  in 
our  nature,  which  we  may  call  'love  of  acquisition;' 
that  we  are  susceptible  of  a  special  pleasure,  from 
hoarding  and  accumulating  what  we  can  call  our  own; 
from  guarding  and  adding  to  a  store  of  property.  In- 
deed this  seems  clear  in  the  extreme  case  of  a  miser; 
since  he  loses  his  relish  for  those  enjoyments  which 
money  can  procure,  in  his  idolatry  of  money  itself. 
What  then  is  the  legitimate  use  of  this  propension  ? 

Our  Saviour  Himself  seems  to  tell  us  (Matthew, 
c.  vi.  v.  19),  'Nolite  thesaurizare  vobis  thesauros  in 
'  terra,  ubi  aerugo,  et  tinea  demolitur,  et  ubi  fures 
4  effodiunt  et  furantur ;  thesaurizate  autem  vobis  the- 
4  sauros  in  ccelo;  ubi  neque  aerugo  neque  tinea  de- 
'  molitur,'  &c.  Even  apart  from  Revelation,  Reason 
would  shew  that  there  are  many  things  which  are  more 
specially  ours  than  money  can  ever  be;  which  may 
more  truly  be  called  property;  which  will  more  ade- 
quately satisfy  our  love  of  accumulation  :  virtuous 
habits,  a  contented  disposition,  a  disengaged  heart— 
these  are  treasures  indeed.  First,  they  are  intrinsic  to 
ourselves,  and  cannot  by  physical  possibility  be  snatched 
from  our  grasp ;  and  secondly,  when  once  gained,  they 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       289 

are  not  diminished  but  increased,  in  proportion  as  we 
draw  upon  our  store.  There  is  a  pleasure,  which  is  un- 
doubtedly attainable,  by  hoarding  and  accumulating;— 
here  a  little  and  there  a  little; — so  much  to-day  and  so 
much  more  to-morrow; — by  watching  for  every  oppor- 
tunity, and  taking  sedulous  advantage  of  it,  which  may 
be  made  the  means  of  further  accumulation.  But  I 
maintain  that  this  pleasure  can  be  far  more  satisfac- 
torily enjoyed,  in  the  gradual  acquirement  and  increase 
of  virtuous  habits,  than  of  perishable  gold.  And  now 
let  us  consider,  in  addition  to  this,  what  the  Gospel 
discloses,  as  to  these  spiritual  and  heavenly  treasures. 
Let  us  ponder  on  that  great  Gift  of  Habitual  Grace, 
which  is  increased  by  every  supernatural  act  we  do. 
Let  us  carry  on  our  thoughts  to  those  future  treasures 
in  Heaven,  spoken  of  by  Our  Blessed  Saviour ;  those 
treasures,  whereof  Habitual  Grace  is  the  seed  and  the 
measure.  Such  thoughts  will  soon  make  clear  to  us, 
what  is  the  full  and  adequate  object  of  the  propension 
before  us. 

143.  I  said  that  the  chief  obstacles  to  piety  enume- 
rated by  ascetical  writers  are,  (1)  Love  of  Honour  or 
Fame;  (2)  Love  of  Power;  (3)  Love  of  Wealth;  and 
these  three  propensions  we  have  now  considered.  Per- 
haps indeed  there  is  a  fourth,  which  both  is,  and  is  com- 
monly admitted  to  be,  an  equally  (or  a  more)  powerful 
antagonist:  I  mean  Pride.  What  is  that  propension 
whereof  pride  is  the  perversion,  and  what  is  its  legiti- 
mate scope,  I  will  consider  somewhat  later  in  the  pre- 
sent Section.  That  which  I  will  next  treat,  shall  be 
Love  of  Knowledge;  or  (as  it  may  perhaps  be  more  suit- 
ably called)  Love  of  Intellectual  Exertion :  a  propension, 
which  exercises  its  full  power  indeed  over  extremely 
few ;  but  almost  makes  up,  by  its  violence  and  intensity, 
for  the  narrowness  of  its  operations.  Nothing,  e.  g.  is 
more  commonly  remarked,  than  the  very  close  and  (as 
it  were)  natural  connexion,  between  great  mathematical 
power  and  extreme  infidelity.  How  is  such  a  fact  to 
be  explained  ?  There  are  few  questions  in  Ethical 

u 


290  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Psychology  more  important  than  this ;  and  I  incline  to 
think  the  true  explanation  is  as  follows. 

There  is  a  certain  small  number  of  men,  endued 
with  singularly  high  intellectual  gifts,  on  whom  various 
choice  intellectual  processes  confer  a  degree  of  plea- 
sure, resembling  that  which  ordinary  men  derive  from 
sensual  indulgences.  I  mean  such  processes  as  these  ; 
viewing  a  large  field  of  truth  in  its  mutual  relations  ; 
pressing  judgments  to  their  various  consequences ; 
analyzing  the  more  recondite  phenomena  of  the  mind, 
&c.  &c.  These  indulgences  however  differ  from  sen- 
sual, in  this  most  important  particular ;  viz.  that  they  are 
capable  of  very  protracted  and  sustained  continuance. 
The  sensualist  obtains  but  transient  and  fitful  excite- 
ments; and  in  the  interval  feels  languor,  perhaps  re- 
morse. But  these  intellectualists  may  give  themselves 
up  for  an  indefinite  period  to  their  darling  pursuit.  If 
then  they  choose  to  do  this  in  a  reckless  inordinate 
way,  simply  for  the  sake  of  the  pleasure  thence  to  be 
derived,  and  with  no  reference  to  moral  duty  or  the 
will  of  God,  what  is  the  result  ?  They  become  more 
thoroughly  obdurate — more  thoroughly  insensible  to 
higher  and  more  spiritual  motives — than  perhaps  any 
class  of  men  which  can  be  named.  The  principle,  on 
which  this  result  takes  place,  will  be  considered  in  our 
work  c  De  Actibus  Hunianis.' 

Next  ensues  a  further  result  —  diabolical  pride. 
The  intellect  is  an  instrument  of  tremendous  power. 
'  Instrument '  is  exactly  the  proper  word  to  express 
my  meaning:  the  intellect  is  an  instrument,  just  as 
any  mechanical  power  is  one.  It  is  as  simply  absurd, 
to  make  the  quality  of  a  man's  intellect  in  itself 
the  matter  either  of  praise  or  blame,  as  to  praise  or 
blame  a  steam-engine:  the  true  matter  for  praise  and 
blame,  is  the  use  which  he  makes  of  this  powerful  in- 
strument; whether  in  God's  service  or  the  Devil's. 
But  I  say,  the  power  of  this  instrument  is  enormous; 
immensely  greater  than  unintellectual  men  can  even 
imagine.  Consider  then,  how  great  must  be  the  in- 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       291 

toxication  of  wielding  a  power  of  this  kind,  in  the  case 
of  such  men  as  I  suppose ;  in  the  case  of  men,  who 
do  not  so  much  as  attern.pt  any  practices  of  religion, — 
meditation,  or  examen  of  conscience,  or  the  like, — 
and  who  are  free  from  severe  bodily  sickness  or 
other  temporal  trouble.  They  know  by  experience  the 
wonderful  influence  of  intellectual  power ;  and  they 
look  up  to  themselves  intensely  for  possessing  it.  Here 
again  is  another  distinction,  which  separates  these  men 
for  the  worse  from  the  class  of  sensualists.  No  sen- 
sualist can  respect  himself,  —  look  up  to  himself, —  on 
the  ground  of  his  bestial  excesses ;  whereas  pride  is  the 
ordinary,  nay  the  necessary  accompaniment  of  great 
intellectual  power,  whenever  the  humbling  exercises  of 
piety  are  neglected. 

Here  then  are  two  qualities  which  naturally  ensue  : 
(1)  insensibility  to  all  spiritual  motives;  and  (2)  pride. 
How  easily  do  these  two  united  lead  to  unbelief.  The 
pride  of  these  men  would  be  most  painfully  wounded, 
by  the  manifest  contradiction  involved,  in  believing 
one  thing,  when  they  practise  another;  while  of  course 
their  indisposition  to  practise  religion  is  the  greatest 
imaginable.  This  being  so,  how  obvious  that  they 
should  have  recourse  to  a  most  easy  and  simple  alter- 
native! They  ponder  on  the  various  objections  (in 
themselves  surely  most  plausible)  which  may  be 
brought,  not  so  much  against  Christianity  in  par- 
ticular, as  against  Theism  in  general.  At  the  same 
time,  they  give  no  careful  thought  at  all  to  those 
replies  which  have  been  made  by  Christian  writers; 
contenting  themselves  with  the  conclusion,  that  the 
whole  thing  is  buried  in  hopeless  uncertainty. 

Here  is  one  obvious  cause  of  their  unbelief ;  an- 
other will  be  found  in  the  following  consideration. 
The  mysteries  of  the  Gospel,  nay  the  doctrines  of  Na- 
tural Religion,  appear,  to  their  blind,  carnal,  grovelling, 
and  proud  intellect,  quite  low  and  contemptible;  such 
as  it  is  impossible  to  believe,  without  doing  violence  to 
their  whole  nature.  '  A  fit  story/  they  think,  4  for  the 
*  cradle  and  the  nursery ;  for  the  earliest  years  of  each 


292  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

1  individual,  or  the  earliest  years  of  the  human  race : 
4  man  has  outgrown  these  puerilities.' 

Indeed  all,  who  are  conscious  of  great  intellectual 
power,  and  who  have  any  kind  of  interest  in  their  own 
perfection, —  must  be  most  painfully  aware  by  expe- 
rience, how  troublesome  and  anxious  an  element  is 
such  intellectual  power  in  their  mental  composition. 
It  may  be  made  no  doubt  an  invaluable  servant :  but 
it  is  ever  trying  to  rise  into  the  position  of  master;  and 
on  no  account  must  this  be  permitted. 

If  then  this  propension  be  not  comparable,  as  to  the 
extensiveness  of  its  evil  effects,  with  those  which  we 
considered  immediately  before — with  Love  of  Honour, 
of  Power,  of  Money — almost  in  the  same  proportion  it 
exceeds  these  propensions  in  the  intensity  of  its  mis- 
chief; in  the  utter  ruinousness  of  those  effects  which 
it  produces,  on  men  who  unreservedly  surrender  them- 
selves to  its  influence.  It  makes  a  perfect  wreck  of 
their  spiritual  character :  it  degrades  them  to  the  very 
lowest  moral  level  possible  on  earth;  to  that  state  of 
mind,  known  in  Theology  as  cobduratio'  and  ^excsecatio.' 
If  then  it  can  be  shewn,  that  even  this  propension  is 
capable  of  important  service  to  morality, — certainly  no 
inconsiderable  addition  will  have  been  made  to  the 
progress  of  our  argument. 

Now  those  frightful  results  of  this  propension  which 
we  have  been  considering,  are  seen  only  in  those,  who 
give  themselves  up  to  it  almost  exclusively.  They  are 
commonly  but  little  gifted  with  the  propension  either  of 
Personal  or  of  General  Love ;  and  they  allow  this  Love 
of  Intellectual  Exertion  to  override  despotically  all  the 
rest.  There  may  be  an  exception  to  this  statement,  (not 
however  affecting  our  argument,)  so  far  as  it  is  true, 
that  various  persons  of  great  intellectual  power  have 
from  time  to  time  yielded  themselves  slaves  to  a  low 
sensuality.  But  at  all  events,  in  the  hardened  men  we 
are  considering,  all  the  higher  propensions  except  the 
one  before  us  are  dormant ;  and  the  Love  of  Intellectual 
Exertion  reigns  paramount  and  supreme.  It  is  obvious 
then  to  enquire,  what  are  the  effects  of  this  propension,  on 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       293 

those  who  gratify  it, — not  in  this  reckless,  inordinate, 
overbearing  way,  —  but  with  due  moderation,  and 
merely  as  one  part  of  their  moral  nature. 

In  regard  to  those  who  must  support  themselves 
by  the  labour  of  their  hands,  hardly  any  answer  can 
be  given  to  this  enquiry ;  the  main  current  of  their  life 
is  such,  as  to  disable  them  altogether  from  gratifying 
this  propension,  except  in  the  most  partial  and  occa- 
sional manner.  The  main  case  to  be  considered  then, 
is  that  of  the  leisured  classes;  and  I  do  not  think  it  too 
much  to  say,  that  if  this  propension  were  away,  and  no 
other  change  wrought  in  human  nature,  the  immense 
majority  of  these  classes  would  find  the  consistent 
practice  of  virtue  morally  impossible.  In  behalf  of  this 
conclusion  I  argue  thus. 

How  many  men  are  there,  so  created  by  God,  that 
they  can  keep  up  through  the  day  a  constant  course  of 
Divine  contemplation?  Just  so  many,  as  have  a  voca- 
tion to  the  purely  contemplative  life ;  i.  e.  an  extremely 
small  minority. 

Now  let  us  turn  our  thoughts  again  to  the  labour- 
ing classes ;  and  I  will  use  this  word  in  its  widest  sense, 
so  as  to  include  all  whose  day  is  spent,  either  in  manual 
labour,  or  in  other  active  and  practical  work  of  a  busy 
and  external  kind.  How  are  these  men  able  to  serve 
God, — through  the  day,  through  the  month,  through  the 
year, — consistently  and  perseveringly  ?  For  our  answer 
let  me  refer  to  n.  129  (p.  257).  They  may  aim  at  referring 
their  various  acts  virtually  and  most  really  to  God ;  and 
the  quiet  tranquil  gratification,  which  their  Creator  has 
ordinarily  attached  to  the  orderly  performance  of  their 
regular  duties,  will  cheer  and  sustain  them  in  their  course. 
If  this  gratification  were  away,  there  would  be  ordi- 
narily (I  suppose)  no  sufficient  moral  power,  of  refer- 
ring the  course  of  their  lives  really  to  God. 

I  ask  then,  what  substitute  for  this  gratification  is 
available  to  the  leisured  classes  ?  Take  away  this  one 
propension  which  we  are  considering,  I  believe  that  no 
other  can  be  named.  The  propension  of  Personal  Love, 
as  directed  to  one  or  more  of  our  fellow-creatures,  is 


294  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

certainly  very  far  from  being  one  which  can  be  called 
into  active  exertion  through  the  day;  the  very  attempt 
to  do  so,  does  but  land  us  in  deep  misery,  unreality, 
and  false  sentimentality.  Will  you  propose  aesthetic 
employments — music,  drawing,  and  the  like?  I  believe 
the  number  is  but  small  in  the  leisured  classes,  who 
could  derive  enjoyment  from  making  such  occupa- 
tions as  these  the  business  of  their  lives ;  most  charm- 
ing and  refreshing  though  they  be  as  recreations,  and 
as  affording  a  grateful  vicissitude  to  severer  studies. 
According  to  God's  merciful  design  however,  the  whole 
field  of  science  and  literature  is  open  to  these  classes; 
each  one  may  cultivate  that,  which  best  suits  his  taste, 
his  circumstances,  his  powers,  or  the  degree  of  his 
intellectual  acquirements  ;  and  most  beneficial  is  the 
result.  That  very  peculiarity  of  the  propension,  which 
constitutes  (as  we  have  seen)  its  chief  evil, — I  mean 
its  singular  power  of  receiving  long-continued  and 
protracted  gratification  —  this  very  peculiarity  confers  a 
most  important  service  in  the  way  we  have  described.* 

*  Father  Newman  had  the  same  truth  in  view,  I  suppose,  when  he 
wrote  the  following  most  powerfully  expressed  passage.  He  has  not,  indeed, 
made  it  sufficiently  clear,  whether  he  is  speaking  of  mankind  in  general 
or  exclusively  of  the  leisured  classes.  If  the  former,  I  venture  to  think  its 
wording  is  open  to  great  exception ;  for  it  would  (on  that  interpretation) 
seem  to  state,  that  few  Christians  of  uncultivated  intellect  have  the  moral 
power  of  avoiding  mortal  sin  :  though  of  course  he  could  not  possibly  have 
meant  this.  If  we  take  it  as  applying  to  the  leisured  classes  alone,  it 
conveys,  I  think,  an  important  truth. 

"  Now  on  opening  the  subject,  we  see  at  once  a  momentous  benefit 
which  the  philosopher  is  likely  to  confer  on  the  pastors  of  the  Church.  It 
is  obvious  that  the  first  step  which  they  have  to  effect  in  the  conversion  of 
man  and  the  renovation  of  his  nature,  is  its  rescue  from  that  fearful  subjec- 
tion to  sense  which  is  its  ordinary  state.  To  be  able  to  break  through  the 
meshes  of  that  thraldom,  and  to  disentangle  and  to  disengage  its  ten 
thousand  holds  upon  the  heart,  is  to  bring  it,  I  might  almost  say,  half-way 
to  Heaven.  Here,  even  divine  grace,  to  speak  of  things  according  to  their 
appearances,  is  ordinarily  baffled,  and  retires,  without  expedient  or  resource, 
before  this  giant  fascination.  Religion  seems  too  high  and  unearthly  to  be 
able  to  exert  a  continued  influence  upon  us  :  its  effort  to  rouse  the  soul,  and 
the  soul's  effort  to  co-operate,  are  too  violent  to  last.  It  is  like  holding  out 
the  arm  at  full  length,  or  supporting  some  great  weight,  which  we  manage 
to  do  for  a  time,  but  soon  are  exhausted  and  succumb.  Nothing  can  act 
beyond  its  own  nature  ;  when  then  we  are  called  to  what  is  supernatural, 
though  those  extraordinary  aids  from  heaven  are  given  us,  with  which 
obedience  becomes  possible,  yet  even  with  them  it  is  of  transcendant  diffi- 
culty. We  are  drawn  down  to  earth  every  moment  with  the  ease  and 
certainty  of  a  natural  gravitation,  and  it  is  only  by  sudden  impulses  and 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       295 

Here  is  the  first  benefit,  and  surely  an  inappreciable 
one,   conferred  by  the  propension  before  us:  it  gives 

(as  it  were)  forcible  plunges  that  we  attempt  to  mount  upwards.  Religion 
indeed  enlightens,  terrifies,  subdues ;  it  gives  faith,  it  inflicts  remorse,  it 
inspires  resolutions,  it  draws  tears,  it  inflames  devotion,  but  only  for  the 
occasion.  The  sinful  spirit  repents,  and  protests  it  will  never  sin  again,  and 
for  a  while  is  protected  by  disgust  and  abhorrence  from  the  malice  of  its  foe. 
But  that  foe  knows  too  well,  that  such  seasons  of  repentance  are  wont  to 
have  their  end :  he  patiently  waits,  till  nature  faints  with  the  effort  of 
resistance,  and  lies  passive  and  hopeless  under  the  next  access  of  temptation. 
What  we  need  then  is  some  expedient  or  instrument,  which  at  least  will 
obstruct  and  stave  off  the  approach  of  our  spiritual  enemy,  and  which  is 
sufficiently  congenial  and  level  with  our  nature  to  maintain  as  firm  a  hold 
upon  us  as  the  inducements  of  sensual  gratification.  It  will  be  our  wisdom 
to  employ  nature  against  itself.  Thus  sorrow,  sickness,  and  care  are  provi- 
dential antagonists  to  our  inward  disorders  ;  they  come  upon  us  as  years 
pass  on,  and  generally  produce  their  effects  on  us,  in  proportion  as  we  are 
subjected  to  their  influence.  These,  however,  are  God's  instruments,  not 
ours  ;  we  need  a  similar  remedy,  which  we  can  make  our  own,  the  object  of 
some  legitimate  faculty,  or  the  aim  of  some  natural  affection,  which  is  cap- 
able of  resting  on  the  mind,  and  taking  up  its  familiar  lodging  with  it,  and 
engrossing  it,  and  which  thus  becomes  a  match  for  the  besetting  power  of 
sensuality,  and  a  sort  of  homoeopathic  medicine  for  the  disease.  Here  then 
I  think  is  the  important  aid  which  intellectual  cultivation  furnishes  to  us 
in  rescuing  the  victims  of  passion  and  self-will.  It  does  not  supply  religious 
motives  ;  it  is  not  the  cause  or  proper  antecedent  of  anything  supernatural ; 
it  is  not  meritorious  of  heavenly  aid  or  reward  ;  but  it  does  a  work,  at  least 
materially  good  (as  theologians  speak),  whatever  be  its  real  and  formal 
character.  It  expels  the  excitements  of  sense  by  the  introduction  of  those 
of  the  intellect. 

"  This  then  is  the  prima  f<icie  advantage  of  the  pursuit  of  knowledge  ; 
it  is  the  drawing  the  mind  off  from  things  which  will  harm  it  to  subjects 
which  are  worthy  a  rational  being  ;  and,  though  it  does  not  raise  it  above 
nature,  nor  has  any  tendency  to  make  us  pleasing  to  our  Maker,  yet  is  it 
nothing  to  substitute  what  is  in  itself  harmless  for  what  is,  to  say  the  least, 
inexpressibly  dangerous  ?  is  it  a  little  thing  to  exchange  a  circle  of  ideas 
which  are  certainly  sinful,  for  others  which  are  certainly  not  so  1  You  will 
say,  perhaps,  in  the  words  of  the  Apostle,  '  Knowledge  puffeth  up  : '  and 
doubtless  this  mental  cultivation,  even  when  it  is  successful  for  the  purpose 
for  which  I  am  applying  it,  may  be  from  the  first  nothing  more  than  the 
substitution  of  pride  for  sensuality.  I  grant  it.  I  think  I  shall  have  some- 
thing to  say  on  this  point  presently  ;  but  this  is  not  a  necessary  result,  it  is 
but  an  incidental  evil,  a  danger  which  may  be  realised,  or  may  be  averted, 
whereas  we  may  in  most  cases  predicate  guilt,  and  guilt  of  a  heinous  kind, 
where  the  mind  is  suffered  to  run  wild  and  indulge  its  thoughts  without 
training  or  law  of  any  kind  ;  and  surely  to  turn  away  a  soul  from  mortal 
sin,  is  a  good  and  a  gain  so  far,  whatever  comes  of  it.  And,  therefore,  if  a 
friend  in  need  is  twice  a  friend,  I  conceive  that  intellectual  employments, 
though  they  do  no  more  than  occupy  the  mind  with  objects  naturally  noble 
or  innocent,  have  a  special  claim  upon  our  consideration  and  gratitude." — 
Newman  on  University  Education,  pp.  295  to  298. 

It  may  be  objected  perhaps  that,  in  certain  states  of  society,  the  leisured 
classes  may  not  have  the  means  of  intellectual  cultivation.  Such  cases 
however,  if  they  exist,  are  in  the  highest  degree  exceptional ;  and  God  no 
doubt  gives  exceptional  grace  to  meet  them. 


296  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

the  leisured  classes  the  moral  power  of  consistently 
obeying  God.  But  the  great  majority,  alas  !  whether 
of  the  leisured  or  any  other  class,  do  not  choose  to  aim 
at  consistent  obedience.  Let  us  consider  then,  secondly, 
the  benefit  conferred  by  this  propension,  even  on  this 
indevout  majority.  As  things  are  now,  the  leisured 
class  are  the  greatest  benefactors  of  mankind;  they 
apply  their  energies,  in  fifty  different  ways,  to  the  in- 
vestigation of  principles  and  truths,  from  which  spring 
the  greatest  advantages  to  society.  But  let  the  propen- 
sion before  us  cease,  what  would  this  class  become  ?  they 
would  sink  into  the  selfish  and  sensual  recipients  of 
bodily  enjoyment.  Now  plainly  this  latter  state,  as 
compared  with  the  former,  is  a  most  formidable  barrier 
to  the  efficacious  entrance  of  Divine  Grace.  The  for- 
mer state  is  not  a  state  of  piety,  or  a  state  which  leads 
to  salvation; — very  far  from  it:  but  it  surely  opposes 
indefinitely  less  obstacles  than  the  latter,  to  the  Holy 
Ghost's  pressing  solicitations. 

A  third  benefit  of  this  propension,  and  not  yielding 
in  importance  to  any,  is  the  assistance  which  it  has 
given  in  forming  the  Church's  Theology; — Dogmatical, 
Moral,  Ascetical,  and  the  rest.  I  must  reserve,  to  its 
proper  place  in  the  second  Book,  the  task  of  putting 
before  you  the  great  importance  of  Theology;  an  im- 
portance, which  it  is  difficult  indeed  to  exaggerate,  and 
of  which  every  additional  opportunity  for  experience 
and  reflection  will  but  increase  your  sense.  But  con- 
sider the  great  labour  and  self-denial  through  which 
this  work  has  been  accomplished;  consider  the  great 
pain  often  involved,  in  those  processes  of  abstraction, 
generalization,  observation,  comparison,  which  are  the 
necessary  conditions  of  success ;  consider  the  many  hours 
of  painful  perplexity  and  anxious  hesitation;  consider 
the  pressure  of  bad  health,  and  sacrifice  of  more  easily 
obtained  enjoyments.  What  could  possibly  have  sup- 
ported a  body  of  thinkers  through  this  exhausting 
labour,  except  the  gratification  afforded  by  the  pro- 
pension  before  us  ?  This  or  that  man,  saintly  in  attain- 
ment, may  have  been  able  so  to  labour,  for  the  pure 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       297 

love  of  God  and  performance  of  duty ;  but  what 
large  succession  of  men  could  have  been  found  so  to 
act? 

144.  In  closing  our  consideration  of  this  propen- 
sion,  we  close  that  of  our  whole  second  class ;  for  we 
have  treated  those  which  (with  one  exception*)  have 
of  all  the  greatest  strength  in  drawing  the  soul  from 
God.  Our  thesis  will  next  be  corroborated,  and 
even  more  strongly,  by  moving  onward  to  a  further 
class;  to  those  propensions,  which  at  first  sight  seem 
of  all  the  most  inevitably  and  exclusively  evil  in  their 
result.  Of  these  we  may  specially  single  out  three; 
Anger,  Envy,  Pride :  the  two  first  would  seem  to  have 
no  scope,  except  injury  to  our  fellow-creatures ;  nor  the 
third,  except  rebellion  against  our  Creator,  If  these 
three  propensions  have  legitimate  gratifications,  a  for- 
tiori (it  may  be  inferred)  must  all  others  have  such. 

The  instance  of  Anger  is  so  important,  that  we  must 
treat  it  at  some  little  length ;  the  other  two  will  be  far 
more  briefly  dispatched. f 

That  Anger  is  not  necessarily  evil,  is  plain  enough 
from  Scripture.  Thus  St.  Paul  (Eph.  iv.  26)  quoting  from 
the  Psalms,  says,  *  Irascimini,  et  nolite  peccare  ;'  while 
nevertheless  in  verse  31  he  adds,  '  Omnis  .  .  .  ira  .  .  . 
'tollatur  a  vobis:'  implying  evidently  that  there  is  a 
lawful  and  an  unlawful  anger.  And  our  blessed  Lord 
Himself  is  represented  as  vouchsafing  to  experience  the 
emotion  of  anger  (Mark,  iii.  5):  '  circumspiciens  eos 
'  cum  ird,  contristatus  super  caecitate  cordis  eorum:' 
He  experienced  the  emotion  of  holy  resentment,  at  their 
base  hypocrisy,  their  deep,  malicious,  blind,  bigotry. 
So  again  (John,  ii.  14-17)  He  drove  the  money- 
changers and  others  from  the  Temple  ;  shewing  such 
marks  of  visible  resentment,  that  the  Apostles  remem- 
bered that  Scripture,  4Zelus  domus  tuae  comedit  me:' 

*  I  mean  that  of  Pride  ;  which  we  are  very  soon  to  consider. 

t  The  whole  treatment  of  '  Anger,'  which  follows  in  the  text,  is  taken 
from  Butler's  '  sermon  on  Resentment ;'  which  I  am  often  inclined  to  think 
both  the  most  original  and  the  most  valuable  of  all  his  writings.  It 
should  be  read  in  connection  with  his  *  sermon  on  Forgiveness  of 
Injuries.' 


298  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

as  if  they  paraphrased  it ;  c  zeal  for  the  honour  of  Thy 
'  House,  and  consequent  resentment  at  its  contumelious 
'  treatment,  have  devoured  me.'* 

We  shall  see  indeed,  as  we  proceed,  that  this  pro- 
pension  is  simply  identical  with  '  Love  of  Justice.'  It 
is  simply  identical,  I  say,  with  a  desire,  that  goodness 
as  such  may  be  rewarded,  and  that  wickedness  as 
such  may  be  punished ;  and  with  a  resulting  pleasure 
when  that  consummation  takes  place.  What  I  have 
to  say  upon  it  will  therefore  be  divided  into  two  parts. 
First,  I  will  explain  to  the  best  of  my  power  the  ex- 
tremely important  purposes,  which  this  propension, 
*  Love  of  Justice,'  subserves ;  and  secondly,  I  will  shew 
you  that  it  is  the  very  same  propension,  which,  in  its 
irregular  manifestations,  has  wrought  such  extensive 
misery,  under  the  shape  of  Anger  or  Malevolence. 
First  then  for  the  former  of  these  two  subjects. 

The  Love  of  Justice  is  so  intimately  associated  with 
our  whole  life,  that  it  requires  the  greatest  effort  of 
abstraction,  to  imagine  how  strange  would  be  the  scene 
presented  here  below  without  it.  Consider  the  great 
majority  of  mankind.  These  men  follow  simply  the 
impulse  of  their  various  propensions,  as  they  are  suc- 
cessively awakened;  like  a  ship,  left,  without  rudder, 
to  the  movement  of  each  successive  gale.  They  are 
simply  passive  in  the  matter ;  they  take  no  consistent 
pains  whatever,  to  follow  that  one  definite  course  which 
Reason  prescribes.  These  men  however,  as  things  are, 
are  led  by  this  propension  to  sympathize  with  virtue  as 
such,  and  abhor  vice.  Their  idea,  indeed,  of  what  con- 
stitutes moral  virtue,  is  vague  and  indefinite  enough ;  so 
deplorably  low  is  the  cultivation  of  their  Moral  Faculty : 

*  "  Surely,  unless  we  had  this  account  given  us  by  an  inspired  writer, 
we  should  not  have  believed  it !  Influenced  by  notions  of  our  own 
devising,  we  should  have  said,  this  zealous  action  of  our  Lord  was  quite 
inconsistent  with  His  merciful,  meek,  and  (what  may  be  called)  His 
majestic  and  serene  temper  of  mind.  To  put  aside  form,  to  dispense  with 
the  ministry  of  His  attendant  angels,  to  act  before  He  had  spoken  His 
displeasure,  to  use  His  own  hand,  to  hurry  to  and  fro,  to  be  a  servant  in 
the  work  of  purification,  surely  this  must  have  arisen  from  a  fire  of  indig- 
nation at  witnessing  His  Father's  House  insulted,  which  we  sinners  cannot 
understand." — Newman's  Parochial  Sermons,  vol.  iii.  p.  198. 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       299 

still  it  is  something.  They  admire,  even  though  they  do 
not  practise,  generosity,  self-devotion,  probity,  and  the 
like ;  they  will  do  something  to  reward  such  qualities; 
they  will  do  a  great  deal  to  punish  their  opposites. 

What  would  be  the  world's  aspect,  if  this  propension 
were  suddenly  removed  ?  The  most  active  imagination 
cannot  follow  this  supposition  into  all  its  various  conse- 
quences ;  I  will  take  only  one  instance.  We  have  seen 
how  completely  the  great  mass  of  men  are  ruled  by  the 
Love  of  Honour.  Now  suppose  Love  of  Justice  were 
absent,  society  would  dispense  its  favour  and  appro- 
bation, without  any  reference  to  virtue  at  all.  Popular 
applause  would  be  bestowed  on  men,  without  any 
reference  at  all  to  their  merit ;  simply  in  proportion  to 
the  degree  in  which  (by  whatever  low  arts  and  devices) 
they  should  be  able  to  curry  favour  (as  we  say)  with 
their  fellows.  No  degree  of  heroic  devotion  to  their 
country's  cause,  or  self-denying  generosity  and  bene- 
volence, would  have  even  a  tendency  to  obtain  for  men 
the  admiration  of  mankind.  And  consequently,  that 
enormous  mass  of  men,  who  are  powerfully  swayed  by 
this  desire  of  being  greatly  admired,  would  simply 
pursue  such  low  arts  and  devices  as  are  alone  available 
for  their  purpose.  You  see  at  once — faintly  indeed  as 
compared  with  the  truth,  yet  very  clearly, — the  total 
wreck  which  must  ensue.  This  propension  then  is  one 
of  the  very  links  which  hold  society  together ;  take  it 
away,  society  collapses. 

In  the  case  of  good  men,  nothing  like  this  could  of 
course  ensue ;  because  they  proceed  on  principle  and 
reason,  not  by  mere  inclination.  Yet  in  their  case  too, 
the  evil  inflicted  by  loss  of  this  propension  would  be 
very  considerable.  As  an  introductory  sample  of  what 
I  mean,  conceive  a  meditation  on  the  Passion,  in  which 
Our  Blessed  Lord's  Innocence  should  have  no  effect  of 
its  own  in  intensifying  our  emotions !  As  things  are,  we 
dwell  on  His  spotless  Purity;  and  our  indignation  is 
excited  against  those  cruel  and  pitiless  men,  who  could 
see  it  unmoved,  and  continue  their  unrelenting  afflictions. 
But  suppose  the  propension  before  us  were  eradicated, 


300  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

then  we  simply  love  these  most  wicked  men  as  God's 
creatures  and  as  Christ's  redeemed:  this  is  the  whole 
account  of  our  feeling  in  regard  to  them.  You  see, 
it  is  as  though  our  moral  nature  were  lopped  of  an 
integral  part ;  as  though  it  went  on  three  legs  instead  of 
four.  Or  take  another  instance.  Consider  the  im- 
mense advantage  to  our  spiritual  growth,  which  arises 
from  viewing  our  sins,  one  after  another,  with  loathing 
and  bitter  indignation,  as  outrages  against  our  Holy 
Creator.  Such  emotions  of  indignation  could  not  exist, 
if  this  propension  were  withdrawn  from  our  nature. 

Then  I  ask  further — what  is  it  which  is  the  ani- 
mating principle  of  holy  men,  missionaries,  parish- 
priests,  nay  laymen,  in  their  zealous  and  sustained 
endeavours  for  the  perfection  of  themselves  and  others  ? 
Will  you  say  Love  ?  I  reply — Love,  in  proportion  to 
its  higher  excellence,  is  a  plant  of  far  slower  growth : 
in  the  earlier  stages  of  our  course,  it  is  rather  this  pious 
zeal  which  is  our  help  and  encouragement.  What 
image  does  S.  Ignatius  put  before  us,  when  he  would 
start  us  on  our  course  with  energy  and  ardour?  The 
feeling  of  military  ardour :  he  puts  before  us  '  the  two 
Standards ; '  and  calls  on  us  to  fight  bravely,  under  Jesus 
as  our  Captain,  against  the  embodied  hosts  of  His 
enemies.  Now  what  is  the  motive  of  military  ardour? 
Partly  no  doubt,  it  is  the  desire  of  honour  and  fame ; 
and  so  far  it  does  not  fall  under  our  present  consider- 
ation. But  in  no  less  a  degree  military  ardour  is  made 
up  of  this  propension,  Love  of  Justice :  each  man  identi- 
fies his  own  course  with  that  of  right,  and  this  inspiring 
thought  gives  animation  to  every  blow.  So  in  the  case 
before  us.  What  are  the  feelings  called  up  in  our  mind, 
by  that  glorious  meditation  on  the  Standards  ?  Partly 
no  doubt,  that  we  are  fighting  under  the  very  eyes  of 
the  Heavenly  Host,  and  are  receiving  our  due  meed  of 
praise :  but  fully  as  much  also,  that  other  feeling,  that 
we  are  engaged  on  the  side  of  Eternal  Truth ;  and  that 
every  blow  we  give  tells  against  the  forces  of  evil. 
Whether  we  are  assailing  evil  within  or  without,— 
fighting  against  a  corrupt  self  or  a  corrupt  world, — in 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       301 

either  case  this  it  is  which  gives  spirit  to  our  exertions, 
that  it  is  evil  against  which  we  are  privileged  to  fight. 
We  see  then  how  vastly  our  practical  work  is  aided  by 
this  propension. 

But  if  we  would  really  understand  the  place  occupied 
by  it  in  our  moral  nature,  let  us  ask,  what  would  be 
the  feeling  of  Christian  Charity,  if  Love  of  Justice  were 
away  ?  in  other  words,  what  effect  would  be  produced  on 
our  character  by  that  other  propension  of  General  Bene- 
volence, Christianly  directed,  if  Love  of  Justice  were  not 
also  present  to  qualify  and  direct  it  ?  Our  feeling  would 
be  simply  that  of  love  to  sinners,  without  any  zeal  at  all 
against  sin;  without  any  emotion  of  hatred  against 
their  principles.  Our  pleasure  would  be  fully  as  great, 
in  rescuing  the  greatest  criminal  from  the  justly  de- 
served punishment  of  his  offences,  as  in  defending  the 
most  saintly  Christian  from  the  unjust  oppression  of  an 
unfeeling  persecutor.  Now  it  is  plain,  without  adding 
another  word,  that  to  act  in  accordance  with  such  a 
feeling  as  this,  would  simply  be  to  turn  the  whole  moral 
world  upside-down.  He  who  should  aim,  in  his  social 
dealings,  simply  at  increasing  the  pleasure  and  lessening 
the  pain  of  his  fellow-men; — he  who  should  do  this, 
I  say,  without  any  reference  whatever  to  their  com- 
parative deserts,  without  any  sustained  attempt  at  pro- 
moting virtue  and  discountenancing  vice  ;  — this  man 
would  act  simply  as  God's  open  enemy. 

It  is  no  exaggeration  then  at  all,  but  the  simple 
truth,  to  say  that  that  very  propension,  General  Love, 
which  might  seem  of  all  the  most  undeniably  and  in- 
evitably beneficial  in  its  character,  would  be  simply  and 
grievously  injurious  to  the  cause  of  virtue,  unless  this 
other  propension,  Love  of  Justice,  were  found  in  its 
company.  Take  either  of  these  most  powerful  pro- 
pensions  separately,  they  lead  us  to  evil.  If  Love  of 
Justice  had  full  sway  in  our  social  dealings,  isolated 
from  the  General  Love  for  mankind, — it  would  lead  us 
to  every  species  of  harshness,  violence,  inconsiderateness, 
uncharitableness,  pride ;  it  would  lead  us  to  feel,  as 
though  we  were  to  be  the  pitiless  judges  of  our  fellow- 


302  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

men.  On  the  other  hand,  if  Love  for  mankind  carried 
us  away,  without  our  being  acted  on  equally  by  Love  of 
Justice, —  our  social  career  would  be  that  of  traitors  to 
Our  Creator  and  recreants  to  His  cause.  Either  one 
then,  taken  by  itself,  would  be  simply  evil  in  its  effects, 
and  lead  us  from  virtue :  but  taken  in  harmony,  just  as 
God  has  implanted  them,  they  lead  us  precisely  in  the 
true  direction ;  they  give  precisely  that  one  legitimate 
and  desirable  impulse,  or  rather  series  of  impulses,  to 
our  whole  dealings  with  mankind,  which  God  desires 
at  our  hands. 

Such  was  the  picture  exhibited,  as  those  tell  us  who 
have  studied  Church  History,  by  the  great  ancient 
champions  of  the  faith,  S.  Athanasius,  or  S.  Leo,  or 
S.  Augustine.  These  great  Saints,  we  are  told,  com- 
bined qualities  which  might  appear  on  the  surface  irre- 
concileable :  they  experienced  most  keenly  the  emotion 
of  holy  resentment,  in  regard  to  heretics  considered  as 
God's  enemies ;  while  they  felt  the  most  lively  tender- 
ness for  them  one  by  one,  as  the  creatures  of  God 
and  the  redeemed  of  Christ.* 

Enough  then  has  been  said  (though  very  much 
more  might  be  added)  to  vindicate  the  first  of  those 
two  propositions  with  which  we  started ;  viz.  that  this 
propension,  Love  of  Justice,  is  of  inappreciable  import- 
ance as  part  of  our  moral  nature.  The  other  propo- 
sition was,  that  it  is  this  very  propension,  and  no  other, 
which,  in  its  perverted  state,  becomes  personal  malice 
— public  faction — in  fact  enmity  and  hatred,  whether 

*  "  0  that  there  was  in  us  this  high  temper  of  mingled  austerity  and 
love  !  Barely  do  we  conceive  of  severity  by  itself,  and  of  kindness  by 
itself ;  but  who  unites  them  ?  We  think  we  cannot  be  kind,  without 
ceasing  to  be  severe.  Who  is  it  that  walks  through  the  world,  wounding 
according  to  the  rule  of  zeal,  and  scattering  balm  freely  in  the  fulness  of 
love  ;  smiting  as  a  duty,  and  healing  as  a  privilege  ;  loving  most  when  he* 
seems  sternest,  and  embracing  those  most  tenderly  whom  in  semblance  he 
treats  roughly  ?  What  a  stste  we  are  in,  when  any  one  who  speaks  the 
plain  threats  of  our  Lord  and  His  Apostles  against  sinners,  or  ventures  to 
defend  the  anathemas  of  His  Church,  is  thought  unfeeling  rather  than 
merciful  ;  when  they  who  separate  from  the  irreligious  world  are  blamed 
as  fanciful  and  extravagant ;  and  those  who  confess  the  truth,  as  it  is 
in  Jesus,  are  said  to  be  bitter,  hot  of  head,  and  intemperate  !" — Newman's 
Sermotis,  vol.  iii.  pp.  204,  205. 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       303 

mi  n  large  or  a  small  scale.  By  far  the  greater  part  of 
all  the  misery  which  man  c  aggressively '  inflicts  on  his 
fellow-men,  is  due  to  nothing  else  than  the  perversion 
and  degeneracy  of  this  one  propension.  I  say  the 
misery  which  he  '  aggressively'  inflicts;  and  I  beg  your 
particular  attention  to  the  sense  of  this  word  'aggres- 
sive.' When  I  speak  then  of  the  misery  which  man 
'aggressively*  inflicts,  I  mean  the  misery  which  he 
inflicts  as  being  misery  \  for  the  sake  of  inflicting  it; 
for  the  pleasure  which  is  thence  produced.  There  is  a 
fearful  mass  of  evil,  /itm-aggressively  inflicted  by  man 
on  man;  inflicted,  that  is,  whether  consciously  or  un- 
consciously, in  pursuit  of  some  end  altogether  different. 
Thus  parents,  who  give  themselves  to  brutal  intem- 
perance, inflict  on  their  children  indefinite  evil ;  bad 
example,  neglect  of  their  education,  and  many  others : 
indeed  almost  all  wickedness  causes  a  vast  amount  of 
social  mischief.  But  I  am  speaking  here,  of  that  misery 
which  is  inflicted  on  others,  as  being  misery  ;  for  the 
sake  of  that  wretched  gratification,  which  results  from 
the  infliction  of  evil  as  such.  Part  even  of  this  no 
doubt  may  be  put  down  to  the  account  of  Envy,  which 
is  next  to  be  considered;  but  I  maintain  that  far  the 
greater  part  arises  from  the  propension  before  us.  In 
other  words,  the  gratification  which  men  derive  from 
the  sufferings  of  their  fellow-men,  simply  as  such,  is 
far  most  commonly  a  gratification  (of  course  a  most 
detestable  and  perverted  gratification)  of  this  propen- 
sion, Love  of  Justice. 

That  we  may  see  this  more  clearly,  let  us  begin  by 
imagining  a  particular  case.  You  will  grant  of  course, 
that,  almost  universally,  those  men  who  are  not  really 
pious  and  interior,  think  far  more  highly  of  their  own 
claims  than  truth  will  warrant.  The  same  principle 
further  applies  to  their  children,  their  friends,  their 
country ;  for  all  these  objects  they  entertain  a  far 
higher  value  than  simple  reason  can  justify.  Suppose 
now  I  receive  some  severity  of  treatment,  which  is 
in  accordance  with  the  strictest  justice.  It  is  far  most 
probable  that  I  shall  regard  it  as  grossly  injurious.  Here 


304  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

then  the  propension  before  us  is  at  once  called  into 
play.  Suppose  I  am  one  of  those,  who  on  the  whole 
act  simply  according  to  their  propensions,  and  not  on 
principle  ;  I  proceed  immediately,  in  accordance  with 
this  particular  propension,  to  retaliate  on  the  aggressor 
for  his  supposed  injury.  Now  if  when  we  receive  just 
treatment  we  consider  ourselves  aggrieved,  what  will 
be  our  thoughts  on  receiving  unjust  treatment  ?  The 
attacked  party  then,  being  unjustly  assailed  by  me, 
thinks  more  seriously  of  the  injury  he  has  now  re- 
ceived, then  /  did  of  my  original  ground  of  complaint. 
And  so  here  you  see  at  once  a  very  remarkable 
scene  opening  before  us ;  blow  and  counter-blow, 
action  and  reaction,  increasing  without  limit  in  the 
way  of  violence  and  intensity.  But  this  is  only  a 
small  part  of  the  case.  My  relations  and  friends  see 
the  whole  thing  on  my  side  ;  his  on  his  side.  And 
similarly,  on  a  greater  scale,  when  countries  contend ; 
England,  e.g.  and  France.  Englishmen  look  on  it 
almost  as  a  matter  of  plain  undeniable  common  sense, 
that  England  is  in  the  right ;  and  can't  in  any  way  be 
got  to  imagine  that  the  case  even  admits  of  another 
interpretation.  Frenchmen  are  equally  obstinate  and 
equally  one-sided.  However  extensive  then  is  the 
class  of  phenomena  to  which  we  are  referring — the 
phenomena  of  mutual  hatred  and  aggressive  injury, — 
here  is  plainly  a  broad  principle,  which  will  account  for 
the  whole. 

And  a  proof  that  this  is  a  true  account, — that  Anger 
(as  distinct  from  Envy)  always  implies  a  notion  of 
injustice  done, — may  be  derived  from  this  fact.  Shew 
me  that  the  injury  which  I  received  was  not  in  any 
way  intentional;  —  e.g.  that  the  other  party  was  intend- 
ing to  do  something  totally  different,  and  by  accident 
hurt  me  ;  or  that  he  was  out  of  his  right  mind  at  the 
time  ;  or  the  like : — what  ensues  ?  I  may  be  unwilling 
to  believe  that  it  was  unintentional ;  this  is  very  com- 
mon : — but  let  me  once  believe  it  to  be  so,  and  yet 
retain  my  resentment,  I  should  be  looked  on  by  all 
mankind  as  simply  beside  myself.  It  is  true  indeed, 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       305 

that  I  may  greatly  resent  what  is  caused  by  mere 
carelessness;  but  this  (as  Butler  well  observes)  is 
because  I  consider  observance  as  my  due,  and  regard 
carelessness  towards  me  as  in  itselffmlty  and  injurious. 
It  is  true  again,  that  I  may  be  angry  with  those  who 
are  not  free  agents;  as  children  or  brutes:  but  this-  (as 
any  angry  man  may  observe  by  looking  back  on  his 
past  consciousness)  is  because,  in  the  blindness  of  my 
rage,  I  was  under  the  practical  impression  that  the 
object  of  my  wrath  was  free  and  responsible.  If  I  can 
only  be  brought  carefully  to  consider  and  ponder  on 
the  fact  that  he  is  irresponsible,  my  anger  begins  to 
subside  as  a  matter  of  course. 

Look  then  over  the  whole  expanse  (and  it  is  a  very 
wide  one)  of  human  hatred  and  malice ; — put  aside 
those  comparatively  few  cases,  which  are  explained 
by  Envy; — and  what  do  we  find?  There  is  not  one 
single  instance,  in  which  hatred  and  malice  are  not 
connected  with  a  feeling  of  moral  disapprobation :  we 
regard  those  whom  we  hate,  as  in  this  or  that  respect 
faulty,  and  therefore  we  hate  them.  We  consider  them 
as  faulty,  for  having  injured  us;  or  for  having  injured 
those  whom  we  love;  or  for  sympathizing  with  those 
who  have  so  acted ;  or  we  regard  them  as  in  some  other 
respect  wilful:  offenders.  Man  is  not  capable  of  any 
feeling  towards  his  fellow-man,  simply  as  such,  except 
that  of  Benevolence.  Hatred,  I  say,  cannot  be  felt 
against  our  fellow-men  simply  as  such ;  but  either  as 
objects  of  Envy  (which  is  another  matter)  or  else  as 
in  this  or  that  way  blameworthy.  Take  even  the  ex- 
treme case  of  the  misanthrope,  and  what  is  its  true 
analysis  ?  He  regards  all  mankind  as  conspiring  and 
banded  together  for  his  injury,  and  therefore  he  hates 
them. 

One  of  you  has  objected,  that  men  are  sometimes 
driven  into  shocking  cruelties,  from  the  motive  of 
fear ;  as  in  the  case  of  certain  slave-owners.  But  this 
objection  proceeds  on  a  misconception  of  my  whole 
statement.  An  injury,  inflicted  from  the  motive  of 
fear,  is  not  an  'aggressive'  injury;  it  is  not  done  for  the 

x 


306  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

pleasure  of  inflicting  evil,  but  for  the  negative  pleasure 
of  myself  escaping  such  infliction.  It  is  true  indeed, 
that  in  such  a  state  of  things  real  hatred  and  malice 
often  arise  ;  but  it  will  be  found  that  this  very  fact 
confirms  our  theory.  In  order  to  justify  to  myself 
those  cruelties  which  I  inflict, — in  order  to  persuade 
myself  that  they  are  due  to  some  higher  motive  than 
mere  pusillanimity  and  terror, —  I  resolve  with  blind 
obstinacy  to  believe,  that  those  objects  of  my  dread  are 
possessed  with  monstrous  and  enormous  faults.  Then, 
by  dwelling  on  these  imaginary  faults,  I  rise  into  a 
sentiment  of  indignation  against  the  offenders,  and  thus 
perpetrate  my  cruelties  under  the  agreeable  delusion 
that  I  am  but  occupied  in  inflicting  a  just  retribution. 

It  may  perhaps  be  objected,  that  malice  and  hatred 
often  exist  as  cool  settled  dispositions  of  the  will ;  quite 
apart  from  \h\sfeeling  of  anger.  This  however  is  only 
one  particular  case  of  a  general  phenomenon;  of  a 
phenomenon,  which  must  be  explained  to  you  at  one 
time  or  another ;  and  which  may  as  well  therefore  be 
explained  now.  The  propensions  may  be  said  to  reside 
primarily  in  the  sensitive  appetite,  and  secondarily  in 
the  will.  Primarily  in  the  sensitive  appetite,  because 
our  susceptibility  of  pleasure  appertains  exclusively 
to  the  sensitive  appetite.  Secondarily  however  in  the 
will,  for  the  following  reason.  Suppose,  e.g.  I  have 
worked  for  some  time  at  money-getting,  under  the 
influence  of  a  strong  and  lively  emotion  tending  in  that 
direction.  These  various  emotions,  as  we  saw  in  the 
third  Section,  have  all  been  accompanied  by  correspond- 
ing acts  of  the  will.  These  various  acts  of  the  will 
have  generated  a  habit ;  and  the  habit  of  aiming  at 
pleasure  will  enable  the  will  to  act,  not  languidly  but 
with  great  steadiness  and  efficacity,  in  the  same  direc- 
tion, even  when  the  sensitive  excitement  is  away. 
And  the  same  truth  holds  of  this  propension  also. 
'Every  feeling  of  resentment  which  I  have  not  resisted, 
is  accompanied  by  an  act  of  the  will ;  these  various 
acts  generate  a  habit  of  hatred  or  malice  ;  and  this 
habit  may  enable  the  will  to  act  with  the  most  de- 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       307 

termined  and  implacable  malignity,  even  apart  from 
any  paroxysms  of  sensitive  excitement. 

On  the  whole  then,  there  can  be  no  doubt,  that  that 
very  propension,  which  would  appear  on  the  surface  as 
tending  far  more  than  any  other  to  the  disruption  and 
overthrow  of  society, — the  feeling  of  mutual  animosity 
and  hatred, — is  really  on  the  contrary,  if  but  rightly 
directed,  one  of  those  necessary  links  which  hold  society 
together.  * 

By  means  of  this  propension,  we  can  explain  a  pheno- 
menon which  we  have  already  admitted  to  exist  (see 
n.  121,  p.  249) ;  viz.  that  extreme  reprobates  feel  a  certain 
pleasure  in  the  mere  fact  of  disobeying  God.  Let  us 
put  the  case  this  way.  Suppose  I  were  to  hear  of  some 
distinct  universe,  under  the  controul  of  a  being  who 
should  be  perfectly  good,  so  far  as  my  own  inadequate 
ideas  of  goodness  extend.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that, 
in  virtue  of  this  propension,  I  should  sympathize  with 
his  government,  rejoice  in  his  success,  grieve  over  his 
failure.  But  now  let  me  become  a  member  of  that 
universe,  and  a  different  kind  of  feeling  ensues.  This 
being's  goodness  brings  him  into  collision  with  myself ; 
he  forbids  me  what  I  wish,  and  restrains  my  liberty. 
My  pride  is  at  once  wounded  ;  a  practical  sense  of  in- 
justice takes  possession  of  me  ;  and  I  feel  pleasure  in  a 
certain  kind  of  retribution.  I  disobey  his  commands, 
as  it  were  to  spite  him.  This  is  St.  Thomas's  account, 
and  I  think  a  true  one,  of  the  cause  which  produces 
'odium  Dei;'  though  here,  as  in  other  cases,  he  is  con- 
sidering habits  of  the  will,  where  I  am  speaking  of 
emotions,  t 

*  "  The  indignation  raised  by  cruelty  and  injustice,  and  the  desire  of 
having  it  punished,  which  persons  unconcerned  would  feel,  is  by  no  means 
malice.  No,  it  is  resentment  against  vice  and  wickedness  :  it  is  one  of  the 
common  bonds  by  which  society  is  held  together  :  a  fellow-feeling,  which 
each  individual  has  in  behalf  of  the  whole  species,  as  well  as  of  himself. 
And  it  does  not  appear  that  this,  generally  speaking,  is  at  all  too  high 
amongst  mankind.*' — BUTLER  On  Resentment. 

t  Respondeo  dicendum,  qu6d,  sicut  ex  supra  dictis  patet  (1. 2.  qusest.  29, 
art.  1)  odium  est  quidam  motus  appetitivse  potentise,  quae  non  movetur  nisi 
ab  aliquo  apprehenso.  Deus  autem  dupliciter  ab  homiue  apprehendi  potest : 
uno  modo  secundum  Seipsum,puta  cum  per  Essentiam  videtur  ;  alio  modo 
per  effectus  suos,  cum  scilicet  "invisibilia  Dei  per  ea  quae  facta  aunt,  intel- 


308  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

This  propension,  as  has  been  so  often  said,  finds  its 
legitimate  gratification  in  justice  being  done  ;  in  good- 
ness being  rewarded,  and  wickedness  punished.  It 
would  appear  then,  that  one-half  of  its  legitimate  grati- 
fication is  found  in  the  misery  of  our  fellow-creatures  ; 
or  rather  indeed  much  more  than  one-half,  since  wicked- 
ness greatly  preponderates  over  goodness.  Here  then 
arises  a  most  difficult  question; — in  what  cases  may  the 
4  vindictive '  emotions  of  this  propension  be  legitimately 
indulged  ?  To  give  this  question  a  fullness  of  treatment, 
commensurate  with  its  difficulty  and  importance,  would 
carry  us  quite  too  far  :  moreover  it  is  an  ethical,  not  a 
psychological  question,  and  therefore  does  not  in  strict- 
ness belong  to  this  Chapter.  Still  some  brief  remarks 
may  be  desirable. 

First,  the  most  legitimate  of  all  gratifications  to  the 
vindictive  emotions  of  this  propension,  is  the  punishing 
our  own  sins.  Those  who  undergo  severe  austerities, 
e.  g.,  may  make  unlimited  use  of  it  in  animating  their 
zeal,  to  inflict  still  greater  punishment  on  their  wicked 

lecta  conspiciuntur."  Deus  autem  per  Essentiam  Suam  est  Ipsa  Bonitas, 
Quam  nullus  habere  odio  potest,  quia  de  ratione  boni  est  ut  ametur  :  et  ideo 
impossibile  est  quod  aliquis  videns  Deum  per  Essentiam,  Eum  odio  habeat. 

Sed  effectus  Ejus  aliqui  sunt  qui  nullo  modo  possunt  esse  contrarii  volun- 
tati  humanse;  quia  esse,  vivere,  et  intelligere  est  appetibile,  et  amabile  omni- 
bus ;  quee  sunt  quidam  effectus  Dei.  Unde  etiam  secundum  quod  Deus 
apprehenditur  ut  auctor  horum  effectuum,  non  potest  odio  haberi.  Sunt 
autem  quidam  effectus  Dei  qui  repugnant  inordinatce  voluntati;  sicut 
inflictio  prense,  et  etiam  cohibitio  peccatorum  per  Legem  Divinara ;  quse  re- 
pugnant voluntati  depravatse  per  peccatum  :  et  quantum  ad  considerationem 
talium  effectuum,  ab  aliquibus  Deus  odio  haberi  potest,  inquantum  scilicet 
apprehenditur  peccatorum  prohibitor  et  poenarum  inflictor. — 2.  2.  quaest.  34, 
art.  1. 

It  is  not  merely  by  accident,  that  in  so  many  cases  our  own  enumeration 
of  the  propensions  coincides  with  St.  Thomas's  of  the  virtues.  The  two  ideas 
in  themselves  indeed  are  totally  distinct,  as  is  most  manifest.  By  propen- 
sion (as  we  have  so  often  observed)  we  mean  simply  man's  susceptibility  of 
pleasure  or  pain  from  any  particular  class  of  objects.  On  the  other  hand, 
a  virtue  is  that  habit  of  the  will  which  disposes  it  to  pursue  its  various 
objects  in  due  measure  and  degree:  as  we  shall  see  in  our  theological  course. 
Still  St.  Thomas  expressly  tells  us,  that  for  every  separate  propension  he 
counts  a  separate  virtue  ;  and  this  fact  readily  accounts  for  the  coincidence 
above  mentioned. 

These  are  St.  Thomas's  words  :  '  Virtutes  perficiunt  nos  ad  prosequen- 
dum  debito  modo  inclinationes  naturales  quse  pertinent  ad  jus  naturale.  Et 
ideo  ad  quamlibet  inclinationem  naturalem  determinatam,  ordinatur  aliqua 
virtus  specialist — 2,  2  queest.  108.  art.  1,  in  corp. 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       309 

and  offending  selves.  All  indeed  who  are  at  all  zealous 
for  their  perfection,  adopt  some  self-chastisement  or 
other ;  whatever  it  may  be,  the  vindictive  emotions  of 
this  propension  will  assist  them  greatly  in  its  sustained 
use. 

Another  very  legitimate  exercise  of  vindictiveness,  is 
against  evil,  whether  in  the  abstract,  or  as  personally 
realized  in  the  evil  spirits,  or  again  as  embodied  in 
material  objects.  Holy  men  may  well  thus  stimulate 
themselves  against  the  Devil  and  his  hosts,  while  actively 
and  earnestly  engaged  in  converting  heretics  or  reclaim- 
ing sinners  ;  in  hewing  down  idols ;  destroying  criminal 
pictures ;  or  the  like. 

Now  to  take  an  extremely  opposite  case.  We  know 
that  those  in  mortal  sin  are  fully  deserving  of  eternal 
torment ;  yet  what  more  intolerable  course  could  there 
be,  than  the  yielding  consent  to  an  emotion,*  which 
finds  pleasure  in  the  prospect,  that  this  or  that  wicked 
man  will  probably  be  damned  ?  We  need  not  deter- 
mine what  may  be  the  case  on  the  Day  of  General 
Judgment ; — how  far  those  who  are  to  be  saved  may  then 
laudably  exercise  this  propension,  in  sympathizing  with 
God's  judgments.  This  is  a  separate  question  alto- 
gether :  but  it  is  plain  that  here  4iu  via'  to  rejoice 
('gaudere,'  see  n.  103,  p.  218)  in  my  neighbour's  pro- 
bable damnation,  will  be  the  surest  means  possible  of 
securing  my  own. 

It  may  be  asked  then,  is  there  no  legitimate  scope 
for  this  propension,  in  contemplating  an  open  and  un- 
blushing sinner  ?  There  is  more  than  one  such  scope  : 
there  are  many  inflictions,  which  on  the  one  hand  are 
chastisements  for  sin,  and  yet  on  the  other  hand  are 
most  salutary  for  moral  improvement.  These  we  may 
most  legitimately  wish  for  sinners.  Suppose  a  wicked 
worldling  has  used  the  power  given  him  by  high  station, 
as  a  means  for  oppressing  and  demoralizing  the  poor  ; — 
it  is  most  lawful  to  admit  a  vindictive  pleasure,  when 
we  hear  that  he  has  been  hurled  down  from  that  high 

*  What  is  precisely  the  yielding  consent  to  an  emotion  has  been  ex- 
plained in  n.  100  and  101,  pp.  211,  212. 


310  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

station  by  the  course  of  events.  And  so  where  we  have 
to  govern  others,  —  as  parents  or  schoolmasters  e.  g. 
govern  children,  —  we  may  most  suitably  make  use  of 
this  feeling,  to  help  us  in  our  bounden  duty  of  inflict- 
ing such  punishments,  as  we  judge  really  conducive  to 
the  moral  improvement  of  those  committed  to  our 
charge.  To  go  beyond  this  towards  others,  would 
plainly  be  to  adopt  towards  them  a  most  different 
measure,  from  that  which  we  apply  to  ourselves.  In 
our  own  case,  we  may  take  a  vindictive  pleasure  in 
looking  e.  g.  on  the  discipline,  as  a  well-deserved  inflic- 
tion on  our  sins  ;  but  we  can  never  say,  '  Oh,  that  Hell 
had  been  my  lot,  as  I  richly  deserved  ! '  We  wish  to 
ourselves  those  inflictions  only,  which  are  corrective  as 
well  as  punitive  ;  to  others  also  we  should  wish  the 
same. 

Here  then  we  also  see,  how  great  a  degree  of  resent- 
ment may  innocently  be  allowed,  in  the  case  of  an  injury 
inflicted  on  ourselves.  An  injury  done  to  ourselves,  is 
as  truly  deserving  of  punishment  as  one  done  to  others. 
We  cannot  then  be  said  to  exceed,  so  far  as  we  allow 
ourselves  in  no  more  than  that  degree  of  resentment, 
which  we  should  experience,  if  another,  wholly  uncon- 
nected with  us,  were  the  party  injured.  Nay  we  may  go 
perhaps  a  little  further ;  for  where  we  are  ourselves  the 
sufferers,  we  are  the  more  able  to  understand,  intellec- 
tually to  appreciate,  the  extent  of  the  injury,  and  so  the 
wrongfulness  of  the  act.  Yet  on  the  other  hand,  in 
proportion  as  we  move  towards  perfection,  we  shall 
feel  much  less  keenly  an  injury  done  to  ourselves;  be- 
cause our  practical  impression  will  the  more  be,  that 
we  deserve  nothing  better.  However,  as  a  help  towards 
aiming  at  perfection,  it  will  be  well  to  discipline  our- 
selves from  the  first  in  the  habit,  of  never  consenting 
to  an  emotion  of  resentment,  for  any  injury  which  we 
may  ourselves  suffer.  It  is  by  such  means,  that  we 
shall  the  more  quickly  grow  to  the  desired  degree  of 
self -hatred  and  self-contempt. 

Finally,  as  we  become  holier  and  better,  we  shall 
more   and   more  cease  to  dwell  on  injuries,  as  being 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       311 

inflicted  against  our  fellow-creatures,  any  more  than  as 
against  ourselves.  We  shall  be  more  and  more  absorbed 
in  the  thought  of  God ;  and  feel  in  regard  to  all  evil- 
doing,  as  towards  an  injury  done  to  God. 

It  will  be  interesting,  in  illustration  of  all  that  has 
been  said,  if  you  are  disposed  to  read  St.  Thomas's 
treatment  of  the  virtue  4  vindicatio'  2,  2,  q.  108 :  though 
it  would  carry  us  much  too  far,  to  examine  precisely 
how  his  statements  stand  in  regard  to  ours. 

145.  A  very  ingenious  objection  has  been  made  by 
one  of  you,  against  the  whole  theory  which  I  have 
drawn  out  on  the  origin  of  malice  and  cruelty.  In 
order  the  more  fully  to  meet  that  objection,  I  will  here 
consider  another  propension,  of  a  totally  different  cha- 
racter from  Love  of  Justice,  and  which  otherwise  would 
have  been  treated  in  a  later  part  of  the  Section.  The 
propension  to  which  I  allude,  may  be  called,  for  want 
of  a  better  name,  c  Love  of  the  Marvellous ;'  for  I  speak 
of  that  delight  which  is  experienced,  from  coming  in 
contact  with  something,  which  is  most  broadly  and 
strikingly  contrasted  with  our  every-day  experience. 

As  an  instance  of  what  I  mean,  consider  the  rap- 
turous enjoyment  of  a  child,  when  he  first  sees  a  play 
or  some  other  gorgeous  and  magnificent  spectacle :  for 
weeks  afterwards  he  can  think  of  nothing  else.  It  is 
this  propension,  which  leads  feebler  minds  to  that  con- 
stant longing  for  novelty  and  change,  which  is  so  very 
common  ;  and  deeper  minds  are  influenced  by  it,  to 
foreign  travel  and  the  search  after  rare  and  unusual 
objects. 

It  is  equally  plain,  that  there  is  nothing  in  this 
visible  scene  which  can  afford  such  a  propension  any 
stable  or  sufficient  gratification.  Its  full  and  legitimate 
Objects,  can  be  nothing  less  than  those  great  and  awful 
Truths,  which  concern  God  and  the  Invisible  World. 
Apart  from  Revelation,  the  contemplation  of  what 
Reason  has  to  tell  concerning  our  Infinite  Creator,  will 
afford  it  a  far  more  adequate  enjoyment  than  can  any 
earthly  scene ;  but  the  marvels  revealed  by  the  Gospel 
are  such,  as  to  give  it  the  keenest  and  most  exquisite 


312  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

delight.  He  who  lives  by  faith,  is  able  to  feed  his  soul 
on  the  most  transporting  mysteries,  even  while  going 
faithfully  and  punctually  through  the  most  ordinary 
business  of  every -day  life.  A  God  Incarnate  !  A 
God  dying  to  redeem  us !  A  God  dwelling  within  the 
Holy  Tabernacle,  and  patiently  awaiting  our  prayers ! 
What  amount  of  meditation  can  ever  exhaust  such 
marvels?  Nay,  and  this  heavenly  -  minded  Christian 
looks  forward  also  from  time  to  time,  with  beating 
heart  and  throbbing  expectation,  to  that  future  period, 
when  he  shall  awake  as  it  were  from  the  darkness  and 
slumbers  of  earth,  to  full  light  and  wakefulness ;  to  the 
actual  vision  of  those  wonders,  which  ueye  hath  not 
seen,  nor  ear  heard,  nor  has  it  entered  into  the  heart 
of  man  to  conceive." 

146.  I  now  approach  the  objection  to  which  I  just 
now  referred.  Hatred  and  Malice,  I  had  said,  are  but 
perversions  of  that  vitally  important  propension,  the 
Love  of  Justice.  Whenever  we  inflict  suffering  on  our 
fellow-men,  for  the  sake  of  that  pleasure  which  we 
derive  from  such  suffering, — there  is  always  (putting 
aside  the  case  of  Envy)  a  practical  impression  (how- 
ever monstrous)  of  injury  received  and  retaliation 
justly  inflicted.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  hatred  of 
our  fellow-men  as  such.  '  You  forget,'  replies  the  ob- 
jector, 4  a  whole  class  of  facts.  Take  such  a  series  of 
4  atrocious  cruelties,  as  those  perpetrated,  e.g.  by  the 
4  worst  Roman  Emperors,  or  by  the  miscreants  of  the 
4  first  French  Revolution.  How  could  Robespierre 
4  imagine  that  he  had  received  injury  at  the  hand  of 
1  those  helpless  multitudes,  whom  he  ruthlessly  slaugh- 
4  tered?'  Let  us  take  then  Robespierre  and  his  asso- 
ciates as  our  instance;  for  whatever  may  be  said  in 
their  case,  is  most  easily  applicable  to  any  other  of 
similar  appearance. 

Now  (1)  such  a  man  as  Robespierre  undoubtedly 
would  consider  his  opponents  to  be  in  some  sense  morally 
culpable ;  for  in  his  fanatical  blindness  he  regarded  the 
enemies  of  republicanism  as  the  enemies  of  the  human 
race.  Add  to  this,  that  a  wicked  man  (as  already  ex- 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       313 

plained)  receives  the  monstrous  practical  impression, 
that  those  who  oppose  himself  deserve  whatever  ven- 
geance he  can  inflict.  I  doubt  not  therefore,  that  his 
cruelties  did  in  some  degree  proceed  from  this  propen- 
sion,  Love  of  Justice,  in  that  frightfully  perverted  state 
to  which  his  wickedness  had  reduced  it. 

But  (2)  his  fear  was  added,  as  an  extremely  strong 
motive  :  to  a  great  extent  his  cruelty  proceeded,  not 
from  any  pleasure  he  received  in  the  suffering  of  his 
victims,  but  from  his  anxiety  to  protect  himself.  To 
pause  in  his  frenzied  course  for  one  day  is,  as  he 
fancies,  to  give  his  prostrate  enemies  time  to  recover 
themselves,  and  to  conspire  against  him.  He  feels  how 
justly  he  has  deserved  their  hatred  ;  and  is  ever  dread- 
ing its  explosion.  This  is  one  of  the  curses  attendant 
on  social  guilt,  that  in  some  sense  past  evil  deeds  neces- 
sitate future.  What  does  Macbeth  feel  after  Duncan's 
murder  ? 

*  I  am  in  blood 

Stepped  in  so  far,  that,  should  I  wade  no  more, 
Returning  were  as  tedious  as  go  o'er.' 

And  so  a  craven  and  panic  fear  possesses  him,  of  the 
terrible  retribution  which  he  must  expect,  the  moment  he 
intermits,  even  for  the  shortest  period,  his  bloody  career. 

Still  I  think  we  shall  by  no  means  do  justice  to  the 
phenomena  of  the  case,  unless  we  introduce  into  our 
analysis  the  propension  treated  in  the  previous  number; 
the  delight  which  accrues,  from  that  which  is  broadly 
and  strikingly  contrasted  with  our  every-day  experience. 
In  virtue  of  this  propension,  the  constant  practice  of 
cruelty  generates  a  kind  of  nervous  excitement,  which 
more  and  more  possesses  the  whole  mind.  Just  as  they 
say  that  a  tiger,  having  once  tasted  blood,  cannot  again 
forbear;-  -so  to  these  men,  after  this  career  of  wild  ex- 
citement, ordinary  existence  appears  vapid,  insipid,  com- 
monplace, to  an  intolerable  degree. 

Take  these  three  facts  :  ( 1 )  these  men's  fanatical 
idea  that  they  are  inflicting  on  their  opponents  a  just 
retribution  ;  (2)  the  panic  fear  caused  by  their  most 
critical  position;  and  (3)  the  strange  attractiveness  of 


314  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

that  nervous  excitement  which  is  kept  up  by  the  pro- 
longation of  these  shocking  cruelties; — all  will  admit, 
I  think,  that  such  cases  as  those  before  us  are  fully 
accounted  for,  without  at  all  supposing  any  hatred  of 
mankind  as  such. 

147.  Next  to  consider  Envy:  and  I  begin  with  these 
preliminary  remarks.  What  is  more  wholesome,  more 
admirable,  more  bracing  to  the  spiritual  strength,  than 
such  an  exercise  as  this  ; — to  ponder  on  the  lives  of  holy 
men,  and  strive  to  lessen  the  distance  between  them 
and  us,  by  advancing  in  all  virtues  and  by  imitating 
their  holy  example  ?  God  has  given  us  a  special  plea- 
sure, in  the  performance  of  this  holy  exercise  ;  or  in 
other  words  has  implanted  in  us  the  propension  Emula- 
tion. 

But  we  may  seek  to  gratify  this  propension, — in 
other  words  we  may  strive  or  desire  to  lessen  the  dis- 
tance between  others  and  ourselves, — by  trying  or 
desiring,  not  to  raise  ourselves,  but  to  depress  them. 
Emulation  then  and  Envy  are  in  fact  the  very  same 
propension  :  rightly  gratified,  it  is  Emulation  ;  wrongly 
gratified,  Envy.  Nothing  can  be  clearer  or  more 
simple.  * 

*  '  Respondeo  dicendum,  quod,  sicut  dictum  est  (art.  prsec.)  invidia  est 
tristitia  quaedam  de  alienis  bonis.  Sed  hsec  tristitia  potest  cotingere  quatuor 
modis. 

1  Uno  quidem  modo,  cum  aliquis  dolet  de  bono  alicujus,  inquantum  ex 
eo  timetur  nocumentum,  vel  sibi  ipsi,  vel  etiam  aliis  bouis  ;  et  tails  tristitia 
non  est  invidia,  ut  dictum  est  (art.  praec.),  et  potest  esse  sine  peccato.  Unde 
Gregorius  22.  Moral,  (cap.  6.  ante  med.)  ait :  "  evenire  plerumque  solet  ut  non 
amissa  caritate,  et  inimici  nos  ruina  laetificet,  et  rursum  ejus  gloria  sine  in- 
vidiae  culpa  contristet ;  cum  et  ruente  eo  quosdam  bene  erigi  credimus,  et 
proficiente  illo  plerosque  injuste  opprimi  formidamus. " 

'  Alio  modo  potest  aliquis  tristari  de  bono  alterius,  non  ex  eo  quod  ipse 
habet  bonum,  sed  ex  eo  quod  nobis  deest  bonum  illud  quod  ipse  habet ;  et 
hoc  proprie  est  zelus,  ut  Philosophus  dicit  in  11.  Rhetor,  (cap.  11.  circ. 
princ.) ;  et  si  iste  zelus  sit  circa  bona  honesta,  laudabilis  esi,  secundum  illud 
1  Corinth.  14.  1,  "^Emulamini  spiritualia."  Si  autem  sit  de  bonis  tempo- 
ralibus,  potest  esse  cum  peccato,  et  sine  peccato. 

'  Tertio  modo  aliquis  tristatur  de  bono  alterius,  inquantum  ille  cui  accidit 
bonum,  est  eo  indignus  :  quae  quidem  tristitia  non  potest  oriri  ex  bonis  ho- 
nestis,  ex  quibus  aliquis  Justus  efficitur,  sed  sicut  Philosophus  dicit  in 
11,  Rhet.  (cap  14.),  est  de  divitiis,  et  de  talibus  quae  possunt  pro  venire 
dignis  et  iudignis :  et  haec  tristitia  secundum  ipsum  vocatur  nemesis,  et 
pertinet  ad  bonos  mores.  Sed  hoc  ided  dicit,  quia  considerabat  ipsa  dona 
temporalia  secundimi  se,  prout  possunt  magna  videri  non  respicientibus  ad 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       315 

There  are  various  corruptions  of  this  propension. 
(1)  Where  the  sphere  of  action  (if  I  may  so  express 
myself)  is  changed.  This  takes  place,  when  we  emulate 
others  in  worldly,  not  in  spiritual  advantages  ;  when  we 
try  to  outstrip  others  in  the  race  of  ambition ;  or  vie 
with  those  richer  than  ourselves,  as  to  ostentation,  com- 
mand of  equipages,  and  the  like  ;  or  indulge  in  any 
other  kind  of  worldly  emulation.  (2)  Not  only  the 
sphere  of  action  may  be  changed,  but  the  propension 
itself  perverted  into  envy.  Needy  men  may  rejoice,  in 
the  calamities  of  those  who  were  richer  than  themselves; 
or  a  politician,  in  the  total  downfall  of  one  who  was  his 
opponent. 

It  may  seem  at  first  strange,  but  it  is  most  un- 
doubtedly true,  that  very  far  the  worst  pervers'ion  of 
this  propeusion,  occurs  where  the  sphere  of  action  is  not 
changed.  Envy  of  our  neighbour's  spiritual  excellence; 
the  desire  that  it  might  be  less,  because  it  overshadows 
and  shames  our  own; — where  can  there  be  a  more 
odious  feeling  than  this  ?  * 

The  will's  deliberate  consent  to  such  an  emotion,  is 
numbered  by  Catholic  writers  as  among  the  most 
heinous  of  sins. 

148.  We  have  now  therefore  seen,  that  those  pro- 
pensions  which  are  far  the  most  powerful  of  all  (with 
one  exception)  in  drawing  souls  from  God — Love  of 
Approbation,  of  Power,  of  Knowledge,  of  Acquisition — 
may  do  most  important  work  in  directing  them  towards 
His  service.  We  have  seen  further,  that  those  very 

seterna.  Sed  secundum  doctrinam  fidei,  temporalia  bona  qua?  indignis  pro- 
veniunt,  ex  justa  Dei  ordinatione  disponuntur,  vel  ad  eorum  correctionem, 
vel  ad  eorum  damnationem  ;  et  hujusmodi  bona  quasi  nihil  sunt  in  compa- 
ratione  ad  bona  futura,  quae  servantur  bonis.  Et  ideb  hujusmodi  tristitia 
prohibetur  in  Scriptura  Sacra,  secuudum  illud  Psal.  36.  1,  "  Noli  semulari 
in  malignantibus,  neque  zelaveris  facientes  iniquitatem  :"  et  alibi  Psal.  72. 3, 
*  Peene  effusi  sunt  gressus  mei,  quia  zelavi  super  iniquos,  paceni  peccatorum 
videns." 

1  Quarto  modo  aliquis  tristatur  de  bonis  alicujus,  in  quantum  alter  exce- 
dit  ipsum  in  bonis  ;  et  hoc  proprieest  invidia  ;  et  istud  semper  estpravum, 
ut  etiam  Philosophus  dicit  in  11.  Rhetor,  (cap.  10),  quia  dolet  de  eo  de  quo 
est  gaudendum,  scilicet  de  bono  proximi' — St.  Thomas,  2.  2,qua3st.  36,  art.  2. 

*  I  mean  of  course  odious  in  its  results,  when  the  will  consents  to  it.' 
No  emotion  in  itself  can  strictly  be  called  odious,  because  it  is  not  in  our 
own  choice  whether  we  experience  it  or  not. 


316  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

propensions,  Anger  and  Envy,  which  might  seem  most 
undeniably  and  exclusively  evil  in  their  tendencies, 
may  be  put  to  most  excellent  account.  Nay  the  former 
of  them,  as  we  have  seen,  is  so  vitally  important  to  our 
moral  nature,  that  if  it  did  not  exist,  the  very  propen- 
sion  of  General  Benevolence  would  be  mischievous  in 
its  effects  on  our  conduct.  All  this  reasoning  gives  the 
greatest  antecedent  probability,  to  the  thesis  we  are 
maintaining;  insomuch  that  even  if  we  were  not  able 
as  yet  to  see  its  full  truth  in  the  case  of  any  particular 
propension,  there  would  be  the  greatest  probability  that 
more  careful  observation  would  place  this  propension 
on  the  same  footing  with  so  many  others. 

I  prefix  these  remarks  to  my  treatment  of  Pride, 
which  is  the  next  case  to  be  considered.  I  am  not 
doing  this  indeed,  because  there  is  any  difficulty  at  all 
in  ascertaining,  what  is  that  propension,  and  what  its 
legitimate  application,  of  which  Pride  is  the  perversion ; 
for  the  case  is  otherwise.  Still  it  must  be^admitted,  I 
think,  that  the  evil  effects  of  this  propension  when  per- 
verted,  exceed  and  overweigh  its  good  effects  when 
rightly  directed,  very  far  more  than  in  the  case  of  any 
other  propension.  And  though  I  think  I  shall  be  able 
to  give  a  perfectly  satisfactory  reason  for  this  fact,  still 
it  seemed  better  to  preface  my  treatment  of  this  most 
important  propension  with  the  above  remark.  I  should 
add  indeed,  that  there  is  another  propension,  of  which 
some  may  think  that  the  evil  effects  of  its  perversion 
exceed  the  good  effects  of  its  legitimate  application  in 
even  a  greater  degree;  I  mean  the  propension  which 
tempts  us  against  the  Sixth  Commandment.  But  so  far 
as  this  statement  is  true,  it  stands  upon  totally  different 
grounds ;  as  will  be  explained  in  its  due  place. 

That  propension,  of  which  Pride  is  the  perversion, 
is  the  l  Love  of  Self-assertion  ; '  the  propension  which 
finds  its  gratification,  in  contemplating  our  own  personal 
importance,  and  acting  with  a  view  to  its  vindication 
and  promotion.  In  order  to  explain  the  place  of  this 
propension  in  our  moral  constitution,  I  proceed  as 
follows  : — 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       317 

(1.)  The  personal  importance  of  us  men  is  incalcul- 
ably great.  If  we  consider  only  what  unaided  reason 
can  tell  us,  we  have  grounds  for  this  statement.  Each 
one  of  us  possesses  true  liberty ;  in  other  words,  each  one 
possesses  what  might  have  seemed  the  inalienable  pre- 
rogative of  God,  (and  which  on  this  very  ground  is  denied 
to  man  by  many  sectaries,)  in  being  (as  it  is  expressed) 
a  self-originating  principle  of  causation.  This  statement 
will  be  explained  and  illustrated,  in  our  theological  work 
on  Liberty;  but  its  general  meaning  is  (I  trust)  suffi- 
ciently clear  to  you.  Each  one  of  us  then  is  entrusted  with 
the  charge  of  that  most  precious  deposit, — his  own 
moral  character,  his  own  permanent  and  eternal  interest. 
It  rests  simply  with  himself,  whether  he  shall  grow 
towards  the  Holiness  of  God,  or  in  the  precisely  oppo- 
site direction  ;  it  rests  precisely  with  himself,  whether 
he  shall  be  for  ever  happy  or  for  ever  miserable. 

But  let  us  introduce  into  our  picture  the  truths  of 
Revelation,  and  this  statement  becomes  far  more  em- 
phatically true.  For  each  one  of  us  God  died ;  it  rests 
then  with  each  one  to  determine,  whether  in  his  regard 
that  death  shall  have  been  efficacious,  or  shall  have 
been  frustrated  of  its  desired  results.  To  each  one, 
supernatural  grace  is  imparted,  abundantly  sufficient  for 
raising  him  to  the  Facial  Vision  of  God;  he  has  the 
unspeakable  privilege  therefore,  the  awful  responsibility, 
of  either  co-operating  with  God  or  directly  resisting  Him. 
Those  in  a  justified  state  moreover  possess,  seated  in  their 
soul,  certain  inward  permanent  gifts,  the  very  thought  of 
which  is  most  elevating  and  transporting. 

(2.)  It  is  of  extreme  importance  that  we  dwell  upon, 
that  we  realize,  this  our  great  personal  importance. 
You  remember,  when  we  were  speaking  of  vain-glory, 
the  weak-minded  youth  at  school ;  of  whom  we  said, 
that  he  shrinks  from  giving  expression  or  effect  to  his 
most  certain  religious  convictions,  from  fear  of  his  com- 
panions' sneers.  What  was  immediately  wanting  to 
him?  precisely  this  ; — a  realization  of  his  own  personal 
importance.  In  every  instance  where  men  are  drawn 
from  their  true  End,  whether  by  vain-glory  or  by  any 


318  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

other  earthly  shadow,  a  true  sense  of  their  own  per- 
sonal importance  would  infallibly  save  them.  And  so 
the  great  writers  of  the  Church  have  ever  felt.  S.  Leo 
for  instance,  as  quoted  in  the  Breviary,  '  agnosce  Chris- 
tiane  dignitatem  tuam;'  c  ponder  on  the  great  dignity  to 
which  you  have  been  called,  and  refuse  for  very  shame 
so  to  act  as  to  degrade  it.'  One  instance  however,  from 
a  contemporary  writer,  will  be  more  to  our  immediate 
purpose,  than  the  multiplication  of  such  quotations  as 
this ;  and  I  will  give  therefore  a  most  interesting  quo- 
tation from  Father  Newman. 

Every  Christian  student  of  Aristotle  is  struck  with 
his  description  of  ^gyaXo-^/y^/a :  that  very  quality,  which 
he  paints  as  the  highest  and  noblest  of  virtues,  appears 
to  ordinary  readers  most  closely  allied  to  that  most 
detestable  sin  of  Pride,  which  flows  from  this  very  pro- 
pension  we  are  considering.  Various  critics,  defending 
Aristotle,  deny  indeed  this  statement ;  and  with  the 
philosophical  or  personal  controversy  thence  ensuing 
we  have  no  kind  of  concern.  Father  Newman  however, 
in  one  of  his  later  Protestant  sermons,  has  based  on 
this  Aristotelic  description,  a  complete  sketch  of  the 
Christian  character.  From  this  sketch  two  inferences 
at  once  follow;  and  they  are  the  very  two  propositions 
which  I  am  occupied  in  maintaining.  First  it  follows, 
that  this  habit  of  self-assertion  is  most  important  to  the 
Christian  life ;  and  secondly  it  follows,  that  this  is  the 
very  principle,  of  which  Pride  is  the  perversion.  I  will 
quote  in  the  note  one  long  passage  from  this  most 
striking  composition,  and  shall  be  very  glad  if  I  thereby 
induce  you  to  study  the  whole.* 

*  "He  then,  who  believes  that,  in  St.  Paul's  words,  he  is  'joined  to  the  Lord' 
as  '  one  spirit,'  must  necessarily  prize  his  own  blessed  condition,  and  look 
down  upon  all  things,  even  the  greatest  things  here  below.  *  Ye  are  of  God, 
little  children,'  says  the  beloved  disciple,  '  and  have  overcome  them  ; 
because  greater  is  He  that  is  in  you  than  he  that  is  in  the  world.  They  are 
of  the  world  ;  ....  we  are  of  God.  He  that  knoweth  God,  heareth  us  ;  he 
that  is  not  of  God,  heareth  not  us.' — 1  John,  iv.  6.  Here  is  the  language  of 
saints  ;  and  hence  it  is  that  St.  Paul,  as  feeling  the  majesty  of  that  new 
nature  which  is  imparted  to  us,  addresses  himself  in  a  form  of  indignation 
to  those  who  forget  it.  '  What ! '  he  says, '  what !  know  ye  not  that  your 
body  is  a  temple  of  the  Holy  Ghost  ? '  As  if  he  said,  '  Can  you  be  so  mean- 
spirited  and  base-minded,  as  to  dishonour  yourselves  in  the  devil's  service  ? 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       319 

(3.)  Seeing  then  that  this  habit  of  Self-assertion  is 
thus  vitally  important,  our  ultimate  conclusion  at  once 
results.  That  there  is  a  certain,  not  inconsiderable, 
pleasure,  derivable  from  dwelling  on  our  personal  im- 
portance, the  phenomena  of  pride  themselves  most  amply 
prove.  Such  pleasure  therefore  is  capable,  in  proportion 
to  its  intensity,  of  giving  us  valuable  assistance  in  our 
Christian  course. 

You  will  ask  perhaps,  is  this  a  different  pleasure 
from  that  which  appertains  to  the  propension  of  Self- 
charity?  A  little  consideration  will  shew  that  it  is 

Should  we  not  pity  the  man  of  birth,  or  station,  or  character,  who  degraded 
himself  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  who  forfeited  his  honour,  broke  his  word, 
or  played  the  coward  ?  And  shall  not  we,  from  mere  sense  of  propriety,  be 
ashamed  to  defile  our  spiritual  purity,  the  royal  blood  of  the  second  A  dam, 
with  deeds  of  darkness  ?  Let  us  leave  it  to  the  hosts  of  evil  spirits,  to  the 
haters  of  Christ,  to  eat  the  dust  of  the  earth  all  the  days  of  their  life. 
Cursed  are  they  above  all  cattle,  and  above  every  beast  of  the  field  ;  grovel- 
ling shall  they  go,  till  they  come  to  their  end  and  perish.  But  for  Christians, 
it  is  theirs  to  walk  in  the  light>  as  children  of  the  light,  and  lift  up  their 
hearts,  as  looking  out  for  Him  who  went  away,  that  He  might  return.' 

"  For  the  same  reason,  Christians  are  called  upon  to  think  little  of  the 
ordinary  objects  which  men  pursue,  wealth,  luxury,  distinction,  popularity, 
and  power.  It  was  this  negligence  about  the  world,  which  brought  upon 
them  in  primitive  times  the  reproach  of  being  indolent.  Their  heathen 
enemies  spoke  truly  ;  indolent  and  indifferent  they  were  about  temporal 
matters.  If  the  goods  of  this  world  came  in  their  way,  they  were  not  bound 
to  decline  them  ;  nor  would  they  forbid  others  in  the  religious  use  of  them  ; 
but  they  thought  them  vanities,  the  toys  of  children,  which  serious  men  let 
drop.  Nay,  St.  Paul  betrays  the  same  feeling  as  regards  our  temporal  call- 
ings and  states  generally.  After  discoursing  about  them,  suddenly  he 
breaks  off  as  if  impatient  of  the  multitude  of  words ;  *  But  this  I  say, 
brethren,'  he  exclaims, '  the  time  is  short.' 

"  Hence,  too,  the  troubles  of  life  gradually  affect  the  Christian  less  and 
less,  as  his  mew  of  his  own  real  blessedness,  under  the  Dispensation  of  the 
Spirit,  grows  upon  him  ;  and  even  though  persecuted,  to  take  an  extreme 
case,  he  knows  well  that,  through  God's  inward  presence,  he  is  greater  than 
those  who  for  the  time  have  power  over  him,  as  Martyrs  and  Confessors 
have  often  shewn. 

"  And  in  like  manner,  he  will  be  calm  and  collected  under  all  circum- 
stances ;  he  will  make  light  of  injuries,  and  forget  them  from  mere  con- 
tempt of  them.  He  will  be  undaunted,  as  fearing  God  more  than  man  ;  he 
will  be  firm  in  faith  and  consistent,  as  '  seeing  Him  that  is  invisible  ; '  not 
impatient,  who  has  no  self-will ;  not  soon  disappointed,  who  has  no  hopes  ; 
not  anxious,  who  has  no  fears  ;  nor  dazzled,  who  has  no  ambition  ;  nor 
bribed,  who  has  no  desires. 

"  And  now,  further,  let  it  be  observed  on  the  other  hand,  that  all  this 
greatness  of  mind  which  I  have  been  describing,  which  in  other  religious 
systems  degenerates  into  pride,  is  in  the  Gospel  compatible,  nay  rather 
intimately  connected,  with  the  deepest  humility."— Sermons  on  Subjects  of 
the  Day,  pp.  163-166. 


320  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

altogether  different.  Suppose  I  believed  myself  de- 
stitute* of  all  freedom ;  of  all  real  power  either  to 
promote  or  obstruct  my  own  well-being;  well — the 
propension  Self-charity  would,  by  such  a  supposition, 
lose  no  part  of  its  adequate  object.  It  would  still  be  a 
matter  of  joy  to  me,  if  I  believed  happiness  is  in  store 
for  me  on  the  whole;  and  of  grief,  if  I  believed  that 
misery  would  preponderate  in  my  lot.  On  such  a 
supposition  I  say,  the  propension  of  Self-charity  would 
lose  no  part  at  all  of  its  adequate  object;  whereas  the 
propension  before  us  would  in  that  case  have  no  legiti- 
mate object  whatever  left.  This  fact  alone,  shews  how 
absolutely  and  entirely  distinct  is  the  legitimate  object 
of  one  of  these  propensions  from  that  of  the  other. 
But  again,  that  personal  responsibility,  which  is  my 
only  true  personal  importance,  and  consequently  the 
only  legitimate  foundation  for  this  propension's  gratifi- 
cation—  this  responsibility  (I  say)  reaches  (as  we  have 
seen)  not  only  to  the  promotion  of  my  own  permanent 
happiness,  but  still  more  prominently  and  importantly 
of  my  own  moral  perfection.  But  as  to  this  latter,  it  is 
evident  on  the  surface  how  utterly  it  is  beyond  the 
scope  of  Self-charity. 

Thus  far,  on  the  legitimate  application  of  this  pro- 
pension.  But  we  now  come  to  a  matter  far  more 
important,  and  deserving  far  more  careful  consider- 
ation; I  mean  the  process  of  its  perversion.  The  legi- 
timate object  then  of  this  propension,  is  our  personal 
importance,  in  the  sense  of  our  vast  personal  responsi- 
bility; of  our  great  spiritual  gifts  and  endowments. 
Everything  which  Reason  or  Revelation  tells  us,  as 
to  the  preciousness  of  that  deposit  committed  to  our 
charge, —  our  own  sanctity,  our  own  eternal  destiny, 
—  every  such  intelligence  gives  a  fuller  scope  for  such 
legitimate  application.  The  propension  is  perverted,  in 
proportion  as  it  seeks  some  gratification  different  from 
this.  So  far  therefore  as  I  dwell  with  complacency  on 
my  (real  or  supposed)  moral  excellence,  I  am  making  a 
perverted  use  of  this  propension.  And  very  far  more, 
so  far  as  I  dwell  with  complacency  on  things  which 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       321 

make  no  pretension  to  be  morally  excellent; — my  in- 
tellectual powers,  or  my  ancient  lineage,  or  my  acquired 
wealth.  Moral  pride  (see  n.  68,  p.  140)  is  very  bad  ; 
but  pride  which  is  not  '  moral'  (as  I  hope  to  shew  in 
our  theological  work)  is  far  more  detestable. 

Now  so  long  and  so  far  as  my  will  is  abjectly  sub- 
missive to  the  will  of  God,  in  that  proportion  pride  is  im- 
possible. It  will  be  a  very  interesting  task  hereafter,  to 
prove  this  statement ; — to  shew  clearly  the  power  pos- 
sessed by  moral  virtue,  of  necessarily  expelling  pride : 
here  let  us  take  for  granted,  what  you  are  all  of  course 
quite  willing  to  admit.  On  the  other  hand,  so  far  as  at 
any  moment  the  energy  of  our  will  towards  good  abates, 
an  entrance  is  opened  to  pride.  This  being  assumed, 
I  here  further  maintain,  that  so  soon  as  an  opening  is 
made  for  pride,  pride  will  infallibly  make  use  of  that 
opening,  and  obtain  entrance  ;  and  I  beg  your  most 
particular  attention  to  the  reason  which  I  give  for  this 
statement. 

The  Propension,  which  we  are  now  considering,  differs 
from  every  other  most  signally,  in  this  one  particular ; 
the  extraordinary  ease  with  which  it  obtains  gratifica- 
tion. Let  us  contrast  it  in  this  respect,  for  instance, 
with  another,  which  in  many  respects  resembles  it,  Love 
of  Approbation.  It  is  a  very  difficult  thing  to  obtain 
the  approbation  of  others;  but  it  is  the  easiest  thing  in 
the  whole  world  to  obtain  our  own :  to  dwell  in  thought 
on  this  or  that  (real  or  imaginary)  excellence.  Now 
the  mass  of  men,  so  far  as  they  do  not  aim  at  c  bonum 
honestum,'  are  perfect  slaves  to  present  and  imme- 
diate '  bonum  delectabile  ;'  they  clutch,  unreflectingly 
and  instinctively,  at  every  gratification  which  comes 
within  their  reach.  But  here  is  a  gratification,  which 
is  within  their  reach  at  every  moment  of  their  exist- 
ence; how  certainly  therefore  it  ensues,  that  they  will 
eagerly  seize  it !  And  thus  it  comes  to  pass,  that  this 
one  pleasure  mixes  itself  unconsciously  with  the  whole 
current  of  their  daily  life,  and  works  at  every  instant 
more  deeply  into  their  soul.  All  these  innumerable 
emotions  of  pride  are  accompanied  as  a  matter  of  course 

Y      • 


322  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

(n.  100,  p.  211)  with  innumerable  acts  of  will,  precisely 
parallel ;  and  these  acts  of  will,  from  their  very  number, 
constitute  in  such  men  a  habit,  more  intense  and  more 
deeply  rooted,  than  any  other  evil  habit  which  can  be 
named. 

Even  a  pious  and  interior  man,  who  sincerely  aims 
at  perfection,  at  every  step  of  his  upward  progress  is 
startled  and  horrified,  at  the  great  abysses  of  pride 
which  he  discovers  in  his  own  heart.  All  those  acts  of 
will,  which  have  generated  this  habit,  have  passed  from 
his  remembrance,  or  more  probably  were  never  distinct 
objects  of  reflection  ;  they  have  been  elicited,  sponta- 
neously and  as  a  matter  of  course,  at  those  moments, 
when  the  will  was  either  altogether  idle,  or  at  all  events 
less  energetic,  in  a  virtuous  direction. 

We  are  now  able  to  explain  the  remarkable  fact 
above  stated,  that  the  good  effects  of  this  Propension 
when  rightly  directed,  bear  so  comparatively  small  a 
proportion,  to  its  evil  effects  when  perverted.  In  order 
to  understand  the  reason  of  this,  observe  first,  that  all 
which  has  been  said  on  the  extreme  ease  of  gratify- 
ing this  propension,  applies  to  it  only  in  its  perverted 
exercise.  This  is  quite  manifest :  the  thought  of  our 
personal  importance,  in  the  sense  of  our  great  personal 
responsibility,  is  not  a  pleasing  but  a  most  painful 
thought,  except  to  those  who  are  really  labouring  for 
their  own  sanctification.  That  thought,  which  is  at 
once  so  gratifying  and  so  easily  elicited,  is  the  thought 
of  some  (real  or  supposed)  excellence ;  and  to  take  plea- 
sure in  this  thought,  with  full  consent  of  the  will,  is 
that  very  perversion  which  we  call  pride. 

In  order  the  better  to  fix  our  ideas,  let  us  choose 
some  other  Propension,  with  which  to  contrast  this  in 
the  particular  above  stated.  No  more  suitable  one  can 
be  chosen  for  this  purpose,  than  that  which  we  have 
already  contrasted  with  it  in  another  aspect ;  Love  of 
Approbation. 

I  say  then  firstly,  that  the  Love  of  Approbation  is  an 
incomparable  keener  and  more  powerful  propension, 
than  the  Love  of  Self-assertion.  This  is  plain,  whether 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUK  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.      323 

we  compare  the  two  in  their  legitimate  or  their  per- 
verted exercise.  How  immeasurably  more  lively  and 
transporting  is  the  delight  which  we  receive,  from 
believing  that  our  dearest  Redeemer  approves  our  con- 
duct, than  that  which  ensues  from  our  conviction  that 
we  are  really  promoting  our  own  true  importance !  On 
the  other  hand,  consider  the  incredibly  and  almost 
fabulously  inspiring  effect,  produced  e.g.ou  soldiers,  who 
possess  the  full  spirit  of  their  profession,  by  the  pros- 
pect of  receiving  praise  and  gratitude  from  their  coun- 
trymen at  home.  Such  is  vain-glory  ;  and  if  we  view 
pride  in  comparison  with  it,  how  languid  and  (as  it 
were)  sullen  a  pleasure  it  is  which  the  latter  confers. 

Why  then  is  it  that  pride  is  ordinarily  so  far  more 
powerful  and  deeply  rooted  a  habit?  Evidently,  be- 
cause the  Propension  far  more  than  makes  up,  by  the 
frequency  of  its  gratifications,  for  their  comparatively 
small  intensity.  Those  acts,  which  engender  the  habit 
of  pride,  are  in  the  mass  of  men  almost  or  altogether 
unceasing;*  those  which  make  up  the  habit  of  vain- 
glory, are  comparatively  rare  and  intermittent.  Acts  of 
virtuous  Self-assertion  are  by  no  means  more  frequent, 
than  acts  wherein  we  aim  at,  or  rejoice  in,  God's  appro- 
bation ;  and  the  latter  Propension,  being  immensely 
the  stronger,  gives  far  greater  help  to  virtue  than 
the  former.  But  acts  of  pride  are  immeasurably  more 
frequent  than  acts  of  vain- glory ;  so  much  so,  as  to  do 
much  more  than  compensate,  for  the  immensely  less 
pleasure  which  appertains  to  the  former  propension. 

One  final  remark  may  be  interesting,  before  we  quit 
this  Propension.  It  has  been  assumed,  in  our  treatment 
of  it,  that  so  long  as  the  will  is  kept  in  due  subordina- 
tion to  God,  the  entrance  for  any  long  time  of  that 
emotion  which  we  call  pride  is  impossible.  Now 
further  I  ask,  what  did  we  find,  in  treating  of  Resent- 
ment, to  be  the  one  principal  source,  from  whence  pro- 
ceed hatred,  malice  and  all  'aggressive'  injury  to  our 
fellow-men  ?  A  small  amount,  it  appeared,  was  due  to 

*  That  is,  of  course,  during  their  waking  hours. 


324  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

the  action  of  envy ;  but  far  the  greater  part,  to  per- 
verted Love  of  Justice.  Lastly  I  ask,  how  does  this  love 
of  Justice  become  perverted  ?  how  is  it  transformed 
into  personal  anger  and  unholy  resentment  ?  Simply 
through  pride  ;  through  our  monstrous  practical  exag- 

feration  of  our  own  just  claims  to  respect  and  deference, 
o  long  then,  it  appears,  as  the  will  is  duly  subordinate 
to  God,  pride  even  as  an  emotion  can  for  no  long  time 
remain  ;  and  so  far  as  pride  is  absent,  personal  anger, 
and  hatred,  and  malice,  will  be  non-existent.  In  other 
words,  it  is  only  in  proportion  as  they  fail  in  due  rever- 
ence to  their  Creator,  that  creatures  ever  experience 
any  continued  emotions  of  mutual  hatred  and  vindictive 
malice  against  each  other. 

149.  The  Propensions,  which  we  have  hitherto  con- 
sidered, all  agree  with  each  other  in  this  respect ;  viz. 
that  every  growth  in  virtue  does  but  give  increased 
scope  for  their  gratification.  It  is  requisite  indeed,  that 
we  take  great  pains  in  fixing  them  carefully  on  their 
legitimate  objects.  It  is  requisite  also,  that  a  certain 
definite  proportion  should  be  preserved,  between  various 
Propensions  of  the  number,  as  to  the  degree  in  which 
we  respectively  cherish  and  foster  them.  To  labour  at 
these  two  tasks  indeed,  is  the  principal  and  most  impor- 
tant office  of  mortification ;  as  we  shall  see  in  our  theo- 
logical course.  But  so  only  that  they  are  fixed  on 
their  legitimate  objects,  and  fixed  in  the  right  relative 
proportion,  it  is  absolutely  impossible  that  we  can 
exceed  in  our  degree  of  calling  them  into  exercise. 
These,  and  whatever  others  there  may  be  which  agree 
with  them  in  this  particular,  I  call  by  the  name  of  the 
higher  Propensions.  Let  us  recapitulate  those  which 
we  have  mentioned,  in  that  order  in  which  they  occurred. 

I.  Love  of  Duty. 
II.  Self-charity. 

III.  Personal  Love,  (1)  Amor  Benevolentiae  and  (2) 

ConcupiscentiaB. 

IV.  General  Love,  (1)  Amor  Benevolentia3 and  (2) 

Concupiscentise. 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       325 

V.  Compassion. 
VI.  Gratitude. 
VII.  Love  of  Approbation. 
VIII.  Love  of  Power. 
IX.  Love  of  Acquisition. 
X.  Love  of  Knowledge. 
XL  Love  of  Justice. 
XII.  Love  of  the  Marvellous. 

XIII.  Emulation. 

XIV.  Love  of  Self-assertion. 

150.  Let  us  still  linger  on  these  Propensions,  before 
passing  on  to  the  rest ;  not  for  the  sake  of  any  addi- 
tional argument  for  our  thesis  which  we  may  thence 
derive,  but  rather  for  the  sake  of  imprinting  them 
more  deeply  on  our  memory,  and  becoming  more  con- 
versant with  their  character. 

And  first  let  us  enquire,  are  there  any  of  these 
Propensions,  which  receive  gratification  from  every 
virtuous  act  which  we  perform  ?  Evidently  the  first 
does  so :  it  is  not  (as  we  have  stated  in  treating  of  it)  a 
powerful  propension  on  its  positive  side  ;  still  a  certain 
pleasure  is  derived,  from  the  consciousness  of  acting 
rightly,  on  every  occasion  when  we  know  ourselves  so 
to  act. 

Is  there  any  other  Propension,  which  is  of  necessity 
thus  universally  gratified  by  virtuous  conduct  ?  You 
will  say  perhaps  that  Self-charity  is  so,  not  to  mention 
others ;  because  every  good  act  really  tends  to  our 
own  happiness.  True;  but  we  are  not,  in  every  good 
act,  thinking  of  our  own  happiness :  as  we  shall  see  in 
the  next  chapter.  The  first  Propension  then  is  the 
only  one,  to  which  we  can  assign  this  universality  of 
gratification  in  the  practice  of  virtue. 

Next,  that  we  may  see  more  clearly  what  benefits 
are  derived  from  these  Propensions  in  our  Christian 
course,  let  us  take  the  ordinary  division  of  duties. 
Let  us  divide  our  duties  then,  into  those  which  are  ( 1 ) 
towards  God;  (2)  towards  ourselves  ;  and  (3)  towards 
our  brethren.  And  among  our  various  Propensions, 


326  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

let  us  consider  which  are  those  calculated  to  give  us 
special  help,  in  fulfilling  the  first,  the  second,  the  third, 
of  these  three  classes. 

First,  duties  towards  God.  It  is  a  very  trite  remark, 
that  all  our  duties  may  in  a  very  true  sense  be  called 
duties  to  God.  Those  which  are  called  in  particular 
by  that  name,  are  on  the  whole  reducible  to  this ; — the 
fixing  our  thoughts  at  due  times,  and  commonly  with 
particular  effort  and  abstraction,  on  the  thought  of  God, 
in  all  His  various  aspects.  And  this  is  important  for  two 
reasons.  First,  that  we  may  preserve  through  the  day 
our  implicit  memory  of  His  presence  ;  or  in  other  words, 
that  our  various  successive  acts  may  be  really,  even  if 
unconsciously,  directed  to  His  love  and  service  (see  n. 
120,  p.  247).  Secondly,  that  by  such  habits  of  familiar 
conversation  with  our  Creator,  we  may  be  the  more 
certainly  and  effectually  transformed  into  His  likeness. 
The  same  duty  is  also  incumbent  on  us,  in  regard  to 
other  Objects  of  the  invisible  world ; — the  Sacred 
Humanity,  our  heavenly  Mother,  Saints,  and  Angels. 
It  will  perhaps  then  be  more  conducive  to  complete- 
ness, if  we  call  these  duties,  duties  towards  God  and  the 
Invisible  World. 

The  chief  Propension  which  will  give  us  energy  for 
this  task,  and  joy  in  fulfilling  it,  is  (I  need  not  say) 
'  Personal  Love,'  in  its  two  great  branches  ;  but  hardly 
less  important  service  will  also  be  rendered  by  c  Love  of 
Approbation.'  '  Love  of  the  Marvellous'  also  enjoys 
signal  delight  in  these  high  contemplations.  *  Gratitude ' 
and  'Compassion'  give  (as  we  have  seen)  subordinate 
assistance  ;  and  it  is  perhaps  not  an  undue  refinement 
to  say,  that  even  such  theological  considerations,  as  are 
in  place  during  direct  prayer  and  meditation,  give  a  real 
gratification  (with  educated  Christians)  to  their  '  Love 
of  Knowledge.'  '  Emulation'  also  stirs  us  up  towards 
following  those  high  examples,  whom  we  study  at  such 
periods. 

The  second  class  of  duties — those  towards  our- 
selves— are  no  whit  less  indispensable  than  the  former. 
Under  this  head  are  included  such  exercises,  as  perio- 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       327 

dical  examen  of  conscience ; — the  labouring  to  discover 
remedies,  for  those  hitherto  hidden  sins  which  we  may 
have  discovered  ; — the  practice  of  penance  and  satis- 
faction, by  way  of  self-revenge ; — the  watching  over 
ourselves  through  the  day,  that  we  practise  faithfully, 
in  all  these  respects,  what  we  may  have  resolved 
wisely.  These  exercises,  I  say,  are  no  less  important, 
than  those  of  the  former  class  ;  or  rather  are  absolutely 
indispensable,  in  order  that  the  others  may  be  really 
performed  at  all.  Unless  there  be  this  constant  interior 
watchfulness  and  discipline,  our  contemplation  of 
Heavenly  Objects  will  be  delusive;  will  not  truly 
correspond  to  the  great  Realities.  It  is  for  this  very 
reason,  that  so  many  misbelievers  have  fallen  into  such 
terrible  abysses  of  evil,  under  pretext  and  imagination 
of  heavenly  contemplation.  It  is  for  this  reason,  that 
so  many  have  mistaken  the  dictates  of  pride  and  bit- 
terness, for  true  zeal  in  God's  behalf;  and  the  untem- 
pered  heats  of  fanaticism,  for  the  fervours  of  genuine 
devotion. 

What  then  are  those  Propensions  which  will  specially 
cheer  us,  in  the  fulfilment  of  these  laborious  and  other- 
wise wearisome  obligations  ?  So  far  of  course  as  the 
motive  for  their  performance  has  reference  to  God, 
those  Propensions  last  recited  have  their  place  also  here. 
But  we  are  rather  inquiring,  what  Propensions  will  be 
specially  called  into  play,  by  that  special  part  of  God's 
service,  which  consists  of  these  interior  duties.  We 
may  answer  as  follows. 

(1.)  '  Self-charity'  will  be  of  most  powerful  assistance 
in  the  cause  :  the  very  fact  that  we  are  thinking  of  our 
own  interior,  will  remind  us  how  essentially  we  are 
promoting  our  own  happiness  by  so  acting.  (2.)  4  Love 
of  Self-assertion'  in  like  manner  will  be  gratified,  in 
proportion  as  we  faithfully  acquit  ourselves  of  that 
responsibility  which  rests  upon  us ;  and  still  more, 
4  Love  of  Acquisition,'  when  we  find  our  evil  habits 
sensibly  diminish,  while  our  various  virtues  are  healthily 
advancing  towards  maturity.  In  regard  to  one  side  of 
these  duties — the  discovery  of  hidden  sins,  and  self- 


328  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

chastisement  in  vindictive  requital, — we  have  seen  how 
very  powerfully  the  c  Love  of  Justice'  will  both  stimulate 
us  to  the  task,  and  sustain  us  in  its  performance. 

There  remains  the  third  class  of  duties,  those 
towards  our  brethren.  These  indeed  are  not  so  abso- 
lutely essential  to  the  very  idea  of  true  religion,  as  are 
the  two  former ;  yet  in  those  circumstances  wherein  God 
has  placed  us,  it  will  ever  remain  true,  that  c  he  who  loves 
God  will  love  his  brother  also.'  What  are  those  Pro- 
pensions  which  will  give  us  special  help  in  this  branch 
of  obligation  ?  On  these  duties  indeed,  as  in  regard  to 
the  former,  it  is  to  be  noted,  that  so  far  as  the  motive 
for  their  performance  has  reference  to  God,  the  Pro- 
pensions  bearing  on  the  first  class  have  their  place  here 
also.  But  the  meaning  of  our  question  is,  what  Pro- 
pensions  will  specially  be  called  into  play,  as  often  as 
our  working  for  God  takes  the  special  shape,  of  aiming 
at  the  conscientious  discharge  of  our  social  duties. 

The  first  place  will  be  held,  in  partnership,  by  those 
two  most  important  Propensions, — l  General  Love'  (in 
its  two  branches)  and  c  Love  of  Justice.'  So  far  as  either 
of  these  unduly  preponderates  over  the  other,  social 
mischief  tends  to  ensue :  it  is  the  resultant  of  their 
united  action,  which  will  speed  us  forward  in  the  due 
direction.  In  proportion  as  we  possess  these  two  Propen- 
sions, (1)  in  the  right  mutual  proportion,  and  (2)  in 
strength  and  intensity,  in  that  proportion  we  shall  be  well 
equipped  by  nature  for  our  social  duties.  Both  c  Com- 
passion' and  '  Gratitude'  are  also  of  great  assistance  to 
these  duties ;  but  far  more  the  former  than  the  latter. 
4  Love  of  Approbation '  also  should  be  enlisted  in  the 
same  cause :  for  though,  when  directed  to  our  fellow- 
men,  there  is  need  of  great  watchfulness,  lest  it  exceed 
and  become  inordinate; — yet  (as  we  before  observed) 
it  may  have  a  perfectly  legitimate  gratification,  in  the 
applause  we  receive  from  good  and  pious  Christians. 
Finally  it  may  be  remembered,  that  in  one  very  important 
part  of  our  social  duties, — intercessory  prayer, — the 
'  Love  of  Power'  is  an  invaluable  stimulus  to  its  due 
performance. 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       329 

151.  Another  course  of  remarks  on  these  Propen- 
sions  will  be  desirable,  in  consequence  of  a  deep  and 
vital  difference  which  exists  on  this  head,  between 
Catholics  and  Protestants.  In  speaking  of  Protestants, 
I  refer  to  those  who  may  be  called  \formal  Protest- 
ants.' There  are  certain  Protestants,  be  they  more  or 
fewer  in  number,  whose  interior  life  is  such,  that  were 
the  Catholic  Church  to  be  truly  exhibited  before  their 
eyes,  in  her  doctrines,  her  precepts,  her  rule  of  life, 
they  would  speedily  recognize  her  Divine  authority: 
their  Protestantism  is  due  to  their  ignorance  of  Catho- 
licism in  its  real  nature.  But  there  are  other  Protest- 
ants, of  whom  a  most  different  account  must  be  given ; 
and  whom  a  clearer  apprehension  of  Catholic  doctrine 
and  practice,  would  but  drive  into  a  more  determined 
and  uncompromising  opposition.*  And  it  is  such  Pro- 
testants as  these,  of  whom  I  intend  speaking.  They 
would  regard  this  whole  treatment  of  our  Propensions 
as  simply  illusory,  and  even  fanatical.  And  as  you 
will  probably  come  often  enough  into  contact  with  such 
opponents,  it  is  better  you  should  at  once  understand 
their  view  of  the  case. 

I  cannot  better  explain  their  general  meaning,  than 
by  a  single  very  characteristic  illustration  :  their 
opinion  on  monasteries  and  convents.  You  will  con- 
stantly hear  them  urge,  that  convents  are  such  dreary 
places ;  and  that  the  unhappy  victims,  there  immured, 
must  pine  away  in  desolation  and  misery.  You  will 
reply  of  course,  that  a  convent  would  indeed  be  a  dreary 
place  for  one  who  had  no  vocation ;  or,  in  other  words, 
who  was  so  constituted  (by  nature  or  habit)  as  to  have 
no  sufficient  power  of  realizing  the  invisible.  But  as 
to  one  who  has  such  a  vocation,  you  will  add,  no  place 
can  be  so  happy  as  a  convent ;  for  God,  and  the  other 
objects  of  the  Invisible  World,  are  a  far  more  adequate 
rest  whereon  the  affections  may  repose,  than  any  beings 


*  It  may  be  asked,  whether  this  distinction  be  equivalent  to  that  between 
'vincible'  and  'invincible'  ignorance;  but  no  intelligible  answer  could  be 


given  in  a  few  words.    '  De  Ignorantia'  will  be  one  important  part  of  our 
the   " 


teological  work. 


330  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

of  this  earth  can  possibly  be.  Now  the  reception, 
which  such  a  reply  will  meet  from  Protestants,  is  deeply 
instructive.  It  is  not  merely  that  they  will  not  admit 
its  force :  they  will  be  angry  with  you,  for  having  the 
'  effrontery  '  to  urge  it ;  they  will  look  on  it  as  a  mere 
juggle  of  words  ;  they  will  regard  it  as  a  mere  super- 
ficial plausibility,  invented  for  the  purpose  of  contro- 
versy, the  truth  of  which  you  yourself  no  more  believe 
at  the  bottom  of  your  heart  than  they  do. 

Now  how  can  we  account  for  this  their  strange  de- 
meanour? They  cannot  possibly  mean,  e.g.  that  our 
Propensions  are  incapable  of  being  gratified  by  invisible 
objects.  Take,  for  instance,  a  fact  to  which  we  have 
often  adverted;  the  incredible  delight  which  a  soldier 
receives,  from  the  praise  of  his  countrymen.  Does  this 
delight  spring  only  from  the  praise  of  those,  among  his 
countrymen,  whom  he  has  seen  and  known  ?  The  sup- 
position is  simply  ridiculous.  He  is  in  the  Crimea,  and 
they  at  home;  those  with  whom  he  is  personally  ac- 
quainted are  but  an  infinitesimal  part  of  the  whole ;  yet 
the  praise  of  that  unknown  mass  is  the  sweetest  music 
in  his  ears.  How  can  it  then  be  called  unmeaning  or 
paradoxical  to  maintain,  that  he  whose  thought  dwells, 
not  on  his  unseen  countrymen  but  his  unseen  Creator, — 
that  such  a  man  will  derive  a  similar  gratification  from 
that  Creator's  praise  and  approbation  ?  or  rather  indeed 
a  much  greater  gratification ;  by  how  much  the  Creator 
has  him  with  immeasurably  greater  constancy  in  His 
thoughts,*  and  knows  with  immeasurably  greater  in- 
timacy his  whole  course  of  life.  This  is  however  but 
one  Propension  out  of  many  :  consider  others  also ; 
consider,  e.g.  Compassion.  If  I  hear  a  most  touching 
tale  of  woe,  who  will  say  that  I  have  no  pleasure  in 
relieving  it,  because  I  never  saw  the  sufferer?  Or, 
taking  Gratitude  as  an  instance,  that  I  have  no  pleasure 
in  requiting  a  service,  unless  I  personally  know  my 
benefactor?  Or  consider  General  Love.  Is  not  the 
hatred  of  my  fellow-men  one  of  the  keenest  sufferings 
imaginable?  And  who  will  say  that  it  is  lessened, 

*  I  express  myself,  of  course, '  more  humano.' 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       331 

because  the  great  majority  of  those  men  are  external 
to  my  acquaintance  ? 

Our  opponents  then  cannot  possibly  mean,  that 
man's  Propensions  are  incapable  of  being  gratified  by 
invisible  objects :  we  must  seek  some  deeper  ground  of 
difference,  between  them  and  ourselves.  Nor  is  it  very 
difficult  to  discover  this  ground.  I  was  once  arguing 
this  very  point  of  doctrine,  with  a  very  candid  and  in- 
telligent Protestant ;  and  the  answer  which  I  received 
shed  quite  a  flood  of  light  on  the  real  matter  at  issue. 
4  Seclusion  from  the  world,'  said  my  antagonist,  4  must 
4  by  absolute  necessity  be  a  wretched  and  dreary  con- 
*  dition,  whatever  you  say  about  such  persons  realizing 
4  the  Presence  of  God.  How  is  it  possible  to  find  con- 
'  tent  and  comfort,  in  the  thought  of  an  abstraction?1 
This,  I  am  persuaded,  leads  us  to  the  real  truth ;  they 
do  not  practically  believe  in  a  Personal  God  at  all. 

Now  on  this  supposition,  nothing  can  be  more  in- 
telligible than  the  above  statement.  A  heathen  phi- 
losopher calls  on  his  hearers  to  live  justly,  temperately, 
beneficently, — not  for  the  sake  of  human  applause,  but 
for  the  pure  love  of  virtue.  4  Virtue/  he  adds,  *  is  its 
6  own  reward,  and  will  support  us  in  the  absence  of  all 
4  human  consolations/  This  is  very  specious  and 
plausible,  so  long  as  his  disciples  are  content  with 
admiring  and  listening  to  his  fine  sentiments;  but  let 
them  once  try  and  put  them  into  practice,  the  fallacy  of 
his  reasoning  will  force  itself  on  their  notice.  '  What 
4  is  meant  at  last  by  virtue?  simply  a  certain  state  of 
4  my  own  mind :  how  can  a  state  of  my  own  mind  be 
4  any  gratification,  to  those  most  powerful  Propensions, 
4  which  rest  on  external  objects  for  their  satisfaction? 
4  How  can  my  Love  of  Approbation,  or  my  desire  for 
4  another's  affection,  be  satisfied  by  a  mere  abstraction  ? 
4  Such  talk  is  mere  insult  or  mockery.7  These  will  be 
the  very  natural  and  just  comments  of  a  heathen  au- 
ditor ;  and  in  proportion  as  any  men  (whatever  they 
are  called)  agree  with  heathens,  in  (practically  at  least) 
ignoring  the  very  notion  of  a  Living  and  Personal 
Creator, — in  that  proportion  the  very  same  reclamation 


332  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

will  be  natural  and  (in  one  sense)  reasonable  in  their 
mouths  also.  To  speak  of  God  as  a  really  satisfying 
Object  to  the  heart,  is  to  give  them  a  stone  when  they 
ask  for  bread;  it  is  to  call  on  them  to  rest  their  affec- 
tions on  a  mere  abstraction.  This  then  I  believe  to  be 
the  real  ground  of  difference,  between  Catholics  and 
these  Protestants  ;  this  it  is,  which  perplexes  both  the 
Catholic  and  the  Protestant  controversialist.  Each 
arguer  is  amazed  and  bewildered,  when  he  finds  his 
opponent  doubting  or  denying,  what  to  him  appear  the 
most  obvious  and  elementary  of  truths.  And  each  is 
tempted  consequently,  to  charge  the  other  with  con- 
scious and  flagrant  disingenuousness  ;  whereas  the 
real  truth  simply  is,  that  they  mutually  differ  as  to 
principles,  far  more  fundamental  and  pervasive,  than 
any  which  have  been  directly  subjects  of  disputation. 

Protestants,  I  say,  in  proportion  as  they  are  4  for- 
mally '  such,  do  not  practically  realize  the  existence  of 
a  Living  and  Personal  Creator,  wholly  distinct  from, 
and  external  to,  ourselves ;  of  a  Being,  who  has  Acts, 
Thoughts,  Affections,  of  His  own;  of  a  Being,  who  may 
be  just  as  truly  and  legitimately  the  Object  of  our 
various  propensions,  as  any  other  external  being  can 
be  ;  of  a  Being,  '  Who,  though  the  highest,  yet  in  the 
4  work  of  creation,  conservation,  government,  retribu- 
4  tion,  makes  himself,  as  it  were,  the  minister  and  ser- 
4  vant  of  all ;  Who,  though  inhabiting  eternity,  allows 
'  Himself  to  take  an  interest,  and  to  feel  a  sympathy, 
4  in  the  matters  of  space  and  time.'  *  They  consider 
themselves  of  course, —  sincerely  consider  themselves,— 
to  believe  most  firmly  in  His  existence  ;  but  all  their 
views  and  opinions  on  religious  matters  imply,  by  ne- 
cessary inference,  the  contradiction  of  that  belief.  To 
suppose  that  the  real  difference  between  Catholic  and 
Protestant,  lies  in  opposite  intellectual  convictions  on 
the  existence  of  Purgatory,  or  on  the  cultus  of  Our 
Blessed  Lady,  or  on  the  efficacy  of  sacraments,  seems 
to  me  a  most  inadequate  view  indeed  of  the  real  gulf 
between  them  and  us.  We  start  from,  and  throughout 

*  Newman's  Discourses  on  University  Education,  p.  93. 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       333 

proceed  upon,  an  essentially  different  view  from  them, 
on  the  very  foundation  of  all  religion; — on  the  nature, 
the  character,  the  claims,  of  our  Almighty  Creator.  On 
this  the  very  foundation  of  all  religion,  the  doctrine 
of  God, — the  Protestant's  practical  belief  is  one  thing, 
the  Catholic's  another  and  most  opposite.  '  No  one/ 
says  Father  Newman,  4  can  really  set  himself  to  master 
'  and  to  teach  the  doctrine  of  an  Intelligent  Creator  in 
4  its  fulness,  without  going  on  a  great  deal  farther  than 
4  he  at  present  dreams/  *  c  Let  him  really  and  truly, 
4  not  in  words  only,  or  by  inherited  profession,  or  in 
4  the  conclusions  of  reason,  but  by  direct  apprehension, 
*  be  a  Monotheist,  and  he  is  already  three-fourths  of  the 
4  way  towards  Catholicism.''  f  I  am  not  speaking  of 

*  Newman's  Discourses  on  University  Education,  p.  100. 

t  I  am  not  saying  that  this  will  tend  to  remove  those  various  obstacles, 
which  prevent  his  regarding  the  historical  arguments  in  favour  of  Catholic 
Doctrine  as  satisfactory  ;  that  is  another  matter.  But  I  say,  it  will  tend 
most  powerfully  to  remove  the  innumerable  objections  to  Catholic  Doctrine 
in  itself,  which  are  felt  by  the  mass  of  Protestants. 

On  the  general  statement  in  the  text,  as  to  Theism  being  the  main  point 
at  issue  between  Catholics  and  Protestants,  I  may  say  that  I  had  come  to 
the  clear  conviction  of  its  truth,  before  I  was  aware  how  far  any  other 
Catholics  were  in  agreement.  The  following  quotation  therefore  expresses  a 
judgment,  of  which  my  own  was  altogether  independent.  '  This  is  the 
doctrine  which  belief  in  a  God  implies  :  if  it  means  anything,  it  means  all 
this,  and  cannot  keep  from  meaning  all  this,  and  a  great  deal  more ;  and, 
though  there  were  nothing  in  Protestantism,  as  such,  to  disparage  dogmatic 
truth  (and  I  have  shewn  there  is  a  great  deal),  still,  even  then,  I  should  have 
difficulty  in  believing  that  a  doctrine  so  mysterious,  so  peremptory,  approved 
itself  as  a  matter  of  course  to  educated  men  of  this  day,  who  gave  their 
minds  attentively  to  consider  it.  Rather,  in  a  state  of  society  such  as  ours, 
in  which  authority,  prescription,  tradition,  habit,  -moral  instinct,  and  the 
influences  of  grace  go  for  nothing  ;  in  which  patience  of  thought,  and  depth 
and  consistency  of  view,  are  scorned  as  subtle  and  scholastic  ;  in  which  free 
discussion  and  fallible  judgment  are  prized  as  the  birthright  of  each  indivi- 
dual ;  I  must  be  excused,  if  I  exercise  towards  this  age,  as  regards  its  belief 
in  this  doctrine,  some  portion  of  that  scepticism,  which  it  exercises  itself 
towards  every  received  but  unscrutinized  assertion  whatever.  I  cannot  take 
it  for  granted,  I  must  have  it  brought  home  to  me  by  tangible  evidence,  that 
the  spirit  of  the  age  means  by  the  Supreme  Being  what  Catholics  mean. 
Nay,  it  would  be  a  relief  to  my  mind  to  gain  some  ground  of  assurance,  that 
the  parties  influenced  by  that  spirit  had,  I  will  not  say,  a  true  apprehension 
of  God,  but  even  so  much  as  the  idea  of  what  a  true  apprehension  is. 

'  Nothing  is  easier  than  to  use  the  word  and  mean  nothing  by  it.  The 
heathens  used  to  say,  "God  wills,"  when  they  meant  "Fate  ;"  "God  pro- 
vides," when  they  meant  "  Chance ; "  "  God  acts,"  when  they  meant 
"  Instinct  "  or  "  Sense  "  ;  and  "  God  is  everywhere,"  when  they  meant  "  the 
Soul  of  Nature."  The  Almighty  is  something  infinitely  different  from  a 
principle,  or  a  centre  of  action,  or  a  quality,  or  a  generalization  of  pheno- 


334  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

course,  as  though  a  sharp  and  definite  line  could  be 
drawn, —  between  those  who  are  'formally'  Protestants 
and  those  who  are  but  accidentally  so, — on  this  spirit 
(as  it  may  be  called)  of  practical  atheism.  Here,  as 
in  all  other  cases  of  the  same  kind,  one  doctrine  melts 
into  the  other  through  numberless  intermediate  grada- 
tions. There  is  the  class  of  Protestants  (be  they  many 
or  few)  who  are  not  c  formally '  Protestants  at  all ;  who 
realize  God's  Personal  Existence,  as  firmly  as  ordinary 
Catholics  realize  it ;  and  who  are  truly  on  their  way  to 
Catholicism,  if  it  were  but  adequately  exhibited  before 
their  sight.  There  is  on  the  other  hand  that  nume- 
rous body  of  extreme  Protestants,  whose  practical  doc- 
trine has  been  described  above.  Lastly,  there  is  a 
large  number  of  intermediate  persons,  who  are  in  a 
greater  or  a  less  degree  of  agreement  with  the  former 
or  with  the  latter. 

This  also  must  be  observed.  I  am  not  here  en- 
gaged in  vindicating  the  deep  harmony  which  exists, 
between  the  most  undoubted  facts  of  our  nature  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  monastic  institute  on  the  other  hand ; 
though  I  hope  indeed,  that  the  proposition  which  we 
are  here  defending,  will  be  found  a  most  important  pre- 
miss for  that  further  conclusion.  To  vindicate  that 
harmony,  is  to  shew  that  certain  souls  possess  such 
keen  power  of  apprehending  the  Invisible,  that  God 
and  other  heavenly  Objects  suffice  of  themselves  to 
satisfy  their  highest  Propensions.  This  is  not  our  pre- 
sent thesis.  In  the  earlier  part  of  our  remarks  on  the 
Propensions,  we  maintained,  that  to  all  those  who  choose 
to  feed  their  thoughts  on  the  great  Truths  of  Faith,  the 
constitution  of  their  nature  gives  two  singular  ad- 
vantages. First,  God  is  an  Object  which  is  suited  to 

mena.  If,  then,  by  the  Word  you  do  but  mean  a  being  who  has  contrived 
the  world  and  keeps  it  in  order  ;  who  acts  in  it,  but  only  in  the  way  of 
general  Providence  ;  who  acts  towards  us,  but  only  through  what  are  called 
laws  of  Nature  ;  who  is  more  certain  not  to  act  at  all,  than  to  act  indepen- 
dently of  those  laws  ;  who  is  known  and  approached  indeed,  but  only  through 
the  medium  of  those  laws  ;  such  a  God  it  is  not  difficult  for  any  one  to  con- 
ceive, not  difficult  for  any  one  to  endure.' — Newman's  Discourses  on  Uni- 
versity Education,  p.  594. 

Father  Faber,  in  various  parts  of  his  work  on  '  The  Creator  and  the 
Creature,'  most  powerfully  enforces  the  same  great  truth. 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.      335 

the  satisfaction  of  their  highest  Propensions,  in  pre- 
cisely the  same  sense  in  which  any  earthly  object  can 
furnish  such  satisfaction;  and  secondly,  the  thought 
of  Him  gives  a  far  deeper,  more  solid,  more  permanent 
gratification  to  these  Propensions,  than  any  earthly 
object  has  to  offer.  To  this  whole  course  of  reason- 
ing various  Protestants  reply,  that  the  very  allegation 
of  God  being  a  real  rest  to  the  affections  is  simply 
sophistical ;  is  founded  on  a  mere  equivocation.  Our 
digression  then  has  been  occupied,  in  dealing  with  that 
Protestant  reply. 

Let  us  now  then  consider,  what  are  those  various 
arguments,  which  may  be  adduced  in  this  controversy. 
How  far  indeed  arguments  are  likely  in  ordinary  cases 
to  be  of  avail , — against  a  principle,  so  widely  and  deeply 
pervading  the  Protestant  mind,  so  unsuspiciously  im- 
bibed and  taken  for  granted  as  self-evident, — this  we 
are  not  here  to  consider:  it  would  require  a  separate 
treatise  of  itself.  But  such  arguments  as  the  following, 
are  in  themselves  surely  very  cogent  and  irrefragable ; 
however  little  our  opponents  may  choose  to  give  them 
a  candid  and  dispassionate  consideration. 

(1.)  One  answer  to  our  opponents  is  contained  in 
all  the  preceding  discussion.  Their  whole  statement 
implies  the  denial  of  a  Personal  God:  once  admit  a 
Personal  Creator,  external  to  ourselves,  it  is  simply 
ludicrous,  to  assume  as  self-evident,  that  the  thought  of 
Him  may  not  be  found  a  most  real  and  keen  gratifica- 
tion to  our  highest  propensions.  Strange  however  as 
it  must  appear,  they  do  assume  this  position  as  self- 
evident  ;  and  thus  imply  a  denial  of  God's  Personal 
Existence.  Yet  so  far  are  they  from  professing  any 
such  denial,  they  are  most  indignant  at  being  even 
suspected  of  it.  Since  therefore  their  reasoning  un- 
doubtedly implies  a  certain  proposition; — and  since 
they  indignantly  deny  that  they  hold  any  such  pro- 
position ;  — their  whole  intellectual  position  is  simply 
self- contradictory. 

(2.)  A  second  answer  to  them  may  be  given,  even 
more  direct  -and  fundamental  than  the  former.  They 


336  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

say,  that  the  thought  of  God  cannot  thus  satisfy  the 
human  affections  ;  we  Catholics  know,  as  a  matter  of 
certain  fact,  that  in  numberless  cases  it  has  and  does  so 
satisfy  them.  There  is  no  fact  on  earth  more  certain, 
than  that  great  numbers  of  monks  and  nuns  have,  in 
every  age,  been  able,  with  joy  and  delight,  to  renounce 
all  human  and  earthly  attachments  altogether,  and 
satisfy  every  longing  of  their  souls  by  communion  with 
the  Invisible  World. 

"  What  are  the  humble  monk,  and  the  holy  nun,  and  other 
regulars,  as  they  are  called,"  asks  Father  Newman, "  but  Christians 
after  the  very  patterns  given  us  in  Scripture?  What  have  they 
done  but  this, —  continue  in  the  world  the  Christianity  of  the 
Bible  ?  Did  our  Saviour  come  on  earth  suddenly,  as  He  will 
one  day  visit,  in  whom  would  He  see  the  features  of  the  Chris- 
tians He  and  His  Apostles  left  behind  them,  but  in  them  ?  Who 
but  these  give  up  home  and  friends,  wealth  and  ease,  good  name 
and  liberty  of  will,  for  the  kingdom  of  heaven  ?  Where  shall  we 
find  the  image  of  St.  Paul,  or  St.  Peter,  or  St.  John,  or  of  Mary 
the  mother  of  Mark,  or  of  Philip's  daughters,  but  in  those  who, 
whether  they  remain  in  seclusion,  or  are  sent  over  the  earth,  have 
calm  faces,  and  sweet  plaintive  voices,  and  spare  frames,  and 
gentle  manners,  and  hearts  weaned  from  the  world,  and  wills 
subdued ;  and  for  their  meekness  meet  with  insult,  and  for  their 
purity  with  slander,  and  for  their  gravity  with  suspicion,  and  for 
their  courage  with  cruelty;  yet  meet  with  Christ  everywhere, — 
Christ  their  all-sufficient,  everlasting  portion,  to  make  up  to  them, 
both  here  and  hereafter,  all  they  suffer,  all  they  dare,  for  His 
Name's  sake?"* 

And  as  so  many  monks  and  nuns  have  ever  found 
God  4  their  all-sufficient  portion,5  so  many  ordinary  Ca- 
tholics also  have  ever  felt  towards  Him  a  real  personal 
affection.  In  the  following  passage,  Father  Newman 
expresses,  what  had  been  to  me  a  most  striking  fact  of 
observation,  from  the  time  when  I  became  acquainted 
with  Catholic  books  of  devotion ;  and  of  course  there- 
fore, long  before  I  read  the  passage  in  question.  He 
expresses  this  fact,  I  need  hardly  add,  with  incom- 
parably greater  clearness  and  force  than  I  could  hope 
to  reach  ;  and  his  words  therefore  will  be  far  more 
suitable  than  any  of  my  own. 

*  Sermons  on  Subjects  of  the  Day,  p.  328. 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       337 

"  And  what  the  Church  urges  on  us  down  to  this  day,  Saints 
and  holy  men,  down  to  this  day,  have  exemplified.  Is  it  neces- 
sary to  refer  to  the  lives  of  the  Holy  Virgins,  who  were  and  are 
His  very  spouses,  wedded  to  Him  by  a  mystical  marriage,  and  in 
many  instances  visited  here  by  the  earnests  of  that  ineffable 
celestial  benediction,  which  is  in  heaven  their  everlasting  portion  ? 
The  martyrs,  the  confessors  of  the  Church,  bishops,  evangelists, 
doctors,  preachers,  monks,  hermits,  ascetical  teachers, — have  they 
not,  one  and  all,  as  their  histories  shew,  lived  on  the  very  name 
of  Jesus,  as  food,  as  medicine,  as  fragrance,  as  light,  as  life  from 
the  dead? — as  one  of  them  says,  cin  aure  dulce  canticum;  in  ore 
mel  mirificum  ;  in  corde  nectar  coelicum.' 

"  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  be  a  Saint  thus  to  feel :  this  intimate, 
immediate  dependence  on  Emmanuel,  God  with  us,  has  been  in 
all  ages  the  characteristic,  almost  the  definition,  of  a  Christian. 
It  is  the  ordinary  feeling  of  Catholic  populations :  it  is  the  ele- 
mentary feeling  of  every  one  who  has  but  a  common  hope  of 
heaven.  I  recollect,  years  ago,  hearing  an  acquaintance,  not  a 
Catholic,  speak  of  a  work  of  devotion,  written  as  Catholics 
usually  write,  with  wonder  and  perplexity  ;  because  (he  said)  the 
author  wrote  as  if  he  had  ( a  sort  of  personal  attachment  to  our 
Lord;  it  was  as  if  he  had  seen  Him,  known  Him,  lived  with 
Him,  instead  of  merely  professing  and  believing  the  great  doc- 
trine of  the  Atonement/  It  is  this  same  phenomenon,  which 
strikes  those  who  are  not  Catholics,  when  they  enter  our  Churches. 
They  themselves  are  accustomed  to  do  religious  acts  simply  as  a 
duty ;  they  are  serious  at  prayer-time,  and  behave  with  decency, 
because  it  is  a  duty.  But  you  know,  my  brethren,  mere  duty,  a 
sense  of  propriety  and  good  behaviour,  these  are  not  the  ruling 
principles  present  in  the  minds  of  our  worshippers.  Wherefore, 
on  the  contrary,  those  spontaneous  postures  of  devotion?  why 
those  unstudied  gestures?  why  those  abstracted  countenances? 
why  that  heedlessness  of  the  presence  of  others  ?  why  that  absence 
of  the  shamefacedness  which  is  so  sovereign  among  professors  of 
other  creeds  ?  The  spectator  sees  the  effect ;  he  cannot  under- 
stand the  cause  of  it.  Why  is  this  simple  earnestness  of  worship  ? 
we  have  no  difficulty  in  answering.  It  is  because  the  Incarnate 
Saviour  is  present  in  the  tabernacle ;  and  then,  when  suddenly 
the  hitherto  silent  church  is,  as  it  were,  illuminated  with  the  full 
piercing  burst  of  voices  from  the  whole  congregation,  it  is  because 
He  now  has  gone  up  upon  His  throne  over  the  altar,  there  to  be 
adored.  It  is  the  visible  sign  of  the  Son  of  Man  which  thrills  through 
the  congregation,  and  makes  them  overflow  with  jubilation."  * 

Here  again,  I  am  not  considering  how  we  can  best 

*  Occasional  Sermons,  pp.  47-49. 


338  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

convince  Protestants  of  this  fact,  which  is  so  familiarly 
known  to  us  Catholics  ;  that  is  another  matter :  I  am 
but  saying,  that  this  fact  is  in  itself  a  most  absolute 
answer  to  their  argument.  When  we  speak  of  personal 
affection  for  God, — personal  in  the  very  same  sense  in 
which  our  affection  for  each  other  is  personal, —  they 
reply,  not  that  such  affection  is  undesirable,  but  that  it 
is  impossible.  If  you  allege  that  a  thing  is  impossible, 
in  no  other  way  can  you  be  so  irrefragably  answered, 
as  by  my  shewing  you  that  it  exists. 

(3.)  The  next  argument  may  be  drawn,  from  the 
New  Testament  Scriptures  ;  which  Protestants  or- 
dinarily hold  to  be  inspired  by  God.*  How  very 
much,  on  the  surface  at  least,  these  inspired  writings 
appear  to  favour  our  side  of  the  question,  is  plain  from 
the  comments  made  on  them  by  infidel  writers.  It  has 
been  urged  again  and  again  by  the  opponents  of  Chris- 
tianity, that  the  New  Testament  overlooks  such  virtues 
as  friendship  and  patriotism,  in  its  earnest  inculcation 
(1)  of  personal  love  for  God  and  (2)  of  general  love  for  all 
mankind.  This  has  been  urged,  I  say,  again  and  again : 
many  Protestant  controversialists  have  considered  the 
objection;  but  I  never  heard  of  one  who  attempted  to 
deny,  that  at  least  far  greater  stress  is  laid  in  the  New 
Testament  on  love  for  God,  than  on  any  love  for  our 
earthly  friends. 

In  attempting  any  citation  of  individual  passages, 
the  real  difficulty  is,  lest,  in  contemplating  individual 
passages,  we  omit  to  consider  the  general  spirit.  No 
one,  I  am  quite  certain,  can  read  the  New  Testament 
with  any  approach  to  fairness,  and  fail  to  see,  how 
simply  it  takes  for  granted  throughout  the  very  pro- 
position for  which  we  are  contending;  the  proposition, 
that  God  is  a  real  Object  for  our  affections,  in  the  very 
same  sense  in  which  we  are  objects  of  each  other's 
affections.  The  following  passages  then  must  be  taken 
merely  as  samples  of  an  indefinite  number. 

Thus,  that  God's  love  to  us  is  no  mere  figurative 

*  Iii  this  and  various  other  parts  of  the  present  book,  for  convenience' 
sake,  the  limits  of  strict  philosophy  have  been  exceeded. 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       339 

expression,  but  is  entirely  analogous  to  an  earthly 
father's  love  of  his  children,  is  stated  expressly  in 
Luke,  xi.  11-13.  *  If  our  earthly  father,'  argues  our 
Blessed  Saviour,  *  will  give  to  his  children  good  gifts 
and  not  bad,  how  much  more  will  our  Heavenly  Father 
so  act ! '  The  argument,  from  our  earthly  father's  love 
to  God's  Love,  implies  of  necessity  what  I  just  stated ; 
otherwise  it  is  simply  unmeaning.  So,  in  the  Parable 
of  the  Prodigal  Son,  God  is  represented  under  the 
figure  of  an  earthly  father,  who,  on  his  son's  return,  is 
moved  with  compassion,  and  falls  on  his  neck,  and 
kisses  him.  (Luke,  xv.  20.)  In  another  place,  His  joy 
over  the  return  of  a  repentant  sinner  is  imaged  by  the 
shepherd's  delight  in  recovering  his  lost  sheep.*  Then 
consider  John,  xvi.  26,  27,  '  Non  dico  vobis  quia  Ego 
rogabo  Patrem  de  vobis :  Ipse  enim  Pater  amat  vos, 
quia  vos  Me  amastis.'  Here  we  see  first,  that  God 
loves  them,  in  that  very  sense  in  which  they  love  our 
Blessed  Saviour.  But  no  one  ever  doubted  (as  I  shall 
presently  urge  at  greater  length)  that  those  disciples, 
who  actually  lived  with  our  Lord  in  the  flesh,  loved 
Him  in  the  same  sense  in  which  they  loved  each  other. 
It  is  in  this  sense  therefore  that  God  loves  them.  And 
we  see,  secondly,  in  this  passage,  that  our  Blessed  Lord 
takes  for  granted,  that  the  same  results  follow  from 
God's  Love,  which  would  follow  from  that  of  an  earthly 
friend ;  and  that  He  will  therefore  readily  hear  their 
prayers.  The  love  of  God  for  man  therefore,  if  the 
New  Testament  can  be  trusted,  is  altogether  analogous 
to  the  love  of  an  earthly  father  for  his  children. 

Next,  that  our  Blessed  Saviour,  in  His  human 
nature,  loves  His  disciples  with  a  human  affection 
(though  this,  at  all  events,  no  one  can  have  ever 
doubted),  is  plainly  stated  in  innumerable  instances; 
of  which  the  few  following  may  be  taken  as  samples. 

*  Matt,  xviii.  12-14.  "Quid  vobis  videtur?  si  fuerint  alicui  centum 
eves,  et  erraverit  una  ex  eis,  nonne  relinquit  nonaginta  novem  in  monti- 
bus,  et  vadit  quserere  earn  quse  erravit '?  Et  si  contigerit  ut  inveniat 
earn,  amen  dico  vobis,  quia  gaudet  super  earn  magis  quam  super  nona- 
ginta  novem  quse  non  erraverunt.  Sic  nan  est  voluntas  atite  Patrem 
vestrum  Qid  in  ccdis  est,  ut  percat  unus  de  pusillis  istis." 


340  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

u  Et  extendens  inanum  in  discipulos  suos,  dixit:  Ecce 
mater  Mea  et  fratres  Mel.  Quicumque  enim  fecerit 
voluntatem  Patris  Mei  Qui  in  coelis  est,  ipse  Meus 
frater,  et  soror,  et  mater  est"  (Matt.  xii.  49,  50.) 
"  Quam  cum  vidisset  Dominus,  misericordid  motus  super 
earn,  dixit  illi:  Noli  flere."  (Luke,  vii.  13.)  "  Majorem 
liac  dilectionem  nemo  liabet,  ut  animam  suam  ponat 
quis  pro  amicis  suis."  (John,  xv.  13.)  "Ante  diem 
festum  paschse,  sciens  Jesus  quia  venit  hora  ejus  ut 
transeat  ex  hoc  niundo  ad  Patrem,  cum  dilexisset 
Suos  qui  erant  in  niundo,  in  finem  dilexit  eos."  (John, 
xiii.  1.) 

And  now  for  the  chief  point  of  all ;  viz.  that  Christ- 
ians are  to  love  their  God  and  their  Saviour,  in  the 
very  sense  in  which  they  love  each  other;  in  the  same 
sense,  but  of  course  in  a  higher  degree,  and  with  more 
unreserved  adherence  of  affection. 

Thus,  "  Qui  aniat  patrem  aut  matrem  plusquam 
Me,  non  est  Me  dignus ;  et  qui  amat  filium  aut  filiam 
super  Me,  non  est  Me  dignus."  (Matt.  x.  37.)  Here 
is  the  very  comparison,  between  love  of  Christ  on  the 
one  hand,  and  love  of  father,  mother,  son,  daughter, 
on  the  other  hand.  Unless  the  word  'love'  is  used  in 
the  same  sense  as  applied  to  the  contrasted  objects,  our 
Lord's  sacred  words  become  a  simple  absurdity;  paral- 
lel to  that  which  is  involved  in  the  question,  c  which  of 
the  two  is  longer,  an  hour  or  a  mile?'  You  cannot 
compare  the  length  of  an  hour  with  that  of  a  mile, 
because  the  word  *  length '  is  used  in  two  totally  dif- 
ferent senses;  and  no  less  utterly  absurd  would  it  be 
to  compare  love  of  Christ  with  love  of  father  and 
mother,  if  the  word  'love'  were  used  in  two  different 
senses. 

Again,  consider  the  well-known  summary  of  the 
Law.  "  Ait  illi  Jesus :  Diliges  Dominum  Deum  tuum 
ex  toto  corde  tuo,  et  in  tota  anima  tua,  et  in  tota 
mente.  tua.  Hoc  est  maximum  et  primum  mandatum. 
Secundum  autem  simile  est  huic :  Diliges  proximum 
tuum,  sicut  teipsum.  In  his  duobus  mandatis  uni- 
versa  Lex  pendet  et  prophetse."  (Matt.  xxii.  37-40.) 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       341 

Here  the  same  word  is  used  for  love  of  God  and  love 
of  our  neighbour. 

Still  more  to  our  general  purpose  is  the  following. 
"  Et  coepit  ei  Petrus  dicere  :  Ecce  nos  dimisimus  omnia, 
et  secuti  sumus  Te.  Respondens  Jesus,  ait :  Amen  dico 
vobis :  Nemo  est,  qui  reliquerit  domum,  aut  fratres,  aut 
sorores,  aut  patrem,  aut  matreni,  aut  filios,  aut  agros, 
propter  Me  et  propter  Evangelium — qui  non  accipiat 
centies  tantum,  nunc  in  tempore  hoc,  domos,  et  fratres, 
et  sorores,  et  matres,  et  Jilios,  et  agros,  cum  persecu- 
tionibus,  et  in  sseculo  futuro  vitam  aeternam."  (Mark, 
x.  28-30.)  No  one  maintains,  that  all  who  give  up 
earthly  goods  and  relations  for  God's  sake,  literally 
receive  them  back  again;  that  he,  for  instance,  who, 
for  God's  sake,  leaves  father  and  mother,  obtains  lite- 
rally two  new  human  objects  for  his  filial  affections. 
What  then  can  be  meant,  except  that  very  proposition 
for  which  we  have  been  arguing?  viz.  that  those  very 
affections,  which  we  tear,  for  God's  sake,  from  their 
immediate  earthly  gratifications,  receive  satisfaction  '  a 
hundred  times'  greater,  in  those  higher  Objects  which 
our  faith  will  bring  within  our  reach. 

Then  what  can  St.  Paul  mean  in  such  passages  as 
the  following,  except  that  his  love  for  Christ  was 
similar  to  our  love  for  a  human  object?  similar,  though 
of  course  immeasurably  higher  and  more  pervasive. 
"  Mihi  vivere  Christus  est,  et  mori  lucrum."  (Philip,  i. 
21.)  "  Desiderium  habens  dissolvi  etesse  cum  Christo" 
(Ibid.  i.  23.)  "  Quis  ergo  nos  separabit  a  charitate 
Christi  ?  tribulatio  ?  an  angustia  ?  an  fames  ?  an  nu- 
ditas  ?  an  periculum  ?  an  persecutio  ?  an  gladius  ?  .  .  . 
Sed  in  his  omnibus  superamus  propter  Eum  Qui  di- 
lexit  nos.  Certus  sum  enim,  quia  neque  rnors,  neque 
vita,  neque  angeli,  neque  principatus,  neque  virtutes, 
neque  instantia,  neque  futura,  neque  fortitude,  neque 
altitudo,  neque  profundum,  neque  creatura  alia,  poterit 
nos  separare  a  charitate  Dei,  quse  est  in  Christo  Jesu 
Domino  nostro."  (Rom.  viii.  35,  37-39.)  And  St. 
Peter,  "  Si  tanien  gustdstis  quoniam  dulcis  est  Dominus." 
(I  Pet.  ii.  3.) 


342  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

St.  Peter's  own  Supremacy  indeed  had  been  based 
on  his  exceeding  the  other  Apostles  in  love  of  Jesus. 
"  Cum  ergo  prandissent,  dicit  Simoni  Petro  Jesus  : 
Simon  Joannis,  diligis  Me  plus  his?  Dicit  ei:  Etiarn, 
Domine,  Tu  scis  quia  amo  Te.  Dicit  ei :  Pasce  agnos 
Meos.  Dicit  ei  iteruin:  Simon  Joannis,  diligis  me? 
Ait  illi:  Etiam,  Domine,  tu  scis  quia  amo  Te.  Dicit 
ei :  Pasce  agnos  meos.  Dicit  ei  tertio :  Simon  Joannis, 
amas  me?  Contristatus  est  Petrus,  quia  dixit  ei  tertio, 
Arnas  me?  et  dixit  ei:  Don  due,  Tu  omnia  n6sti:  Tu 
scis  quia  amo  Te.  Dixit  ei :  Pasce  oves  rneas."  (John, 
xxi.  15-17.)  And  St.  Paul  dwells  on  that  very  con- 
nection between  love  of  Christ  and  love  of  each  other, 
on  which  his  Master  laid  such  repeated  stress.  "  Et 
ambulate  in  dilectione,  sicut  et  Christus  dilexit  nos, 
et  tradidit  semetipsum  pro  nobis  oblationem  et  hostiam 
Deo  in  odorem  suavitatis."  (Eph.  v.  2.) 

Again,  earthly  love,  in  proportion  as  it  is  more 
deeply  rooted  in  the  whole  feelings  and  affections, 
does  not  content  itself  with  emotion,  but  issues  in  a 
careful  compliance  with  every  wish  of  the  beloved  per- 
son. In  this  respect  also  love  of  God  and  of  Christ  is 
to  resemble  it ;  for  it  is  to  shew  itself  in  punctual  per- 
formance of  the  Divine  Commandments.  "  Qui  habet 
mandata  Mea,  et  servat  ea,  ille  est  qui  diligit  Me. 
Qui  autem  diligit  Me,  diligetur  a  Patre  Meo :  et  Ego 

diligam  eum,  et  manifestabo  ei  Meipsum Ee- 

spondit  Jesus  et  dixit  ei :  Si  quis  diligit  Me,  sermonem 
Meum  servabit,  et  Pater  meus  diliget  eum,  et  ad  eum 
veniemus,  et  mansionem  apud  eum  faciemus.  Qui  non 
diligit  Me,  sermones  Meos  non  servat.  Et  sermonem 
quern  audistis,  non  est  Meus:  sed  Ejus  qui  misit  Me, 
Patris."  (John,  xiv.  21,  23,  24.)  "  Sicut  dilexit  Me 
Pater,  et  ego  dilexi  vos.  Manete  in  dilectione  Med. 
Si  prcecepta  mea  servaveritis,  manebitis  in  dilectione 
Med,  sicut  et  ego  Patris  mei  praecepta  servavi,  et 
inaneo  in  Ejus  dilectione."  (John,  xv.  9,  10.) 

(4.)  So  much  on  the  inferences  deducible,  from  the 
plain  statements  of  Scripture.  We  may  derive  a  further 
argument  from  the  fact  itself  of  the  Incarnation  ;  an 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       343 

argument  which  will  be  cogent,  not  indeed  against  all 
our  opponents,  but  at  least  against  those  Protestants, 
who  consider  themselves  to  believe  that  great  and  most 
august  Mystery. 

No  one,  I  suppose,  who  believes  in  any  sense  the 
New  Testament  facts,  ever  doubted  that  St.  John,  e.  g. 
"  who  lay  on  Jesus's  breast "  had  a  real  personal  love 
for  Him  ;  or  St.  Peter,  who  wept  bitterly  when  He 
turned  to  look  on  him  ;  or  St.  Mary  Magdalen,  when 
she  was  unable  to  apprehend  any  other  thought,  except 
the  one  pervasive  and  absorbing  impression,  "  They  have 
taken  away  my  Lord,  and  I  know  not  where  they  have 
laid  Him."  Now  no  one  will  dream  of  maintaining, 
that  Personal  Love,  once  formed,  is  lost,  merely  because 
its  object  departs  from  this  visible  scene;  and  it  follows 
therefore,  that  all  those  pious  men,  who  mixed  familiarly 
with  our  Lord  during  His  earthly  ministry,  retained  for 
Him  a  life-long  Personal  Love.  But  those  who  believe 
the  Incarnation,  hold  necessarily  that  Personal  Love  for 
Jesus,  is  Personal  Love  for  the  Incarnate  God  ;  in  their 
judgment  therefore,  all  these  favoured  disciples  had  a 
life-long  Personal  Love  for  the  Incarnate  God. 

Now  I  ask,  can  there  be  an  hypothesis  more  abso- 
lutely incredible,  than  that  this  was  purely  an  exceptional 
case  ?  that  those  indeed  who  lived  with  our  Lord  in  the 
flesh  retained  for  Him  a  Personal  Love,  but  that  no 
other  Christians  could  ever  have  the  power  of  sharing 
their  blessedness  ?  that  the  humblest  of  the  seventy 
could  enjoy  this  high  privilege,  but  that  St.  Paul  had 
not  even  the  physical  possibility  of  arriving  at  it  ?  yet 
this  must  be  maintained  by  those  who  say,  that  a  real 
Personal  Love  for  Him  is  now  impossible. 

Further,  there  is  a  fact,  perhaps  the  most  remark- 
able fact  in  all  the  world,  which  throws  a  flood  of  light 
on  this  whole  matter.  There  are  preserved  to  us 
authentic  records  of  our  Blessed  Saviour's  life.  We  are 
able,  by  a  truly  amazing  disposition  of  God's  Provi- 
dence, to  study  one  by  one  the  very  acts  and  words  of 
Almighty  God  ;  to  trace  Him  through  each  various 
event  of  His  earthly  ministry  ;  and  to  share,  with  those 


344  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

who  were  actually  present,  its  salutary  effect.  Surely 
it  is  most  incredible  that  so  marvellous  a  Providence 
shall  have  been  put  forth,  except  for  some  most  im- 
portant end.  We  know  of  course  that  the  end,  for 
which  God  the  Son  became  Incarnate  and  died,  was 
the  salvation  of  us  men  ;  but  I  am  now  inquiring  into 
the  end  of  this  further  fact,  that  His  words  and  deeds 
in  the  flesh  have  been  so  extensively  recorded,  and  are 
authenticated  by  inspiration  itself.  And  I  say  that  this 
fact  is  eminently  suited  for  the  vitally  important  purpose, 
of  engendering  in  us  that  personal  knowledge  of  our 
dearest  Lord,  on  which  personal  affection  can  be  reared. 

See  then  whither  we  are  led.  It  is  most  incredible 
that  Personal  Love  for  our  Lord  should  be  the  peculiar 
privilege  of  one  solitary  Christian  generation ;  and 
this  inspired  record  of  His  life  is  eminently  suited  to 
give  every  successive  generation  of  believers  the  fullest 
means  of  attaining  that  Love.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
most  incredible  that  this  inspired  record  can  have  been 
put  forth,  except  for  some  most  important  purpose  ; 
and  yet  no  other  purpose  can  be  even  suggested,  except 
the  very  one  which  we  are  considering.  Here  then  is 
a  two-fold  ground  for  our  conclusion,  that  it  is  our 
great  duty  and  blessedness  so  to  meditate  on  His  life 
and  actions,  as  to  rise  into  His  love. 

And  now  we  are  able  to  answer  an  objection,  which 
Protestants  might  have  made  with  some  superficial 
plausibility,  to  our  original  reasoning.  '  True,'  they 
might  have  said,  c  many  of  our  Propensions  may  be 
'  abundantly  satisfied  by  invisible  objects  :  our  Love  of 
'  Approbation  may  be  so  satisfied ;  or  our  Compassion ; 
4  or  our  General  Love  of  mankind.  But  Personal  Love  is 
'  essentially  different ;  Personal  Love  requires  personal 
'  knowledge.' 

To  this  our  reply  is  now  obvious.  First  indeed  I  will 
observe,  that  this  reasoning  only  professes  to  meet  one 
out  of  \hefour  arguments  adduced  for  our  proposition. 
But  secondly,  even  in  regard  to  that  one,  the  reply  is 
inefficacious.  No  doubt,  in  human  friendships,  personal 
knowledge  supplies  the  firmest  and  surest  basis  for 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       345 

tenderness  of  personal  affection  :  yet  even  in  them  it  is 
far  from  indispensable.  That  I  may  take  instances 
which  Protestants  will  admit,  consider  such  a  personal 
knowledge  as  we  obtain  e.  g.  of  Johnson  from  BoswelFs 
life,  or  of  Dr.  Arnold  from  Mr.  Stanley's.  What 
student  is  there  of  these  biographies,  who  is  not  con- 
scious of  personal  regard,  and  that  indeed  in  no  incon- 
siderable degree,  towards  the  remarkable  men  there 
commemorated  ?  But  supposing  we  had  reason  to  know 
that  Johnson  and  Arnold  appreciate  us  as  we  appreciate 
them ;  — that  they  know  our  various  thoughts,  and  sym- 
pathize in  our  various  troubles;  —  what  then  would  be 
wanting  to  a  very  complete  personal  friendship  ?  The 
application  is  apparent.  And  I  may  refer  in  this  connec- 
tion to  the  comparison  drawn  out  at  length  in  n.  135, 
(p.  268-271)  between  Personal  Love  to  our  blessed  Sa- 
viour and  Personal  Love  to  any  human  object  whatever. 
You  will  object,  that  at  least,  in  order  to  cultivate 
such  Personal  Love,  we  must  give  great  and  constant 
effort  to  the  task  of  realizing  the  invisible  world. 
4  Since  we  cannot  actually  see,  and  hold  palpable  con- 
*  verse  with,  our  Blessed  Lord,  it  will  be  the  more 
6  requisite  to  supply  the  deficiency,  by  specially  fixing 
4  our  thoughts  on  His  various  works  and  actions  ;  the 
4  study  of  which  brings  home  to  our  feelings  and 
4  imagination  His  personal  character/  The  whole 
practice  of  the  Catholic  Church  is  in  full  accordance 
with  this  statement.  Meditation  is  recognized,  as  a 
most  important  integral  part  of  the  Christian  life  ;  and 
the  great  majority  of  meditation-books  occupy  far  the 

freater  part  of  the  year,  in  a  study  of  the  various 
[ysteries  relating  to  our  Lord.  The  truth  alleged  is 
indeed  most  undoubted.  Let  any  one  consider  the 
terrible  hold  which  the  world  has  on  our  affections,  ( 1 ) 
from  the  very  fact  that  it  is  so  importunately  visible, 
and  (2)  from  the  tendency  of  our  corrupt  nature 
towards  all  those  things  which  are  antagonistic  to 
God, — and  what  will  be  his  certain  inference?  this, 
that  unless  we  direct  special  and  sustained  efforts  to 
this  very  purpose, — the  purpose  of  realizing  the  invisible, 


346  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

of  making  ourselves  practically  and  influentially  con- 
versant with  the  things  of  faith,  — the  things  of  sight, 
this  dazzling  and  delusive  world,  will  infallibly  draw 
us  into  its  vortex. 

Of  all  our  higher  Propensions,  this  of  Personal  Love 
is  the  only  one,  in  regard  to  which  any  objection,  ever 
so  superficially  plausible,  could  be  alleged  against  our 
statement,  that  they  may  find  their  highest  and  most 
adequate  gratification  in  the  great  Objects  of  faith. 
Any  such  objection  has  now  (I  trust)  been  entirely 
overthrown  ;  but  what  is  most  remarkable  is,  that  it  is 
precisely  this  very  Propeusioii  of  Personal  Love,  in 
regard  to  which  Scripture  speaks  with  such  singular 
frequency  and  emphasis. 

It  may  be  said,  that  there  is  one  class  of  Protestants 
at  least,  to  whom  we  cannot  with  any  truth  ascribe 
such  opinions  as  those  which  we  have  been  combating ; 
the  c  Evangelicals/  c  These  religionists,'  it  will  be  urged, 
4  preach,  as  their  very  characteristic  doctrine,  the  abso- 
6  lute  necessity  of  personal  trust  in  our  Saviour.' 

Now  I  will  most  willingly  make  the  same  distinction 
in  their  case,  as  in  that  of  other  Protestants  :  among 
them,  perhaps  even  more  than  among  others,  there  are 
various  men,  who  are  not  '  formally '  Protestants ;  whose 
interior  life  is  such,  that  if  Catholicism  were  really  and 
purely  presented  to  their  notice,  they  would  be  at  once 
efficaciously  moved  by  grace  to  embrace  it.  I  am 
most  eager  to  think,  that  among  those  who  have  in 
various  times  professed  'Evangelical'  opinions,  there 
are  very  many,  who  have  had  a  most  real  love  for  their 
Redeemer.  But  speaking  of  *  Evangelicals '  as  a  class, 
it  is  most  remarkable,  notwithstanding  all  their  pro- 
fessions, how  little  they  display  of  Personal  Love  for 
our  Lord.  Their  favourite  scriptural  study,  e.  g.  is 
not  the  Gospel  narrative,  which  speaks  throughout 
simply  of  our  Lord;  but  rather  the  Epistles,  which 
speak  of  faith  and  love  towards  Him,  far  more  pro- 
minently than  of  Himself.  And  so,  generally,  it  is  not 
when  our  Lord  is  mentioned,  but  when  faith  is  men- 
tioned, that  your  true  '  Evangelical '  feels  his  interest 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUE  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       347 

awakened,  his  affections  inflamed,  his  attention  keen 
and  eager.  If  I  am  a  Catholic,  my  love  for  my  Saviour 
leads  me  to  follow  Him  e.  g.  step  by  step,  through  all 
the  various  stages  of  His  bitter  Passion ;  and  accom- 
pany each  step  by  its  appropriate  affections.  Catholic 
books  of  devotion  on  this  plan  are  simply  innumerable ; 
what  single  one  is  there  of  the  kind,  which  has  issued 
from  the  '  Evangelical '  quarter  ?  Protestants  of  a 
1  high  church '  complexion  have  occasionally  thus 
written  ;  witness  e.  g.  Jeremy  Taylor :  but  what 
4  Evangelical '  has  so  done  ? 

149.  The  same  doctrine  which  we  have  been  treat- 
ing in  the  last  two  numbers,  may  be  put  forth  in  a 
slightly  different  shape  as  follows. 

All  spiritual  writers  are  of  course  unanimous  in 
telling  us,  that  our  one  way  to  perfection  is  the  mor- 
tifying our  evil  and  corrupt  affections.  In  proportion 
as  we  do  so,  they  tell  us,  heavenly  and  spiritual  affec- 
tions grow  up  within  us ;  we  become  changed  beings  ; 
our  joys  and  sorrows,  our  hopes  and  fears,  all  are  essen- 
tially different  from  what  they  were ;  we  live  in  a  new 
world  ;  no  phrase  in  fact  can  so  well  express  the  change 
wrought  within  us,  as  St.  Paul's  significant  and  em- 
phatic statement,  that  we  become  '  a  new  creation.'  No 
doctrine  of  course  can  be  more  true,  or  more  funda- 
mental, than  this.  And  yet  not  unfrequently  it  is 
understood,  in  a  sense  totally  different  from  that  which 
these  writers  ever  imagined,  and  directly  at  variance 
with  the  most  certain  psychological  facts.  Such  lan- 
guage is  not  unfrequently  understood,  as  though  there 
were  certain  evil  passions  in  our  nature,  which  it  is  our 
simple  business  to  extirpate ;  and  as  though,  in  proportion 
as  we  do  so,  certain  totally  different  affections,  hitherto 
dormant,  were  sure  to  start  into  existence,  and  become 
the  animating  principle  of  our  lives. 

There  cannot,  I  say,  be  a  more  extravagant  suppo- 
sition than  this  ;  nor  indeed  could  any  one  entertain  it, 
who  in  any  sufficient  way  mastered  the  meaning  of  his 
words.  Our  natural  constitution  is  simply  good ;  it 
contains  no  one  evil  passion.  There  can  be  un- 


348  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

doubtedly  no  more  essential  discipline,  than  that  of  mor- 
tification ;  but  the  work  of  mortification  is  wholly  mis- 
understood, wherever  such  a  theory  is  held  as  that  just 
stated.  Our  lower  propensions  no  doubt, — those  which 
we  are  presently  to  consider, — are  to  be  more  and  more 
stinted  of  gratification.  But  the  main  office  of  mortifi- 
cation, is  not  to  stint  or  check  the  exercise  of  our  Pro- 
pensions,  but  the  very  contrary  ;  it  is  to  tear  them 
away  from  objects  utterly  unworthy  of  them,  that  they 
may  be  the  more  undividedly  fixed  on  Those,  which 
alone  can  give  them  any  deep  or  permanent  satisfaction. 
I  am  not  professing  to  prove  this  statement ;  for  I  con- 
sider that  the  whole  of  the  present  section  has  been  one 
continued  proof  of  it.  I  am  but  shewing  you,  under  a 
different  point  of  view,  what  that  conclusion  is,  at  which 
we  have  been  aiming  throughout. 

An  objection  however  may  be  started  against  this 
whole  doctrine,  which  at  first  blush  has  a  somewhat 
plausible  appearance.  '  Is  it  not  the  commonest  remark 
4  in  the  world,'  you  may  ask,  cthat  to  the  Saint  everything 
'  which  is  most  painful  to  the  natural  man, — the  world's 
'  hatred  and  the  world's  reproach,  contempt  and  bodily 
4  pain, — are  not  tolerable  merely  but  delightful  ?  And 
4  does  not  this  clearly  shew,  that  there  is  that  very 
'  change  of  Propensions,  which  you  deny  ?  that  the  old 
6  assemblage  has  been  extirpated  from  his  nature,  and  is 
4  succeeded  by  others  of  a  directly  opposite  character  ?' 

I  reply,  first  by  asking,  —  is  it  indeed  true  that  the 
old  Propensions  have  been  extirpated  from  his  nature  ? 
Take  Love  of  Approbation,  e.g.  is  it  indeed  true,  that  the 
thought  of  God's  disapproval  gives  the  Saint  no  pain  ? 
or  less  pain  than  it  gives  ordinary  men  ?  or  rather  does  it 
not  give  him  immeasurably  more  ?  Take  again  Personal 
Love — has  the  Saint  less  of  this  feeling  towards  God 
and  Christ,  than  ordinary  men  for  each  other?  A 
moment's  consideration  suffices  to  shew,  that  such  a 
statement  as  the  above  is  so  preposterous,  so  contradic- 
tory to  the  most  obvious  facts,  that  nothing  can  possibly 
be  more  so.  If  then  e.  g.  the  Saint  has  become  in- 
different to  men's  approbation — nay  if  he  even  delights 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       349 

in  their  reproach, —  it  is  for  some  reason  most  widely 
different  from  the  supposition,  that  the  Love  of  Appro- 
bation has  been  eradicated  from  his  nature. 

We  will  continue  to  take  Love  of  Approbation  as  our 
sample  Propension  ;  and  whatever  is  said  of  this,  may 
be  most  easily  applied  to  the  other  Propensions  also. 
And  it  is  obvious  to  remark,  that  the  account  to  be 
given  of  the  Saint's  indifference  to  human  applause  is 
most  simple.  His  mind  is  pervaded  with  the  thought 
of  God,  not  of  man  ;  and  it  is  divine,  not  human,  appro- 
bation therefore,  which  he  earnestly  covets. 

But  we  have  further  to  explain  why  it  is,  that  he  is  not 
-  merely  indifferent  to  human  applause,  but  that  he  rather 
rejoices  in  its  opposite.  This  will  lead  us  back  to  a 
psychological  remark,  already  made  in  a  different  con- 
nection. In  treating  on  Love  of  Money,  I  explained  that 
when  a  single  object  is  serviceable  for  avast  assemblage 
of  further  ends,  those  various  ends  so  completely  colour 
our  thought  of  the  bonum  utile,  that  it  seems  as  though 
a  new  Propension  arose,  directed  to  that  bonum  utile 
itself  (see  n.  142,  p.  284  and  288.)  This  is  not  of  course 
really  the  case  ;  it  is  the  various  ends,  which  really  and 
virtually  influence  us,  through  the  intermediate  object. 
Only,  since  the  object  is  one  and  the  ends  are  very  many ; 
— since  the  object  is  constantly  and  explicitly  before  our 
mind  in  our  attempts  at  gaining  it,  and  the  ends  not  so ; 
— they  are  merely  presented  to  our  mind  in  a  vague 
and  confused  mass. 

Now,  on  the  side  of  good,  the  same  phenomenon  is 
seen.  Human  contempt,  e.  g.  is  felt  by  holy  men  as  so 
intensely  conducive  to  ends  which  they  have  inexpres- 
sibly at  heart,  that  a  new  Propension  seems  to  spring 
up  within  them;  they  derive  the  keenest  pleasure  from 
that  object,  which  they  have  so  long  coloured  with  the 
combined  attractiveness  of  those  various  ends. 

The  following  indeed  is  but  a  most  brief  and  im- 
perfect portion,  in  that  great  catalogue  of  ends.  (1.) 
Human  contempt  saves  the  good  Christian  from  all  those 
temptations  to  vain-glory,  which  are  otherwise  so  trying, 
and  which  require  such  constant  watchfulness.  (2.)  By 


350  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

freeing  him  from  such  an  impediment,  it  enables  him  to 
gaze  more  directly  and  with  more  unclouded  vision  on 
Heavenly  Truth.  (3.)  It  consequently  enables  him 
to  grow  far  more  quickly  in  love  of  God  and  in  every 
virtue.  (4.)  Such  growth  is  not  only  an  object  of  love 
to  him  for  its  own  sake,  but  also  as  increasing  his 
heavenly  reward ;  as  intensifying  the  degree,  in  which 
he  will  see  and  love  God  for  all  eternity.  (5.)  This 
same  growth  gives  his  intercessory  prayer  greater  weight 
with  God,  and  (6)  enables  him  to  satisfy  more  effica- 
ciously for  his  own  sins  and  those  of  others.  Then 
(7)  human  contempt  is  a  fresh  mark  of  resemblance  to 
his  crucified  Lord,  who  is  the  deepest  Object  of  his 
affections  ;  and  (8)  it  is  welcomed  by  him  also  as  the 
suitable  lot  for  such  a  sinner  as  he  feels  himself  to  be. 
And  the  list,  as  I  have  said,  might  be  quite  indefinitely 
prolonged. 

It  is  not  therefore  that  a  new  Propension  springs  up 
within  him,  Love  of  being  disapproved:  —  what  can  be 
more  absurd  ?  It  is  not  this,  but  a  most  different  fact. 
His  love  of  approbation  is  most  abundantly  satisfied,  by 
the  thought  of  God  and  of  other  Heavenly  Objects  ;  and 
contented  with  this,  he  seeks  no  such  comparatively 
worthless  food,  as  his  fellow-creatures'  praise  on  earth. 
And  at  the  same  time,  to  be  despised  by  his  fellow- 
creatures,  is  recognized  by  him  as  eminently  serviceable 
towards  various  ends,  to  which  his  other  propensions 
are  powerfully  attracted.  Just  so  in  regard  to  every 
parallel  case. 

150.  I  have  spoken  thus  at  length  on  the  higher 
Propensions,  because  they  are  far  more  important  to  my 
subject  than  the  rest.  Yet  the  others  also  must  not  go 
without  some  degree  of  attention  ;  for  the  thesis,  which 
I  profess  to  prove,  is  that  all  our  propensions  are  most 
usefully  available  in  the  cause  of  virtue.  I  will  pro- 
ceed then  to  the  extremely  opposite  class,  the  Bodily 
Propensions. 

The  chief  Bodily  Propensions  will  be  Love  of  Eating ; 
of  Drinking ;  and  that  which  tempts  against  the  Sixth 
Commandment,  which  we  may  call  the  Propension  of  the 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       351 

Flesh.  To  these  may  be  added  such  others,  as  the 
Love  of  Warmth  when  we  are  cold,  and  of  Coldness  when 
we  are  warm  ;  the  Love  of  Bodily  Rest  when  we  have 
worked  too  much,  and  Love  of  Activity  when  we  have 
rested  too  much.  In  the  same  class  also,  should  be 
placed  the  pain  caused  by  bodily  lesion,  to  which  we 
have  already  referred  (see  n.  93,  p.  197).  In  the  same 
class  also,  that  most  delightful  feeling,  which  we  call  a 
sense  of  good  health ;  which  is  experienced,  when  our 
various  bodily  organs  are  in  that  state,  which  most  fits 
them  for  active  and  serviceable  work.  That  each  one 
of  these  Propensions  has  some  important  office,  in  soli- 
citing us  to  the  performance  of  this  or  that  duty,  —  this 
is  so  obvious  on  the  surface,  that  it  would  be  impertinent 
to  shew  it  in  detail.  Yet  something  more  should  be  said 
about  these  Bodily  Propensions  ;  and  I  will  take,  as 
their  sample  and  representative,  the  pleasure  which  we 
derive  from  eating  and  drinking.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Propension  of  the  Flesh  is  in  many  respects  of  most 
exceptional  character ;  and  so  far  from  being  available 
as  a  sample  of  others,  requires  quite  a  separate  treat- 
ment of  its  own.  I  will  speak  of  it  here,  as  soon  as  I 
have  said  what  seems  desirable  of  the  others  ;  but  there 
will  be  a  further  treatment  also,  appertaining  to  the  next 
Section. 

We  have  more  than  once  referred,  to -those  pleasures 
and  refreshments,  which,  by  God's  merciful  appoint- 
ment, accompany  all  our  innocent  worldly  engage- 
ments. Every  process  of  manual  work  or  industry,  — 
every  intellectual  process, — every  occupation  in  short, 
—has  ordinarily  and  normally  its  concomitant  enjoy- 
ment.* This  appointment  of  God  is  in  deepest  harmony 
with  the  facts  of  our  nature.  In  proportion  indeed  as 
men  advance  towards  the  heights  of  perfection,  (1),  their 
higher  Propensions  receive  ordinarily,  a  far  keener  and 
far  more  constant  enjoyment  from  the  Invisible  World; 

*  "  Dieu,  par  une  sage  disposition  de  Sa  Providence,  a  mis  de  la  facilite 
et  du  plaisir  en  tout  ce  qui  est  necessaire  a  1'entretien  de  la  vie  ;  et  il  n'est 
point  de  la  douceur  de  Sa  Conduite,  qu'une  chose,  de  laquelle  on  ne  se  pent 
passer,  devienne  laborieuse  et  pe"nible."— SURIN,  Lettres  Spirituetle*,  vol.  i. 
p.  233,  234. 


352  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

and  (2)  even  were  it  otherwise,  their  moral  power  is 
far  greater,  of  pursuing  God's  work  under  aridity. 
But  ordinary  persons  are  most  differently  circum- 
stanced. I  am  not  denying  (God  forbid!)  that  the 
merest  beginner  in  spirituality  is  really  cheered  and 
supported, — and  that  to  a  very  appreciable  extent, — by 
the  rest  of  his  propensions  in  God  ;  yet  (putting  aside 
cases  rare  and  utterly  exceptional)  his  joy  in  God  is 
neither  at  all  continuous,  nor  at  all  sufficient  by  itself 
to  carry  him  forward.  This  being  so,  the  conclusion 
is  manifest.  His  good  habits  are  so  fresh,  arid  his  evil 
tendencies  so  strong,  that  it  is  morally  impossible  for 
him  to  continue  perseveringly  to  resist  temptation, 
unless  various  refreshments  and  recreations  be  fur- 
nished as  he  proceeds.  Were  it  not  then  for  this 
merciful  dispensation  to  which  I  have  just  referred, 
he  would  be  morally  unable  to  resist  successfully  those 
various  temptations  which  cross  his  path. 

And  here,  be  it  observed  by  the  way,  is  one  of  the 
greatest  injuries  which  those  inflict  on  their  own  hap- 
piness, who  give  themselves  up  unreservedly  to  the 
pursuit  of  keen  and  violent  pleasures  of  a  sensual 
character.  Such  pleasures,  by  the  constitution  of  our 
nature,  can  be  but  sparingly  obtained ;  while  on  the 
other  hand  indulgence  in  them  indefinitely  impairs  our 
relish  for  those  tranquil,  yet  most  really  enlivening, 
enjoyments,  of  which  we  have  been  speaking.  And 
this  is  one  of  the  reasons,  why  it  is  so  terrible  a  calamity 
to  have  once  begun  such  a  course  ;  why  the  temptation 
to  repeat  the  indulgence  is  so  woefully  greater,  than  was 
that  which  induced  us  first  to  pursue  it. 

Keturning  then  to  the  matter  before  us,  I  proceed 
thus.  As  the  various  other  innocent  occupations  of 
life,  are  invested  by  our  merciful  Creator,  each  with  its 
own  appropriate  gratification; — so  particularly  this  is 
the  case,  with  the  necessary  duty  of  supporting  bodily 
life.  Not  merely  is  the  gratification  of  hunger  in  itself 
a  matter  of  enjoyment,  but  there  are  various  pleasures 
of  palate  also,  which  necessarily  accompany  it.  I  am 
far  of  course  from  denying,  that  there  is  here  much 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       353 

danger  of  sin,  and  that  temperance  is  a  great  duty  ; 
indeed  in  our  theological  work,  we  shall  have  to  con- 
sider precisely,  what  is  that  mode  of  surrendering  our- 
selves to  any  gratification,  which  renders  the  act  sinful. 
But  I  maintain  most  confidently,  and  shall  in  that  part 
of  our  work  give  reasons  for  the  statement,  that  it  is  a 
most  serious  mistake  to  suppose,  that  the  deliberately 
accepting  such  gratification  is  in  itself  at  all  sinful ;  or 
even  that  to  persons  of  ordinary  spiritual  attainments, 
the  abstaining  from  it  is  subjectively  preferable  (see 
n.  57,  p.  124).  Again,  I  admit  freely,  or  rather  urge 
most  earnestly,  that  in  proportion  as  we  advance  towards 
perfection,  it  becomes  more  and  more  our  duty  to 
resist  and  repress  the  lower  propensions.  But  I  utterly 
and  absolutely  deny,  that  it  is  either  obligatory  or 
preferable,  to  begin  by  the  attempt  at  refusing  them 
all  satisfaction  ;  and  in  denying  this,  I  am  confident 
that  I  am  speaking  in  harmony  with  the  Church's 
spirit.  It  is  certain,  that  as  on  the  one  hand  she  has 
ever  most  loudly  maintained  the  heroic  excellence  of 
austerity,  so  on  the  other  hand  she  has  been  no  less 
watchful  against  any  intrusion  of  rigorism  and  harsh- 
ness. Consider  this  one  fact  alone  ;  the  habit,  pre- 
valent throughout  the  Church,  of  celebrating  the 
greater  festivals  by  greater  delicacies  than  are  enjoyed 
on  ordinary  days.  Why,  on  the  view  which  I  am 
opposing,  such  a  procedure  would  change  the  most 
holy  periods  of  the  year  into  the  mere  occasions  of  sin 
and  imperfection.  And  the  Church  has  in  every  age 
been  censured  accordingly.  Just  as  one  class  of  men 
have  regarded  her  as  possessed  with  an  unnatural  love 
of  human  suffering,  so  another  class  has  ever  de- 
nounced her  as  lax  and  compromising:  so  that,  from 
the  very  first,  she  has  been  permitted  to  inherit  her 
Lord's  reproach ;  u  Behold  a  man  that  is  a  glutton  and 
a  drinker  of  wine,  the  friend  of  publicans  and  sinners. 

And  [yet]  wisdom  is  justified  by  all  her  children."* 
The  notion,  which  I  am  opposing,  is  pregnant  with  im- 
measurably greater  and  more  fearful  evil,  than  we 

*  Luke,  vii.  34,  5. 

A  A 


354  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

should  at  first  suppose.  Consider  what  has  been 
already  said,  that  those  who  are  novices  in  piety  (1) 
certainly  do  not  obtain  keen  and  constant  enjoyment 
from  the  thought  of  God;  while  (2)  they  have  not  the 
moral  power  of  persevering  for  a  long  period  in  His  ser- 
vice without  sensible  solace.  Suppose  then  a  certain 
small  number  of  such  men  were  really  persuaded,  to 
aim  at  renouncing  all  these  innocent  pleasures  ;  what 
must  ensue  ?  They  would  be  actually  driven  to  seek 
their  solace,  in  the  sinful  pleasures  of  pride  and  vain- 
glory ;  and  in  the  more  subtle  forms  of  worldliness. 

And  observe  how  fact  corresponds  with  this  theory. 
In  every  age  of  the  Church,  characters  of  the  following 
kind  present  themselves  to  our  notice.  We  find  men 
who,  at  first  sight,  challenge  our  reverence,  as  glorious 
models  of  superhuman  austerity.  Their  doctrines  are 
condemned  by  the  Church,  or  in  some  other  way  they 
are  strictly  sifted ;  and  then  what  do  we  behold  ? 
They  display  themselves  in  their  true  colours,  as 
monsters  of  diabolical  pride. 

What  has  now  been  said,  will  suffice  to  explain 
the  view  which  appears  to  me  true,  of  all  our  various 
bodily  Propensions.  It  remains  to  say  a  few  words  on 
that  exceptional  one,  which  I  have  called  the  Pro- 
pension  of  the  Flesh.  The  direct  purpose,  for  which 
this  has  been  implanted  by  God,  is  of  course  plain 
enough :  the  propagation  of  mankind  ;  the  continued 
existence  of  men,  who  are  Christ's  redeemed  and  ca- 
pable of  sanctification.  Undoubtedly  it  is  appalling, 
and  again  it  is  heart-breaking,  to  consider  the  terrible 
amount  of  sin  to  which  this  Propension  has  led.  Yet 
other  circumstances  being  as  they  are,  some  Propen- 
sion of  the  kind  was  requisite,  in  order  that  mankind 
should  continue  to  exist  in  undiminished  numbers. 
It  is  true  (no  doubt)  that  the  Propension  of  Personal 
Love, — taken  in  connection  with  the  mental  pecu- 
liarities of  the  two  sexes,  so  supplementary  of  each 
other, — would  in  very  many  cases  lead  to  such  exclu- 
siveness  of  affection,  between  one  man  and  one  woman, 
as  exists  under  the  holy  sacrament  of  Matrimony. 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       355 

Perhaps  the  cases  are  far  more  than  is  sometimes  sup- 
posed, when  this  Propension  of  Personal  Love  has  been 
the4  main  impulsive  cause  of  marriage.  But  consider 
the  great  burden  which  children  are,  to  the  great 
majority  of  men  ;  consider  the  great  anxiety,  and  great 
pecuniary  pressure,  which  they  cause.  Consider  this, 
and  you  will  see  very  plainly,  that  unless  some  most 
powerful  instinct  had  been  implanted  which  tends  to 
the  generation  of  children,  there  would  have  been  no 
security  at  all,  with  the  mass  of  men,  that  marriage 
would  have  attained  its  very  principal  end. 

There  seems  however  the  strongest  reason  for 
thinking,  that  this  Propension  does  not  now  exist  in  us 
according  to  its  natural  state,  but  rather  under  a  most 
miserable  and  morbid  exaggeration.  A  more  detailed 
consideration  therefore  of  its  phenomena,  must  be  re- 
served for  the  next  Section,  which  is  to  treat  expressly 
on  the  degradation  of  our  nature.  Yet  one  concluding 
remark  on  it  will  here  be  in  place. 

There  are  several,  who  are  called  by  God  to  the 
admirable  height,  of  refusing  all  gratification  to  this 
Propension:  even  to  them — which  might  seem  strange 
— it  performs  most  important  services.  There  can  be 
no  doubt,  that  through  the  arduousness  of  that  conflict 
which  they  have  to  sustain,  habits  of  humility  and 
watchfulness  are  engendered,  in  a  far  greater  degree 
than  would  otherwise  be  the  case.  Then  secondly, 
a  great  additional  motive  is  supplied  them  for  the 
practice  of  perfection;  viz.  the  fear,  lest  God  should 
otherwise  refuse  them  that  grace,  whereby  they  shall 
in  fact  triumph  over  the  assaults  of  this  Propension. 
And  lastly,  by  the  triumph  itself,  (in  those  who  are 
victorious)  an  invaluable  element,  both  of  heroism  and 
of  tenderness,  accrues  to  the  character. 

151.  The  last  class  of  Propensions  to  which  I  shall 
refer,  may  be  called  by  one  compendious  name  the 
4  Love  of  Beauty.'  I  include  under  this  head,  love  of 
beautiful  scenes,  of  architecture,  of  music,  and  the  like. 
We  may  conveniently  also  include,  love  of  those  enjoy- 
ments, which  are  derivable  from  the  sense  of  smell. 


356  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

There  is  a  very  great  diversity,  as  to  the  degree  in  which 
this  or  that  person  is  susceptible  of  these  various  plea- 
sures ;  but  the  vast  majority  of  mankind  are  in  greater 
or  less  degree  under  their  influence.  The  benefit 
afforded  by  these  propensions  to  the  increase  of  virtue 
is  so  obvious,  that  the  only  difficulty  is,  to  marshal  in 
due  order  the  various  thoughts  which  throng  the  mind. 

(1.)  By  increasing  the  amount  of  innocent  recrea- 
tion, they  very  considerably  lessen  the  temptations  to 
sin,  and  increase  the  facility  of  practising  virtue.  This 
advantage  is  far  greater,  than  might  at  first  blush 
appear ;  as  will  be  most  evident,  if  we  consider  what  I 
have  recently  urged,  on  the  great  difficulty  experienced 
by  ordinary  men,  when  they  try  to  persevere  in  God's 
service  under  circumstances  of  dullness  and  aridity. 

(2.)  They  are  of  great  service  in  lessening  the 
undue  domination  of  the  bodily  Propensions.  No  one 
will  doubt,  that  we  are  far  less  unfavourably  circum- 
stanced in  regard  to  piety,  that  we  present  a  far  less 
powerful  barrier  to  the  Holy  Spirit's  operations, — in 
proportion  as  we  pursue  the  enjoyment  of  beautiful 
scenery  or  music,  rather  than  the  lower  pleasures  of 
sense. 

(3.)  These  Profusions 'are  capable  of  being  enlisted 
much  more  directly,  and  with  much  greater  efficacity,  in 
the  service  of  our  Lord :  and  the  Church  has  very  largely 
availed  herself  of  them  for  this  purpose.  Who  can 
exaggerate  the  beneficial  effects  of  music,  towards  pro- 
ducing sensible  devotion  in  the  more  ordinary  class  of 
Christians  ?  What  exercises  are  more  animating  and 
inspiriting,  than  congregational  hymnody  ?  What  ex- 
ternal appliance  can  be  named,  which  is  so  serviceable 
in  drawing  the  mass  of  men  from  worldly  thoughts,  and 
for  the  time  bringing  them  (as  it  were)  close  on  the 
gate  of  Heaven,  as  some  touching  strain  on  the  organ, 
or  some  sweet  and  soft  harmony  of  voices  ?  Again, 
consider  the  use  ever  made  by  the  Church  of  painting ; 
not  only  indeed  for  the  purpose  of  stimulating  sensible 
devotion,  but  also  of  bringing  the  Mysteries  of  Faith 
more  definitely  and  more  interestingly  before  the  mind. 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       357 

Nay  the  very  sense  of  smell  has  its  place  in  the  beauti- 
ful whole  ;  as  in  the  use  of  incense  at  Mass  and  Bene- 
diction. 

(4.)  What  has  been  hitherto  said,  applies  to  the  great 
mass  of  men.  But  there  are  certain  souls,  gifted  with  a 
far  keener  and  more  sensitive  organization,  in  whom  this 
perception  of  beauty  seems  quite  different  in  kind  from 
that  experienced  by  their  fellow-men  ;  and  in  them  a  still 
further  religious  effect  is  to  be  observed.  Such  re- 
marks as  the  following,  have  more  than  once  been  made 
in  various  shapes,  by  such  gifted  men. 

4  Suppose  I  am  engaged  in  gazing  on  some  en- 
4  chanting  scene  of  loveliness.  First,  my  emotions  are 

*  absolutely  undescribable  ;   so   thrilling   are  they,  so 

*  subduing,  so  overwhelming.     If  you  have  yourself  had 
'no   experience   of  such   emotions,  in  vain   should   I 
4  attempt  to  describe  them  ;    any  more  than   I   could 
4  explain  the  nature  of  light  to  one  born  blind  :  simply 

*  I  have  a  sense,  which  you  have  not.     This  is  my  first 
4  remark  :  and  my  second  is,  how  this  beauty  with  holy 
4  violence  draws  me  to  God  ;  how  peremptorily  it  refuses 
4  to  be  rested  in  as  an  end.    I  feel  a  pensive,  melancholy, 
4  yearning,  for  something  still  absent.    I  wish,  as  it  were, 

*  to  embrace  this  beauteous  scene  before  me  ;  but  it 
4  eludes  my  grasp:  if  I  try  to  draw  nearer,  it  vanishes; 
4  it  is  dissolved  into  rocks,  trees,  and  water,  which  are 
4  its  component  parts  indeed,  but  which  in  themselves 
4  have  no  such  beauty.     Thus  it  bears  witness  against 
4  itself,  that  it  is  a  shadow  and  not  a  reality.' 

The  conclusion,  drawn  from  these  considerations,  is 
one  surely,  which  recommends  itself  to  the  judgment  of 
the, philosopher,  no  less  than  to  the  feelings  of  those 
who  are  thus  sensitively  organized.  4  Surely,'  it  is 
argued,  c  these  exhibitions  of  natural  beauty  point  to 
4  something  altogether  beyond  and  above  themselves  ; 
4  they  are  but  adumbrations,  adapted  to  our  present 
4  perceptive  powers,  of  the  Eternal  and  Supreme 
4  Beauty ;  of  that  Beauty,  which  is  so  transcendant  and 
4  so  ravishing,  that  its  contemplation  will  be  our  all- 
4  sufficient  Beatitude  throughout  endless  ages.' 


358  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

There  is  a  striking  passage  in  the  "  British  Critic  " 
of  1838,  which  briefly  expresses  this  view  of  the  case. 

"  All  [i.  e.  the  whole  constitution  of  the  physical  world] 
is  magnificent  promise,  unsubstantial  and  encouraging.  Is  there 
not  something  very  strange  and  pregnant  in  the  mere  fact,  that 
an  assemblage  of  lifeless,  senseless,  atoms,  should  be  enabled 
to  excite  in  moral  beings  those  apprehensions  of  beauty  and 
sublimity,  with  which  the  physical  world  doubtless  does  over- 
power us  ?  Can  these  apprehensions  be  more,  or  can  they 
be  less,  than  indications  of  great  spiritual  truths ;  a  temporary 
and  arbitrary  system,  for  training  our  minds  to  receive  notions 
which  are  as  yet  beyond  us?  They  surely  are  too  baseless  to 

be  more ;  too  noble  to  be  less All  nature  seems  to 

invite  our  affections  but  to  reject   them,  and  to  testify  of  a" 
Greater  Who  is  behind. *— Jan.  1838,  p.  216,  7. 

And  the  same  general  doctrine,  thus  expressed  in 
regard  to  the  beauty  of  natural  scenery,  has  been  put 
forth  by  Father  Newman  in  the  case  of  music. 

"  To  many  men,  the  very  names  which  the  science  employs  are 
utterly  incomprehensible.  To  speak  of  an  idea  or  a  subject  seems 
to  be  fanciful  or  trifling,  and  of  the  views  which  it  opens  upon 
us  to  be  childish  extravagance ;  yet  is  it  possible,  that  that  in- 
exhaustible evolution  and  disposition  of  notes,  so  rich  yet  so 
simple,  so  intricate  yet  so  regulated,  so  various  yet  so  majestic, 
should  be  a  mere  sound,  which  is  gone  and  perishes  ?  Can  it  be, 
that  those  mysterious  stirrings  of  heart,  and  keen  emotions, 
and  strange  yearnings  after  we  know  not  what,  and  awful  im- 
pressions from  we  know  not  whence,  should  be  wrought  in  us 
by  what  is  unsubstantial,  and  comes  and  goes,  and  begins  and 
ends  in  itself  ?  It  is  not  so ;  it  cannot  be.  No ;  they  have 
escaped  from  some  higher  sphere ;  they  are  the  outpourings  of 
eternal  harmony  in  the  medium  of  created  sound;  they  are 
echoes  from  our  Home ;  they  are  the  voice  of  Angels,  or  the 
Magnificat  of  Saints,  or  the  living  laws  of  Divine  Governance, 
or  the  Divine  Attributes ;  something  are  they  besides  them- 
selves, which  we  cannot  compass,  which  we  cannot  utter, — 
though  mortal  man,  and  he  perhaps  not  otherwise  distinguished 
above  his  fellows,  has  the  gift  of  eliciting  them."  —  Sermons 
before  Oxford  University,  p.  349. 

We  have  now  gone  through  so  large  a  list  of 
our  various  Propensions,  that  no  doubt  (I  think)  can 

*  In  the  original — "  of  a  greater  system  which  is  behind." 


st 
or 

I 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       359 

remain  in  your  mind,  on  the  truth  of  our  general  propo- 
sition. And  thus  we  complete  the  fifth  argument 
adducible  for  our  thesis.  We  have  seen,  that  our  Pro- 
pensions  alone  are  the  cause  of  our  not  leading  lives  of 
simply  spotless  virtue ;  and  we  have  also  seen,  that  there 
is  not  one  of  these  Propensions  which  has  not  im- 
portant service  to  perform,  in  the  interests  of  virtue. 
Can  there  be  a  stronger  proof,  that  virtue  is  the  end  for 
which  our  nature  has  been  constituted  ? 

152.  I  prepare  the  way  for  our  sixth  argument,  by  a 
general  remark,  which  follows  at  once  from  the  map  of 
our  Propensions  that  has  been  just  drawn  out.  Each 
Propension  of  course  aims  immediately  at  its  object ; 
Hunger  aims  at  food  ;  Anger  at  vindictive  retribution ; 
Love  of  Popularity  at  popularity.  But  in  some  cases 
that  object  is  in  itself  and  primarily  beneficial  to  ourselves, 
in  other  cases  it  is  in  itself  and  primarily  beneficial  to 
others.  As  an  instance  of  the  first  class,  take  Self- 
charity,  or  again  Love  of  Knowledge.  These  Propen- 
sions lead  me  to  promote  respectively  my  own  happi- 
ness, and  my  own  possession  of  knowledge  ;  in  other 
words,  they  lead  me  to  pursue  objects,  which  are  mainly 
and  directly  beneficial  to  myself.  As  a  very  strong  in- 
stance of  the  second  class,  take  Compassion  :  this  can 
only  be  gratified  at  all,  by  benefiting  &  fellow -creature. 
The  same  may  be  said  on  the  Propension  of  Gratitude. 

again  consider  the  Love  of  Communicating  know- 
ledge ;  the  great  pleasure  which  many  men  derive,  from 
imparting  to  others  their  intellectual  acquisitions :  this 
pleasure  cannot  by  possibility  be  enjoyed,  without  ex- 
erting ourselves  for  the  advantage  of  others.  In  the 
case  of  Personal  and  of  General  Love,  we  have  already 
drawn  this  very  distinction :  we  have  divided  them  into 
'Amor  Benevolentiae,'  which  leads  us  directly  to  the 
benefit  or  service  of  another;  and  '  Amor  Concupis- 
centiae,'  which  leads  directly  to  our  own. 

There  are  several  cases  no  doubt,  in  which  it  is 
difficult  to  decide,  whether  a  Propension  belongs  to  the 
former  or  the  latter  class  ;  whether  its  object  primarily 
tends  to  others'  benefit,  or  to  our  own.  And  in  all 


360  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

cases,  there  is  a  very  important  reciprocity  of  benefit : 
those  objects  which  primarily  benefit  myself,  ultimately 
benefit  others  also  ;  those  which  primarily  benefit  others, 
ultimately  benefit  myself.  Thus  (confining  our  atten- 
tion to  merely  earthly  results)  if  I  gratify  my  Love  of 
Knowledge,  I  primarily  benefit  myself;  but  unless  I  am 
unusually  reserved,  I  ultimately  benefit  others  also.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  I  gratify  Compassion,  I  primarily  be- 
nefit another :  yet  in  so  doing  I  obtain  myself  a  two-fold 
advantage;  viz.  (1)  the  elevation  of  iny  own  character, 
and  (2)  the  raising  up  friends  for  myself  against  any 
future  time  of  trouble  or  distress.  Still  on  the  whole, 
the  two-fold  division  of  Propensions,  in  accordance  with 
this  principle,  is  undoubtedly  a  just  division. 

Let  us  call  the  former  of  these  classes  c  self-regard- 
ing : '  the  latter  then  would  be  suitably  expressed  by 
the  term  '  extra-regarding  ;'  but  as  this  is  rather  cum- 
brous, let  us  drop  a  syllable  and  call  them  '  ex-regard- 
ing.' So  '  Amor  Benevolentise'  is  ex-regarding  Love  ; 
'  Amor  Concupiscentise,'  self-regarding. 

On  counting  over  these  Propensions  respectively,  we 
shall  find  that,  according  to  the  average  condition  of 
human  nature,  the  ex-regarding  are  fully  as  strong,  fully 
as  importunate,  as  the  others.  Still  many  persons  are 
of  course  in  a  class,  either  below  or  above  this  average 
condition.  So  you  have  selfish  men  in  great  numbers  ; 
that  is  men,  with  whom  the  self-regarding  more  or  less 
preponderate  in  strength  over  the  others.  A  selfish 
man  by  temperament,  is  one  in  whom  by  nature  this  is 
the  case ;  a  selfish  man  by  habit,  is  one  who  has  cul- 
tivated the  former  and  neglected  the  latter.  And  here 
we  are  led  to  one  obvious  conclusion  :  viz.  that  selfish- 
ness '  does  not  pay?  that  it  defeats  its  own  end.  Hap- 
piness can  only  be  proportionate,  to  the  degree  in  which 
our  various  Propensions  are  gratified.  But  the  selfish 
man,  so  far  as  he  is  such,  refuses  all  gratification  to  one- 
half  of  his  propensions,  and  those  perhaps  naturally 
the  strongest.  What  kind  of  happiness  can  be  his,  who 
hardly  ever  enjoys  the  pleasure,  and  never  in  a  great 
degree,  of  gratifying  Friendship,  Compassion,  Gratitude  ? 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       361 

And  so  your  selfish  men,  with  long-headed  maxims  of 
shrewdness  ever  in  their  mouths, — '  I  will  never  neglect 
my  own  interest ;  no  such  fool  as  that :'  and  the  like  ;— 
are  (to  say  the  least)  far  from  being  that  class  of  men, 
who  really  attain  the  greatest  degree  of  earthly  hap- 
piness. 

Here  then  we  may  draw  out  our  sixth  argument. 
It  is  a  metaphysical  truth,  that  (circumstanced  as  we 
are)  we  act  most  sinfully  in  living  only  for  ourselves : 
the  great  majority  are  called  on  to  live  also  for  their 
fellow-men,*  and  all  to  live  chiefly  for  God.  Now 
parallel  with  this  metaphysical  truth,  is  a  psychological 
fact;  viz.  that  unless  we  live  in  great  degree  for  our  fel- 
low-men and  for  God ;  —  unless  we  keep  Him  and  them 
habitually  in  our  thoughts ; — we  cannot  lead  thoroughly 
happy  lives :  for  one  half  at  least  of  our  natural  cravings 
will  be  violently  thwarted  and  repressed.  Here  surely 
is  a  reason  of  great  strength,  for  holding  that  our  nature 
has  been  formed  for  virtue. 

153.  The  seventh  is  a  still  more  cogent  argument. 
Trace  the  progress  of  a  holy  man  towards  perfection, — 
what  are  those  Propensions  which  he  will  more  and 
more  gratify  ?  what  are  those  which  he  will  more  and 
more  repress  ?  Of  course  I  am  not  for  a  moment  for- 
getting, the  indefinite  difference  which  exists  between 
this  and  that  man's  vocation  ;  how  immeasurably  greater 
in  that  amount  of  worldly  gratification  which  A.  is 
called  to  resign,  than  that  whose  abandonment  falls 
within  B.'s  vocation.  Still  on  the  whole,  in  proportion 
as  we  advance  towards  perfection,  in  that  degree  our 
life  tends  in  a  greater  proportion  to  consist  of  these 
two  things :  1st,  contemplating  God  and  Heavenly 
Objects  ;  and  2ndly,  working  for  them.  In  other  words, 
in  proportion  as  we  advance  more  towards  perfection, 
we  more  and  more  gratify  those  Propensions  (1)  which 
are  satisfied  by  the  direct  contemplation  of  God  and 
Heavenly  Objects;  and  (2)  those,  the  satisfaction  of 
which  is  absolutely  inseparable  from  the  very  fact  of 

*  I  speak  of  external  life  :  of  course  even  solitaries  are  called  on  to  love 
their  fellow-men,  and  pray  for  them. 


362  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

working  for  God.  These  two  classes,  I  say,  we  shall 
more  and  more  gratify ;  the  others  we  shall  more  and 
more  repress.  Now  let  it  be  most  carefully  observed, 
that  those  which  we  shall  more  and  more  repress,  are  pre- 
cisely those  which  even  worldly  men  can  gratify  but 
occasionally  and  at  intervals ;  whereas  those  which  we 
shall  more  and  more  gratify,  are  those  which  may  per- 
vade our  whole  life.  This  will  at  once  be  evident,  on 
turning  to  the  respective  catalogues.  It  is  Love  of 
Honour,  e.g.  or  Power,  or  Money,  which  colours  the 
whole  of  a  godless  man's  Life  ;  not  Love  of  Sensual 
Pleasures  nor  even  of  ^Esthetieal  Enjoyments.  But  it  is 
precisely  Love  of  Honour,  of  Power,  of  Acquisition, 
which  any  one  may  and  does  gratify  more  and  more 
deeply,  more  and  more  without  stint  or  measure,  in 
proportion  as  he  gives  himself  up  more  entirely  to  God. 

Now  who  can  be  so  wild  as  to  maintain,  that  this 
most  remarkable  fact  is  due  wholly  to  chance  f  Yet  if 
it  be  not  due  to  chance,  what  can  it  manifest,  except  a 
most  remarkable  and  distinct  provision,  on  our  Creator's 
part,  tending  to  the  result,  that  the  path  of  virtue  and  of 
happiness  shall  be  made  identical? 

This  deep  and  tranquil  rest  of  our  most  powerful 
and  pervasive  propensions,  in  God  and  God's  service, 
would  seem  to  be  that  most  precious  gift,  so  often  com- 
memorated in  Scripture  under  the  name  of  'Peace.' 
To  this  again  refers  St.  Augustin's  often-quoted  address 
to  God:  'Thou  hast  made  us  for  Thyself:  and  our 
heart  is  restless  and  unquiet,  till  we  find  our  repose  in 
Thee ! '  It  has  always  drawn  me  specially  to  Lombez's 
great  spiritual  treatise,  that  he  makes  this  great  and 
paramount  blessing  the  central  figure  (as  it  were)  in  his 
picture;  the  point  from  which  all  his  ascetical principles 
radiate,  and  to  which  they  converge.  Hear  again  St. 
Alphonsus,  quoting  in  his  own  favour  another  great 
Saint  also. 

"  S.Franciscus  Salesius,  ut  Deo  alliceret  peccatores,  potissimum 
curabat,  ut  ipsi  cognoscerent  pacem  qua  fruuntur  illi  qui  Deo 
adhcerent,  et  vitam  infelicem  quam  ducit  qui  a  Deo  alienus  est 
Curetur  ut  pcenitens  cognoscat  pacem  interiorem,  qua  do- 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       363 

naritur,  qui  Dei  amicitirt  fruuntur ;  et  infernum  quern  ante  tempus 
experiuntur,  qui  alieni  sunt  a  Deo :  addita  pernicie  temporal!, 
quam  secum  trahit  peccatum.' — Praxis  Confessarii,  nn.  5  and  15. 

The  same  general  truth  is  contained  in  the  various 
statements,  made  by  theologians,  on  that  c  beatitudo  im- 
perfecta'  which  is  attainable  here  in  via.  Thus  Bellar- 
mine  declares  it  as  a  thing  quite  evident  (cum  satis  con- 
stet)  c  beatitudinem  in  hac  vita  in  virtute  perfectd  sitam 
esse:'*  and  declares  that,  even  on  this  ground  alone, 
'ratio  postulat,  ut  magno  studio  in  hancrem  (virtutem) 
incumbauius.7  Other  theologians  do  not  speak  quite  so 
clearly  and  distinctly  as  this ;  nor  do  they  attach  to  the 
subject  an  importance  approaching  that,  which  (in  my 
humble  judgment)  it  really  deserves:  still  the  general 
drift  of  their  statements  is  in  the  same  direction. 

154.  This  whole  consideration  leads  at  once  to  an 
enquiry,  very  closely  related  to  it.  How  far  has  God 
(1)  so  constituted  our  nature,  and  (2)  so  providentially 
arranged  external  circumstances,  that  virtue  and  earthly 
happiness  are  coincident  ?  For  a  satisfactory  discussion 
of  this  matter,  I  consider  that  we  have  not  sufficient 
data ;  at  all  events  I  do  not  feel  myself  competent  to 
attempt  it.  Yet  something  may  be  said  perhaps,  both 
true  and  important ;  though  it  will  fall  far  short  of  a 
complete  and  thorough  investigation. 

And  first  I  will  say,  that  there  is  hardly  any  subject, 
on  which  it  is  of  more  extreme  importance  to  avoid 
anything  like  exaggeration ;  while  there  are  few,  on 
which  moralists  have  greater  tendency  (most  uninten- 
tionally) to  exaggerate.  They  are  most  keenly  con- 
scious, how  great  is  the  peace  implanted  in  them  by 
a  Christian  life; — how  absolutely  satisfactory  to  their 
highest  affections  are  those  Objects,  to  which  they  have 
given  their  hearts ; — how  low  and  contemptible  are  those 
idols,  on  which  worldly  men  squander  their  affections ; 
and  all  this  leads  them,  most  unaffectedly  and  sincerely, 
to  regard  such  men  as  plunged  in  deepest  misery.  Yet 
if  the  fact  really  be  not  so,  or  at  least  not  universally  so, 
then  (as  I  just  now  observed)  there  is  more  than  one 

*  De  AmissS,  Gratia,  1.  6.  c.  10,  n.  6. 


364  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

reason,  wiry  it  is  of  very  great  importance  not  to  make  any 
allegation  on  the  subject,  which  facts  will  fail  to  sustain. 

(1.)  One  reason  why  this  is  so  important,  is  the 
great  danger  of  the  '  incredulus  odi.'  Worldly  men 
are  certainly  not  naturally  disposed  to  regard  their 
condition  as  so  lamentable ;  if  therefore  the  picture  be 
too  highly  coloured,  there  is  great  danger  that  they 
will  not  even  look  at  it ;  if  facts  are  stated  which  their 
own  experience  falsifies,  they  will  not  give  due  attention 
to  other  facts,  which  their  own  experience  (if  they 
would  but  consult  it)  would  most  completely  confirm. 

Then  (2)  there  is  real  danger,  if  we  press  too  far 
the  necessary  coexistence  of  piety  and  earthly  happi- 
ness, lest  we  transgress  an  important  point  of  doctrine. 
There  is  no  more  fundamental  tenet  of  Christianity 
than  this ;  that  by  way  of  the  C?*oss  we  advance  to  our 
Crown,  and  that  suffering  is  the  chief  instrument  for 
strengthening  and  perfecting  our  virtue. 

And  now  for  such  remarks  on  the  general  subject, 
as  may  seem  warrantable  and  safe.  It  would  appear 
certainly  at  first  sight  probable,  from  the  facts  brought 
together  in  the  preceding  numbers,  not  merely  that  the 
pious  man  must  immeasurably  exceed  others  in  earthly 
happiness,  but  that  those  others  must  be  utterly  mise- 
rable. Yet  candour  obliges  us  to  admit,  that  many 
worldly  men  do  on  the  whole  lead  lives  of  great  enjoy- 
ment :  particularly  if  they  be  gifted  with  good  health 
and  pecuniary  competence  ;  and  if  they  are  exempt 
from  the  more  violent  and  passionate  emotions.  It  is 
true  indeed  that  this  happiness  is  most  precarious  and  in- 
secure. For  first,  even  so  far  as  this  world  is  concerned, 
it  is  at  the  mercy  of  a  thousand  accidents,  which  may 
occur  at  any  moment,  and  the  like  of  which  do  con- 
stantly occur.  And  secondly,  their  prospects  as  to  the 
next  life  are  such,  as  must  absolutely  appal  them,  if 
they  would  but  steadily  contemplate  the  facts  of  the 
case.  But  it  is  truly  wonderful  how  great  a  power 
such  persons  possess,  of  refusing  to  contemplate  the 
facts  of  the  case ;  of  giving  themselves  up  to  this  or 
that  worldly  enjoyment;  and,  in  the  pursuit  or  posses- 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUK  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       365 

sion  of  such  enjoyment,  of  forgetting  altogether  both 
God  and  themselves.  This  power  is  simply  owing,  as 
I  believe,  to  the  corruption  of  our  nature,  on  which  in 
the  next  Section  I  hope  to  speak ;  but  whatever  its 
cause,  its  existence  is  undeniable. 

Now  in  comparing  the  happiness  of  good  and  bad 
men,  we  must  put  out  of  account  those,  who  are  called 
by  God  to  the  highest  paths  of  Sanctity,  and  who  are 
faithful  to  that  vocation.  Of  such  men,  both  the  griefs 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  consolations  on  the  other,  are 
in  a  most  special  sense  the  immediate  work  of  God's 
hands,  for  the  direct  purpose  of  their  sanctification. 
These  griefs  and  consolations,  I  say,  do  not  come  from 
the  action  of  circumstances  on  the  constitution  of  their 
nature,  but  by  God's  direct  and  immediate  agency ; 
their  frequency  and  their  degree  does  not  depend  on 
any  action  of  general  laws,  but  on  the  special  circum- 
stances of  that  individual  soul.  This  then  is  one  reason, 
why  there  would  be  no  meaning  in  any  attempted  com- 
parison between  their  earthly  happiness  and  that  of 
worldly  men :  and  another  reason  is,  because  their 
sorrows  and  their  joys  are  so  utterly  heterogeneous 
from  those  of  worldly  men,  that  no  kind  of  comparison 
is  even  possible. 

It  must  not  of  course  be  supposed,  that  God  exer- 
cises a  less  watchful  and  minute  Providence  over 
ordinary  Christians  than  over  Saints.  Yet  in  the 
former  case  that  Providence  is  carried  on,  in  a  very 
far  greater  degree,  by  and  through  general  laws  ;  and 
it  is  therefore  quite  intelligible  to  inquire  whether, 
according  to  these  laws,  virtue  is  or  is  not  ordinarily 
more  conducive  to  happiness,  than  is  the  opposite  course 
of  conduct.  It  is  true  again,  in  ordinary  Christians  as 
in  Saints,  that  their  joys  arid  sorrows  are  on  the  whole 
different  in  kind  from  those  which  befall  worldly  men. 
Still  this  holds  in  a  far  less  degree  in  ordinary  Chris- 
tians than  in  Saints ;  and  in  the  former  case  it  by  no 
means  holds  to  so  great  an  extent,  as  that  every  kind  of 
comparison  is  rendered  impossible. 

There  are  various  considerations  then  which,  in  my 


366  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

humble  judgment,  will  lead  us  most  gravely  to  doubt, 
whether  real  advancement  in  virtue  can  ever  be  opposed 
to  increase  in  earthly  happiness. 

Thus  ( 1 )  according  to  the  very  trite  remark,  worldly 
men  are  most  happy  at  those  times  when  we  see  them ; 
interior  men  at  those  times  when  we  do  not  see  them. 
It  is  impossible  therefore  to  draw  any  trustworthy  in- 
ference, on  the  happiness  really  appertaining  to  a 
worldly  man,  by  merely  observing  him  in  the  general 
intercourse  of  society. 

(2.)  There  are  the  strongest  grounds  for  believing, 
that  worldly  men  carry  about  with  them  the  constant 
sense,  how  utterly  hollow  and  unsatisfactory  are  their 
real  state  and  prospects.  We  have  already  (see  n.  127, 
p.  252)  drawn  attention  to  the  fact,  that  such  men  ever 
avoid  the  contemplation  of  their  own  interior,  as  care- 
fully as  that  of  the  most  disgusting  object  in  nature. 
But  it  is  very  observable,  by  how  constant  and  spon- 
taneous an  instinct  they  do  this.  It  is  not,  that  from 
time  to  time  they  turn  their  thoughts  within,  and  then 
recoil  from  the  spectacle  which  they  behold :  they  never 
for  a  moment  do  so.  How  is  this  to  be  explained, 
except  by  the  hypothesis  above  stated?  viz.  that  they 
bear  about  with  them  a  constant,  unceasing,  inextin- 
guishable sense,  of  their  own  miserable  plight?  More 
will  be  said  on  this  most  remarkable  phenomenon,  in  our 
theological  course ;  here  we  advert  to  the  fact,  for  the 
sake  of  its  obvious  bearing  on  our  present  argument. 
Surely  this  sense  of  inward  unsatisfactoriness  and  of 
most  serious  peril,  must  be  a  most  serious  drawback 
from  their  enjoyment. 

Then  consider  (3)  how  little  they  value  those  very 
things,  to  the  acquisition  of  which  their  whole  life  has 
been  devoted;  whether  their  object  has  been  wealth, 
or  power,  or  whatever  else.  To  fix  our  ideas,  let  us 
take  the  instance  of  an  ambitious  politician.  Though 
he  be  at  the  highest  point  of  preferment; — though  he 
have  squandered  his  best  years  in  working  actively  for 
its  attainment;  —  when,  once  gained,  it  crumbles  within 
his  grasp :  its  pursuit  was  intoxicating,  but  its  possession 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       367 

is  disappointing.  Where  shall  we  find  such  a  politician, 
who  will  contemplate  the  high  position  he  has  attained, 
and  then  say  to  himself  with  perfect  sincerity, — '  this  is 
indeed  a  sufficient  reward  for  all  the  pains  devoted  to 
its  pursuit  ? ' 

The  only  case  which,  even  on  the  surface,  can  seem 
an  exception  to  this  general  remark,  is  the  case  of 
sensual  men.  Yet  is  there  any  one  of  them,  who,  on 
looking  back  at  the  end  of  life  on  his  past  enjoyments, 
will  say  that  they  were  really  purchased  at  no  extrava- 
gant price,  by  such  sacrifice  of  labour,  of  wealth,  of 
reputation,  as  has  been  involved  in  his  career? 

Contrast  with  this  the  interior  man.  Suppose  him 
to  recognise  unmistakeably,  that  —  comparing  his  state 
with  that  of  a  year  or  two  back — he  sees,  far  more 
clearly  and  constantly,  the  depth  of  his  own  sinfulness ; 
that  by  help  of  prayer  and  grace  he  is  able  to  triumph 
far  more  constantly  over  this  or  that  temptation ;  that 
he  realizes  the  invisible  world  far  more  keenly  and 
pervasively.  Well :  he  rejoices  in  this  increase  of 
piety,  as  in  a  most  precious  possession.  He  regards  it 
indeed  (1)  as  intrinsecally  excellent,  and  (2)  as  greatly 
conducive  to  His  eternal  interests ;  and  so  far,  the  fact 
does  not  bear  on  our  argument:  but  he  rejoices  in  it 
also,  and  cherishes  it  most  joyfully,  as  contributing 
most  importantly  to  his  present  happiness. 

(4.)  Our  fourth  consideration  shall  be  based  on 
what  has  been  said  in  this  Section,  as  regards  the  com- 
pleteness with  which  all  our  Propensions  can  be  grati- 
fied in  the  service  of  God.  In  the  case  of  worldly 
men,  this  propension  ever  conflicts  with  that.  What 
worldly  career  is  possible,  in  which  all  these  various 
propensions,  above  recited,  can  receive  their  due  food 
and  nourishment?  or  even  in  which  any  approach  is 
made  to  such  a  result?  If  a  man  surrenders  himself 
to  one  tyrant  Propension — if,  e.g.  for  the  sake  of  am- 
bition, he  sacrifices  Duty,  Personal  Love,  Popularity, 
and  the  rest, — these  various  unsatisfied  Propensions 
must  inflict  on  him  more  or  les.s  of  serious  suffering. 
If  on  the  other  hand  he  aims  at  giving  to  all  a  little 


368  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

gratification,  they  clamour  painfully  for  more.  Let  it 
be  said  again.  Those  earthly  objects,  which  correspond 
to  these  various  Propensions,  are  mutually  antagonistic: 
if  therefore  we  thus  indulge  those  propensions  a  little, 
they  clamour  for  more ;  if  we  indulge  them  much,  they 
clash  with  each  other.  In  either  case,  they  produce 
jar  and  conflict  in  our  mind ;  and  afford  the  most 
striking  contrast  to  that  union  and  harmony,  where- 
with these  very  Propensions  enjoy  their  appropriate 
objects  in  a  good  man's  life. 

(5.)  Then  consider,  lastly,  the  great  peace  and 
serenity  of  mind,  which  the  good  man's  resignation  to 
God's  Will  must  ever  tend  to  engender.  He  firmly 
believes,  (remember)  and  realizes  the  truth,  that  every- 
thing which  happens  to  him,  great  and  small,  is  specially 
appointed  by  a  God,  Who  tenderly  loves  him  and  most 
earnestly  desires  his  eternal  happiness.  Surely  then, 
under  even  the  very  heaviest  trials,  he  has  a  ground 
for  the  deepest  peace  and  tranquillity ;  and  a  ground, 
to  which  the  worldly  man,  even  in  the  lightest  mis- 
chances of  every -day  life,  is  a  total  stranger.  Such 
light  mischances  (as  daily  experience  shews  us)  inflict 
on  the  latter  class  of  men  immeasurably  greater  pain, 
than  we  should  at  all  have  expected  from  their  trivial 
character.  It  is  astonishing,  how  mere  a  trifle  will 
destroy  the  happiness  of  a  vain-glorious,  or  again  of  an 
ambitious,  man,  for  a  day  or  for  a  week. 

Hitherto  we  have  spoken  of  those  worldly  men, 
who  are  able  to  secure  considerable  enjoyment;  those 
worldly  men  (in  other  w^ords)  who  are  well  circum- 
stanced in  regard  to  health  and  money,  and  who  are 
troubled  with  no  deep  and  violent  emotions.  But 
these  at  last  are  a  comparatively  small  number.  Piety 
imparts  its  best  consolations  to  the  sick  and  the  poor; 
what  comfort  do  these  men  receive  from  the  world? 
Or  take  again  the  worldly  man,  who  loses  that  very 
object  to  which  he  has  devoted  his  life :  a  soldier,  who 
lies  under  the  unanswerable  imputation  of  cowardice ; 
a  money-getting  man,  who  has  lost  his  whole  sub- 
stance, and  has  no  means  of  replacing  it;  an  intel- 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       369 

lectual  man,  whose  eye-sight  fails  him  or  whose  facul- 
ties decay.  What  is  the  predicament  of  such  as  these, 
if  they  have  not  learnt  to  seek  their  happiness  in  God? 
Or  lastly,  consider  men  who  have  been  endued  by  God 
with  keen  and  deep  sensibilities :  what  are  they  with- 
out piety  ?  Father  Newman  here  brings  out  what  I 
would  say,  with  insurpassable  force  and  accuracy  of 
expression.  He  is  speaking  of  St.  Augustine's  conver- 
sion, and  these  are  his  remarks. 

"  Men  of  ordinary  minds  are  not  so  circumstanced  as  to  feel 
the  misery  of  irreligion.  That  misery  consists  in  the  perverted 
and  discordant  action  of  the  various  functions  and  faculties  of  the 
soul,  which  have  lost  their  legitimate  governing  power,  and  are 
unable  to  regain  it  except  at  the  hands  of  their  Maker.  Now  the 
run  of  irreligious  men  do  not  suffer  in  any  great  degree  from  this 
disorder,  and  are  not  miserable ;  they  have  neither  great  talents, 
nor  strong  passions ;  they  have  not  within  them  the  materials  of 
rebellion,  in  such  measure  as  to  threaten  their  peace.  They  fol- 
low their  own  wishes  ;  they  yield  to  the  bent  of  the  moment;  they 
act  on  inclination,  not  on  principle ;  but  their  motive  powers  are 
neither  strong  nor  various  enough  to  be  troublesome.  Their 
minds  are  in  no  sense  under  rule :  but  anarchy  is  not  in  their 
state  a  case  of  confusion,  but  of  deadness ;  like  what  is  said  to  be 
the  internal  condition  of  Eastern  cities  and  provinces  at  present, 
in  which,  though  the  government  is  weak  or  null,  the  body 
politic  goes  on  without  any  great  embarrassment  or  collision  of 
its  members  one  with  another,  by  the  force  of  inveterate  habit.' 
It  is  very  different,  when  the  moral  and  intellectual  principles  are 
vigorous,  active,  and  developed.  Then,  if  the  governing  power 
be  feeble,  all  the  subordinates  are  in  the  position  of  rebels  in 
arms ;  and  what  the  state  of  a  mind  is  under  such  circumstances, 
the  analogy  of  a  civil  community  will  suggest  to  us.  Then  we 
have  before  us  the  melancholy  spectacle,  of  high  aspirations  witli- 
out  an  aim ;  a  hunger  of  the  soul  unsatisjied ;  and  a  never-ending 
restlessness  and  inward  warfare  of  its  various  faculties.  Gifted 
minds,  if  not  submitted  to  the  rightful  authority  of  religion, 
become  the  most  unhappy  and  the  most  mischievous.  They 
need  at  once  an  object  to  feed  upon,  and  the  power  of  self- 
mastery  ;  and  the  love  of  tfieir  Maker,  and  nothing  but  it,  sup- 
plies both  the  one  and  the  other.  We  have  seen  in  our  own 
day,  in  the  case  of  a  popular  poet,  an  impressive  instance  of  a 
great  genius,  throwing  off  the  fear  of  God,  seeking  for  happiness 
in  the  creature,  roaming  unsatisfied  from  one  object  to  another, 
breaking  his  mind  upon  itself,  and  bitterly  confessing  and  im- 

B  B 


370  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

parting  his  wretchedness  to  all  around.  I  have  no  wish  at  all  to 
compare  him  to  St.  Augustine ;  indeed,  if  we  may  say  it  without 
presumption,  the  very  different  termination  of  their  trial  seems  to 
indicate  some  great  difference  in  their  respective  modes  of  encoun- 
tering it.  The  one  dies  of  premature  decay,  to  all  appearance  a 
hardened  infidel ;  and  if  he  is  still  to  have  a  name,  will  live  in 
the  mouths  of  men  by  writings  at  once  blasphemous  and  im- 
moral :  the  other  is  a  Saint  and  Doctor  of  the  Church.  Each 
makes  confessions;  the  one  to  the  Saints,  the  other  to  the  powers 
of  evil.  And  does  not  the  difference  of  the  two  discover  itself  in 
some  measure  even  to  our  own  eyes,  in  the  very  history  of  their 
wanderings  and  pinings  ?  At  least,  there  is  no  appearance  in 
St.  Augustine's  case  of  that  dreadful  haughtiness,  sullenness, 
love  of  singularity,  vanity,  irritability,  and  misanthropy,  which 
were  too  certainly  the  characteristics  of  our  own  countryman. 
Augustine  was,  as  his  early  history  shews,  a  man  of  affectionate 
and  tender  feelings,  and  open  and  amiable  temper  ;  and,  above 
all,  he  sought  for  some  excellence  external  to  his  own  mind,  in- 
stead of  concentrating  all  his  contemplations  on  himself. 

"  But  let  us  consider  what  his  misery  was :  —  it  was  that  of  a 
mind  imprisoned,  solitary,  and  wild  with  spiritual  thirst;  and 
forced  to  betake  itself  to  the  strongest  excitements,  by  way  of 
relieving  itself  of  the  rush  and  violence  of  feelings,  of  which  the 
knowledge  of  the  Divine  Perfections  was  the  true  and  sole  sus- 
tenance. He  ran  into  excess,  not  from  love  of  it,  but  from  this 
fierce  fever  of  mind.  1 1  sought  what  I  might  love/  he  says  in 
his  Confessions,  e  in  love  with  loving,  and  safety  I  hated,  and  a 
way  without  snares.  For  within  me  was  a  famine  of  that  in- 
ward food,  Thyself,  my  God ;  yet  through  that  famine  I  was  not 
hungered,  but  was  without  all  longing  for  incorruptible  sus- 
tenance ;  not  because  filled  therewith,  but  the  more  empty,  the 
more  I  loathed  it."'  —Church  of  the  Fathers,  pp.  226,  7,  8. 

We  shall  better  see  the  force  of  these  various  con- 
siderations, if  we  state  precisely  the  question  before  us. 
For  the  question  is  not  precisely,  whether  good  men 
are  on  an  average  happier  than  worldly  men  ;  but 
whether  this  individual  man,  with  the  same  tempera- 
ment, in  the  same  state  of  health,  under  the  same 
external  circumstances,  will  or  will  not  be  happier,  if 
he  has  consistently  sought  his  rest  in  God,  than  if  he 
has  sought  it  in  the  world.  I  have  said  l  under  the 
same  external  circumstances;'  though  of  course  the 
argument  fairly  requires  me  to  add, —  except  so  far  as 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       371 

those  circumstances  would  be  changed  by  the  mere 
fact  of  living  interiorly. 

Now  in  considering  such  a  question  as  this,  great 
regard  must  be  had  to  the  peculiarity  of  different  indi- 
viduals. There  is  no  psychological  fact  in  the  whole 
range  of  them  more  remarkable,  than  the  wonderful 
difference  of  men  from  each  other,  as  to  their  natural 
susceptibility  of  happiness.  No  doubt,  bodily  health 
has  a  great  deal  to  do  with  this;  and  past  circum- 
stances also  may  greatly  affect  our  present  capabilities 
of  enjoyment.  Yet  on  the  whole  I  strongly  incline 
to  think,  that  its  chief  cause  is  far  deeper  than  either 
of  these  explanations  would  suggest.  God  has  made 
one  man  joyous,  and  another  melancholy,  by  natural 
temperament ;  and  as  God  has  made  him,  so  he  will 
remain. 

Yet  even  here  something  may  be  said  on  a  good 
man's  happiness.  Observation  will  certainly  shew,  that 
in  many  good  men  there  is  a  certain  most  strange  and 
impressive  union  often  found,  of  this  natural  melan- 
choly with  inward  peace ;  the  deep  happiness,  engen- 
dered by  a  good  life,  becomes  more  remarkable,  from 
the  superficial  sadness  below  which  it  is  to  be  found. 

And  as  this  is  true  in  regard  to  natural  tempera- 
ment, so  is  it  also  in  regard  to  external  circumstances. 
It  is  very  remarkable,  how  great  a  degree  of  external 
agitation  and  excitement,  is  compatible  with  real  and 
true  enjoyment  of  that  great  gift  of  peace.  There  is 
plainly  no  inconsistency  at  all  in  the  supposition,  that 
while  two  or  three  Propensions  are  causing  grief  or 
excitement,  the  great  body  of  Propensions  may  at  the 
same  moment  be  enjoying  a  deep  and  tranquil  gra- 
tification. And  this  will  be  made  still  more  intelligible, 
by  considering  an  important  psychological  fact;  a  fact 
which  we  shall  have  to  treat  carefully,  in  the  very  impor- 
tant discussion  hereafter  to  be  attempted,  on  the  relations 
between  Intellect  and  Will.  I  allude  to  the  great  num- 
ber of  implicit  acts  ever  proceeding  in  the  mind  :  acts, 
which  bear  most  importantly  on  the  agent's  happiness 
and  character,  and  of  which  nevertheless  he  is  wholly 


372  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

unaware.  It  will  be  remarked  also,  that  the  enjoyment 
which  results  from  the  thought  of  this  or  that  happy 
object,  continues  long  after  the  thought  itself  has  come 
to  an  end.  See  n.  96,  p.  203. 

I  have  already  said  that  the  question  before  us 
comes  in  fact  to  this:  —  Will  the  same  individual  man 
ordinarily  gain  or  lose  as  to  earthly  happiness,  in  pro- 
portion as  he  pursues  the  interior  life  ?  But  we  may 
in  fairness  add  even  a  second  qualification.  Let  us 
suppose,  that  a  man  has  for  years  been  plunged  in 
worldliness,  or  even  in  great  and  gross  sin.  The  grace 
of  God  efficaciously  touches  his  soul,  and  he  turns 
from  his  evil  ways.  Supposing  it  were  true  that, 
during  the  earlier  period  at  least  of  his  new  course, 
there  were  a  real  diminution  of  enjoyment; — this  fact 
in  all  fairness  should  be  put  down,  not  to  his  present 
piety,  but  to  his  past  recklessness  and  irreligion. 

On  the  whole  then  it  may  well  be  doubted,  whether 
in  any  one  case  it  can  truly  be  said  that  earthly  hap- 
piness is  diminished  by  the  practice  of  virtue.  That 
in  the  immense  majority  of  instances  at  least,  great 
increase  of  such  happiness  is  so  obtained,  cannot  admit 
of  fair  doubt. 

I  may  add  however  in  conclusion,  that  this  whole 
question  is  not  a  very  practical  one.  The  essential 
happiness,  to  which  a  good  Christian  looks,  belongs  to 
Heaven  and  not  to  Earth  ;  nor  would  it  in  any  way 
take  him  by  surprise,  if  it  were  necessary  to  make 
some  sacrifice  of  temporal  happiness,  in  order  to  his 
attaining  eternal.  There  are  two  collateral  matters 
indeed  which  are  of  great  moment  ;  but  on  these,  'after 
all  which  has  been  said,  there  can  be  no  possible 
doubt.  They  are  the  two  following : 

( 1 . )  We  have .  been  occupied,  during  this  Section, 
in  drawing  out  arguments  for  the  proposition,  that  our 
nature  has  been  formed  for  virtue.  One  of  these 
arguments  is,  that  God  has  so  specially,  and  in  such 
various  ways,  provided  for  the  happiness,  even  for  the 
earthly  happiness,  of  those  who  give  themselves  to 
Him.  This  proposition  at  all  events  will  (I  think)  be 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       373 

denied  by  none,  who  have  considered  what  we  have 
urged  in  its  behalf. 

(2.)  We  have  often  adverted  to  the  fact,  that 
ordinary  Christians  have  in  so  small  a  degree  the 
moral  power,  of  persevering  in  their  interior  course, 
without  the  help  of  pleasurable  emotion.  This  being 
so,  it  is  a  fact  of  very  great  importance  to  the  spiritual 
life,  that  such  men  can  always  obtain  quite  enough  of 
rest  and  solace  in  the  service  of  God,  to  give  them  the 
fullest  moral  power  of  persevering  in  their  high  enter- 
prise. And  this  has  been  (I  hope)  most  abundantly  shewn 
in  the  present  Section.  It  is  quite  manifest,  from  what 
has  been  said,  that  every  one  has  full  moral  power 
(if  he  pleases)  to  make  God's  service  his  one  central 
and  pervasive  object:  the  object,  which  influences  all 
his  deeper  emotions ;  which  gives  zest  and  animation 
to  the  main  current  of  his  life. 

155.  Some  Catholic  philosophers,  in  considering 
the  imperfect  beatitude  attainable  on  earth,  seem  to 
consider  it  as  consisting,  very  far  more  in  the  prospect 
of  future  felicity,  than  in  the  enjoyment  of  present 
peace  :  nay  they  speak  of  it,  as  though  they  placed  it 
almost  exclusively  in  the  former.*  A  few  words  should 
be  said  on  this  statement,  were  it  only  in  deference 
to  the  authority  of  those  Catholics  who  have  main- 
tained it.  Now  this  proposition,  that  our  present 
happiness  mainly  consists  in  our  hope  of  future  Bliss, 
may  be  understood  in  three  different  senses.  Let  us 
consider  them  in  order. 

First  it  may  be  understood  (so  to  speak)  in  a  ne- 
gative sense.  The  statement  intended  may  be  this ; 
that  the  happiness  of  a  good  man  would  be  utterly 
destroyed,  if  he  had  not  solid  and  substantial  grounds 
for  expecting  its  continuance ;  nay,  and  that  it  would 
be  most  terribly  diminished,  unless  he  had  grounds  for 

*  So  Solimani :  "  Vitse  hujus  felicitas  sita  potissimt  est  in  prcemii  post 
obi  turn  obtinendi  spe  minim  e  fallaci,  quae  morum  integritate  nitatur."  Vol. 
ii.  p.  232.  On  the  other  hand,  Dmowski  speaks  of  "  imperfecta  beatitudinis 
species,  quse  in  vitd  ex  virtute  et  rationis  pnescripto  peractA,  cum  spe 
futurae  et  perfectse  felicitatis  assequendae,  consistit."  Vol.  iii.  p.  29. 


374  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

expecting  after  life  that  completeness  and  intensity 
of  Bliss,  to  which  we  look  forward  under  the  Gospel. 
In  this  sense,  no  thoughtful  Christian  can  doubt  the 
proposition.  It  is  true  that  a  worldly  man  is  able  to 
possess  great  enjoyment,  though  he  have  means  of 
knowing  that  nothing  can  be  more  gloomy  than  his 
prospects  after  death.  But  this  is  because  of  the  phe- 
nomenon to  which  we  have  so  often  referred  ;  viz.  that 
worldly  men  have  a  wonderful  power  of 'tot 'ally  forgetting 
themselves  and  their  own  interior,  while  they  throw 
themselves  eagerly,  for  gratification,  on  the  various 
objects  of  sense  or  of  worldly  pleasure.  It  is  the  cha- 
racteristic of  a  good  man,  that  he  does  look  within ; 
that  he  does  contemplate  his  own  state  and  prospects. 
If  then  that  state  and  those  prospects  are  of  so  miserably 
gloomy  a  character  as  above  supposed,  his  wretched- 
ness must  be  intolerable. 

A  second  sense,  in  which  the  above  proposition 
may  be  understood,  is  the  following.  '  Of  all  those 
'  various  spiritual  enjoyments,  which  render  Christ's 
'  yoke  easy  and  His  burden  light,  the  one  main  and 
'  principal  enjoyment,  is  the  looking  forward  to  our 
4  future  Reward.'  In  this  sense  the  proposition  appears 
to  me  very  doubtful.  It  is  quite  certain  of  course,  that 
the  prospect  of  Beatitude  is  a  most  important  consti- 
tuent in  the  good  man's  present  happiness  ;  but  is  it 
the  chief,  the  almost  sole,  constituent  ?  This  is  the 
precise  question  which  we  are  here  asking. 

That  the  prospect  of  heavenly  Bliss  is  a  most  im- 
portant constituent  in  the  just  man's  happiness,  is  (I 
say)  quite  certain.  The  Propension  of  Self-charity  is 
gratified  almost  exclusively  by  this  thought.  Self- 
assertion  also  receives  much  gratification  from  looking 
to  the  future.  Personal  Love  again  receives  pleasure, 
from  the  thought  of  that  time,  when  the  mutual  love  of 

O  ' 

God  and  man  will  be  so  far  more  perfect.  Love  of  the 
Marvellous  looks  with  keenest  delight  to  the  thought 
of  those  wonders  that  are  to  be  revealed.  All  our 
Propensions,  so  far  as  they  agree  in  seeking  pleasure 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.      375 

and  recoiling  from  pain,  are  drawn  most  powerfully  to 
the  thought  of  that  happy  Life,  where  all  suffering  shall 
be  absent  and  all  joy  abound. 

All  this  is  undoubtedly  true :  yet  still  I  cannot  but 
think  it  doubtful,  whether  this  thought  be  the  chief 
part  of  a  good  man's  earthly  happiness.     I  cannot  but 
think  that  an  interior  man  would  speak  somewhat  as 
follows.     *  Truly  it  is  a  happy  thing,  the  looking  for- 
4  ward  to  future  Bliss ;  and  yet  the  chief  part  of  my 
4  present   happiness   arises   less   from   this   than  from 
'  other  things.     It  arises  rather  from  the  close  bond 
4  of  love,  which  now  unites  me  to  my  dearest  Saviour  ; 
*  from  my  consciousness  of  His  tender  affection,  and 
4  niy  power  of  in  some  degree  returning  that  affection. 
It   arises   from   my    basking   in  the  sunshine   (as  it 
were)  of  my  Creator's  approval.     It  arises  from  that 
communion  with  God  in  prayer,  which  I  so  constantly 
enjoy  ;  and  from  that  far  closer  communion  with  Him, 
which  is  imparted  in  the  Holy  Eucharist.     It  arises 
from  my  consciousness  of  a  will,  at  peace  with  itself, 
and  submitting  with  absolute  resignation  to  the  Pro- 
4  vidence  of  God  ;  a  will,  not  torn  asunder  by  conflict- 
4  ing  emotions,  but  fixed  uudividedly  on  my  True  End.' 
I  am   inclined   to   think   this  would   be   the   true 
account  of  the  case  ;  though  I  am  far  from  speaking 
with  any  confidence,  and  the  matter  at  last  is  of  small 
moment.    An  argument  for  my  opinion  may  be  grounded 
on  this  fact.     Suppose  a  good  man  is  oppressed   by 
some   most   severe   trial ;    bodily  torment,    or   mental 
anguish.     What  is  that  thought,  to  which  he  has  in- 
stinctive  recourse   for   alleviation  ?  does  he   turn   his 
thoughts  to  the  Bliss  which  is  in  store  for  him  here- 
after,— the  wonders  of  the  Beatific  Vision, — the  absence 
of  all  pain,  which  is  to  be  his  endless  privilege  ?    Surely 
he  rather  turns  to  the  contemplation  of  Christ  Crucified ; 
of  his  Saviour  dying,  and  dying  for  his  love.     What  is 
the  special  charm  of  that  thought  ?     Doubtless,  that  it 
enables  him  to  value  that  Saviour's  present  love,  and  to 
elicit  happy  acts  of  open-hearted  confidence  and  col- 
loquy. 


376  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

(3.)  We  have  now  considered  two  different  sei, 
in  which  the  proposition  before  us  may  be  intended. 
In  the  first  sense,  it  is  most  undeniably  true  ;  in  the 
second,  I  am  inclined  (though  with  diffidence)  to  dissent 
from  it.  But  there  is  a  third  sense  also  imaginable,  of 
the  following  kind.  It  may  have  been  intended  then 
to  say,  that  at  last  the  possession  of  present  enjoyment 
is  no  matter  of  great  moment ;  that  all  men  have  full 
moral  power  (by  means  of  grace)  to  work  steadily  for 
God,  with  a  future  reward  in  prospect,  even  though 
there  were  little  or  no  immediate  happiness  to  cheer 
them  in  their  course.  From  this  view  I  most  strongly 
and  confidently  dissent ;  and  I  am  quite  certain  that  a 
very  little  examination  of  phenomena  will  suffice  to  dis- 
prove it.  But  on  this  head  I  need  not  here  enlarge  ;  as 
everything  which  has  been  said,  or  will  be  said,  on 
the  moral  inability  of  ordinary  Christians  to  tarry  on 
an  interior  life  through  long  -  continued  gloom  and 
depression,  is  really  said  in  opposition  to  any  such  view. 

156.  You  will  remember  a  criticism  which  we  made 
early  in  the  Chapter,  (see  n.  93,  p.  198)  on  a  psychologi- 
cal proposition  implied  by  St.  Thomas.  It  is  this  :  that 
all  those  pleasures,  which  are  not  obtained  by  bodily 
contact,  are  enjoyed  by  means  of  no  closer  possession, 
than  our  mere  belief  in  the  existence  of  their  object. 
Thus  the  pleasures  of  vain-glory  are  fully  enjoyed, 
through  my  confident  belief  that  others  admire  and 
value  me  :  nor  is  it  possible  to  obtain  a  closer  contact 
with  the  pleasurable  object,  than  this  mere  intellectual 
conviction  of  its  existence.  On  this  we  remarked,  that 
St.  Thomas  certainly  makes  too  broad  and  general  a 
statement :  for  instance  Love  of  Knowledge  is  not  really 
and  solidly  gratified,  by  our  mere  belief  that  we  possess 
a  true  and  deep  philosophy;  the  philosophy  must  be 
true  and  deep,  or  else  the  Propension  (in  the  case  at 
least  of  all  higher  intellects)  is  the  cause  of  suffering 
instead  of  gratification. 

We  are  now  enabled  to  add  one  or  two  further 
instances  of  the  same  truth.  Thus,  consider  that  peace, 
which  pious  men  enjoy,  from  the  harmonious  rest  of 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       377 

their  Propensions  in  God.  This  great  blessing  is  not 
really  enjoyed,  by  our  merely  believing  in  its  existence. 
A  self-deceiving  fanatic,  e.  g\,  may  be  very  confident 
that  he  possesses  this  heavenly  gift,  when  he  is  really  a 
pivy  to  the  tormenting  emotions  of  pride,  envy,  and  a 
hundred  others.  In  order  to  enjoy  this  deep  repose,  our 
propensions  must  be  resting  harmoniously  in  the  invi- 
sible world ;  and  it  will  by  no  means  suffice,  that  we 
believe  the  case  to  be  so.  Or  take  again  that  happy 
temperament  which  many  men  possess,  and  to  which  I 
have  alluded  in  n.  154  (p.  371).  We  do  not  enjoy 
the  pleasures  thence  accruing,  by  merely  believing  that 
ours  is  such  a  temperament ;  unless  it  really  be  so,  those 
pleasures  escape  our  grasp. 

It  is  not  clear  however  that  in  either  of  these  cases 
we  have  added  to  the  number  of  those  Propensions  (see 
n.  93,  (p.  198),  which  are  physical  without  being  corpo- 
real ;  of  those  Propensions,  in  other  words,  which  require 
for  their  gratification  some  far  closer  contact  with  their 
object  than  mere  belief  in  its  existence,  while  yet  that 
contact  is  not  of  a  corporeal  kind.  It  is  not  clear,  I  say, 
in  regard  to  either  of'  the  two  instances  just  given  as 
exceptions  to  St.  Thomas'  statement,  that  they  enable 
us  to  enlarge  our  list  of  those  Propensions,  which  are 
thus  '  physical '  without  being  '  corporeal/ 

The  first  instance  most  certainly  does  not  enable  us 
to  do  so  :  for  this  blessing  of  inward  peace  (as  we  have 
abundantly  seen)  is  not  obtained  by  the  gratification  of 
any  one  special  Propension,  but  by  the  harmonious 
agency  of  all  those  which  are  more  powerful  and  per- 
vasive. 

In  regard  to  the  second  instance,  there  may  be  greater 
doubt.  It  may  be  said,  and  perhaps  with  truth,  that 
persons,  possessing  this  happy  temperament,  do  really 
receive  enjoyment  from  a  separate  Propension.  We 
may  assign,  perhaps,  a  Propension,  distinct  from  any 
other,  which  we  may  call  'Love  of  Existence;'  and 
which  expresses  the  susceptibility  of  pleasure  which 
such  men  possess,  from  the  mere  fact  of  living,  so 
long  as  there  is  no  special  bodily  or  mental  anguish  to 


378  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

destroy  that  pleasure.  This  Propension,  if  it  be  justly 
assigned,  is  undoubtedly  'physical;'  and  yet  probably 
not  'corporeal.'  It  is  probably  not  'corporeal;'  for 
these  men's  happy  temperament  seems  attributable  to 
some  far  deeper  reason  than  mere  bodily  health.  Yet, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  undoubtedly  a  '  physical '  Pro- 
pension;  for  it  derives  its  pleasure,  not  from  the  fact 
that  such  men  believe  themselves  to  be  living,  but  from 
the  fact  that  they  are  living.  One  thing  however  should 
be  added.  Even  if  this  theory  of  a  special  Propension 
be  true,  still  the  principal  superiority,  in  point  of  earthly 
happiness,  which  these  men  possess  over  others,  does 
not  consist  in  their  possessing  this  special  Propension  ; 
but  far  more,  in  the  singular  degree  of  enjoyment  which 
each  one  of  their  Propensions  receives,  from  possessing 
its  appropriate  object. 

At  last  then,  the  exceptions  to  St.  Thomas'  state- 
ment would  appear  to  be  but  few ;  and  the  cases  are 
still  fewer,  of  a  physical  Propension  which  is  not  cor- 
poreal. All  the  Propensions  indeed,  which  we  have 
called  bodily,  are  undoubtedly  'physical;'  and  so  are  all 
those  which  we  have  called  by  the  general  name  c  Love 
of  Beauty.'  But  all  these  are  'corporeal'  also;  they 
are  gratified  by  the  bodily  contact  of  their  objects,  and 
can  be  fully  gratified  in  no  other  way.  The  sound  of 
the  music  must  reach  our  bodily  ears;  —  the  sight  of  the 
beautiful  scenery  must  reach  our  bodily  eyes; — or  our 
enjoyment  is  incomplete.  On  the  other  hand,  those 
which  we  have  called  the  '  higher  Propensions,'  are 
certainly  not  '  corporeal ; '  but  then  neither  ( with  one 
exception)  are  they  '  physical.7  If  we  look  through  the 
catalogue  given  in  n.  145,  we  shall  find  that  Propen- 
sion so  often  cited  by  us,  the  'Love  of  Knowledge,'  to  be 
the  only  one,  which  is  not  most  adequately  and  amply 
gratified,  by  belief  in  its  object's  existence.  I  gratify 
Love  of  Approbation,  by  firmly  believing  that  I  am 
approved  by  God  or  men  ;  nor  can  I  derive  from  that 
Propension  any  fuller  gratification.  I  gratify  Personal 
4  Amor  Concupiscentise,'  by  firmly  believing  that  my 
Divine  Friend,  or  my  human,  returns  my  affection ;  nor 


ON  THE  ADAPTATION  OF  OUR  NATURE  TO  VIRTUE.       379 

is  closer  contact  possible,  between  that  Propension  and 
its  object.  It  will  be  desirable,  that  you  should  your- 
selves take  the  trouble  of  going  through  the  whole  list, 
and  satisfying  yourselves  that  I  have  spoken  truly  in 
what  I  have  now  asserted. 

This  fact  is  sufficiently  remarkable,  to  serve  as  the 
basis  of  a  further  argument  (and  it  will  be  the  8th)  for 
our  general  proposition ;  viz.,  that  human  nature  was  con- 
stituted for  the  practice  of  virtue.  It  might  have  been 
thought  beforehand,  that  earthly  objects,  from  being  so 
much  nearer  at  hand,  would  be  able  to  come  into  far 
closer  contact  (if  I  may  so  express  myself)  with  our 
various  Propensions;  and  that  our  happiness  would 
therefore  be  far  greater,  from  fixing  them  on  visible, 
than  on  invisible,  objects.  We  have  found,  however,  in 
regard  to  all  those  Propensions  which  are  really  of  great 
importance  to  happiness,  —  in  regard  to  all  those  Pro- 
pensions  which  unite  power  with  pervasiveness,  —  that 
(with  one  single  exception)  the  case  is  totally  otherwise. 
The  ambitious,  the  vain-glorious,  nay,  even  the  covetous 
man,  cannot  by  possibility  come  into  closer  contact  with 
the  object  of  his  desire,  than  is  obtained  by  belief  in  its 
existence.  But  this  is  the  precise  nature  of  that  con- 
tact with  Heavenly  Objects,  which  every  believer  has 
within  his  power.  To  believe  firmly,  to  realize  keenly, 
the  truths  of  religion; — this  befalls  every  individual,  in 
proportion  as  he  advances  in  virtue.  In  proportion 
therefore  as  we  do  so  advance,  all  our  higher  Propen- 
sions receive  in  a  greater  degree  that  very  gratification, 
which  is  literally  the  only  kind  of  gratification  permitted 
them  by  their  very  constitution. 

There  is  one  exception,  as  we  have  seen;  viz.,  Love 
of  Knowledge.  If  it  were  really  true  then,  that  the  doc- 
trines of  Christian  Philosophy  and  Theology  are  less  in 
agreement  with  those  necessary  truths,  which  reason 
declares, —  or  with  those  deep  facts  of  human  nature 
which  experience  testifies, — or  that  they  are  less  concor- 
dant and  mutually  harmonious,-  -than  the  doctrines  of 
some  unchristian  philosophy,  then  undoubtedly  the  mere 
fact  of  our  believing  the  case  to  be  otherwise  would  not 


380  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

avail  us.  But  I  may  here  assume,  that  the  fact  is  widely 
otherwise  ;  and  since  it  is  widely  otherwise,  this  Pro- 
pension  also,  Love  of  Knowledge,  affords  far  deeper 
gratification  to  the  genuine  student  of  Christian  Theo- 
logy, than  to  the  student  of  any  human  philosophy 
which  has  ever  been  devised. 

The  general  fact  which  we  have  been  treating, — I 
mean  the  dependence  of  our  higher  Propensions,  for 
their  gratification,  merely  on  our  belief  m  their  objects' 
existence, — is  closely  connected  (as  we  shall  see  in  our 
theological  course)  with  that  great  doctrine,  Justi- 
fication by  Faith;  a  doctrine,  on  which  St.  Paul  lays 
such  prominent  and  such  singular  stress. 

Eight  arguments  then  have  been  adduced  for  our 
proposition,  that  human  nature  is  formed  for  virtue. 
In  the  course  of  evolving  those  arguments,  various  psy- 
chological facts  have  been  stated  and  dwelt  upon,  which 
you  will  find,  I  think,  of  extreme  value,  in  our  subse- 
quent theological  enquiries. 


381 


SECTION  VI. 

On  the  Marks  of  Moral  Degradation  in  our  Nature  as 
it  now  exists. 

157.  The  considerations  of  the  last  Section  lead  to 
an  obvious  difficulty.    If  our  nature  is  so  unmistakeably, 
indeed  so  eminently,  formed  for  virtue  and  perfection, 
how  is  it,  that  imperfection  and  forgetfulness  of  God 
are  so  widely,   so  awfully,  prevalent  throughout   the 
world  ?     Here  indeed  we  are  brought  face  to  face  with 
that  master  difficulty, — so  saddening  to  the  heart,  and 
so  perplexing  to  the  intellect, — the  existence  of  evil. 
In  every  part  (I  might  almost  say  in  every  corner)  of 
Theology,    this   difficulty   meets   us   in  one  or   other 
development ;  and,  even  in  its  least  formidable  shape, 
is  utterly  insoluble.     Let  us  take  a  review  then  of  this 
difficulty,  as  it  here  encounters  and  amazes  us. 

158.  What  then  are  those  facts  which  we  learn, 
not   from   Revelation,  not  from    any  theological  pre- 
miss, but  from  direct  and  undeniable  experience  ?     On 
the  one  hand   all  men  see,  and    must  see,  with   the 
greatest   clearness,    the    obligation    of   obeying    their 
Moral  Faculty;  many  will  promptly  admit,  that  their 
earthly  happiness  is  best  promoted  by  such  obedience  ; 
every  Theist  in  the  world  confesses,  that  his  eternal 
happiness   is   simply  dependent   on  it.     And   yet   all 
mankind  with  one  consent,  it  is  hardly  too  much  to 
say,  have  agreed  to  live  for  this  world,  instead  of  living 
for  duty  and  for  God.     We  have  seen  how  undeniable 
it  is,  that  the  heathens  possessed  the  elementary  idea  of 
moral  obligation.     We  have  seen  (n.  68,  p.  141)  how 
immediate  is  the  inference,  that  if  there  be  such  a  thing, 
it  should  be  the  one  guide  of  life.     And  yet  we  see 
with  equal  clearness,  that  no  one  of  them  on  record, 
remaining  a  heathen,  has  ever  so  much  as  aimed  at 


382  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

enthroning  moral  obligation  in  its  one  legitimate  place, 
the  place  of  supreme  and  absolute  authority.  Indeed 
had  any  one  of  them  attempted  to  do  so,  I  am  persuaded 
that  his  renunciation  of  heathenism,  and  belief  in  his 
Creator's  Existence,  must  have  immediately  followed.* 
But  why  dwell  on  the  case  of  heathen,  when  the 
phenomena  of  the  Christian  world  are  even  more 
amazing  ?  Here  again  I  am  not  at  all  assuming  the 
truth  of  Revelation ;  but  only  the  fact,  that  certain 
multitudes  of  men  firmly  believe  it  to  be  true.  Take 
the  case  then  of  some  Catholic  country,  and  what  do 
we  find?  The  whole  nation  is  firmly  convinced,  that 
this  life  is  but  a  span ;  that  an  eternity  of  bliss  or 
misery  depends  on  their  conduct  here ;  that  every 
moment  therefore  is  worse  than  wasted,  which  is  not 
devoted  to  growth  in  perfection.  This  is  the  belief  of 
all;  and  what  is  the  practise  of  the  great  majority? 
It  is  difficult  to  know  which  would  be  greater,  their 
horror  of  a  man  who  should  not  believe  it,  or  their 
disgust  at  any  one,  living  in  the  world,  who  should 
practise  it.  Take  the  case  of  any  layman,  who  should 
merely  exhibit  in  practice  what  all  his  fellow-believers 
admit  in  theory ;  who  should  shew,  that  to  him  national 
greatness,  or  intellectual  power,  or  ancient  family,  or 
acquired  wealth,  is  worthless  as  the  seaweed,  except  so 
far  as  they  affect  (for  good  or  evil)  the  advance  of 
sanctity :  —  how  will  he  be  regarded  by  the  great  ma- 
jority of  his  fellow-laymen?  on  the  whole,  with  wonder 
and  something  like  disgust.  What  is  the  time,  or  what 
the  country,  however  exclusively  Catholic,  in  which  the 
immense  majority  of  men  have  not  pursued  objects  of 
this  world, — their  own  temporal  support  or  advance- 
ment, or  their  country's  temporal  aggrandizement,  or  the 
interests  of  their  political  party, — with  far  greater  zeal 
and  far  greater  interest,  than  the  sanctification,  whether 
of  themselves  or  of  others  ?  What  is  this  deep  mystery  ? 
what  is  this  broad  gulf  which  seems,  as  if  by  some  fated 

*  The  case  of  the  heathen  is  to  be  considered  at  length — by  the  light 
of  Theology,  Experience,  and  Reason, — in  our  theological  work,  '  de  actibus 
humanis.' 


ON  OUR  MARKS  OF  MORAL  DEGRADATION.     383 

necessity,  always  and  everywhere  to  exhibit  itself, 
between  what  man  can  do  and  ought  to  do — between 
this  on  the  one  hand,  and  what  they  choose  to  do  on 
the  other  hand  ? 

159.  I  really  do  not  think  that  Revelation  has  in- 
creased this  difficulty,  though  certainly  it  has  not  lessened 
it.  I  have  already  viewed  it,  as  it  is  shewn  simply  by  the 
light  of  experience  :  that  you  may  see  how  it  stands 
viewed  by  the  light  of  Revelation,  I  will  ask  you  three 
questions.  (1.)  Theology  teaches  us,  that  all  men  have 
the  full  moral  power  of  arriving  at  belief  in  the  One 
True  God,  —  of  consistently  avoiding  mortal  sin, — and, 
through  that  belief  and  avoidance,  of  attaining  Eternal 
Salvation.  I  ask — is  there  one  single  heathen  on  record, 
who,  unassisted  by  Theistic  missionaries,  has  exercised 
this  moral  power  which  is  possessed  by  all  ?  (2. )  Theo- 
logy tells  us,  that  all  Catholics  at  least  have  the  full 
moral  power,  to  make  their  own  perfection  the  one  main 
work  arid  occupation  of  their  lives.  Now — in  regard 
to  that  constituent  part  of  the  Church  to  which  I  have 
the  honour  to  belong,  I  mean  the  laity,  —  I  will  ask  this 
question.  I  will  not  ask,  how  large  a  proportion  of  us 
make  this  the  chief  occupation  of  our  lives,  but  how 
many  make  it  any  part?  How  great  a  proportion  is 
there,  of  laymen  living  in  the  world,  who  give  themselves 
up,  say  even  once  in  the  week,  to  such  occupations  as 
the  following?  I  mean — the  carefully  examining  our- 
selves, the  carefully  considering  our  habitual  course  of 
life,  in  order  to  discover  our  latent  faults;  the  careful 
consideration,  the  diligent  asking  of  advice  at  the 
hand  of  spiritual  guides,  as  to  the  best  means  of  cor- 
recting those  faults ;  the  further  examining  ourselves, 
as  to  our  diligence  in  applying  such  remedies.  In 
regard  to  our  worldly  occupations,  we  all  know  what  is 
meant  by  steadily  applying  ourselves  to  their  pursuit; 
we  know  what  is  meant,  by  a  man  really  devoting  him- 
self to  a  merchant's  calling,  or  a  lawyer's,  or  a  poli- 
tician's, or  a  tradesman's.  What  I  am  asking  is,  how 
great  is  the  proportion  of  us  laymen,  who  really  devote 
ourselves  to  our  Christian  calling?  who  really  make 


384  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

an  occupation  of  such  inward  exercises,  in  the  same 
sense  in  which  we  make  an  occupation  of  our  worldly 
trade  or  profession  ?  I  say,  even  in  the  same  sense,  how- 
ever less  in  degree  ?  We  all  agree  absolutely  in  theory, 
that  the  divine  occupation  is  immeasurably  more  im- 
portant than  the  secular ;  do  we  not  agree  almost  as 
absolutely  in  practice,  by  neglecting  the  former  and  pur- 
suing the  latter  ?  by  neglecting  that  which  we  hold  to  be 
infinitely  important,  because  of  our  deep  interest  in  those, 
which  we  know  to  IDC  utterly  valueless  in  comparison  ? 

My  third  question  shall  be  this.  Theology  tells  us, 
that  the  whole  world  has  full  moral  power  of  being 
good ;  I  ask,  why  is  it  that,  in  Scripture  and  ascetical 
writers,  it  is  assumed,  quite  as  a  first  principle,  that  the 
world  is  of  course  bad  ? 

160.  It  would  be  simply  absurd,  if  I  professed  to 
say  one  word  by  way  of  attempting  to  solve  this  diffi- 
culty. But  there  is  a  relevant  psychological  fact  to 
which,  on  various  grounds,  I  must  solicit  your  very 
particular  attention.  It  is  this:  —  our  nature  is  very 
strongly  biassed  in  the  wrong  direction;  it  is  very  far 
less  powerful  towards  the  practice  of  good,  than  towards 
the  reckless  and  unbridled  pursuit  of  pleasure.  In  so 
great  a  degree  is  this  true,  that  simple  quiescence, 
simple  abstinence  from  effort  and  struggle  towards  good, 
will  by  itself  absolutely  ensure  a  constant  progress 
towards  what  is  evil.  He  who  shall  abandon  himself, 
without  special  pains  and  effort,  to  float  down  the  cur- 
rent of  his  Propensions,  will  most  infallibly  advance  by 
steady  steps  from  bad  to  worse ;  and  (unless  he  change 
his  course)  he  will  assuredly  close  with  a  most  miserable 
end. 

This  fact  is  of  course  no  solution  of  the  above  diffi- 
culty: for  the  question  at  once  recurs, — since  men 
know  very  well  that,  without  special  struggle,  they  get 
worse  and  worse, — and  since,  by  help  of  prayer  and 
grace,  all  have  the  fullest  moral  power  to  put  forth  such 
struggle,  —  why  does  so  great  a  majority  fail  of  doing 
so?  The  fact,  just  stated,  fully  explains  undoubtedly, 
why  it  is  that,  without  special  struggle,  men  fall  from 


ON  OUR  MARKS  OF  MORAL  DEGRADATION.     385 

bad  to  worse ;  but  it  does  not  even  tend  to  explain,  why 
such  struggle  is  not  in  fact  more  universally  put  forth. 
However,  for  its  own  sake  it  deserves  our  most  careful 
attention;  and  it  will  be  found  (I  think)  to  throw  a 
flood  of  light,  on  some  of  the  (otherwise)  darkest  points 
of  Theology.  Let  us  consider  it  then  with  some  care, 
as  an  observed  psychological  fact. 

161.  The  first  phenomenon,  to  which  I  beg  your 
attention,  is  this.  Our  will  itself  is  far  weaker,  in  its  aim 
at  virtue,  than  in  its  aim  at  pleasure.  Let  us  bring  two 
different  cases  into  juxtaposition.  A  devoted  and 
enterprising  officer,  wholly  destitute  however  of  all  pious 
principle,  goes  through  a  military  campaign.  His  suf- 
ferings, both  in  great  matters  and  small,  are  severe; 
his  dangers  constant ;  he  encounters  the  whole,  with 
unflinching  courage  and  unbending  resolution.  What 
are  his  sustaining  influences?  Such  as  these: — the 
desire  of  his  countrymen's  applause;  —  ardent  attach- 
ment to  his  country; — desire  of  his  own  esteem; — and 
other  similar  motives.  He  undergoes  perhaps  au 
excruciating  operation,  without  a  groan :  why  ?  because 
it  would  lower  his  self-respect,  it  would  keenly  wound 
his  pride,  if  he,  a  brave  soldier,  could  be  overcome  by 
pain.  In  the  same  army  serves  a  good  and  zealous  mis- 
sionary priest;  enduring  the  same  sufferings;  exposed 
to  the  same  dangers ;  called  to  constant  and  most  trying 
exertion,  for  the  service  of  God :  and  he  also  perhaps 
undergoes  a  severe  operation.  Now  I  ask,  what  is  this 
priest's  experience?  What  is  his  sustaining  power?  It 
is  prayer.  Let  him  give  up  the  practice  of  prayer, 
how  great  will  be  his  power  of  working  for  God? 
Literally,  or  almost  literally,  none  at  all.  By  help  of 
prayer  no  doubt,  his  will  may  be  far  more  firmly  fixed 
on  God,  than  any  worldly  man's  on  his  worldly  objects : 
but  let  him  cease  from  prayer,  he  almost  ceases  from 
God's  service.  Nay  I  will  ask  this  : — have  any  of  us 
the  moral  power,  of  so  much  as  enduring,  without  re- 
sentment, one  passing  insult  from  a  companion, — unless 
we  address  ourselves  to  God  and  call  prayer  to  our  aid  ? 

Now  it  is  sometimes  assigned,  as  a  reason  for  this 

c  c 


386  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

contrast,  that  visible  objects  so  press  upon  our  atten- 
tion; and  that  the  invisible  has  (from  its  very  nature) 
so  much  less  power  of  influencing  the  will.  But  you 
will  find,  on  consideration,  that  both  soldier  and  priest 
have  to  overcome  the  visible  by  thinking  of  the  invisible. 
The  frequent  perils,  the  constant  privations,  the  agoniz- 
ing pain,  all  these  surely  are  visible  and  palpable  in- 
ducements to  cowardice  ;  they  are  so  in  one  case  no 
less  than  in  the  other.  On  the  other  hand,  on  what 
does  the  soldier  fix  his  thoughts,  to  support  him  under 
these  most  visible  trials  ?  His  distant  country ; — • 
applause  of  his  absent  countrymen ;  —  sense  of  his  own 
dignity; — how  can  these  be  called  visible  objects?  The 
godless  soldier,  I  repeat,  no  less  than  the  pious  priest, 
contends  against  the  visible  by  thinking  of  the  invisible. 

Nor  again  can  it  be  said,  that  the  soldier  is  more 
firmly  convinced  than  the  priest,  as  to  the  reality  and 
value  of  his  objects.  Which  of  these  two,  do  you  sup- 
pose, is  the  firmer?  A  soldier's  conviction  that  France 
or  England  deserves  his  love; — that  his  countrymen's 
applause  will  crown  his  efforts ; — that  his  own  dignity  is 
great  and  elevated; — or  the  priest's  firm  faith,  that  God 
is  an  Object  worthy  of  being  loved  and  that  God's 
approbation  is  to  be  most  dearly  prized. 

Another  explanation  is  sometimes  attempted,  by 
those  who  are  unwilling  to  believe  the  doctrine  for 
which  I  am  arguing.  They  say,  that  Concupiscence  is 
an  adversary  of  tremendous  power;  and  that  in  pursuing 
virtue  a  man  is  exposed  constantly  to  those  powerful 
assaults  of  Concupiscence,  from  which,  in  pursuing 
worldly  objects,  he  is  altogether  free.  We  have  not 
yet  considered  precisely  the  meaning  of  this  word  '  Con- 
cupiscence ;'  but  we  may  say  generally,  that  it  signifies 
the  assemblage  of  those  solicitations,  which  are  put  forth 
by  the  Sensitive  Appetite,  against  the  course  of  virtue 
and  the  service  of  God.  And  this  being  Concupiscence, 
I  maintain  that  the  attempt  to  explain,  by  means  of  Con- 
cupiscence, those  phenomena  to  which  I  have  directed 
your  attention,  is  to  the  full  as  untenable,  as  are  those 
other  explanations  which  we  have  already  refuted. 


ON  OUR  MARKS  OF  MORAL  DEGRADATION.     387 

Those  who  dwell  so  much  on  the  power  of  Con- 
cupiscence, seem  most  strangely  to  forget  the  great 
power,  exercised  by  the  Sensitive  Appetite,  in  behalf  of 
virtue.  To  give  merely  one  instance  of  what  I  mean ; — 
they  seem  to  forget  altogether  the  sweetness  of  sensible 
devotion  (see  n.  130,  p.  257).  To  fix  our  ideas,  I  will 
direct  your  attention  to  one  phenomenon,  which  is 
common  enough  in  the  interior  life.  We  must  all  have 
experienced  at  times  something  of  this  kind.  We  are 
perhaps  in  a  state  of  happy  recollectedness ;  dwelling 
on  the  thought  of  that  Love  which  is  entertained  to- 
wards us,  by  our  Creator,  our  Redeemer,  our  Heavenly 
Mother.  We  may  even  reflect  upon  our  state ;  we 
may  say  to  ours.elves,  '  How  incomparably  sweeter 
and  happier  are  these  true  pleasures,  than  are  the 
polluted  waters  of  pride  and  vainglory,  at  which  we 
so  often  slake  our  thirst.'  And  yet  we  feel,  at  the  very 
same  time,  that  (by  a  kind  of  spiritual  gravitation)  we 
are  ever  tendings/Tom  the  former  to  the  latter ;  tending 
from  that,  which  we  practically  feel  to  be  happier  ;  and 
tending  to  that,  which  we  practically  feel  as  less  happy. 
The  fact  then  of  this  tendency  cannot  possibly  be  attri- 
buted to  the  agency  of  our  Sensitive  Appetite.  Our 
Sensitive  Appetite  is  now  not  only  not  opposed  to  virtue, 
but  soliciting  most  powerfully  in  its  favour;  and  yet 
our  Will  is  ever  tending  downwards.  We  feel  most 
intimately,  that,  without  prolonged  and  sustained  effort, 
the  dreaded  descent  is  practically  inevitable. 

162.  Such  then  is  the  present  constitution  of  our 
nature.  Our  Will,  in  pursuit  of-  pleasure,  is  firm, 
stable,  consistent ;  in  pursuit  of  virtue  (except  so  far 
as  we  bring  prayer  to  its  support)  is  most  weak,  most 
wayward  and  capricious.  On  its  weakness  we  have 
sufficiently  enlarged ;  it  was  the  first  phenomenon,  to 
which  I  asked  your  attention.  But  consider  also  a 
second  phenomenon,  its  waywardness  and  capricious- 
ness.  What  is  our  frequent  experience  ?  ouch  as 
this.  '  Can  I  be  the  same  man,  who  but  yesterday  had 
'  so  clear  a  vision  of  divine  things  ?  who  made  such 
4  successful  resistance  to  temptation  ?  who  elicited  such 


388  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

'  noble  acts  ?  To-day,  on  the  contrary,  I  seem  moved 
'  by  every  breath  of  emotion; — enslaved  to  the  most 
'  ignoble  tendencies  ; — helpless  and  resourceless  in  the 
4  direction  of  virtue.7 

Perhaps  indeed,  if  we  were  able  to  examine  care- 
fully all  the  facts,  we  should  ordinarily  find,  that  this 
contrast  depends  on  the  greater  or  less  degree  of  com- 
pleteness, with  which  we  have  exercised  ourselves 
through  the  day  in  the  spirit  of  prayer;  the  greater  or 
less  degree  of  humility  and  self-distrust,  with  which 
we  have  placed  our  sanctification  in  our  Creator's 
hands.  There  cannot  be  a  more  vital  doctrine  than 
this ; — the  intimate  connection  of  our  growth  in  sanctity, 
with  our  distrust  in  ourselves,  our  confidence  in  God, 
our  constancy  in  implicit  prayer  :  and  it  will  occupy  a 
most  prominent  place  in  our  theological  course.  But 
this  doctrine  does  not  essentially  affect  the  fact,  to 
which  I  am  now  directing  your  attention ;  for  as  a  matter 
of  experience,  how  vast  is  the  difference  between  one 
day  and  another,  as  to  mj  facility  of  giving  myself  is 
prayer.  We  seem  never  to  acquire  a  stable  habit  of 
prayer ;  any  permanent  or  reliable  facility  for  its  per- 
formance. To-day  it  is  quite  easy  to  me,  that  I  repose 
my  whole  trust  in  God :  while  to-morrow  the  preserving 
a  spirit  of  prayer  through  the  day,  is  like  rolling  a 
stone  up  a  hill ;  such  constant  struggle  and  effort  does 
it  require. 

In  reply  to  this  whole  statement,  (1)  of  the  will's 
weakness,  and  (2)  its  capriciousness,  in  the  practice  of 
good,  —  an  objection  of  the  following  kind  has  been 
sometimes  put  forth  ;  though  surely  it  is  a  most  hasty 
and  ill-considered  objection.  It  has  been  said,  that  the 
will  may  be  naturally  indeed  very  weak  towards  good; 
but  that  when  raised  to  the  sz//?er-natural  order  it  is 
strong  and  vigorous.  It  is  difficult  to  imagine  what 
can  be  meant  by  such  an  allegation.  Look  at  the 
missionary  priest,  who  has  served  us  for  our  illustra- 
tion ;  the  priest  who  accompanies  the  army  on  a 
military  campaign.  His  will  is  most  certainly  raised 
to  the  supernatural  order,  if  there  be  any  man  in  the 


ON  OUK  MARKS  OF  MORAL  DEGRADATION.     389 

world  whose  will  is  thus  raised.  Yet  it  was  in  regard 
to  him  that  we  decided,  as  of  a  thing  palpable  to 
experience,  that  without  prayer  his  strength  for  good 
is  as  nothing. 

163.  The  third  and  last  phenomenon  which  I  will 
adduce,  as  illustrating  the  present  proclivity  of  our 
nature  to  evil,  regards,  not  the  Will  but  the  Sensitive 
Appetite.  The  Propension  of  the  Flesh,  I  mean  that 
which  tempts  us  against  the  Sixth  Commandment,  differs 
in  various  most  important  respects  from  all  others.  A 
very  little  consideration  will  sufficiently  shew  this. 
Suppose  it  is  a  fast-day  :  who  ever  heard  of  the  notion 
that  the  mere  sight  of  meat, —  much  more  that  the  mere 
reading  about  it, — is  so  proximate  an  occasion  of  sin 
as  to  be  in  itself  mortal?  Or  (to  avoid  objections  which 
may  be  raised  against  this  particular  instance)  suppose 
I  were  a  Cistercian,  and  meat  were  always  unlawful  to 
me :  —  who  in  such  a  case  ever  heard  of  a  notion  like 
that  above  imagined  ?  Yet  we  all  know  the  frightful 
peril  involved,  in  allowing  ourselves  to  gaze  on  evil 
objects,  or  even  to  read  about  them,  in  matters  of 
impurity.  Or  let  me  suppose  the  case  of  a  Christian, 
who  was  once  in  the  habit  of  stealing,  and  by  help  of 
his  thefts  leading  a  comfortable  and  luxurious  life ;  but 
who  has  now  reformed,  and  belongs  to  some  strict  order. 
Who  ever  heard  that  the  contemplation  of  wealth, — the 
mere  looking  at  fine  equipages,  grand  appointments, 
handsome  houses,  —  produces  the  almost  inevitable 
effect,  of  reviving  the  passion  '  delectatio'  in  regard  to 
the  old  mortal  sin  ?  Yet  in  the  matter  of  impurity  such 
would  be  the  case.  Nay,  take  that  very  Propension, 
which  of  all  is  far  the  nearest  to  the  one  which  we  are 
considering; — take  the  desire  of  revenge,  as  it  exists  in 
an  Italian  or  Spaniard.  To  a  revengeful  man,  even  when 
reformed,  the  sight  of  his  enemy  might  doubtless  be  a 
great  occasion  of  sin :  but  surely  no  one  will  deny,  that 
such  a  man  may  read  the  account  of  murders  in 
general,  and  may  enter  too  into  every  detail  and  par- 
ticular of  some  individual  murder  where  the  parties 
concerned  are  quite  unknown  to  him, — without  so 


390  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

much  as  a  passing  temptation  to  his  old  sin.  How 
totally  opposite  is  our  nature,  in  regard  to  impurity  ! 
Indeed  spiritual  writers  universally  recognize  this  fact. 
As  one  instance  of  such  recognition,  they  will  never 
permit  any  such  detailed  consideration  of  past  sins 
under  this  head,  as  they  most  earnestly  recommend  in 
regard  to  all  other  sins  of  whatever  kind. 

164.  From  this  review,  I  cannot  hut  draw  an  infer- 
ence. Reason  shews  most  clearly,  that  our  nature  was 
formed  for  virtue ;  hut  I  think  Eeason  alone  would  also 
make  the  opinion  extremely  probable,  that  this  same 
nature  of  ours  has  received  some  wrench,  some  jar, 
some  disorganization ;  that  it  does  not  in  fact  wear  that 
very  shape,  those  very  proportions,  in  which  it  was 
originally  formed.  The  singular  weakness  and  capri- 
ciousness  of  our  Will  in  the  direction  of  virtue,  would 
by  itself  strongly  recommend  this  opinion  to  our  ac- 
ceptance. But  the  third  phenomenon  above  mentioned 
seems  to  give  even  stronger  grounds  for  its  support: 
for  this  particular  Pro  pension  seems  to  have  received 
quite  a  morbid  intensity ;  an  intensity  greatly  exceed- 
ing what  we  may  suppose  to  have  been  God's  original 
design. 

And  if  we  may  be  allowed  for  a  moment  to  enter 
on  the  ground  of  Revelation,  it  is  difficult  not  to  con- 
nect all  this  with  the  dogma  of  Original  Sin.  The 
third  phenomenon  above  stated  is  indeed  most  remark- 
able, in  connection  with  that  dogma.  It  is  through 
this  particular  Propension,  that  Original  Sin  is  propa- 
gated. Our  Nature  then  bears  upon  it,  as  we  may  say, 
the  stamp,  of  that  ignominy  and  degradation  in  which 
we  are  involved  by  coming  into  the  world;  in  that  the 
Propension,  whereby  we  come  into  the  world,  has  been 
thus  morbidly  exaggerated  and  perverted. 

We  shall  see  however  in  our  theological  course, 
that  there  is  no  question,  on  which  theologians  go  into 
a  greater  variety  of  opinions,  than  on  this.  That  our 
Nature  has  in  itself  suffered  at  all  from  the  Fall; — that 
we  have  lost  anything  except  certain  preternatural  gifts: 
— this  is  very  far  indeed  from  an  universally  admitted 


ON  OUR  MARKS  OF  MORAL  DEGRADATION.     391 

proposition.  And  those  theologians,  who  think  that  it 
has  suffered,  differ  from  each  other  in  no  slight  degree, 
as  to  the  particulars  in  which  that  suffering  exists. 
The  psychological  phenomena  then,  to  which  I  have 
now  drawn  your  attention,  will,  at  a  later  period,  give 
us  very  considerable  help,  in  our  theological  treatment 
of  this  question. 


392 


SECTION  VII. 
On  Certain  Philosophical  Terms. 

165.  This  last  Section  of  the  present  Chapter  will 
consist  of  two  parts,  totally  distinct  from  each  other. 
It  is  important  that  you  should  understand  the  meaning 
of  certain  philosophical  terms,  which  occur  in  ordinary 
theological  .works ;  and  this  seems  the  most  convenient 
place  for  explaining  them. 

The  first  of  these  terms  will  be  the  word  4  Nature;' 
a  term  which  we  have  already  frequently  used,  although 
we  have  not  yet  specially  considered  its  precise  meaning. 
No  one  can  say  this  is  an  insignificant  word,  in  refer- 
ence to  our  own  purpose ;  since  the  very  name  we  give 
to  our  present  course  is,  c  on  Nature  and  Grace.'  In- 
deed to  attempt  any  really  complete  discussion  of  this 
word,  would  bring  us  across  some  of  the  most  difficult 
philosophical  questions  which  exist.  But  perhaps  we 
may  find  it  possible  to  steer  clear  of  such  questions, 
while  yet  giving  a  practical  explanation  of  the  term, 
which  will  be  sufficient  for  our  own  exigencies. 

It  is  conceivable  that  God  might  have  so  made  me, 
that  there  should  be  no  kind  of  regularity  or  con- 
formity, in  the  processes  and  operations  of  my  mind 
and  my  body.  To-day  I  can  hardly  with  great  effort 
crawl  along  the  ground  ;  to-morrow  (without  any  in- 
trinsic change  in  my  body)  I  might  find  myself  flying 
in  the  air.  To-day  the  fire  warms  my  hands,  to- 
morrow it  nips  and  freezes  them.  To-day  I  derive 
pleasure  from  the  thought  of  being  liked  and  approved ; 
to-morrow  it  gives  me  pleasure  on  the  contrary,  to 
think  that  I  am  hated  both  by  God  and  man.  Had 
God  so  made  me,  I  should  have  had  no  'nature;'  to 
say  that  I  have  a  '  nature,'  implies  the  contradictory  to 


ON  CERTAIN  PHILOSOPHICAL  TERMS.  393 

any  such  supposition  as  that  just  made.  So  far  then,  it 
might  appear  that  my  '  nature  '  means  simply,  4  the 
assemblage  of  those  fixed  laws,  according  to  which  God 
appoints,  that  the  various  operations  and  modifications 
of  my  mind  and  body  shall  proceed.' 

But  a  little  consideration  will  shew,  that  as  yet  our 
notion  is  far  from  sufficient.  To  fix  our  ideas, —  take 
the  case  of  my  warming  my  hands  at  the  fire.  Plainly 
it  is  no  sufficient  account  of  the  matter  to  say,  that 
every  time  I  put  my  hands  to  the  fire,  God,  by  a  kind 
of  compact,  confers  on  them  the  sensation  of  warmth. 
This  would  be  to  deny  the  agency  of  second  causes 
altogether ;  and  such  indeed  is  the  opinion  of  those, 
who  are  called  in  philosophy  the  Occasionalists.  But 
no  Catholic  maintains  anything  like  this.  No :  God  has 
given  to  the  fire,  once  for  all,  a  permanent  quality;  and 
He  has  given  to  my  hand,  once  for  all,  &  permanent  qua- 
lity;  in  virtue  of  which  two  qualities,  the  warmth  ensues. 
No  doubt  God,  Who  gave  this  permanent  quality,  may 
when  He  pleases  suspend  its  operation ;  no  doubt  He 
must  co-operate  every  moment,  when  it  is  called  forth 
into  action :  still  He  did,  once  for  all,  give  that  perma- 
nent quality;  and  His  subsequent  interference  in  the 
matter  has  merely  been,  to  preserve  what  He  has  once 
given.  I  am  not  professing  to  prove  these  various 
statements ;  I  am  assuming  them  from  ordinary  philo- 
sophical treatises.  My  purpose  is  merely,  by  means 
of  them,  to  explain  this  term  '  nature.'  And  we  are 
now  much  nearer  at  least  to  our  desired  point ;  for  my 
'nature'  would  seem  to  be,  'the  assemblage  of  those 
permanent  qualities,  which  God  has  made  intrinsic  to 
me.'  It  is  in  virtue  of  my  nature  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  fire's  nature  on  the  other,  that  my  hand  grows 
warm. 

You  will  object;  —  'an  acquired  habit  is  a  perma- 
nent quality,  intrinsic  to  me.'  This  objection  will 
make  clearer  my  original  statement.  Certainly  an 
acquired  habit  is  a  permanent  quality  intrinsic  to  me ; 
and  how  close  is  the  connexion  between  habit  and 
nature,  is  universally  proverbial.  But  an  acquired 


394  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

habit  is  not  a  quality  which  God  has  made  intrinsic  to 
me  :  it  is  not  God,  but  my  own  acts,  which  have  been 
the  immediate  cause  of  this  quality.  My  4  nature'  then, 
is  the  assemblage  of  those  qualities  which  God  has 
made  intrinsic  to  me,  without  any  co-operation  of 
mine  ;  but  my  acquired  habits  are  permanent  qualities, 
which  have  become  intrinsic  to  me  through  my  own 
acts.  On  the  other  hand,  my  power  of  engendering 
habits  by  means  of  acts, — this  power  is  part  of  my 
1  nature :'  God  Himself  has  implanted  this  power ;  it 
is  a  permanent  quality,  which  God  has  made  intrinsic 
to  my  soul. 

Let  us  examine  this  interpretation  of  the  word 
'  nature,'  which  I  believe  to  be  the  true  one,  by 
bringing  it  to  bear  on  various  recognized  theological 
propositions.  The  following  statement  will  include 
four  such  propositions.  (1)  All  Catholic  theologians 
agree,  that  Adam  was  preserved  from  Concupiscence, 
not  by  any  part  of  his  '  nature,'  but  by  a  series  of 
Divine  Acts  supplementary  to  that  nature.  (2)  All 
agree,  that  he  lost  no  part  of  his  nature  by  the  fall ; 
neither  (3)  did  he  receive  (as  the  Calvinists  suppose) 
some  evil  addition  to  his  nature.  (4)  Some  Catholic 
theologians  however  are  of  opinion,  and  I  follow  them, 
that  his  nature  received  some  wrench  or  disorganiza- 
tion, making  it  far  weaker  towards  good. 

Now  to  interpret  these  four  propositions,  according 
to  our  explanation  of  the  term  'nature.7  (1)  How 
was  Adam  saved  from  Concupiscence  ?  By  this,  that 
on  every  single  occasion  when  God  saw  that  temptation 
would  arise,  He  interposed  an  act  of  His  Power,  to 
suppress  the  otherwise  inevitable  emotion.  (2)  But 
suppose  God  had  endowed  Adam's  soul  with  some 
intrinsic  permanent  quality,  in  virtue  of  which  tempta- 
tion could  not  assail  him, — then  that  very  thing  would 
have  been  true,  which  theologians  say  is  not  true  ; 
viz.  that  Adam,  by  sinning,  lost  an  integral  part  of  his 
nature.  (3)  On  the  other  hand,  had  Adam  on  his  fall 
received  from  God  some  intrinsic  permanent  quality, 
which  he  did  not  before  possess,  and  in  virtue  of  which 


ON  CERTAIN  PHILOSOPHICAL  TERMS.  395 

evil  had  a  power  over  him  such  as  it  had  not  in  the 
state  of  Innocence, — then  Calvin's  statement  would 
have  been  true,  that  there  was  an  evil  addition  to  his 
nature.  But  (4)  a  different  supposition  is  conceivable: 
viz.  that  those  intrinsic  permanent  qualities,  which 
assist  him  in  pursuing  good,  should  be  weakened  ;  and 
that  those  which  assist  him  in  departing  from  God's 
service,  should  be  strengthened :  that  his  intrinsic 
power  e.g.  of  pursuing  'bonum  honestum'  should  be 
made  less ;  and  his  intrinsic  power  of  seeking  4  delect- 
abile,'  without  reference  to  l  honestum,'  should  be  made 
greater.  Those  theologians,  who  should  adopt  this 
supposition,  would  say,  that  the  Fall,  without  making 
any  evil  addition  to  his  nature,  yet  threw  it  into  a 
state  of  moral  disadvantage  and  disorganization. 

A  further  objection  may  be  made  to  this  whole 
statement,  which  will  again  make  my  meaning  clearer. 
It  may  be  said,  that,  on  this  view,  Habitual  Grace 
would  be  part  of  my  *  nature ;'  for  surely  it  is  a  per- 
manent quality,  implanted  by  God  in  my  soul.  I  reply, 
that  Habitual  Grace  is  no  doubt  a  permanent  quality, 
made  by  God  inherent  in  my  soul ;  but  not  therefore 
intrinsic  to  it.  Let  me  explain  this  difference  by  one 
or  two  illustrations. 

It  is  no  permanent  quality,  intrinsic  to  my  body, 
that  it  shall  be  warm  :  yet  there  is  a  permanent  quality 
intrinsic  to  my  body,  and  another  intrinsic  to  the  fire, 
by  virtue  of  which  two  qualities,  my  body,  when  in 
contact  with  the  fire,  becomes  warm.  Now  suppose 
God,  without  in  any  way  altering  the  intrinsic  con- 
stitution of  my  body,  yet  decreed  that  the  effect  of  the 
fire  should  follow  me  about  wherever  I  went.  Well  — 
I  should  enjoy  a  permanent  gift  of  warmth  ;  that 
warmth  would  be  inherent  in  my  body  ;  yet  it  would 
not  be  intrinsic  to  it.  Take  any  moment,  when  I  am 
thus  comfortably  warm.  My  body  does  not  possess 
any  quality,  which  is  the  full  cause  of  that  warmth. 
That  warmth  is  partially  caused,  of  course,  by  an 
intrinsic  quality  of  my  body ;  viz.  its  capability  of 
receiving  warmth,  from  fire  or  other  hot  substance: 


396  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

but  another  cause  also  concurs ;  viz.  the  power  of 
God,  miraculously  supplying  the  effect  of  fire  in  its 
absence. 

Or  take  another  case.  Balaam's  ass  once  spoke. 
This  speech  was  not  in  any  sense  due  to  any  intrinsic 
quality  ;  there  was  nothing  in  the  beast's  organs,  which 
was  even  a  partial  cause  of  speech  ;  but  God  simply 
used  them,  as  His  instrument  for  a  miraculous  opera- 
tion. He  might  have  repeated  this  miracle  through 
the  animal's  whole  life  ;  in  other  words,  given  him  a 
permanent  gift  of  speech.  Still,  if  he  effected  no 
intrinsic  change  in  the  animal's  organs,  —  if  those 
organs  remained  precisely  in  the  same  state  with  those 
of  other  asses, — then  this  one  would  no  more  possess 
the  intrinsic  quality  of  speech,  than  they  do.  In  any 
instant,  when  this  ass  was  speaking,  the  cause  of  that 
speech  would  not  be  any  intrinsic  quality  whatever 
appertaining  to  his  organs,  but  simply  God's  mira- 
culous operation. 

There  is  a  controversy  agitated  in  the  Catholic 
schools,  as  to  the  sacraments,  which  will  afford  us 
another  apposite  illustration  of  our  point.  We  con- 
sidered just  now,  you  remember,  two  alternatives  as 
conceivable,  in  regard  to  the  warmth  which  I  derive 
from  putting  my  hands  to  the  fire.  First  it  might 
merely  have  been,  that  by  a  kind  of  pact  God  made 
my  hands  warm,  as  often  as  I  did  so  ;  the  other  that 
He  might  have  given  (as  in  fact  He  has)  an  intrinsic 
permanent  quality,  both  to  fire  and  hands.  Now  take 
the  case  of  an  infant  e.  g.  being  baptized,  and  so  re- 
ceiving Habitual  Grace.  Here,  in  like  manner,  two 
alternatives  are  imaginable  ;  and  each  is  defended  by 
various  theologians.  It  may  be  true,  that  God  has 
promised  that,  by  a  kind  of  pact,  He  will  always  infuse 
Habitual  Grace,  whenever  Baptism  is  duly  adminis- 
tered to  a  child.  But  it  may  also  be  true,  that  the 
sacrament,  duly  administered,  possesses  a  certain  in- 
trinsic quality,  which  of  its  own  nature  infuses  Habitual 
Grace.  Those  who  hold  this,  express  it  by  saying, 
4  sacramenta  physice  conferunt  gratiam ;'  intimating 


ON  CERTAIN  PHILOSOPHICAL  TERMS.  397 

very  plainly  the  close  connection  between  the  word 
1  nature'  and  the  idea  i  intrinsic  quality.' 

Thus  it  is  (I  conceive)  that  we  may  apprehend, 
what  Revelation  calls  on  us  to  hold,  in  regard  to 
Habitual  Grace.  It  is  a  permanent,  an  inherent, 
quality ;  but  it  is  not  intrinsic.  The  constitution  of 
the  soul  is  not  changed  in  any  one  respect,  by  the 
infusion  of  Habitual  Grace ;  but  God  miraculously 
supports  the  two  in  union. 

It  is  readily  imaginable,  as  we  have  seen,  that  God, 
without  in  any  way  altering  the  intrinsic  constitution 
of  my  body,  yet  might  miraculously  preserve  the 
created  quality  of  warmth,  in  constant  union  with  it : 
and  on  such  an  hypothesis,  warmth  would  be  inherent, 
but  not  intrinsic.  Just  so,  we  believe,  on  the  authority 
of  Revelation,  that  God,  without  in  any  way  altering 
the  intrinsic  constitution  of  my  soul,  miraculously 
preserves  the  created  quality  of  Habitual  Grace,  in 
constant  union  with  it.  Habitual  Grace  therefore  is 
inherent  in  the  justified  man's  soul,  but  not  intrinsic. 

I  need  hardly  add,  that  this  is  to  be  received  simply 
on  faith;  and  that  we  have  no  kind  of  definite  idea 
corresponding  to  our  words*  We  have  already  seen, 
that  on  the  nature  of  the  soul  itself,  as  distinct  from  its 
operations,  we  are  absolutely  and  blindly  ignorant ;  and 
we  can  of  course  have  no  clearer  notion  of  a  miracle 
wrought  in  the  soul,  than  we  have  of  the  soul  itself. 

166.  Hitherto  we  have  spoken  of  'my  own  indi- 
vidual nature.'  We  are  now  to  rise  into  the  idea,  of 
4  one  nature  common  to  me  with  many  others.'  You 

*  The  reader  may  here  be  inclined  to  retort,  that  I  have  spoken  of  it 
(p.  190)  '  as  one  of  the  very  worst  habits  which  can  possibly  come  upon  a 
philosophical  student,'  that  he  should  'use  words  without  precise  cor- 
responding ideas.'  But  I  have  said  '  unconsciously  use  words  without,'  &c. 
Let  any  one  ponder  on  man's  deep  ignorance,  and  on  his  incapacity  of 
apprehending  the  Invisible  world,  and  he  must  readily  admit,  that  we  often 
have  to  use  words,  which  express  no  corresponding  ideas  of  our  own; 
though  (as  we  firmly  believe)  they  do  express  unknown  realities.  But  it  is 
all-important,  that  when  we  thus  use  words,  we  should  not  do  it  *  uncon- 
scioiisly?  The  whole  subject  here  referred  to — a  most  deeply  important 
one,—  is  most  appropriately  treated  in  the  theological  treatise, c  de  Deo 
Uno  et  Trino.' 


398  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

and   I   have   the   same  nature ;  a   rabbit   and  I  have 
different  natures  :  what  is  meant  by  this  ? 

Some  scholastics  seem  to  have  held,  that  there  is 
some  real  thing,  called  human  nature,  actually  existing 
in  all  men,  and  handed  down  from  father  to  son.  This 
strange  notion  is  now  (I  believe)  universally  exploded; 
but  it  has  been  succeeded  by  another  even  more  strange. 
Many  modern  speculators  maintain,  that  the  distinction 
of  species  is  purely  an  effect  of  human  reason.  '  I  con- 
'  veniently  classify  men  under  one  head,  and  rabbits 
4  under  another ;  just  as,  with  equal  propriety,  I  might 
4  conveniently  classify  white  animals  under  one  head, 
4  and  black  under  another.  God  has  no  more  made 
4  any  true  distinction  between  men  and  rabbits,  than 
4  between  white  animals  and  black.'  This  is  really  so 
absurd,  that  it  would  be  an  insult  to  common  sense  if 
I  attempted  its  refutation.  But  the  question  recurs : — 
what  is  precisely  meant,  when  I  say  that  you  and  I  are 
of  the  same  nature  ;  a  rabbit  and  I  are  of  different 
natures?  I  suppose  the  true  answer  is  somewhat  as 
follows.  (1.)  Compare  the  permanent  qualities  made 
by  God  intrinsic  to  you,  with  those  made  by  Him 
intrinsic  to  me :  there  is  quite  immeasurably  more 
similarity  than  discrepancy.  Compare  those  given  to 
me  with  those  given  to  a  rabbit,  and  the  reverse  holds. 
(2.)  But  I  have  a  further  conviction  than  this.  I  have 
a  conviction  that,  by  means  of  experimenting  on  myself, 
I  may  discover  an  indefinite  number  of  further  qualities, 
which  have  been  hitherto  unsuspected.  And  I  have 
also  a  conviction  that,  if  I  find  them  in  myself,  I  have 
the  fullest  reason  for  holding  that  they  exist  also  in 
you  ;  though  within  certain  limits  of  possible  variation. 
I  recognize  in  myself,  Love  of  Approbation,  Love  of 
Justice,  Love  of  Acquisition :  and  I  infer,  without 
doubt,  that  my  fellow-men  have  the  same ;  though  they 
may  have  them  in  very  different  proportions,  whether 
as  compared  with  me,  or  as  compared  with  each  other. 
If  you  ask,  what  are  the  limits  within  which  variation 
is  possible,  you  are  treading  on  those  most  difficult 


ON  CERTAIN  PHILOSOPHICAL  TERMS.  399 

philosophical  questions,  from  which  I  desire  to  keep 
clear.  Nor  am  I  professing  at  all  to  consider  the 
grounds  of  my  conviction,  that  you  and  I  are  of  the 
same  nature,  a  .rabbit  and  I  of  different  natures ;  be- 
cause I  am  not  considering  the  grounds,  but  the  mean- 
ing, of  that  statement.  The  broad  fact  is  plainly  as 
follows. 

God  has  created,  not  merely  individuals,  but  certain 
gre&tfa?nilies  of  sentient  beings.  Each  family,  more- 
over, is  so  united,  that  (1)  all  its  members  agree  with 
each  other  in  possessing  an  indefinite  number  of  per- 
manent intrinsic  qualities,  directly  implanted  by  God ; 
and  that  (2)  there  is  no  such  quality  given  by  God  to 
any  one,  which  has  not  its  counterpart  in  every  other. 
In  saying  this,  we  save  of  course  individual  exceptions 
—  monsters  and  the  like — and  speak  generally  and 
broadly.  Revelation  adds  to  the  completeness  of  this 
view,  by  declaring  that  each  species  or  family  comes 
from  a  common  pair  of  parents.  This  fact  however  is 
by  no  means  necessary  to  the  idea  itself  of  a  common 
nature ;  as  a  moment's  consideration  will  shew. 

167.  There  is  another  string  of  philosophical  terms, 
with  which  this  will  be  a  convenient  opportunity  of 
making  you  acquainted.  I  mean  those  which  relate  to 
Aristotle's  classification  of  mental  phenomena,  as  taken 
from  him  by  the  great  scholastic  writers.  No  one,  I 
imagine,  now  adheres  to  this  strange  theory  ;  but  it  is 
necessary  that  we  should  understand  those  terms  which 
express  it,  because  of  their  frequent  occurrence  in 
theological  works.  The  following  then  is  some  most 
general  and  superficial  account  of  the  Aristotelic 
theory. 

Ask  Aristotle  or  St.  Thomas,  how  we  obtain  a 
knowledge  of  the  external  world,  and  they  will  answer 
as  follows.  c  From  every  external  thing  there  flies  off 
4  a  '  Species  Sensibilis ;'  bearing  to  the  thing  itself  the 
'  same  kind  of  relation,  which  the  impression  of  a  seal 
'  bears  to  its  original.  Flies  off  whither  ?  It  takes  its 
'  residence,  in  that  faculty  of  ours  which  we  call  the 
'  '  Phantasia.'  No  sooner  does  the  '  Species  Sensibilis ' 


400  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

4  thus  arrive,  than  the  '  Intellectus  Agens '  is  at  work, 
4  transmuting  it  into  a  4  Species  Intelligibilis  ;'  and  this 

*  c  Species'  resides  in  the  '  Intellectus  Possibilis.'     All 
'  emotions  arise  from  the  c  Species  Sensibilis ;'  but  all 
'  volitions  from  the  '  Species  Intelligibilis.'     Hence  the 
'  4  Phantasia '  bears  the  same  relation  to  the  Sensitive 

*  Appetite,  which  the  '  Intellectus  Possibilis '  bears  to 
4  the  Will.     The   '  Phantasia,'  and   Sensitive  Appetite 
'  make  up  the  lower  part  of  the  soul,  which  is  common 

to  us  with  the  brutes :  the  4  Intellectus '  and  '  Voluntas ' 
make  up  the  higher  part ;  which  is  peculiar  to  man- 
kind, among  the  visible  creation.     Each  part  of  the 
soul  then  has  its  own  mode  of  aiming  at  an  object; 
or  its  own  '  Appetitus  :'  the  lower  part,  the  4  Appe- 
titus    Sensitivus ;'    the   higher   part,  the    '  Appetitus 
Kationalis,'  or  '  Appetitus  Intellect! vus,'  or  4  Voluntas.' 
6  These  three  latter  expressions  all  stand  for  precisely 
'  the  same  idea, 

'  Both  the  4  Appetitus  Sensitivus,'  and  *  Kationalis,' 
'  exert  themselves  in  the  conscious  acts  of  a  sentient 
4  being.  Thus,  man  aims  by  *  Appetitus  Eationalis'  at  a 
'  certain  *  bonum  honestum ;'  and  a  cow,  by  6  Appetitus 
4  Sensitivus,'  longs  for  some  nice  fresh  grass,  which  is 
4  just  out  of  her  reach.  But  there  may  be  a  tendency, 
4  which  does  not  shew  itself  in  any  conscious  act,  of 
4  which  even  an  inanimate  object  may  be  capable :  this 
4  is  called  '  Appetitus  Innatus.'  So  a  stone  has  an 
4  4  Appetitus  Innatus,'  drawing  it  towards  the  earth.' 

Such  is  the  philosophical  theory,  which  underlies  an 
immense  number  of  theological  propositions,  put  forth 
by  scholastic  writers.  You  will  wish  to  know,  how 
these  propositions  may  become  intelligible  to  us;  how 
we  may  translate  them  (as  it  were)  from  the  Aristotelic 
philosophy  into  our  own.  Two  principal  rules  will 
perhaps  suffice. 

(1.)  We  drop  altogether  the  distinction  between 
4  Phantasia '  and  4  Intellectus,'  or  4  Species  Sensibilis ' 
and  4  Species  Intelligibilis.'  Every  operation,  attributed 
by  Scholastics  to  the  4  Phantasia,'  we  ascribe  to  the 

*  Intellect.' 


ON  CERTAIN  PHILOSOPHICAL  TERMS. 


401 


(2.)  We  drop  altogether  the  'Intellectus  Agens;' 
and  recognize  no  c  Intellect/  except  that  called  by  scho- 
lastics the  t  Intellectus  Possibilis.' 

You  will  find  that  this  Aristotelic  philosophy  is  very 
far  more  prominent  and  pervasive  in  St.  Thomas' 
Theology,  than  in  that  of  the  great  post-Tridentine 
scholastics;  which  alone  would  suffice  to  make  the 
latter  far  easier  reading. 


D 


CHAPTER  III. 


ON    SELF-CHARITY. 

168.  You  are  no  doubt  aware  generally,  of  the  great 
controversy  carried  on  (some  two  centuries  ago)  between 
Bossuet  and  Fenelon,  on  man's  desire  of  happiness.  It 
is  difficult  to  imagine  opinions  more  fundamentally 
opposed. 

Bossuet  maintained,  that  every  single  act,  done  by 
every  single  man,  from  the  dawn  of  reason,  is  directed  to 
one,  and  one  only,  absolute  end  ; — his  own  happiness  : 
that  his  one  animating  motive,  in  everything,  great  or 
small,  which  he  does  or  wishes,  is  simply  and  exclusively 
the  desire  of  felicity.  Fenelon  on  the  contrary  held, 
that  those  who  have  reached  the  highest  state  of  perfec- 
tion are  quite  indifferent  to  their  own  felicity  for  its 
own  sake;  that  they  desire  Heavenly  Bliss  for  them- 
selves, in  no  other  sense  than  that  in  which  they  desire 
it  for  others ;  and  that  the  one  reason  of  this  desire,  is 
their  wish  that  God's  Glory  may  be  the  more  promoted. 
This  doctrine  was  most  deservedly  condemned  by  the 
Holy  See,  as  c  temerarious,  scandalous,  evil-sounding, 
offensive  to  pious  ears,  pernicious  in  practice,  and 
erroneous.7  But  I  confess,  that  Bossuet's  extremely 
opposite  thesis  seems  to  me  quite  as  plainly  and  un- 
deniably mistaken  as  Fenelon's.*  It  will  be  our  busi- 
ness therefore,  in  considering  both  these  extremes,  to 
draw  out  (as  best  we  may)  a  philosophical  statement, 
which  shall  be  consistent  with  itself,  with  Reason,  and 

*  I  mean,  of  course,  so  far  as  reason  is  concerned.  The  Church  has 
actually  condemned  Fenelon  ;  and  for  believing  therefore  his  system 
erroneous,  we  have  grounds  far  stronger  than  an  individual's  reason. 


ON  SELF-CHARITY.  403 

with  the  observed  facts  of  human  nature.  It  will  be 
part  of  our  theological  course  to  shew,  that  the  state- 
ment, thus  recommended  by  Reason,  is  also  the  one 
which  consistently  harmonizes  the  various  utterances  of 
Revelation. 

It  was  impossible  to  treat  this  subject  in  either  of 
the  preceding  Chapters,  for  this  reason.  The  first 
Chapter  was  wholly  metaphysical ;  the  second,  wholly 
psychological :  but  our  present  question  necessitates 
consideration  both  of  Metaphysics  and  Psychology.  . 
Bossuet's  statement  is  purely  psychological,  and  so 
therefore  must  our  answer  to  it  be.  Pension's  state- 
ment is  mainly  metaphysical;  viz.,  that  the  not  desiring 
felicity  for  its  own  sake,  is  '  objectively  preferable'  (see 
n.  57,  p.  124T)  to  the  desiring  it.  Just  then  as  our 
answer  to  Bossuet  must  be  solely  psychological,  our 
answer  to  Feuelon  must  be  mainly  metaphysical :  and 
the  chapter  will  therefore  naturally  divide  itself  into  two 
Sections,  directed  severally  against  the  two  respective 
writers  whom  I  am  opposing. 

Of  these  two  Sections,  the  psychological  must  come 
first.  Bossuet  maintains,  that  we  are  physically  neces- 
sitated to  aim  at  felicity  in  every  act.  This  allegation 
directly  crosses  our  path,  and  must  be  disposed  of  in 
the  first  instance.  If  we  are  physically  necessitated  thus 
to  seek  felicity,  it  would  be  absurd  enough  to  enquire, 
how  far  we  are  morally  obliged  to  do  so.  It  would  be 
like  asking,  how  far  we  are  under  the  moral  obligation 
of  keeping  our  bodies  on  the  earth,  instead  of  flying  up 
with  them  into  the  moon. 


404 


SECTION  I. 
On  Man's  Desire  of  Felicity. 

169.  We  are  now  then  to  consider  Bossuet's  thesis: 
viz.  that  the  desire  of  our  own  happiness  is,  by  the  ne- 
cessity of  our  nature,  our  one  motive  of  action.  In 
connection  with  which  statement,  let  us  consider  such 
familiar  facts  of  everyday  life  as  the  following.  An  un- 
happy man  groans,  day  after  day,  hour  after  hour, 
under  the  weight  of  some  evil  habit,  from  which  he 
will  not  shake  himself  free.  He  feels  most  deeply,  to 
his  very  heart  of  hearts,  that  his  whole  happiness,  here 
and  hereafter,  depends  on  his  emancipation:  he  never 
feels  this  more  deeply,  than  at  the  very  moments  when 
he  does  give  way.  What  becomes  then  of  Bossuet's 
thesis  ?  Certainly  this  wretched  sufferer  would  be  de- 
lighted beyond  words,  if  he  could  really  believe  any 
such  thesis ;  if  he  could  really  believe  that  there  is  no 
necessity  for  him  even  to  struggle  or  exert  himself,  but 
that  his  firm  conviction  of  Eternal  Life  being  at  stake, 
will  necessitate  his  pursuing  the  course  of  virtue. 

Take  another  instance.  Is  there  one  of  you  here, 
who  has  the  slightest  doubt,  that  to  lead  a  life  of  fault- 
less perfection,  is  the  one  thing  which  would  most  con- 
duce to  your  future  happiness?  Do  we  find  ourselves 
on  that  account  leading  such  a  life  ?  And  that  indeed 
quite  as  a  matter  of  course; — without  any  kind  of 
struggle  ; — by  physical  necessity  ? 

It  is  really  difficult  to  imagine,  what  can  have  led 
any  sane  person  to  put  forth  a  theory,  which  stands 
out  in  such  broad  contradiction  with  the  most  familiar 
and  obvious  facts.  You  may  well  doubt  indeed,  whether 
so  great  a  man  as  Bossuet  can  possibly  have  done  so  ; 
but  such  a  doubt  would  be  dissipated,  in  proportion  as 


ON  MAN'S  DESIRE  OF  FELICITY.  405 

you  should  study  his  writings  on  the  Quietist  contro- 
versy. It  is  impossible  of  course  to  put  before  you,  in 
any  brief  compass,  the  cumulative  evidence  which  would 
thus  be  obtained;  but  I  will  adduce  two  quotations, 
which  can  leave  no  room  for  question.  The  first  shall 
be  from  his  work  c  Schola  in  tuto ;'  in  which,  more  than 
in  any  other,  he  aims  at  expressing  his  doctrine  with 
scholastic  precision.  He  prefaces  this  work,  with  a 
formal  statement  of  the  various  propositions  which  he 
undertakes  to  prove;  and  the  sixth  of  these  proposi- 
tions stands  thus : 

"  Neque  quisquam  diffitetur,  quin  omnes  homines,  quidquid 
aqunt,  quidquid  volunt,  quidquid  cogitant,  quod  ad  vitam  humaiiam 
alicujus  moment!  esse  videatur,  id  omne  ad  J3eatitudinem  explicite, 
vel  implicite,  sive  virtualiter,  referant.  Citius  animam  auferas, 
quam  ut  cuiquam  liomini  hanc  mentem,  Imnc  sensum,  hanc  animi 
prseparationem  eripias." 

The  only  possible  doubt  which  can  exist,  as  to  his 
meaning  in  this  proposition,  will  turn  on  the  word 
4  Beatitude ;'  it  may  be  questioned  whether  he  can  really 
take  it  as  simply  synonymous  with  4  happiness.7  There 
is  no  such  doubt  however  about  the  French  word 
4  heureux;'  and  our  second  quotation  therefore  shall  be 
from  one  of  Bossuet's  French  works  : 

"  C'est  non  seulement  qu'on  veut  etre  heureux,  mais  encore 
qu'on  ne  veut  que  cela,  et  qu'on  veut  tout  pour  cela." 

This  at  least  is  plain  enough.  And  he  adds,  further 
on  in  the  page  : 

"  II  demeure  toujours  veritable qu'on  ne  peut  se  desin- 

teresser,  jusqu'au  point  de  perdre,  dans  un  seul  acte  quel  qu'il  soit, 
la  volonte  d'etre  heureux ;  pour  laquelle  on  veut  toutes  choses."  * 

He  is  claiming  throughout  undoubtedly  the  authority 
of  St.  Augustin  as  on  his  side;  but  how  far  he  does 
so  truly  and  legitimately,  is  a  separate  question  which 
we  are  not  here  considering.  What  I  am  here  observ- 
ing, as  to  the  above  quotations,  is  this ;  that  throughout 
he  translates  the  word  '  beatus '  by  the  French  word 

*  Reponse  a  Quatre  Lettres,  n.  9. 


406  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

'  heureux.'  His  statement  then  is  most  clear  and  intelli- 
gible ;  viz.,  that  we  desire  nothing  whatever  as  an  absolute 
end  (see  n.  110,  p.  233),  except  only  happiness.  'All 
'  other  ends,'  according  to  Bossuet,  4  are  relative  and 
'  intermediate ;  the  one  absolute  end  is  felicity.  We 
c  can  never  aim  at  virtue,  because  of  its  virtuousness ; 
'  we  can  never  aim  at  pleasure,  because  of  its  imme- 
6  diate  pleasurableness  ;  we  desire  neither  virtue  nor 
1  present  pleasure,  except  merely  as  means  to  perma- 
4  nent  felicity.  Look  at  that  miserable  man,  enmeshed 
4  in  a  sinful  habit,  who  consents  to  temptation,  under 
4  a  deep  sense  of  the  injury  which  he  inflicts  on  his 
1  own  happiness  by  doing  so ;  his  one  motive  for 
'  sinning,  is  the  desire  of  that  happiness,  in  regard 
to  which  he  knows  and  most  deeply  feels,  that  his  sin 
will  impair  it.  Look  at  that  ecclesiastical  student, 
who  commits  a  deliberate  imperfection,  while  distinctly 
remembering  that  his  eternal  happiness  would  be 
better  promoted  by  refraining  from  such  commission; 
it  is  his  desire  of  happiness,  which  influences  him, 
knowingly  and  consciously  to  do  that,  which  will 
infallibly  lessen  such  happiness.'  Argument  seems 
almost  impertinent,  when  directed  against  a  thesis,  so 
manifestly,  so  monstrously,  at  variance  with  facts.  Yet 
it  will  be  better  to  examine  it,  somewhat  more  accurately 
than  we  have  yet  done. 

170.  There  are  three  different  senses,  in  which  this 
Felicity- thesis  may  imaginably  be  maintained.  First  it 
may  be  asserted,  that  we  always  act  at  every  moment 
in  that  direction,  which  we  speculatively  believe  most 
conducive  to  our  permanent  and  ultimate  happiness. 
According  to  this  version  of  the  thesis,  the  avaricious 
man  speculatively  believes  the  acquisition  of  money  to 
be  his  greatest  possible  happiness;  and  the  sensualist 
speculatively  believes,  that  his  sum  of  happiness,  here 
and  hereafter,  will  on  the  whole  be  augmented,  by  com- 
mitting the  various  sins  forbidden  by  the  Sixth  Com- 
mandment. Vasquez  replies  very  obviously,  that, 
according  to  this  version,  every  sinner  must  be  a  heretic; 
nay,  we  may  add,  every  one  who  commits  deliberate 


ON  MAN'S  DESIRE  OF  FELICITY.  407 

• 

imperfection  must  be  a  heretic.  Nor  need  it  be  added, 
that  Experience  is  as  diametrically  opposed  to  this 
version  as  is  sound  Theology.  In  this  most  extrava- 
gant of  all  shapes,  no  one  of  course  ever  dreamed  of 
advocating  the  thesis  which  we  are  opposing.  What 
ever  Bossuet  meant, — and  it  is  difficult  to  imagine 
what  he  did  mean, — he  never  can  have  intended  this. 
(2.)  A  more  modified  version  of  the  Felicity-thesis 
may  run  as  follows.  'A  speculative  opinion  is  most 
4  different  from  a  practical  impression.  We  by  no 

*  means  maintain,  that  man  always  pursues,  what  he 
1  speculatively  believes  most  conducive  to  his  happiness ; 
4  but  what  at  the  moment  practically  impresses  him  as 

*  thus  conducive.      When  temptation  assails  him,    the 
4  tempting   object,   from   its  proximity   and  from   the 
4  violence   of   his   present   emotion,  practically   over- 
4  shadows  that,  which,  though  immeasurably  more  in- 
4  tense,  yet  is  future  and  distant.     At  the  moment  of 

*  sinning  then,  his  practical  impression  is,  that  he  thus 
•*  obtains  his  greatest  happiness/ 

Yet  a  moment's  consideration  will  shew,  that  this 
allegation  is  no  less  undeniably  opposed  to  Experience, 
than  is  the  former.  Is  it  not  the  commonest  phenomenon 
in  the  world,  as  we  lately  stated,  that  men  yield  to 
temptation,  with  a  keen  feeling  of  remorse,  and  with 
the  strongest  practical  impression  that  they  are  thus 
injuring  their  real  happiness?  When  they  gratify  e.g. 
the  Propension  of  the  Flesh,  while  at  the  same  moment 
their  Propension  of  Duty  and  Self-charity  inflict  on 
them  a  severe  pang, —  I  say  it  is  their  practical  im- 
pression at  the  very  moment  of  sinning,  and  not  merely 
their  speculative  opinion,  that  they  are  sacrificing  per- 
manent happiness  to  present  pleasure. 

Experience  then  is  most  violently  opposed  to  this 
second  version  of  the  Felicity-thesis.  But  sound 
Theology  is  no  less  opposed  to  it;  for  it  utterly  over- 
throws the  doctrine  of  Liberty.  At  this  moment  I  am 
assailed  by  some  temptation ;  and  my  practical  impres- 
sion either  is,  or  is  not,  that  I  shall  promote  my  per- 
manent happiness  by  succumbing.  If  it  is  not,  then 


408  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

(according  to  this  thesis)  I  have  no  power  to  succumb  ; 
if  it  is,  then  I  have  no  power  to  abstain  from  succumb- 
ing. You  will  reply  perhaps,  that  I  may  set  to  work 
to  change  this  practical  impression ;  but  such  a  reply 
merely  puts  the  difficulty  one  step  further  back.  Is  it 
my  practical  impression,  that  I  shall  promote  my  per- 
manent happiness  by  thus  setting  to  work?  If  so, 
according  to  Bossuet,  I  am  necessitated  thus  to  act.  Is 
the  reverse  my  practical  impression?  then,  according  to 
Bossuet,  I  am  unable  so  to  act. 

Now  the  doctrine  of  Liberty  is  established  by 
Reason,  as  well  as  declared  by  Revelation.  We  see 
therefore  that  Revelation,  Reason,  Experience,  stand 
all  in  the  most  direct  and  undeniable  opposition  to  this 
Felicity-thesis,  even  in  the  most  plausible  shape  which 
it  can  possibly  assume. 

(3.)  At  last  perhaps  nothing  more  is  meant,  than 
that  man  always  pursues  present  pleasure.  If  by  this 
it  be  meant  that  this  is  always  his  one  end,  we  have 
already  refuted  the  statement  by  anticipation:  for  we 
have  shewn  that  man  can  pursue  future  pleasure,  no 
less  than  present ;  and  that  he  can  also  pursue  '  bonum 
honestuni.'  (See  nn.  118,  9,  p.  243,  5.)  According  to 
this  version  of  the  thesis  indeed,  no  single  virtuous  act 
is  physically  possible.  (See  n.  56,  p.  123.) 

If  on  the  other  hand  it  be  only  intended  to  say,  that 
at  every  moment  some  part  of  the  Will's  energy  is 
directed  to  present  pleasure, — I  am  inclined  indeed  to 
regard  so  universal  a  statement  as  mistaken  (see  n.  118, 
p.  245);  but  the  whole  matter  is  of  the  smallest  pos- 
sible importance.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that,  in  the 
vast  majority  of  instants  through  the  day,  the  will  is 
aiming  in  some  degree  at  present  pleasure;  that  plea- 
sure is  one  of  the  various  ends,  which  actuate  and 
impel  it:  and  if  any  one  thinks  that  this  is  the  case 
universally  and  without  exception,  I  am  not  aware  of 
any  kind  of  evil  result,  which  would  follow  from  such 
an  opinion.  I  need  not  however  say,  how  widely 
removed  is  such  a  statement,  from  the  thesis  against 
which  we  are  arguing;  the  thesis,  viz.  not  that  the  will 


ON  MAN'S  DESIRE  OF  FELICITY.  409 

aims  partially,  but  that  it  aims  exclusively,  at  happiness ; 
and  that  from  the  constitution  of  our  nature  it  can  aim 
at  nothing  else. 

In  real  truth,  the  only  difficulty  I  find  in  dealing 
with  this  thesis,  is  the  difficulty  of  understanding  how 
any  sane  man  can  possibly  have  maintained  it. 

171.  But  indeed  it  seems  to  me  a  complete  mistake, 
to  maintain  that  there  is  any  one  end  of  all  human 
action.  It  is  not  merely  a  mistake,  I  say,  to  maintain 
that  happiness  is  such  an  end,  but  that  there  is  any 
such.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  been  shewn  (I  think)  in 
nn.  118,  119,  p.  243-6,  that  there  are  just  as  many 
absolute  ends  of  human  action,  as  there  are  4boua 
honesta'  and  'delectabilia'  within  human  cognizance. 

To  this  an  obvious  reply  will  immediately  be  made. 
4  In  saying  this,  you  are  running  counter  to  the 
4  unanimous  voice  of  theologians ;  for  they  all  agree  in 
4  asserting,  that  there  is  but  one  absolute  end  of  human 

*  action,  viz.  Beatitude.     You  may  raise  questions,  no 
4  doubt,  as  to  what  is  meant  by  '  Beatitude ;'  we  can  by 
4  no  means  take  for  granted  that  it  is  identical  with 
4  4  happiness ;'  but  that  Beatitude  (whatever  is  meant  by 
4  the  term)  is  the  one  absolute  end  of  human  action,  is 

*  the  assertion  undoubtedly  and  undoubtingly  made  by 

*  the  great  body  of  theologians.' 

I  reply  (1)  that  one  most  eminent  school  of  theolo- 
gians, viz.  the  Scotists,  have  invariably  denied  the 
statement  altogether,  that  Beatitude  is  the  real  end  of 
all  human  action ;  and  in  the  ante-Tridentine  period,  the 
Scotists  were  one  of  the  two  great  schools  which  divided 
Theology  between  them.  I  reply  (2)  that,  among  post- 
Tridentine  theologians,  the  most  eminent  of  those  who 
adopt  the  statement  in  words,  have  explained  it,  in  a 
sense  absolutely  identical  with  the  proposition  which  I 
have  been  maintaining.  I  will  first  make  good  this 
latter  allegation. 

Lugo,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  in  no  part  of  his  works 
makes  any  such  statement,  as  that  Beatitude  is  the 
absolute  end  of  all  human  action ;  or  that  men  in  every 
act  aim  at  Beatitude.  Vasquez  however,  Suarez,  Viva, 


410  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

and  others,  do  make  that  statement;  and  now  let  us 
see  in  what  sense  they  make  it.  The  following  from 
Vasquez  will  shew  his  interpretation  of  the  phrase  :— 

(f  Potissima  in  praesenti  controversial  difficultas  est,  in  assignanda 
ratione,  ob  quam  dicatur  quis  omnia  bona,  quaa  appetit,  appetere 
propter  ultimum  finem :  omnes  enim  scholastici,  excepto  Scoto, 
in  eo  conveniuut,  ut  dicant  omnia  bona,  quse  appetunttir,  appeti 
propter  ultimum  finem :  nomine  autem  ultimi  finis  intelligimus 
rationem  optimi  finis,  qui  dicitur  esse  Beatitude  nostra,  sive  in  hac 
re  sive  in  alia  earn  esse  dicamus.  Scotus  tamen  (in  4  distinctione 
49.  quoestione  10  §.  'ex  his  sequitur,')  negat  omnia  bona,  qua3 
appetimus,  appeti  a  nobis  propter  ultimum  finem.  Id  vero  probat 
primum,  equia  potest  quis  appetere  aliquod  bonum  singulare,ra£{o«^ 
bonitatis  ipsius  singularis,  nihil  cogitando  de  Beatitudine ;  ergo 
potest  aliquid  appetere,  quod  non  appetat  propter  Beatitudinem : 
nemo  enim  potest  appetere  aliquid  propter  aliquem  finem,  si  de  fine 
non  cogitavit.  Deinde  potest  quis  appetere  aliquid,  quod  vere  sciat 
esse  contra  veram  Beatitudinem ;  ut  occidere  seipsum :  et  fidelis 
homo  appetit  peccatum  mortale,  quod  certb  credit  esse  contra  veram 
Beatitudinem.  Ergo  non  omnia  quas  appetit  homo,  appetit  propter 
Beatitudinem.' 

"  Communis  autem  et  vera  sententia  est,  omnia  bona,  quse  a 
nobis  appetuntur,  aliguo  modo  appeti  propter  Beatitudinem.  Ita 
docent  Sanctus  Thomas  in  hoc  articulo,  Cajetanus,  Conradus,  et 
recentiores  Thomistse  ibidem,  et  idem  Cajetanus  1  parte,  quses- 
tione  82.  articulo  2.  dub.  2.  dist.  38.  qusestione  4.  numero  5.  Imo 
verb  recentiores  Thomistse  nonnulli  affirmant,  Scoti  sententiam, 
non  solum  esse  contra  sanctum  Thomam,  sed  etiam  contra  Aris- 
totelem  1.  Ethicorum  capite  1.  4.  &  7  ;  Ciceronem  libro  1.  &  2. 
de  Finibus ;  et  Augustinum  19.  de  civitate  Dei,  capite  1  &  2. 
Existimant  enim  recentiores  illi  Thomistse,  ultimum  finem  a  Doc- 
toribus  ita  definiri,  ut  sit,  in  quern  omnia  referuntur,  hoc  est, 
propter  quern  omnia  appetuntur.  Verum  pra?dicti  Doctores, 
locis  allegatis,  non  ita  definiunt  ultimum  finem,  quasi  omnia  in 
ipsum  actu  referantur ;  sed  ut  talis  sit,  in  quern  omnia  referri 
possint,  quod  sit  optimum  humanaB  vitas.  An  vero,  quidquid 
appetitur,  appetatur  propter  liunc  finem,  non  definiunt;  tametsi 
August,  alio  in  loco,  quern  inferius  citabimus,  hanc  communem 
sententiam,  et  optimo  sensu,  quern  nos  etiam  inferius  adducemusy 
explicatam,  plane  tradiderit 

(i  His  suppositis,  duo  sunt  modi  defendendi  et  confirmandi 
praadictam  sententiam,  quam  contra  Scotum  diximus  veriorem  esse. 
Prior  est  Caietarii  in  hoc  articulo,  ad  primum  Scoti :  qui  docet, 
omnia,  quse  nos  appetimus,  ideo  appetere  propter  Beatitudinem 
et  ultimum  finem,  quia  prsecessit  qusedam  voluntas  Beatitudinis  et 


ON  MAN'S  DESIRE  OF  FELICITY.  411 

ultimi  finis,  quae  ita  dicitur  habitu  manere,  ut  rationc  illius  omnes 
nostrse  actiones  in  eum  finem  referantur.  In  qua  sententia  fuisse 
videtur  Sanctus  Thomas  in  hoc  articulo  ad.  3  &  1 .  parte  quasstione 
60.  articulo  2  ;  cui  etiam  fundamento  innitens,  de  priori  voluntate 
circa  finem  quae  praecesserit,  docet  quaestione  2.  de  virtutibus 
articulo  1.  ad  secundum,  opera  existentis  in  grati&  esse  mcritoria 
vitae  aeternae,  ex  priori  voluntate  charitatis.  Eandeni  rationem,  et 
modumexplicandi  praedictam  sententiam,  videtur  amplexus  Durand. 
in  2.  distinctione  38.  quaestione  ilia  4.  numero  8.  et  Conrad,  in  hoc 
articulo  in  principio,  et  circa  solutionem  3  :  quamvis  ipse  alium 
etiam  modum  et  rationem  hujus  sententiae  assignat.  Convenit  etiam 
Capreol.  in  primo  dist.  2.  q.  3.  art.  1.  circa  primam  conclusionem. 
"  Verum  hie  modus  explicandi  hanc  communem  sententiam 
firmum  fundamentum  non  habet.  Primum  quidem,  quia  nemo 
probabili  aliquo  fundamento  affirmare  potest,  in  omnibus,  qui 
libere  operantur,  semper  praecessisse  voluntatem  expressam  ultimi 
finis,  qui  est  Beatitudo  nostra;  ergo  nullus  probabili  ratione  ad- 
ductus  affirmare  potest,  omnia,  quae  nos  appetimus,  ideo  appetere 
propter  ultimum  finem,  quia  praecessit  voluntas  quaedam  ultimi 
finis.  Deinde  etiamsi  praecessisset  aliquando  talis  voluntas  ultimi 
finis,  nihilominus  ea  non  sufficeret,  ut  caetera  opera  virtute  ipsius 
in  eundern  finem  referrentur.  Etenim,  ut  optime  notarunt  Bona- 
ventura  (in  2.  distinctione  41.  articulo  primo  quaestione  tertia 
in  corpore,  et  ad  ultimum,)  et  Ricardus  (ibidem  articulo  primo, 
quaestione  2.)  ut  ex  aliqua  voluntate  finis,  quae  praecessit,  dicantur 
aliqua  opera  sequentia  in  eundem  finem  referri,  necesse  est  talem 
voluntatem  aliquo  modo  connecti  cum  sequentibus  operibus,  et 
opera  cum  tali  voluntate.  Nam  si  prior  voluntas  omnino  in- 
terrupta  sit,  nee  cum  sequentibus  operibus  connexa,  nulld  ratione 
ad  ipsa  opera  videtur  pertinere ;  ac  proinde  neque  opera  sequentia 
dici  possunt  ex  tali  voluntate  in  finem  ordinari:  cujus  doctrinae 
veritas,  quam  iterum  repetemus  (disputatione  32.  capite  2.  et  dis- 
putatione  75.  capite  2.)  confirmari  potest  tribus  modis 

"  Jam  vero,  etiamsi  concederemus  voluntatem  ultimi  finis  in 
omnibus  hominibus  priorem  esse  caeteris  voluntatibus,  vel  quia 
initio  vitae  praecessit,  vel  quia  quovis  die  vel  hora  earn  re- 
sumimus,  nullo  tamen  fundamento  probabili  dicere  possumus,  ex 
hdc  voluntate  derivari  in  nobis  reliquas  omnes  voluntates,  proximo 
aut  remote :  ut  experimento  compertum  est ;  neque  enim  singula 
nostra  negotia  ex  hdc  voluntate  Beatitudinis  universe  inchoamus 
et  prosequimur.  Ergo  prsedicti  Doctores  non  recte  probant,  quse- 
cumque  appetimus  appetere  propter  Beatitudinem  et  ultimum 
finem,  ratione  praecedentis  voluntatis  circa  talem  finem. 

"  Com  munis  igitur  sententia — quae  asserit  omnia,  quse  appe- 
timus, dici  aliquo  modo  appeti  propter  ultimum  finem,  qui  est 
Beatitudo, — alio  faciliori  modo  explicari  potest,  quern  quidem  Scolus 


412  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

non  negaret :  ut  enim  colligitur  ex  rationibus  ejus,  solum  negare 
voluit,  omnia  appeti  propter  ultimum  finem,  nempe  propter  Beati- 
tudinem  expresse  apprehensam  :  quod  sane  verissimum  est.  Faci- 
lior  igitur  modus  explicandi  prsedictam  communem  sententiam  est, 
quern  tradiderunt  Durandus  et  Conradus  locis  citatis,  et  videtur 
sequi  Ferrarien  (3  contra  gent.  cap.  17.)  colligiturque  ex  Sancto 
Thoma  (in  hoc  articulo  6.  in  prima  ratione)  ;  nempe  ideo  nos  dici 
appetere  omnia  propter  ultimum  finem,  hoc  est,  propter  Beati- 
tudinem  universe  consideratam,  quia  omnia  qua  appetimus,  solum 
appetimus  sub  ratione  boni :  omnia  autem,  hoc  ipso  quod  bona 
sunt,  sudpte  naturd  ad  Beatitudinem  videntur  ordinata.  Hoc  autem 
ita  est  intelligendum,  non  quia  omnia,  quse  appetimus,  natura  sua 
sint  ordinata  ad  consequendam  veram  Beatitudinem ;  cum  multa 
potius  sint  omnino  contraria  et  inepta :  sed  quia  in  omnibus  bonis 
participatione  quddam  includitur  affectus  Beatitudinis.  Nam  af- 
fectus  Beatitudinis  est,  habere  omne  bonum  et  carere  omni  malo, 
sive  hoc  sive  illo  modo  id  fiat ;  et  quia  desiderio  cujusque  rei, 
quam  appetimus,  desideramus  habere  aliquod  bonum,  et  carere 
aliquo  malo,  et  ita  requiem  aliquam  invenire,  quse  est  veluti  pars 
qusedam  Beatitudinis  in  universum  considerate, —  ideo  dicimur 
omnia  appetere  propter  Beatitudinem,  etiam  appetendo  id  quod 

peccatum  est 

"  Ex  qua  doctrina,  et  vero  sensu  hujus  sententise,  constat,  quam 
parum  roboris  habeant  rationes  duse  Scoti,  quse  in  primo  capite 
allatse  sunt,  ad  probandum  non  omnia,  quaB  nos  appetimus,  appetere 
propter  Beatitudinem.  Nam  prior  ratio  solum  probat,  nos  non  velle 
omnia  quse  appetimus,  propter  ultimum  finem  (Beatitudinem  scilicet 
in  universum),  ratione  voluntatis  prascedentis,  qua  omnia  futura 
nostra  opera  retulerimus  in  talem  finem:  hoc  autem  nos  libenter 
fatemur ;  atque  talem  voluntatem,  etiamsi  prsecessisset,  ad  hoc 
minime  sufficere  capite  primo  demonstravimus :  sed  dicimus  alia 
ratione  nos  velle  omnia  propter  ultimum  finem,  quam  superius  in 
hoc  capite  explicuimus.  Posterior  vero  ratio  Scoti  solum  probat, 
multa  eorum,  quse  diligimus  et  appetimus,  nihil  conferre  ad  con- 
sequendam re  ipsa  Beatitudinem  in  universum ;  et  ita  recte  probat, 
nos  non  appetere,  tanquam  medium  ad  Beatitudinis  consequutionem, 
omnia  quce  appetimus;  et  prsesertim  ea,  qua3  tali  consequutioni 
adversari  omnino  cognoscimus :  hoc  tamen  non  obstat,  quo  minus 
dicamur  omnia  appetere  propter  Beatitudinem  universe  considera- 
tam, ea  ratione,  qua  paulo  antea  in  hoc  capite  id  explicavimus, 
nempe  ratione  participationis  et  assimilationis  cujusdam" — In  1,  2, 
Disput  6,  c.  1  and  c.  2. 

Here  then  we  have  Vasquez's  doctrine ;  which  may 
be  briefly  expressed    as    follows  :  *   c  By  Beatitude    is 

*  Consider  his  words :  '  habere  aliquod  bonum  et  carere  aliquo  malo, 
est  veluti  pars  qucedam  Beatitudinia  in  universum  considerate.' 


ON  MAN'S  DESIRE  OF  FELICITY.  413 

*  meant  the  sum  of  every  possible  bonum.  Hence,  in 
1  every  act,  I  am  in  a  very  true  sense  aiming  at  Beati- 
1  tude:  for  I  am  aiming  at  some  bonum  or  other;  and 
4  consequently  at  some  part  or  other  of  complete  Beati- 
'  tude/ 

So  Viva : 

"  II.  Quseritur  2.  An  quicquid  homo  vult,  prater  Beatitudinem 
seu  finem  ultimum,  necessario  velit  propter  illam  ? 

"  Resp.  cum  Vasquez,  disp.  6,  cap.  2.  Salas,  Martinonio,  quod 
homo,  quicquid  vult  praeter  Beatitudinem,  appetat  propter  illam 
solum  interpretative.  Ratio  est,  quia  non  appetimus  bona  particu- 
laria  propter  Beatitudinem  formaliter  et  expresse,  ut  constat  ex- 
perientid.  Neque  virtualiter,  ita  ut  ex  intentione  finis  ultimi 
prseterit£  procedant  omnes  intentiones  finium  particularium ;  multa 
enim  amamus,  quin  prcecesserit  amor  ultimi  finis,  vel,  si  prsecesserit, 
non  perseverat  virtualiter,  dum  particularia  bona  amamus9  ita  ut 
influat  ac  determinet  ad  istorum  amorem.  Nee  demum  habitua- 
liter ;  turn  quia  non  est  necesse,  quod  prsecesserit  intentio  ultimi 
finis  ad  amorem  bonorum  particularium ;  turn  quia  etiamsi  prseces- 
serit,  potuit  tamen,  per  voluntatem  oppositam,  ejus  habitualis  per- 
severantia  interrumpi :  nam  qui  per  peccatum  deserit  amorem 
ultimi  finis,  non  dicitur  deinde  alia  bona  appetere  ex  intentione 
ultimi  finis  habitualiter  perseverante ;  cum  ea  sit  interrupta  per 
peccatum.  Quare  quicquid  homo  appetit,  prseter  Beatitudinem, 
solum  interpretative  appetit  propter  illam,  confuse  saltern,  et  abs- 
tracto  cognitam ;  quatenus  quisquis  particulare  aliquid  bonum 
vult,  aut  malum  fugit,  ita  censetur  erga  illud  affectus,  ut  bonum 
totale,  ad  quod  particulare  ordinatur,  esset  voliturus,  si  offerretur." 
— Pars  ii.,  d.  2,  q.  4,  n.  2. 

And  Suarez, — 

"  UTRUM OMNES  ACTIONES  HOMINIS  SINT  PROPTER  ULTIMUM  FINEM 
SIMPLICITER,  SALTS M  EX  INCLINATIONS. 

"  Ratio  dubitandi  est,  quia  vel  est  sermo  de  fine  ultimo 
formali ;  aut  de  fine  ultimo  materiali,  seu  de  re  ill&,  ad  quam  homo 
natura  sua  tendit,  ut  ad  ultimum  finem :  neutro  autem  modb 
videtur  homo  operari  semper  propter  ultimum  finem.  De  primo 
patet,  quia,  ut  supra  dixi  sectione  1,  num.  6,  intentio  finis  ultimi 
formalis  non  sufficit  ad  electiones  faciendas;  atque  ade6  nee  ad 
operandum  propter  finem,  ex  proprift  intentione  ipsius  hominis 
operantis:  ergo  nee  etiam  naturalis  proportio  ad  hunc  finem 
formalem  sufficit,  ut  homo  in  omni  actu  suo  dicatur  operari 
propter  ultimum  finem  hunc,  ex  inclinatione  naturse;  quia  non 
omnia,  quce  amat,  sunt  media  ad  hunc  finem.  Alter  a  pars  probatur : 
quia  finis  ultimus,  ad  quern  homo  natura  sua  tendit,  est  Deus; 


414  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

sed  non  omnia,  qua?  homo  .operatur,  tendunt  in  Deum ;  ut  patet 
maxime  de  actibus  malis,  seu  peccatis :  ergo, 

"  Hsec  quaestio  facillime  expediri  potest,  suppositis  his,  quae 
supra  dicta  sunt,  in  disput.  2.  section  4.  de  variis  modis  operandi 
propter  finem :  nam  hie  modus,  de  quo  nunc  agimus,  non  requirit 
propriam  intentionem  ipsiusoperantis9\e\  prsesentem,  vel  praeteritam; 
sed  solum  inter pretativam,  quse  censetur  contineri  in  ipso  objecto 
proximo  humanae  operationis  seu  voluntatis,  quatenus  illud  naturd 
sud  tendit  in  aliud,  vel  tanquam  medium  ad  finem,  vel  tanquam 
pars  ad  totum.  Unde  dicendum  est  primo,  hominem  in  omnibus 
actibus  suis,  tarn  bonis  quam  malis,  operari  aliquo  modo  propter 
ultimum  finem  formalem ;  ex  naturali  connexione  cujuscumque 
objecti  voluntatis  cum  tali  fine.  Ita  est  intelligendus  D.  Thorn. 
1.  2.  q.  1.  a.  6.  ut  clarius  idem  explicuit  in  4.  dist.  49.  qua?st.  1. 
artic.  3.  qua3stiunc.4.  ubi  cseteri  Theologi  idem  sentiunt;  prseter  eos, 
qui  existimant  voluntatem  posse  ferri  in  malum  sub  ratione  mali, 
quod  improbabile  est,  ut  nunc  suppono.  Et  colligitur  eadem  con- 
clusio  ex  Arist.  (1,  Ethicorum  capite  4  et  7.  et  1.  Rhetor,  cap.  5,) 
et  est  frequens  apud  Augustin.  (10.  Confess,  cap.  20  et  21.  e  lib.  11. 
de  Trinit.  cap.  6.  lib.  19.  de  Civit.  capite  1,  et  lib.  de  Epicureis  et 
Stoicis.)  f  Nam  qui  et  bonus  est/  inquit, '  ideo  bonus  est,  ut  beatus 
sit ;  et  qui  malus  est,  malus  non  esset,  nisi  inde  beatum  se  posse 
esse  speraret.'  Secundo,  ratio  est  clara ;  quia  homo  naturaliter 
appetit  complementum  omnis  boni;  in  omni  autem  voluntate  sua 
appetit  saltern  partem,  seu  inchoationem  aliquam,  hujus  boni :  ergo 
implicit^  et  interpretative  appetit  quidquid  appetit,  quatenus  confert 
aliquo  modo  ad  suum  completum  bonum ;  et  hoc  est  amare  illud 
interpretative  propter  ultimum  finem  formalem.  Confirmatur,  et 
explicatur  :  quia  licet  non  pracedat  in  homine  intentio  elicita  hujus 
finis,  pra3cedit  tamen  naturalis  propensio  in  ilium ;  et  ab  hoc 
procedunt  omnes  actus  circa  particularia  bona:  ergo  saltern 
impetu  naturae  omnes  tendunt  in  hujusmodi  finem.  In  quibus 
rationibus  intelligitur,  hoc  non  solum  procedere  in  actionibus 
liberis,  sed  etiam  in  omni  appetitu  cujuscumque  boni.  Intelli- 
gitur etiam,  hanc  habitudinem  particularium  finium  seu  objec- 
torum  ad  ultimum  finem  formalem,  non  tarn  esse  medii  ad  finem 
proprie  loquendo,  quam  partis  ad  totum ;  secundum  veritatem,  aut 
saltern  secundum  apparentiam  et  similitudinem :  ut  recte  D.  Th. 
explicuit.  Nam  quando  homo  appetit,  v.  gr.  voluptatem,  aliquo 
modo  earn  existimat  partem  sui  completi  boni;  quia  licet  talis 
voluptas  non  semper  sit  ilia,  qua3  vere  pertinet  ad  perfectionem 
felicitatis  humanae,  habet  tamen  quandam  similitudinem  cum  illd." 
— De  ultimo  Fine,  disp.  3,  sec.  6,  nn.  1  and  2. 

Oviedo,  a  Jesuit  theologian  of  no  very  great 
eminence,  has  happened  to  express  the  same  doctrine 


ON  MAN'S  DESIRE  OF  FELICITY.  415 

with    extreme   clearness  ;  professing  simply  to  follow 
Vasquez  : — 

"  Hac  prajmissft  explications  Beatitudinis  in  communi,  asscro, 
ex  eo  homines  omnia  objecta  prosequi  propter  Beatitudinem  in 
communi,  quia  ea  prosequuntur  formaliter  ut  lona ;  sive  eorum 
bonitas  in  re  vera  sit,  sive  tantum  apparens  :  et  dum  fugiunt 
objecta,  ea  fugiunt  quia  mala,  quod  est  prosequi  ipsorum  ca- 
rentiam.  Unde  homo,  in  quocumque  actu,  aut  prosequitur  bonum 
aut  carentiam  mali :  quod  est  prosequi  partem  Beatitudinis ;  cum 
Beatitudo  sita  sit  in  cumulo  omnium  bonorum  et  carentid  omnium 
malorum,  quse  secum  afFerunt  quietem  et  tranquil litatem  animi, 
et  satietatem  appetitus,  quam  semper  affectat  homo  in  suis  actibus, 
et  inveniendam  existimat  in  objectis  qua)  prosequitur.  Ideo  in 
quocumque,  saltern  partem  Beatitudinis  sibi  prafigit ;  falso  tamen, 
dum  aliquid  extra  Deum  appetit,  quia  solus  Deus  animum  Deo 
capacem  potest  replere  et  satiare.  Appetit  insuper  homo  partem 
illam  Beatitudinis,  dum  hoc  bonum  appetit  seu  carentiam  hujus 
mali,  sub  ilia  ratione,  sub  qua  omnia  quaecumque  alia,  quibus 
Integra  Beatitudo  constituitur,  ad  Beatitudinem  pertinent;  unde 
in  illo  objecto,  quod  est  tantum  partialis  Beatitudo,  seu  ut  pars 
Beatitudinis  apprehenditur,  appetit  homo  rationem  illam  formalem9 
ex  vi  cujus  alia  objecta,  simul  cum  isto,  Beatitudinem  adasquatam 
constituunt;  nempe  rationem  boni  et  fugam  mali,  in  quibus  ap- 
petitus quiescit,  et  quibus  satiatur ;  sub  qu&,  ad  Beatitudinem  sive 
veram  sive  fictam,  pertinet  quidquid  illam  constituit." — De 
Beatitudine,  Contr.  i.  Punct  2,  n.  1 1. 

Yet  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  all  theologians, 
who  are  not  Scotists,  even  adopt  the  expression  which 
we  have  been  considering.  For  instance,  Becanus,  a 
Jesuit  whose  name  as  a  scholastic  stands  very  high, 
asserts,  in  so  many  words,  that  we  have  the  power 
*  nolendi  Beatitudinem  in  communi.''  This  is  the  passage : 

"  Dices, (  Nemo  potest  nolle  Beatitudinem  in  communi :  erg6 
nee  Beatitudinem  supernaturalem  in  particulari,  quae  consistit  in 
Visione  Beatifica;  cum  sit  par  ratio.'  Respondeo.  Verum  est, 
quando  Beatitudo  apprehenditur  secundum  se,  sine  ulla  alia 
circumstantia :  falsum,  quando  apprehenditur,  ut  difficilis  et 
ardua  ad  acquirendum.  Sed  contra  :  '  Nemo  potest  nolle  bonum 
in  communi,  quucunque  facta  suppositione :  Ergo  etiam  non  potest 
nolle  Beatitudinem  in  communi,  in  simili  casu.  Antecedens 
patet,  quia  omnis  nolitio  fundatur  in  volitione ;  et  omnis  volitio 
est  alicujus  boni/  Respondeo:  Negatur  consequentia;  quia  non 
est  eadein  ratio  de  bono  in  communi,  et  de  Beatitudine  in  com- 


416  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

muni.  Nam  bonum  in  communi  includitur  in  omni  bono  par- 
ticular! ;  ac  proinde  nemo  potest  velle  bonum  aliquod  particulare, 
quin  simul  velit  bonum  in  communi.  At  Beatitudo  in  communi  non 
includitur  in  omni  bono  particulari;  quia  significat  bonum  integrum 
et  consummation,  quod  non  invenitur  in  omni  bono  particulari. 
Unde  potest  quis  velle  bonum  aliquod  particulare,  quod  repugnet 
Beatitudini  in  communi ;  et  consequenter  potest  nolle  Beatitudinem 
in  communi" — De  Beat.  cap.  i.  quaest.  xi.  n.  4. 

Sporer  again,  certainly  one  of  the  most  eminent 
writers  on  Moral  Theology,  thus  expresses  himself:— 

e<  Hanc  libertatem  habet  homo  pro  hoc  statu,  quoad  omnia 
prorsus  objecta ;  tarn  ipsum  ultimum  finem,  quam  media  quse- 
cumque.  Quia  nimirum  nullum  omnino  objectum,  in  hac  vita,  tarn 
necessario  apparet  prosequendum,  tit  omissio  actus  circa  illud  non 
etiam  aliquam  rationem  boni  habeat.  Quin  ipsam  etiam  Beati- 
tudinem, in  hdc  vita,  nee  libet  nee  expedit  semper  actu  appetere."- 
De  Actibus  Humanis,  n.  7. 

And  these  words  of  Bellarmine,  which  I  have  already 
quoted  in  a  different  connection,  to  say  the  least, 
breathe  a  spirit  greatly  at  variance  with  the  statement, 
that  men  are  always  aiming  at  Beatitude  : — 

"  Est   incredibilis   qucedam   negligentia  in  iis,   quas   ad  beate 
vivendum,  turn  in  hac  vM,  turn  etiam  post  mortem,  pertinent,"- 
De  Amiss.  Grat..  lib.  vi.  cap.  10. 

You  will  have  observed  Vasquez'  language,  in  re- 
gard to  Scotus.  He  says  expressly,  that  Scotus  would 
freely  hold  his  (Vasquez')  doctrine;  and  he  implies 
therefore,  that  the  difference  is  merely  one  of  words. 
In  regard  to  that  question  of  words,  for  myself  I  most 
earnestly  follow  Scotus:  I  cannot  but  consider  that 
great  confusion  and  misunderstanding  is  likely  to 
ensue,  so  long  as  the  statement  which  we  have  been 
considering  is  generally  admitted  into  Theology.  Ac- 
cording to  the  same  mode  of  speech,  as  it  seems  to 
me,  I  might  say,  that  the  one  motive  which  in- 
fluences every  day-labourer  in  England  to  pursue  his 
vocation,  is  his  desire  of  realizing  a  million  of  money. 
According  to  our  opponents,  it  may  be  properly  said 
that  man  in  every  act  aims  at  Beatitude,  because  in 


ON  MAN'S  DESIRE  OF  FELICITY.  417 

every  act  he  aims  at  some  bonum  or  other,  and  every 
bonum  is  a  part  of  Beatitude.  I  reply,  that,  according 
to  the  same  mode  of  expression,  every  day-labourer 
is  aiming  at  the  possession  of  a  million  of  money  : 
because  he  is  aiming  at  the  possession  of  some  small 
sum ;  and  every  small  sum  is  part  of  a  million  pounds. 

All  those  theologians  whom  I  have  cited,  you  see, 
plainly  hold  what  I  hold;  viz.  that,  instead  of  there 
being  any  one  absolute  end  of  human  action,  there 
are  as  many  distinct  ends,  as  there  are  distinct  bona 
within  human  cognizance.  No  one  can  doubt  then, 
that  any  Catholic,  who  considers  this  to  be  the  view  in- 
dicated by  genuine  psychological  investigation,  has  the 
fullest  liberty  to  embrace  it.  Nor  would  this  liberty 
be  one  whit  less,  even  though  it  were  true  that  St. 
Thomas  or  St.  Augustine  is  differently  minded. 

You  may  ask  me  however,  what  I  consider  to  be 
St.  Thomas'  doctrine  on  the  subject.  In  the  first  place 
it  would  seem  perfectly  clear,  that  with  him  4  Beatitude7 
is  by  no  means  synonymous  with  *  happiness,' — if  we 
consider  only  what  he  says  in  one  single  article,  1,  2, 
q.  4,  a.  2.  In  that  article  he  decides,  that  the  Vision 
of  God  is  a  more  principal  part  of  Beatitude,  than  is 
the  delight  which  follows  on  that  Vision.  Our  eternal 
happiness  on  the  other  hand  consists,  beyond  all  pos- 
sible question,  in  that  delight  itself,  and  in  nothing  else. 
Hence  our  eternal  happiness,  according  to  St.  Thomas, 
is  not  even  the  principal  part  of  our  Eternal  Beatitude. 

In  the  second  place  however,  I  cannot  persuade 
myself  that  St.  Thomas'  meaning  is  accurately  repre- 
sented by  Vasquez  and  Viva.  I  hold  their  doctrine  as 
most  certainly  true ;  but  I  cannot  persuade  myself,  that 
it  is  St.  Thomas'  doctrine.  What  St.  Thomas'  doc- 
trine is,  it  is  not  very  easy  to  discover;  and  though  I 
do  incline  to  a  certain  definite  opinion  on  the  subject, 
it  is  by  no  means  worth  while  to  state  and  defend 
that  opinion.  I  have  admitted  that  I  cannot  claim  St. 
Thomas'  authority,  for  that  doctrine  on  the  subject 
which  appears  to  me  true ;  and  the  question  therefore 

E  E 


4  1  8  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

what  St.  Thomas'  precise  opinion  was,  becomes  a  ques- 
tion of  merely  historical  interest. 

You  may  further  ask,  how  far  is  Bossuet  justified 
in  citing  St.  Augustine  as  on  his  side?  Both  Vasquez 
and  Oviedo  maintain,  and  I  think  with  reason,  that 
when  St.  Augustine  declares  that  man  is  ever  aiming 
at  Beatitude,  he  understands  by  that  phrase  no  more, 
than  the  doctrine  which  Vasquez  himself  understands 
by  it;  a  doctrine  altogether  consistent  with  the  pro- 
position which  we  have  throughout  maintained.  If 
you  care  to  examine  the  matter  for  yourselves,  I 
would  refer  you  to  the  entire  passages  of  those  theolo- 
gians, from  which  I  have  taken  the  preceding  extracts. 
You  will  there  find  (1)  St.  Augustine's  statement ;  (2) 
their  interpretation  of  that  statement ;  and  (3)  their 
reasons  (in  my  opinion  very  cogent  ones)  for  affixing 
that  interpretation. 


419 


SECTION  II. 
On  the  Claims  of  Self-  Charity. 

172.  Since  then  man  is  no  way  necessitated  (far 
indeed  from  it)  to  be  ever  aiming  at  his  own  happi- 
ness, it  becomes  a  very  practical  question,  how  far  he 
is  morally  obliged  so  to  do.     I  will  only  attempt  here 
to  state  the  broad  and  general  principles,  which  appear 
to  me  true  in  relation  to  this  subject;  leaving  to  our 
theological  course  their  development  and  application. 

173.  First  Principle.     It  is  metaphysically  impossi- 
ble, that  any  act  or  series  of  actions,  which  is  morally 
obligatory,  shall  be  otherwise  than  conducive  to  my 
happiness  on  the  whole;  taking  in  the  entire  sum  of 
my  existence.     I  consider  that  this  is  both  an  intuitive 
and  also  an  inferential  truth. 

(1.)  It  is  an  intuitive  truth.  There  can  be  no 
better  test  of  a  legitimate  moral  intuition  (as  we  found 
in  Chap.  I.  Sect.  6)  than  this, — that  all  those  who 
have  given  their  Moral  Faculty  any  considerable  cul- 
tivation, agree  in  recognizing  it  as  such.  Now  let  any 
one,  thus  qualified,  imagine  for  a  moment  that  a  duty 
were  proposed  to  his  performance,  and  at  the  same 
time  that  he  were  informed,  on  indisputable  authority, 
that  the  sum  of  his  happiness  would  be  promoted  by 
violating  that  duty.  Surely  such  a  supposition  speaks 
for  itself.  He  would  consider  himself,  in  such  a  case, 
to  be  under  two  contradictory  obligations ;  or  in  other 
words  he  would  intue,  that  such  an  imaginary  case  is 
metaphysically  impossible. 

(2.)  The  same  truth  is  known  to  us,  by  way  of  in- 
ference from  the  Existence  of  a  Holy  Creator  and  Moral 
Governor  of  the  World.  It  is  evidently  implied,  in 
the  very  idea  of  such  a  Moral  Governor,  that  the  path 


420  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

of  virtue  and  of  real  permanent  happiness  shall  in 
every  single  case  be  made  identical;  that  no  one  shall 
obtain  increase  of  happiness,  simply  from  disobeying 
his  Creator's  Command. 

The  Christian  Revelation  on  the  whole,  as  is  most 
evident,  confirms  this  principle  which  Reason  declares ; 
it  tells  us,  that  to  every  good  act  God  has  awarded 
recompense,  and  to  every  bad  act  punishment.  At  the 
same  time  there  are  certain  facts,  which,  on  the  surface 
at  least,  seem  inconsistent  with  this  principle.  As  one 
instance  of  what  I  mean,  take  such  a  case  as  the  fol- 
lowing, which  is  often  mentioned  by  theologians.  A 
Christian,  in  mortal  sin,  is  under  the  moral  obligation, 
e.g.  of  confessing  the  Faith  and  undergoing  mar- 
tyrdom. It  would  appear  on  the  surface,  that,  by  com- 
plying with  this  obligation,  he  irreparably  injures  his 
own  permanent  happiness  ;  for  he  loses  those  years, 
which  he  might  have  devoted  to  repentance  and  good 
works.  I  merely  mention  such  cases  here,  to  shew 
that  I  have  not  forgotten  them ;  for  a  solution  of  the 
difficulty  which  they  involve,  we  must  wait  for  our 
theological  course. 

174.  Second   Principle.     It   is  metaphysically  im- 
possible, that  one  act  or  series  of  acts,  shall  be  more 
morally  worthy  than  another,  without  being  also  more 
conducive  to  the  agent's  happiness  on  the  whole.    This, 
like   the   former,    I  consider  to   be  both  an  intuitive 
and  also  an  inferential  truth.     It  may  be  established,  on 
grounds  precisely  similar  to  those  on  which  we  rested 
our  first  principle;  it  may  be  met  by  an  objection  pre- 
cisely similar;  and  in  this,  as  in  the  former  case,  we 
defer  our  consideration  of  that  objection  to  our  theo- 
logical course. 

175.  Third  principle.     Self-charity  is  a  virtuous  end 
of  action  (nn.  54-56).  Let  us  consider  what  is  involved 
in  this  statement.     We  have  seen  e.  g.  (n.   54)   that 
Justice  is  a  '  virtuous  end  of  action.'    Let  us  see  what 
various  propositions  this  implies ;  and  let  us  also  see  how 
the  same  propositions  hold  in  regard  to  Self-charity. 

(1)  An  act,  motived  by  the  virtuousness  of  Justice, 


ON  THE  CLAIMS  OF  SELF-CHARITY.  421 

is  itself  virtuous ;  and  the  more  so,  in  proportion  as  the 
will  is  fixed  on  that  virtuousness  with  greater  firmness 
and  efficacity  (see  nn.  56  and  58).  This  holds  in  every 
respect  of  Self-charity.  Suppose  I  am  tempted  by  some 
immediate  sinful  gratification :  and  suppose  I  resist  that 
temptation,  on  no  other  grounds  than  this; — viz.,  the 
virtuousness  of  preferring  my  permanent  and  integral 
happiness  to  the  passing  pleasures  of  a  moment.  In  pro- 
portion as  we  have  cultivated  our  Moral  Faculty,  we 
shall  intue,  with  the  greater  keenness  and  irresistible- 
ness,  that  this  act  is  virtuous ;  and  the  more  virtuous, 
in  proportion  as  my  will  is  fixed  on  that  virtuousness 
with  the  greater  firmness  and  efficacity. 

(2.)  Caeteris  paribus,  A  is  a  more  virtuous  man  than 
B  in  proportion  as  ne  has  acquired  the  habit  of  Justice 
in  a  greater  degree;  or  (in  other  words)  as  he  possesses 
more  strongly  the  prevalent  intention  (see  n.  114,  p.  237) 
of  acting  justly.  It  is  very  evident  that  in  like  manner, 
caeteris  paribus,  A  is  a  more  virtuous  man  than  B,  in 
proportion  as  he  has  acquired  the  habit  of  Self-charity 
in  a  greater  degree;  or  (in  other  words)  in  proportion 
as  he  possesses  more  strongly  the  prevalent  intention,  of 
acting  in  accordance  with  his  own  permanent  happiness. 
We  shall  see  however,  in  the  course  of  our  theological 
discussion,  that  in  the  case  of  Self-charity  we  may  go 
much  further  than  in  the  case  of  Justice ;  and  that  the 
qualification  '  cseteris  paribus '  is  unnecessary.  We 
shall  see  that  simply  and  absolutely,  in  proportion  as 
any  one  grows  in  virtue,  his  prevalent  intention  of  pro- 
moting his  own  permanent  happiness  will  constantly 
increase. 

(3.)  Lastly,  if  I  commit  an  unjust  act,  e.  g\,  refuse 
to  return  a  deposit, — my  act  is  sinful,  as  in  various 
other  ways,  so  also  in  this,  that  it  is  contrary  to  Justice. 
Even  were  it  not  sinful  under  other  heads,  the  simple 
fact  of  its  being  contrary  to  Justice  would  suffice  to 
make  it  so.  In  like  manner  here.  If  I  commit  any  sin 
whatever,  such  an  act,  as  it  possesses  various  '  malitise,' 
so  possesses  also  this,  that  it  is  opposed  to  Self-charity ; 
'  contra  obligationeni,'  as  theologians  say,  '  procurandse 


422  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

proprise  salutis;'  or  '  caritatis  erga  meipsuin.'  Even  if 
(per  inipossibile)  it  were  not  sinful  on  other  grounds, 
this  alone  would  suffice  to  make  it  sinful. 

These  are  the  three  principal  truths  included  in  the 
statement,  that  Self-charity  is  a  'virtuous  end  of  action/ 

176.  Fourth  principle.  It  often  happens,  that  I 
avoid  sin  from  the  motive  of  promoting  my  own  happi- 
ness, while  yet  my  will  is  not  at  all  directed  to  the 
virtuomness  of  that  motive.  I  may  be  tempted,  e.  g., 
to  some  sin  of  sensuality :  and  the  thought  of  Hell-fire 
may  protect  me  against  the  temptation,  simply  from  this 
fact;  viz.,  that  the  practical  impression  of  that  future 
suffering  preponderates  (even  in  the  way  of  simple 
emotion)  over  the  practical  impression  of  present  plea- 
sure. Under  these  circumstances,  the  temptation  in 
fact  ceases ;  and  the  act  of  will,  whereby  I  resolve  not 
to  commit  the  contemplated  sin,  is  motived,  not  by  the 
virtuousness,  but  by  the  (negative)  pleasurableness,  of 
escaping  so  awful  a  doom.  '  Surely,'  it  may  be  said, 
'  such  an  act  is  most  commendable,  although  not  motived 
at  all  by  the  virtuousness  of  Self-charity.' 

It  is  impossible  certainly  that  an  act  can  be  virtuous, 
of  which  pleasurableness  is  the  absolute  end.  In  regard 
however  to  the  act  in  question,  wre  may  say  in  the  first 
place  that  it  is  at  all  events  indifferent ;  free  from  the 
very  slightest  admixture  of  evil.  This  will  be  abun- 
dantly proved  in  our  theological  course,  when  we  come 
to  consider  what  are  the  characteristics  of  an  evil  act. 

We  may  add  further  (and  this  will  be  our  second 
remark  on  the  subject)  that  this  act,  in  itself  indifferent,. 
is  invariably  accompanied  by  another,  which  is  always 
virtuous,  and  commonly  virtuous  in  a  very  high  degree. 
This  virtuous  act,  in  the  particular  case  which  we 
have  taken  as  our  instance,  may  be  thus  analysed :  c  I 
'  fix  my  mind  earnestly  on  the  thought  of  Hell-fire, 
'  — that  I  may  escape  from  this  temptation, — that  I 
4  may  the  better  conform  my  Will  to  God's,  Who  is  so 
4  worthy  of  love;'  or  'that  I  may  obey  the  commands 
'  of  my  Holy  Creator;'  or  c  that  I  may  promote  my  own 
'  permanent  happiness ;'  or  the  like.  Such  acts  as  these 


ON  THE  CLAIMS  OF  SELF-CHA1UTY.  423 

then  vary  indefinitely  from  each  other,  as  to  the  precise 
motive  which  influences  them;  but  in  the  substance  (as 
distinct  from  the  end)  they  agree.  In  all  such  acts,  the 
Will  compels  the  Intellect  to  ponder,  e.  g\,  on  the  awful- 
ness  of  Hell-torments,  so  intently  and  resolutely,  that 
the  needed  practical  impression  is  produced,  and  the 
temptation  vanishes.  And  such  an  act  is  always  present 
in  the  case  supposed :  because,  when  some  present  plea- 
sure is  offered,  it  is  only  by  means  of  an  effort,  nay,  in 
general  of  very  considerable  effort,  (as  daily  experience 
shews)  that  we  can  bring  the  thought  of  future  anguish 
to  bear  on  the  present  pleasure,  and  neutralize  its  im- 
pression. Acts  of  this  kind  will  be  specially  considered 
in  our  theological  course,  under  their  recognized  appel- 
lation, '  actus  extrinsece  imperantes.' 

Such  then  I  consider  to  be  the  true  philosophical 
principles,  on  which  our  theological  treatment  of  Self- 
charity  must  throughout  be  based. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

ON  THE  VARIOUS  KINDS  OF  CERTAINTY  AND  IMPOSSIBILITY. 

177.  THIS  is  the  last  philosophical  subject,  which  it  will 
be  necessary  to  consider  in  this  introductory  book. 
And  in  this,  as  in  other  cases,  our  intention  is  by  no 
means  to  probe  it  to  its  depths ;  but  to  say  only  what  is 
absolutely  necessary,  for  the  purposes  of  that  part  of 
Theology,  which  we  are  afterwards  to  treat.  There  are 
several  questions,  of  great  intricacy  and  difficulty,  con- 
nected with  the  various  kinds  of  certainty ;  but  we  shall 
be  able  (I  trust)  altogether  to  avoid  these,  without 
injuring  at  all  the  scientific  completeness  of  our  work. 

Things  may  be  certain  in  themselves,  or  certain  to 
us*  The  former  kind  of  certainty  may  be  called  '  ob- 
jective,' the  latter  'subjective;'  and  the  latter  is  that 
with  which  we  shall  commence.  Things  are  considered 
certain  to  us,  if  these  two  conditions  concur:  (1)  that 
we  have  in  fact  no  doubt  about  them;  (2)  that  we  have 
fully  sufficient  reason  to  be  thus  without  doubt,  f 

178.  Subjective  certainty  is  either  (1)  experimental 
or  (2)  theoretical.  By  experimental  certainty,  I  mean 
our  conviction  that  our  various  judgments  of  experience 

*  "Est  autem  duplex  certitude:  Una  objecti,  id  est,  rei  cognitae,  vel 
creditae  ;  Altera  subjecti,  id  est  hominis  cognoscentis,  vel  credentis.  Prior 
certitude  est  immutabilitas  rei,  quse  re  vera  aliter  se  habere  non  potest, 
quam  creditur,  vel  cognoscitur :  qua  notione  dicimus,  certum  esse,  Deum 
esse  bonum,  peccatum  esse  rnalum.  Posterior  certitudo  est  firinitas  quae- 
dam  assens&s  nostri  ad  rem,  quso  cognoscenda  vel  credenda  proponitur  :  de 
qua  certitudine  loquinaur,  cum  dicimus :  'Hoc  mihi  est  certum  :'  'ego  de 
hac  re  certus  sum  :'  '  hoc  habeo  pro  comperto  :'  id  est, '  ita  firmiter  adhaereo 
huic  sententiae,  ut  prorsus  de  illius  veritate  non  dubitem." — BELLARMIXE, 
De  Justification^  lib.  iii.  cap.  2,  n.  2. 

t  "Qui  certo  credunt  ea  quse  falsa  sunt,  non  tarn  certi,  quam  persuasi, 
dici  debent." — BELLARM.  De  Just.  lib.  iii.  cap.  2,  n.  5. 


ON  CERTAINTY  AND  IMPOSSIBILITY.  425 

(see  n.  1,  p.  5)  are  correct.  I  feel  at  this  moment  the 
sensation  which  we  call  cold,  or  I  experience  the  pheno- 
menon which  we  call  anger.  That  I  really  do  have 
this  feeling, — that  I  really  do  experience  this  pheno- 
menon,— is  to  me  a  matter  of  'experimental'  certainty. 
Every  other  kind  of  subjective  certainty  we  may  call 
*  theoretical/ 

179.  The  first  and  most  important  kind  of  'theo^e- 
tical'  certainty,  may  be  called  '  fundamental-/  it  is  our 
conviction  that  we  may  trust  our  faculties;  that  we 
may  confidently  form  certain  '  intuitive'  judgments.   See 
n.  6,  p.  14. 

180.  The  second  kind  of  theoretical   certainty  is 
called  'metaphysical.'    It  exists,  whenever,  on  sufficient 
grounds,  we  recognize  any  truth  as  necessary.     See  n. 
13,  p.  24.    I  am  metaphysically  certain,  that  a  rectilineal 
figure  of  three  sides  has  three  angles ;  that  the  base 
angles  of  an  isosceles  triangle  are  equal  to  each  other ; 
that  in  a  right-angled  triangle  the  square  of  the  hypo- 
thenuse  equals  the  sum  of  the  square  of  the  sides ;  that 
there  is  such  an  attribute  as  moral  evil,  appertaining  to 
certain  actions;  that  Veracity  and  Humility  are  vir- 
tuous ends  of  action ;  that  generosity  is  morally  better 
than  selfishness;   that  a  Holy  Creator  exists,  Infinite 
in   all    Perfections ;   that    obedience    to    Him   is    our 
highest  duty;  &c.  &c. 

181.  The   third   kind  of   theoretical   certainty,    is 
called  '  physical.'     It  is  that  which  arises  necessarily, 
from  my  knowledge  of  this  or  that  definite  and  assign- 
able natural  property,  or  assemblage  of  natural  proper- 
ties.    See  n.  165,  p.  392-7.     It  is  physically  certain  to 
me,  that,  unless  a  miracle  be  wrought,  no  human  beings 
are  able  to  remain  supported  in  mid-air;  that,  unless  a 
miracle  is  wrought,  an  explosion  will  take  place,  when- 
ever fire  is  brought  into  contact  with  dry  gunpowder; 
that,  unless  a  miracle  be  wrought,  the  expectation  of 
severe  pain  is  itself  painful ;  that,  unless  a  miracle  be 
wrought,  a  proud  man,  who  receives  some  galling  insult, 
will  experience  violent  emotions  of  anger ;  &c.  &c. 

Two  different  ways  of  expressing  ourselves,  are  here. 


426  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

possible.  We  may  express  ourselves  thus :  '  It  is  phy- 
'  sically  certain  that  no  human  being  can  remain  in 
4  mid-air;  that  the  expectation  of  pain  is  itself  painful;' 
&c.  &c.  Or  we  may  express  ourselves,  as  I  have  done : 
8  It  is  physically  certain  that,  unless  a  miracle  is  wrought, 
'  these  results  will  ensue.'  I  prefer  this  latter  mode  of 
expression ;  because  otherwise  physical  certainty  would 
not  be  absolute,  but  only  hypothetical,  certainty. 

182.  But  there  are  very  many  things,  of  which  I  am 
absolutely  certain,  which  cannot  be  ranked  under  any 
of  these  heads.  Thus  I  am  absolutely  certain  that  the 
city  of  Rome  exists ;  quite  as  certain  as  I  am  that  fire, 

Fut  to  dry  gunpowder,  will  produce  an  explosion.  Yet 
have  never  seen  Rome ;  nor  if  it  were  alleged  that  all 
the  witnesses  who  testify  its  existence  had  combined  to 
deceive  me,  could  it  be  said  that  this  allegation  is 
opposed  to  any  definite  and  assignable  natural  proper- 
ties. In  like  manner,  I  am  absolutely  certain,  that  a 
stout  and  lazy  man,  reasonably  well  off  and  not  miserly, 
will  not  go  ten  miles  in  two  hours  for  the  sake  of  a  half- 
crown  wager.  And  yet  no  physical  property  would  be 
violated  if  he  did  so ;  he  has  perfect  physical  power  to 
achieve  the  bodily  feat  in  question ;  and  if  he  were  pur- 
sued all  the  way  by  a  man  with  a  drawn  sword,  trying 
to  kill  him,  he  probably  would  achieve  it. 

It  is  a  characteristic  of  moral  certainty,  that  it  is 
constituted  by  a  gradual  increase  of  those  conditions, 
which  constitute  probability.  If  three  independent 
witnesses  assure  me  of  Rome's  existence,  the  fact 
becomes  probable  to  me;  if  ten,  very  probable;  if  fifty, 
almost  certain :  but  long  before  you  reach  that  number 
and  variety  of  informants  who  in  fact  combine  their 
testimony,  absolute  certainty  has  been  reached.  So 
again,  that  such  a  man  as  above  described  will  not  go 
four  miles  in  two  hours  for  such  a  wager,  is  very  pro- 
bable ;  that  he  will  not  go  six,  almost  certain ;  that  he 
will  not  go  anything  like  ten,  is  quite  absolutely  certain. 
The  phrase  '  morally  certain '  is  sometimes  used  indeed 
in  a  less  strict  sense,  to  express  that  which  is  in  the  very 
greatest  degree  probable,  though  not  quite  absolutely 


ON  CERTAINTY  AND  IMPOSSIBILITY.  427 

certain.  But  this  sense  of  the  wOrd  is  wholly  distinct 
from  our  use  of  it  in  this  Chapter;  and  indeed  (to 
prevent  confusion)  I  shall  never  myself  use  the  phrase 
in  any  such  sense.* 

183.  So  much  on  subjective  certainty,  or  things 
certain  to  us :  but  there  is  also  an  objective  certainty ; 
there  are  things  certain  in  themselves.  Here  indeed  an 
obvious  difficulty  may  be  interposed.  4  Of  course  very 
*  many  things  are  certain  in  themselves :  for  of  every 
'  thing  which  ever  happened  or  ever  will  happen,  we 
'  may  truly  say,  that  it  certainly  happened, — that  it 
4  certainly  will  happen.'  Such  certainty  is  4  a  posteriori ;' 
and  the  remark  is  undoubtedly  true.  But  there  are 
many  things  'objectively7  certain  'a  priori;'  and  it  is 
of  these  things  that  it  is  important  to  speak. 

Truths  are  '  objectively  certain  a  priori,'  when  there 
are  grounds  for  certainly  knowing  them,  quite  inde- 
pendently of  any  direct  knowledge,  that  they  have  ex- 
isted or  will  exist.  And  yet  it  may  happen  very  fre- 
quently indeed,  that  these  truths  are  not  certain  to 
us:  because  we  have  not  the  means  of  knowing  these 
grounds ;  or  have  not  the  faculties,  enabling  us  to 
deduce  from  them  their  legitimate  inference.  Thus, 
there  is  a  very  large  number  of  mathematical  truths, 
objectively  certain ;  to  the  Angels  perhaps  subjectively 

*  "  Evidentia  Metaphysica  est,  quando  clar£  apparet,  rem  nullo  modo 
posse  aliter  se  habere  :  v.  g.  duo  et  duo  esse  quatuor ;  nihil  posse  simul 
esse,  et  non  esse  ;  et  alia  similia.  Evidentia  autem  Physica  est,  quando 
constat  clare,  rem,  licdt  metaphysice*  possit  aliter  se  habere,  non  tamen 
physice,  seu  attentd  virtute  causarum  physicarum  et  naturalium,;  v.  g.  ignem 
applicatum  subjecto  capaci  calefacere  ;  sab  accidentibus  panis  dari  panis 
suDstantiam  ;  et  similia.  Denique  Evidentia  Moralis  dicitur,  quando,  licet 
metaphysicd  non  repugnet  contrariuni,  neque  etiam  physice,  hoc  est, 
attentft  virtute  causarum  naturalium, — apparet  tamen  dare  talis  et  tanta 
difficultas,  ut  ratione  illius  numquam  contrarium  ponatur,  vel  ponendum 
credatur,  in  aliquo  casu.  Et  ided  dicimus  esse  Evidentiam  Moralem  apud 
nos,  de  exixtentid  regionis  Indices,  quain  nunquam  vidimus :  quia  licet, 
attenta  virtute  causarum  naturalium,  non  repugnet  physicd,  quod  omnes, 
qui  nobis  testificati  sunt  de  India  mentiri  voluerint ;  hoc  tamen  ipsum  est 
adeo  difficile,  ut  non  credamus  id  unquam  eventurum,  ut  tot  tamque 
diversi  testes  convener] nt  ad  volendum  nos  decipere ;  et  cum  tanta 
uniformitate  et  constantia  nobis  eadem,  diversis  etiam  temporibus  et  locis, 
testificentur,  absque  ulla  discrepantia  :  et  idcirco  dicimus,  nos  habere 
Moralem  Evidentiam,  et  plusquam  fidem  humanam,  de  Indica  regione ; 
quod  sufficit,  ut  intellectus  convincatur,  nee  possit,  nisi  per  summam 
dementiam  et  obstinationem,  dissentire." — LUGO,  De  Fide,  Disp.  2,  n.  40. 


428  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

certain  ;   but  which  no  man  has  ever  yet   proved   or 
even  thought  of. 

Objective  a  priori  certainty  is  either  '  metaphysical/ 
4  physical,'  or  'moral:'  a  division  which  altogether  cor- 
responds, to  the  division  of  '  subjective  certainty.'  All 
necessary  truths,  whether  we  recognize  them  as  such  or 
not,  are  '  metaphysically'  certain  a  priori.  Every  truth 
is  'physically'  certain  a  priori,  which  results  from 
definite  and  assignable  laws  of  nature ;  and  there  are, 
I  need  not  say,  multitudes  of  such  truths,  whereof  we 
have  no  suspicion.  The  law  of  gravitation,  e.g.  was 
physically  certain  a  priori  in  Homer's  time  no  less  than 
in  our's;  it  has  become  subjectively  certain  only  within 
the  last  centuries.  Every  truth  which  is  '  objectively 
certain  a  priori,'  and  yet  neither  metaphysically  nor 
physically  certain,  is  c  morally  certain  a  priori.' 

184.  If  any  truth  is  certain  a  priori,  its  contradictory 
is  '  impossible : '  and  there  are  therefore  the  same  kinds 
of  'impossibility,'  which  there  are  of  objective  a  priori 
certainty.  Thus  it  is  metaphysically  impossible,  that 
there  can  be  a  triangle,  whose  united  angles  shall  exceed 
two  right  angles ;  or  that  a  rational  creature  can,  with- 
out sin,  refuse  obedience  to  his  Holy  Creator.  It  is 
physically  impossible,  that,  unless  a  miracle  be  wrought, 
a  stout  man  can  walk  on  a  bridge  made  of  ordinary 
paper;  or  a  proud  man  receive  a  galling  insult,  without 
experiencing  emotions  of  rage.  It  is  morally  impossible, 
that  a  stout  lazy  man,  reasonably  well  off  and  not 
miserly,  shall  go  ten  miles  in  two  hours,  for  the  sake  of 
a  half-crown  wager.* 

We  have  said  as  much  on  this  subject  of  certainty 
and  impossibility,  as  is  requisite  for  our  subsequent 
Theology.  At  the  same  time  I  am  well  aware,  how 
extremely  superficial  our  remarks  have  been,  if  they  are 
considered  as  any  approach  to  a  full  philosophical  treat- 
ment of  the  whole  matter. 

*  "  Ad  hoc  enim  ut  aliquid  sit  moraliter  impossible,  duo  requiruntur ; 
nee  unum  sine  altero  sufficit :  scilicet  quod  illud  nunquam  fuerit,  vel 
futurum  sit,  imo  nee  videatur  futumm  sub  conditione,  in  hac  vel  alia  sirnili 
hypothesi ;  et  prseterea,  quod  hoc  ipsum  oriatur  ex  summa  difficultate, 
quani  oporteret  vincere  ad  ponendum  illud." — LUGO,  De  Incarnatione, 
disp.  2,  n.  14. 


429 


SUPPLEMENTARY  SECTION. 

BEING  SECTION  4TII  OF  CHAPTER  FIRST. 

Catholic  Authority  on  Independent  Morality. 

185.  Certain  Catholics,  as  I  observed  in  the  third 
Section,  are  under  the  impression,  that  there  is  some 
overwhelming  amount  of  theological  authority  for  the 
thesis,  that  all  moral  obligation  springs  from  God's 
Command.  The  first  and  principal  part  of  this  Section 
then  will  be  devoted,  to  establishing  the  contradictory 
of  this.  I  will  shew  that  so  considerable  a  number  of 
the  greatest  Catholic  writers  oppose  themselves  to  any 
such  thesis,  that  at  all  events  any  Catholic,  who  may 
regard  it  as  opposed  to  Reason,  has  the  fullest  liberty 
of  denying  it.  I  will  afterwards  consider  the  bearing 
of  Catholic  authority  on  those  other  theories,  adverse 
to  ours,  which  were  enumerated  in  the  third  Section. 

Now  as  to  the  proposition  that  all  moral  obligation 
springs  from  God's  free  Command, — this  is  not  only  not 
held  by  the  body  of  theologians;  it  is  actually  de- 
nounced by  them:  and  I  imagine  no  Catholic  could 
maintain  it,  without  incurring  some  theological  censure. 
At  all  events  the  following  passage  of  Father  Perrone 
will  sufficiently  shew,  how  unanimously  Catholic  theo- 
logians reject  any  such  proposition. 

"  Hue  demum,  ut  plura  alia  ejusdem  generis  silentio  prseter- 
earaus,  recidit  doctrina  ilia,  cui  tot  Protestantes  juris  natune  scrip- 
tores  firmissime  adhaeserunt,  nullum  intrinsecum  inter  bonnm  ac 
malum  morale  dari  discrimen,  sed  illud  a  Liberd  tqntum  ac  Positivd 
Dei  Voluntate  totum  esse  repetendum ;  unde  consequitur,  ipsum 
ex  positiva  duntaxat  Dei  revelatione  posse  innotescere." 

F  F 


430  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

To  this  passage  F.  Perrone  appends  the  following 
note  : — 

"  Haec  fttit  palmaris  doctrina  Pufendorfii,  quam  ipse  a  parente 
suo  Luthero  hausit.  Eum  sequuti  sunt  Cocceijus,  ac  saltern  ex 
parte  Heineccius,  Thomasius,  aliique  e  Protestantibus.  Ita  etiam 
Seldenus  a  positiva  Dei  revelatione  totum  jus  naturale  repetit. 
Hinc  omnes  isti  Protestantes  juristae  doctores  scholasticos  vehementer 
irrident  ac  exagitant,  eo  quod  intrinsecum  boni  ac  inali  moralis  dis- 
crimen  in  ipsis  rerum  essentiis  ac  naturd  fundatum  tuentur,  ac  Legem 
^Eternam  in  Deo,  a  Libera  Dei  Voluntate  independentem,  vindi- 
cant.  Haud  ergo  satis  mirari  possumus,  quomodo  philosophus 
Scotus,  magni  inter  recentiores  nominis,  Dugald  Stewart,  in 
praBfatione  quam  praemisit  volumini  primo  Supplement!  Britan- 
nicaB  Encyclopedias,  hanc  Melanchthoni  tribuere  gloriam  potuerit, 
quod  nempe  primus  omnium  docuerit  distinctionem  inter  bonum 
ac  malum  morale,  non  a  revelatione,  sed  ab  intrinsecd  rerum  naturd 
dimanantem ;  sic,  ut  (ipse  subdit)  Catholici  posthac  ex  Protes- 
tantibus doctrinam  hanc  sint  mutuali.  Num  ha3c  ipsa  doctrina 
non  omnibus  fere  jam  antea  scholasticis  communis  erat,  si 
Occamum,  Nominalium  parentem,  excipias ;  qui  tamen  statim  ac 
contrarium  docuit,  ceteros  pene  omnes  scholasticos  sibi  adversos  habuit, 
et  a  pluribus,  quos  inter  a  Jo.  Duns  Scoto,  invicte  refntatus 
est?  Num  scholastici  ob  hoc  ipsum  tot  a  Protestantibus,  quos 
commemoravimus,  injurias  pati  non  debuerunt?  Num  contraria 
sententia,  quae  morales  distinctiones  omnino  tollit,  non  fuit  a 
Luthero  ejusque  sectatoribus  prcedicata  ?  Adeo  praejudicia  protest- 
antismi  philosopho,  cseteroqui  commendabili,  Stewarto,  fucum 
facere  potuerunt !" — PERRONE  de  Locis  Theologicis,  pars  3,  n.  9. 

Billuart  again  expressly  says,  that  even  in  his  days 
this  opinion  had  entirely  disappeared  from  among 
Catholics : — 

"  Okam,  Gerson,  Petrus  de  Alliaco,  et  pauci  quidam  antiqui, 
opinati  sunt  Deum  posse  absolute  dispensare  in  omnibus  prseceptis 
Legis  Naturae,  imo  totam  illam  Legem  abrogare;  ita  ut  etiam 
odium  Dei  non  esset  peccatum.  Sed  haec  opinio  merito  rejicitur 
ab  aliis  theologis,  et  nunc  inolevit." 

As  to  the  present  day,  if  such  an  opinion  could  be 
found  in  any  Catholic  school  of  Philosophy,  it  would  be 
among  the  traditionalists.  But  I  have  before  me  a  most 
vigorous  assault  on  F.  Chastel  S.  J.  by  F.  Ventura ;  in 
which  the  writer  (as  I  understand  him)  expressly  de- 


CATHOLIC  AUTHOBITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    431 

clines  to  carry  his  opposition  any  such  monstrous  length. 
These  are  his  words : — 

"  '  Dieu,'  dit  cet  auteur  semi-rational iste  (Chastel),  '  loin  de 
decider  arbitrairement  le  bien  et  le  mal,  est  au  contraire  ndcessitd 
par  Sa  Perfection  &  defendre  Tun  et  k  vouloir  Pautre.'  Cela  est 
tres-vrai." — Le  Semi-Rationalisme  Ddvoild.  Par  le  Pere  Ventura 
de  Raulica,  p.  82.  Ed.  1856. 

186.  On  this   truly   monstrous   and   blasphemous 
position  then,  no  more  need  be  said.      But  we  are  now 
to  go  further:  we  are  to  give  some  specimen  of  the 
amount  of  theological  authority  adducible  against  the 
proposition,    that   God's   Necessary   Command   is   the 
source   of  all   moral   obligation. 

We  will  begin  with  the  Church's  condemnation  of 
two  propositions  ;  they  are  the  48th  and  49th  of  those 
condemned  by  Innocent  XI.  in  1679.  (See  Denzinger, 
pp.  328,  329.) 

"  Tarn  clarum  videtur  fornicationem  secundum 
"  se  nullam  involvere  malitiam,  et  soliim  esse  malam 
"  quia  interdicta,  ut  contrarium  omnino  ration! 
"dissonum  videatur." 

"  Mollities  jure  naturae  prohibita  non  est. 
"  Unde,  si  Deus  earn  non  interdixisset,  ssepe  esset 
"  bona,  et  aliquando  obligatoria  sub  mortal!." 

I  will  not  go  the  length  of  saying,  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  accept  this  condemnation  in  any  imaginable 
sense,  without  denying  the  proposition  which  we  com- 
bat :  yet  the  general  bearing  of  the  condemnation  is 
none  the  less  obvious.  Caramuel  is  condemned  for 
maintaining,  that  the  two  sins  here  mentioned  are  only 
1  mala  quia  prohibita ;'  in  other  words,  for  not  admitting 
that  they  are  intrinsecally  evil,  apart  from  God's  Pro- 
hibition. But  if,  apart  from  God's  Prohibition,  they  are 
independently  evil,  then,  apart  from  God's  Prohibition, 
we  are  under  the  independent  obligation  of  avoiding 
them. 

187.  The  next  citation  was  pointed  out  to  me  by  a 
Jesuit  friend,  as  illustrating  the  present  subject.     It  is 


432  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

from  a  work,  which  can  by  no  means  indeed  claim  for 
any  of  its  statements  the  authority  due  to  an  actual 
decision  of  the  Church ;  but  which  will  nevertheless  be 
admitted  by  all  Catholics,  as  possessing  very  far 
greater  weight  than  the  dictum  of  any  single  theo- 
logian. I  refer  to  the  Spiritual  Exercises  of  S.  Ignatius. 
The  citation  is  taken  from  the  Second  Exercise  of  the 
First  Week :  and  the  person  going  through  the  Exer- 
cises is  exhorted,  as  his  '  secundum  punctum/ 

"peccata  ipsa  perpendere,  quanta  sit  foeditas  et  nequitia  singu- 
lorum  ex  naturd  sud,  si  vel  prohibita  non  essent." 

To  this  text,  F.  Roothaan  appends  an  explanatory 
note. 

((  Intellige,  ob  inordinationem  et  oppositionem  quam  habent 
ad  rectam  Rationem,  etiamsi,  per  impossibile  ubi  de  Legis 
Nature  Prasceptis  agitur,  non  existeret  Lex  prohibens.  Cogita 
v.g.  blasphemiam,  perjuriam,  calumniam,  oppressionem  innocentis, 
proditionem,  seminationem  discordiae,  &c.  &c.  singula  utique  tur- 
pissima,  rectitudini  naturali  contraria,  etiamsi  neque  Lex  prohibens 
nee  poenge  sanctio  cogitetur." 

I  need  hardly  add,  that  if  such  acts  are  base  and 
wicked,  independently  of  any  Prohibition, — then  there 
exists  a  moral  obligation  of  avoiding  them,  indepen- 
dently of  any  Prohibition. 

188.  Next  let  us  proceed  to  the  great  post-Tridentine 
scholastics;  who  will  be  found,  in  handling  the  subject, 
to  cite  no  small  amount  of  anterior  testimony  also. 
And  first  for  Suarez.  This  great  theologian  treats 
the  question  very  fully  in  his  "  De  Legibus;''  which  is 
usually  considered  his  greatest  and  most  authoritative 
work.  The  Chapters,  in  which  this  treatment  is  to  be 
found,  are  the  fifth  and  sixth  Chapters  of  the  second 
Book.  I  will  first  give  various  extracts  from  these 
Chapters,  and  then  an  analysis  of  their  contents. 

Let  us  commence  with  certain  statements,  put 
forth  by  him  as  arguments  for  a  certain  doctrine  of 
Vasquez,  which  he  (Suarez)  opposes.  These  state- 
ments themselves  are  certainly  true  in  Suarez's  judg- 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.  433 

ment,  because  he  immediately  subjoins  these  words  : 
4  In  hac  [Vasquezii]  sententia,  veram  esse  existimo  doc- 
1  trinam  quam  in  fundameuto  supponit,  de  intrinsecd 
'  honestate  vel  malitid  actuum,  quse  sub  Legem  Natu- 
'  ralem  cadunt.'  (lib.  ii.  c.  v.  n.  5.)  What  his  difference 
from  Vasquez  is,  we  shall  see  when  we  analyse  the 
chapter :  but  he  at  once  states  that  he  has  no  differ- 
ence with  that  theologian  on  the  question  immediately 
before  us ;  on  the  intrinsic  virtue  or  vice  of  those  acts, 
which  fall  under  the  Natural  Law. 

What  then  are  those  statements,  which  may  be 
supposed  as  put  forth  by  Vasquez,  and  to  which 
Suarez  expresses  his  complete  assent  ?  Such  as  the 
following : — 

"  Sunt  aliquse  actiones  ita  intrinsecd  malse  ex  naturd  sud,  ut 
nullo  modo  pendeant  in  malitia  ex  Prohibitione  extrinsecd  nee  ex 
Judicio  vel  Voluntate  Divind  ....  Quod  suppono  ex  communi 
sententid  theologorum  ....  Ratio  est,  quia  actus  morales  habent 
suas  intrinsecas  naturas  et  essentias  immutabiles,  quae  non  pendent 
a  Causa  vel  Voluntate  extrinsecd,  magis  quam  alias  rerum  esscntice, 
quce  per  se  non  implicant  contradictionem." — (Ibid.  n.  2.) 

Again : — 

"  Sicut  essentise  rerum,  quatenus  non  implicant  contradic- 
tionem, sunt  tales  vel  tales  in  esse  essentise,  ex  se  et  ante  omnem 
causalitatem  Dei  et  quasi  independent er  ab  Ipso — ita  honestas  veri- 
tatis  et  turpitudo  mendacii  talis  est  ex  se  et  secundum  aternam 
veritatem." — (n.  4.) 

So  much,  where  stating  his  agreement  with  Vas- 
quez. In  the  next  chapter,  while  stating  his  own  doc- 
trine, he  is  equally  clear : — 

"  Dictamina  rationis  naturalis,  in  quibus  hoec  lex  consistit,  sunt 
intrinsece  necessaria  et  independentia  ab  omni  voluntate  etiam 
Divind ;  .  .  .  .  ut  '  Deus  est  colendus,'  '  parentes  honorandi,' 
'mendacium  est  pravum  et  cavendum,'  et  similia." — (c.  vi.  n.  1.) 

"  Etiam  in  Deo,  ad  Voluntatem  antecedit,  secundum  rationem, 
Judicium  mentis  indicans  mentiri  esse  maluni,  servare  promissum 
esse  omnino  rectum  et  necessarium." — (c.  vi.  n.  6.) 

Again,  having  explained  that  the  Natural  Law  refers 


434  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

properly  to  God's  Command,  and  not  to  the  intrinsic 
rectitude  or  pravity  of  acts,  he  proceeds : — 

"  Hsec  Dei  Voluntas,  Prohibitio  aut  Praeceptio,  non  est  tota 
ratio  bonitatis  et  malitice  quse  est  in  observatione  vel  transgressione 
Legis  Naturalis,  sed  supponit  in  ipsis  actibus  necessariam  quamdam 
honestatem  vel  turpitudinem ;  et  illis  adjungit  specialem  Legis 
Divinse  Obligationem.  Hsec  assertio  ....  colligitur  ex  illo  com- 
muni  axiomate  theologorum,  qusedam  mala  esse  prohibita  quia 
mala;  si  enim  prohibentur  quia  mala,  non  possunt  primam  ra- 
tionem  malitice  accipere  a  Prohibitione.  (c.  vi.  n.  11.)  .... 
"  Secundum  ordinem  rationis  [mendacium]  prius  est  actus  malus 
quam  prohibitus  per  propriam  Legem." — (  c.  vi.  n.  14.) 

Lastly : — 

"  Respondeo,  in  actu  humano  esse  aliquam  bonitatem  vel 
malitiam,  ex  vi  objecti  prcecise  spectati  ut  est  consonum  vel  dis- 
sonum  rationi  rectce ;  et  secundum  earn  posse  denominari  et  malum, 
et  peccatum,  et  culpabilem,  secundum  illos  respectus,  seclusd  habi- 
tudine  ad  propriam  Legem.  Prseter  hanc  vero,  liabet  actus  hu- 
manus  specialem  rationem  boni  et  mali  in  ordine  ad  Deum,  addita 
Divind  Lege  prohibente  vel  prcecipiente" — (c.  vi.  n.  17.) 

Let  us  now  proceed  to  our  promised  analysis  of  the 
two  chapters. 

4  It  is  said  that  the  Natural  Law  is  nothing  else 
'  than  the  rational  nature.  But  this  may  be  held  in 
'  two  senses : — 

c  First,  it  may  be  held  that  the  Natural  Law  is 
4  nothing  else  than  the  rational  nature,  according  to 
4  that  sense  of  the  latter  phrase,  in  which  we  say  that 
'  things  intrinsecally  good  are  conformable  to  the  ra- 
'  tional  nature,  and  things  intrinsecally  evil  repugnant 
'  to  it. 

c  In  another  sense  it  may  be  said  that  the  Natural 
4  Law  is  our  rational  nature,  meaning  thereby  that  the 
'  discernment  of  duty,  which  appertains  to  the  rational 
4  nature,  is  the  very  promulgation  of  the  Natural  Law. 
4  (c.  5,  n.  1.) 

4  Vasquez  holds  the  proposition  in  the  former  sense ; 
4  and  though  he  quotes  no  authorities  in  behalf  of  his 
4  statement,  something  may  be  said  in  its  behalf  on 
4  grounds  of  Reason.  First,  as  theologians  commonly 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    435 

1  admit,  certain  acts  are  intrinsecally  right  or  intrinse- 
4  cally  wrong.  Yet  they  must  be  right  from  conformity 
c  with  some  law  or  other,  and  not  from  mere  conformity 
6  with  our  judgment.  But  they  are  right  from  con- 
4  formity  with  our  rational  nature  ;  hence  our  rational 
4  nature  is  a  real  law.  But  if  it  be  any  law,  then 
4  plainly  it  is  the  Natural  Law. 

4  Secondly,  these  acts  are  right,  antecedently  to  any 
4  judgment  formed  concerning  them  by  God  :  hence  the 
'  obligation  to  perform  them,  that  is  the  Natural  Law, 
4  cannot  come  from  God :  what  else  therefore  can  it  be, 
4  except  our  rational  nature  ?  (nn.  2-4.)* 

4  Now  I  quite  agree  with  Vasquez  in  all  that  he 
4  says  about  the  intrinsic  obligation  of  acts ;  yet  I  can- 

*  not  agree  with  his  conclusion. 

'  First,   theologians   and    philosophers    do   not   in 

*  general   so    express    themselves.     Secondly,   a    law 

*  should  give  command,  light,  and  direction  ;   but  the 
'  rational   nature   (in  Vasquez'  sense)    does   not   give 
c  command,  light,  or  direction.     Thirdly,  there  can  be 

*  no  law,  properly  so  called,  without  the  will  of  some 
'  one  giving  command,  (n.  5.) 

In  the  third  reason  I  anticipate  c.  6.  n.  1  ;  '  Lex 
enim  propria  et  praBceptiva  non  est,  sine  voluntate 
alicujus  pracipientis.'  To  proceed  however  with  our 
analysis : 

4  Besides,  see  what  consequences  would  follow.  It 
4  would  follow  in  the  first  place,  that  God  is  no  less 
4  subject  to  the  Natural  Law  than  we  are  :  for  in  God 
4  also,  as  well  as  in  man,  to  act  viciously  would  be  to 
4  act  against  His  Nature.  If  therefore  this  fact  suffices 

*  in  our  case  to  constitute  our  nature  as  a  law  to  us,  it 
4  would  no  less  constitute  God's  Nature  as  a  Law  to 
4  Him.     And  it  would  follow  in  the  second  place,  that 
4  to  us  the  Natural  Law  would  not  be  a  Divine  law  at 
4  all.  (nn.  7,  8.) 

4  The  common  doctrine  of  theologians  therefore  is, 
'  that  our  rational  nature  in  the  second  sense  is  the 

*  I  have  omitted  as  irrelevant  the  third  reason  suggested  by  Suarez  in 
Vasquez'  behalf. 


436  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

4  Natural  Law'  (lie  means,  is  the  promulgation  to  us  of 
the  Natural  Law) ;  '  for  by  our  rational  nature,  in  this 
4  sense,  the  human  will  receives  command  or  prohibi- 
'  tion,  as  to  '  quod  agendum  est  ex  naturali  jure/  (c.  5, 
4  n.  9.)  4  This  view  may  be  supported  by  Scripture, 
4  Fathers,  and  Reason,  (nn.  10-15.) 

4  But  here  wre  come  to  a  great  difficulty.  For 
'  those  things  which  the  light  of  Reason  thus  dictates, 
4  as  '  Deus  est  colendus,'  '  parentes  sunt  honorandi,' 
4  and  the  like,  are  truths  independent  even  of  the 
4  Divine  Will.  If  then  the  mere  light  of  Reason  be 
4  the  promulgation  of  the  Natural  Law,  how  can  that 
4  Law  be  in  any  strict  sense  a  law  at  all?  for  the  light 
4  of  Reason  does  not  make  known  to  us  (it  may  be 
4  said)  the  command  of  any  Superior,  but  only  the 
'  intrinsic  virtuousness  or  viciousness  of  certain  acts. 
4  (c.  6.  nn.  1,  2.) 

'  Some  theologians  have  accepted  this  consequence : 
4  they  have  said  that  the  Natural  Law  is  not  in  strict- 
4  ness  a  law ;  is  not  the  command  of  any  superior ;  but 
4  only  an  inherent  light,  teaching  us  what  is  intrinse- 
4  cally  good.  It  is  a  *  lex  indicans,'  but  not  a  4  lex 

*  praecipiens.' '  (n.  3.) 

It  would  seem,  though  Suarez  does  not  advert  to 
it,  that  this  is  precisely  Vasquez'  view.  To  proceed 
however  with  the  Doctor  Eximius. 

'  An  extremely  opposite  view  has  been  taken  by 
4  some  other  theologians;  who  maintain  that  the  Na- 
4  tural  Law  is  simply  a  collection  of  Commands,  im- 
4  posed  by  God  as  the  Author  and  Governor  of  our 

*  nature. 

4  These  theologians  say,  that  the  whole  distinction 
c  between  good  and  evil  turns  on  the  Will  of  God ;  and 
4  that  God  does  not  command  a  thing  because  it  is  in- 
4  trinsecally  good,  but  on  the  contrary  it  is  intrinse- 
4  cally  good  because  He  commands  it.'  (n.  4.)* 

*  '  Qui  etiam  addunt  totam  rationem  boni  et  mali,  in  rebus  ad  legem 
naturae  pertinentibus,  positam  esse  in  Voluntate  Dei :  et  non  in  judicio 
rationis,  etiam  Ipsius  Dei ;  neque  in  rebus  ipsis,  quee  per  talem  legem 
vetantur  aut  preecipiuntur.' 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    437 

'  I  am  satisfied  with  neither  opinion ;  and  therefore 
4  judge  that  a  middle  course  should  be  held,  which  I 

*  think  is  the  opinion  of  St.   Thomas  and  the  common 
1  one  of  theologians.* 

6  I  say  then  first  [against  the  first  opinion]  the  (pro- 
4  mulgation  of  the)  Natural  Law  is  not  merely  a  point- 
4  ing  out  of  the  intrinsic  good  and  evil  contained  in 
'  actions,  but  contains  an  express  Command  of  good 
4  and  Prohibition  of  evil  on  God's  part.  (n.  5.) 

4  This  I  prove  by  two  arguments.  First,  a  pos- 
'  teriori ;  otherwise  the  Natural  Law  would  not  pro- 
4  perly  be  a  law.  Secondly,  a  priori,  because  Reason 
4  itself,  in  recognising  a  Holy  God,  recognises  e.g.  His 

*  Prohibition  of  things  intrinsecally  evil.'  (nn.  6-10.) 

We  have  developed  this  latter  reason  in  n.  48*, 
p.  105*. 

4  I  say  secondly  [against  the  second  opinion]  this 
4  Prohibition  or  Command  of  God,  given  in  the  Natural 
4  Law,  supposes  a  certain  necessary  virtuousness  or  base- 
4  ness  in  the  acts  themselves ;  and  adds  to  those  acts  the 
4  special  obligation  of  a  Divine  Law.'f  (n.  11.) 

4  The  former  part  of  this  statement,  (viz.  that  the 

*  acts  themselves  have  intrinsic  virtuousness  or  baseness 
4  necessarily  inhering,)  is  implied  in  that  axiom  of  theo- 
4  logians,  that  some  evils  are  4  prohibita  quia  mala ;'  and 
4  is  quite  evident  indeed  from  the  arguments  suggested 
4  in  behalf  of  Vasquez'  doctrine.     The  second  part  of 
4  this  statement,  (viz.  that  the  Natural  Law  adds  a  special 
4  obligation  in  addition  to  this  intrinsic  virtuousness  or 
4  baseness,)  follows  upon  what  has  already  been  said.    I 

*  have  shewn  that  the  Natural  Law  is  a  real  Divine  Law ; 
4  therefore  it  must  add  some  obligation.      Nor  is  there 
4  any  imaginable  repugnance  in  the  idea,  that  a  new 
4  obligation  may  be  added,  where  one  already  exists. 
<  (nn.  11,  12.) 

4  I  say  therefore  thirdly  (recapitulating  what  has 

*  '  Mihi  vero  neutra  sententia  satisfacit ;  et  ideo  mediam  viam  tenen- 
dam  censeo,  quam  existimo  esse  sententiam  D.  Thoinso  et  communem 
theologorum.'  (n.  5.) 

t  See  quotation  already  given  in  p.  434. 


438  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

4  preceded)  that  the  Natural  Law  is  a  true  law,  God 
4  being  Legislator.  Yet  it  supposes  a  judgment  in  God, 
4  that  the  aets  commanded  by  the  Natural  Law  are 
4  conformable,  and  the  acts  forbidden  by  it  are  repug- 
*  nant,  to  our  rational  nature :  to  which  judgment  of 
4  God,  this  Natural  Law  adds  an  act  of  His  Will, 
6  obliging  men  to  observe  that  which  right  Eeason 
4  dictates.*  (n.  13.) 

4  Now  to  consider  the  arguments  in  favour  of  the 
4  two  opinions  which  I  reject.  Their  consideration  will 
4  turn  entirely  on  this  hypothetical  statement;  "  even 
'  though  God  did  not  prohibit  or  command  those  things 
4  which  belong  to  the  Natural  Law,  nevertheless  to  lie  is 
4  evil,  and  to  honour  parents  good  and  obligatory."  In 
4  regard  to  which  hypothetical  statement,  I  must  con- 
4  sider  two  things :  First,  what  would  follow  from  such 
4  a  hypothesis  ?  Secondly,  is  the  hypothesis  a  possible 
4  one?'  (n.  14.) 

We  omit  his  statements  of  other  opinions  in  nn. 
15  and  16,  and  come  to  his  own  in  n.  17.  '  As  to  the 
'  first  question,  I  make  this  answer.  In  a  human  action 
4  there  is  a  certain  goodness  or  badness  from  the  object 
'  considered  precisely ;  and  according  to  this  (badness) 
4  it  may  be  called  an  evil,  a  sin,  culpable^  without  any 
4  relation  to  a  law  properly  so  called.^.  Besides  this 
'  badness,  a  human  act  has  a  special  quality  of  good  or 
4  bad  in  relation  to  God,  from  the  Divine  Law  being 
4  added  which  commands  or  prohibits  it.  (nn.  17-19.) 

4  As  to  the  second  question, —  whether  the  hypothesis 

*  '  Unde  probandum  non  est,  quod  doctores  posteriori  loco  allegati 
dicunt,  Voluntatem  Divinam,  qua  lex  naturalis  sancitur,  non  supponere 
dictamen  Divinse  Rationis  dictantis,  hoc  esse  honestum  vel  turpe  ;  neque 
Voluntatem  illam  Dei  [non]  supponere  in  objecto  intrinsecam  convenientiam 
vel  disconvenientiam  ad  naturam  rationalem,  ratione  cujus  vult  unum  fieri 
et  aliud  vetari:  constat,  enim,  ex  dictis  in  secunda  conclusione,  hocfcdsum 
esse  et  contra  rationem  Legis  Naturalis.  Quamvis  ergo  obligatio  ilia  quam 
addit  Lex  Naturalis,  ut  proprie  preeceptiva  est,  sit  ex  Voluntate  Divina, 
tamen  ilia  Voluntas  supponit  judicium  de  malitid,  verbi  gratici,  mendacii  et 
similium  :  tamen,  quia  ex  vi  soliusjudicii  non  inducitur  propria  Prohibitio, 
vel  obligatio  Prcecepti,  quia  hoc  sine  voluntate  intelligi  non  potest,  ideo 
adjungitur  Voluntas  prohibendi  illud,  quia  malum  est.'  (cap.  6,  n.  13.) 

t  For  the  distinction  of  these  three  phrases,  see  a  passage  quoted  from 
Vasquez,  post,  note  to  n.  200,  p.  461. 

$  'Malum,  peccatum  culpabile, seclusa  habitudine  ad  propriam^ew?.' 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    439 

4  is  a  possible  one  (that  God  should  not  prohibit  or  com- 
4  mand  those  things  which  are  in  themselves  evil  or 
'obligatory  respectively) — there  are  two  opinions. 
4  First,  that  it  is  impossible  '  de  Dei  Potentia  Ordinata,' 
4  but  not  4  Absoluta ;'  secondly,  that  it  is  impossible 
4  even  '  de  Dei  Potentia  Absolut^.'  This  latter  is 
4  plainly  St.  Thomas's  opinion,  and  I  follow  it.  It 
4  would  be  contrary  to  the  very  Attributes  of  a  Holy 
4  and  Wise  Creator,  if  He  did  not  impose  such  an 
4  obligation  on  His  rational  creatures.  You  may  object, 
4  that  God's  Will  is  free  in  all  external  actions ;  but  I 
4  reply  with  Cajetan,  not  altogether  so.  He  is  free  e.g. 
4  to  make  or  not  to  make  a  promise ;  but  if  He  does 
4  make  one,  He  is  necessitated  to  keep  it :  He  is  free 
4  to  make  or  not  to  make  a  revelation  ;  but  if  He  do 
4  make  one,  He  is  necessitated  to  reveal  truth.  And 
4  in  a  way  precisely  similar,  He  is  free  to  create  or  not 
4  to  create  rational  persons ;  but  if  He  do  create  them, 
4  He  is  necessitated  to  impose  on  them  the  obligations 
4  of  the  Natural  Law.  (nn.  21,  23.)  * 

4  A  second  objection  may  be  made ;  viz.  that  pro- 
4  mulgation  is  essential  to  a  law  properly  so  called. 
4  Now  God  is  certainly  free,  it  may  be  said,  as  to 
4  whether  He  will  or  will  not  promulgate  His  Command, 
4  that  men  shall  act  conformably  with  Reason  ;  and 
4  therefore  it  still  remains,  that  He  is  free  whether  He 
4  shall  or  shall  not  impose  the  Natural  Law.  But  I 
4  reply,  that  He  is  necessitated  to  promulgate  such  a 
6  Law;  for  if  He  be  necessitated  to  enact  it,  He  must 
*  be  necessitated  to  promulgate  it.  And  He  has  in 
'  fact  promulgated  it,  by  the  fact  already  mentioned ; 
'  the  fact,  viz.  that  Reason  alone  suffices  to  shew  us 
4  His  Will  in  this  particular.'! 

*  See  quotation  already  given  in  the  note  to  n.  48*,  p.  106*,  "  Dico 
igitur  ex  Cajetano,"  &c. 

t  Hac  de  causa  per  lumen  uaturale  cognoscitur,  Deum  offendi  peccatis 
quae  contra  Legem  Naturalem  fiunt,  et  ad  Ipsum  pertincre  illorum  punitionem 
et  judicium.  Ergo  ipsum  naturale  lumen  est  de  se  sufficiens  promulgatio 
Legis  Naturalis :  non  solum  quia  manifestat  intrinsecam  disconvenientiam 
vel  convenientiam  actuum,  quam  lumen  Dei  increatum  ostendit ;  sed  etiani 
quia  intimat  homini,  contrarias  actiones  displicere  Auctori  natures,  tanquam 


440  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

I  would  beg  you  to  read  carefully  these  two  chapters 
of  Suarez ;  and  see  whether  I  have  not  represented  him 
with  perfect  faithfulness.  * 

It  is  quite  impossible  then  to  doubt  his  meaning. 
His  immediate  subject  is  not  morality  but  law  ;  and  it 
is  a  very  important  matter  therefore,  from  his  point  of 
view,  to  oppose  Yasquez's  opinion,  that  the  Natural 
Law  is  not  strictly  a  law  imposed  by  God's  Will.  Yet 
with  all  his  earnest  opposition  to  Vasquez,  never  for  a 
moment  does  he  lose  sight  of  the  great  truth,  that  the 
acts,  prohibited  by  the  Natural  Law,  are  also  inde- 
pendently wrong  ;  and  would  be  '  mala,  peccata,  culpa- 
bilia,'  (c.  6.  n.  17),  even  though  that  Law  did  not  exist. 

In  Suarez's  judgment  then,  no  less  certainly  than 
in  Vasquez's,  there  is  an  obligatory  Rule  of  human 
action,  quite  independently  of  the  Divine  Command  : 
the  only  difference  is,  that,  according  to  Suarez,  this 
Rule  is  not  precisely  the  Natural  Law.  At  the  same 
time,  Suarez  himself,  in  another  part  of  the  same  Book 
in  the  *  De  Legibus,'  does  not  hesitate  to  call  this  Rule 
c  Lex  ostensiva  naturalis  rationis  :'  see  the  quotation  in 
p.  177  of  this  volume. 

189.  Vasquez,  as  is  evident  from  what  has  preceded, 
will  be  found  even  more  emphatic  than  Suarez  him- 
self, in  declaring  that  the  intrinsic  wickedness  of  vice 
does  not  arise  from  God's  Prohibition  ;  but  that  on  the 
contrary  God's  Prohibition  of  it  arises  from  its  intrinsic 
wickedness.  One  citation  then  will  suffice,  from  that 
chapter  of  his  which  Suarez  quotes  : — 

Si  vero  sermo  sit  de  Lege  Naturali,  qose  suapte  m  natura 
constare  dicitur  non  autem  placito  aut  alicujus  voluntate,  aliter 
dicendum  est.  Cum  enim  lex  aut  jus  sit  regula  cui  sequari 
debent  actiones  ut  justse  sint,  Naturalis  Lex  aut  naturale  jus  erit 
regula  naturalis,  quse  nulld  voluntate  sed  suapte  natura  constat. 
Porro  talem  esse  aliquam  legem  aut  jus,  quod  nulla  voluntate  etiam 

Supremo  Domino,  et  Curator!,  ac  Gubernatori,  ejusdem  naturae,  (cap.  6, 
n.  24.) 

*  Suarez'  "De  Legibus"  is  a  book  so  commonly  met  with,  and  I  have 
been  obliged,  as  it  is,  to  make  so  many  extracts  from  it,  that  I  have  not 
thought  it  necessary  to  swell  the  bulk  of  my  volume  by  copying  the  entire 
chapters. 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    441 

Dei  constitutum  sit,  illud  maxim6  confirmat  quod  superius  dixi- 
mus  (disp.  97,  c.  3);  nempe  quaedam  ita&c  se  mala  et  peccata  esse, 
ut  ex  nulld  voluntate  etiam  Dei  eorum  prohibitio  pendeat :  id  quod  ;i 
nobis  satis  superque  probatum  est.  Nee  solum  hoc  ita  esse  osten- 
dimus,  verum  etiam  monstravimus,  multa  ita  esse  ex  se  mala,  ut 
eorum  malitia  prcecedat,  secundum  rationem,  omne  indicium  Divini 
Intellectus ;  hoc  est,  non  ideo  sint  mala  quia  mala  judicantur  k 
Deo,  quin  potius  ideo  talia  judicentur  quia  ex  se  taliasunt.  Ex  quo 
illud  efficitur,  ut  ante  omnein  Dei  Voluntatem  et  Imperium,  imo 
etiam  ante  omne  Judicium,  aliqua  ex  se  sint  bona  opera  vel  mala ; 
ut  ibidem  monstratum  est.  Cumque  omne  bonum  vel  malum 
per  ordinem  ad  reyulam  aliquam  dicatur  bonum  vel  malum, 
justum  vel  injustum,  consequens  fit,  ut  ante  omne  imperium, 
ante  omnem  voluntatem,  imo  ante  omne  judicium,  sit  regula  quce- 
dam  harum  actionum,  qua  sudpte  naturd  constet,  sicut  res  omnes 
su&pte  natura  contradictionem  non  implicant.  Haec  autem  non 
potest  alia  esse,  quam  ipsamet  rationalis  natura,  ex  se  non  im- 
plicans  contradictionem ;  cui,  tanquam  regulse  et  juri  natural i, 
bona3  actiones  conveniunt  et  sequantur,  malaB  autem  dissonant 
et  insequales  sunt:  quamobrem  et  ilia?  bonas,  has  autem  mala?, 
dicuntur"  (in  lm  2ffi  d.  150,  nn.  22,  23). 

190.  Lessius  is  equally  clear  with  Suarez  and  Vas- 
quez.  We  are  not  here  concerned  with  the  conclusion 
which  he  is  labouring  to  prove ;  on  which  however  I 
shall  speak  before  we  close  the  Section.  What  we 
are  here  concerned  with  however,  are  the  principles 
which  he  assumes  as  undoubted,  in  order  to  establish 
his  conclusion.  He  assumes  two  principles.  First, 
that  sin  cannot  become  mortal,  i.  e.  cannot  deserve  an 
Eternity  of  punishment,  unless  so  far  as  it  is  against 
ihe  Commandment  of  God.  Secondly,  he  assumes, — 
and  this  it  is  with  which  we  are  here  concerned, — that 
even  if,  *  per  impossibile,'  there  were  no  Divine  Law, 
nay  and  no  God,  yet  that  there  would  remain  intrinsic 
morality ;  and  that  offences  against  that  morality  would 
be  sins,  though  not  mortal  ones. 

Thus  :— 

"  Ex  quibus  sequitur  primo,  Si  nullus  esset  Deus,  nullum 
fore  peccatum  vere  et  proprie  mortiferum,  sed  omnia  fore  veni- 
alia:  quia  carebunt  ilia  malitia,  qua)  spectatur  in  ordine  ad 
Deum." — De  Perfectionibus  Divinis}  lib.  xiii.  n.  186. 

Offences  would  then  still  be  'peccata,'  but  4venialia.T 


442  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Again  :  — 

"  Sequitur  secundo,  Nullum  etiam  fore  peccatum  mortiferum, 
si  Deus  peccata  non  prohibuisset,  saltern  per  Legem  Naturae  menti- 
bus  hominum  insculptam :  quod  intellige  de  peccatis,  quae  per  se 
non  continent  Dei  contemptum.  Si  enim  peccata  non  essent  a 
Deo  ita  prohibita,  ut  homines  intuitu  Dei  seu  reverentiae  Divinae 
tenerentur  ilia  vitare,  non  censerentur  Deum  contemnere,  vel 
injuriam  irrogare,  patrando  peccata;  sed  solum  naturam  suam 
dedecorare  et  contra  rectam  rationem  agere.  Verum  sicut  impos- 
sibile  est,  ut  actus  liber  reetce  rationi  repugnans  non  sit  prohibitus  a 
Deo,  ita  etiam  impossibile  est  ut  non  sit  peccatum  mortiferum,  si 
sit  in  re  gravi  ab  homine  Deum  aliquo  modo  cognoscente.  Dices : 
'  Furtum,  adulterium,  perjurium,  et  similia,  quas  sunt  contra 
f  Legem  Naturae,  non  ideo  mala  sunt  quia  prohibita  Lege  Naturae, 
'  sed  ideo  sunt  prohibita  quia  mala:  ideo  enim  Ratio  Naturalis  et 
f  Lex  ^Eterna  dictat  ilia  esse  fugienda,  quia  in  se  mala  sunt.  Unde 
'  prius  est  ilia  esse  mala  quam  esse  prohibita,  et  malitia  praevenit 
6  Prohibitionem  :  ergo  etiam  si  fingamus  non  esse  prohibita,  retine- 
(  bunt  tamen  suam  malitiam.'  Respondeo,  ante  omnem  Prohi- 
bitionem considerari  in  illis  quam  dam  malitiam  objectivam  et 
materialem,  quatenus  isti  actus  sunt  dissoni  naturae  rationali,  ita 
ut  non  possint  recte  appeti,  nee  recte  fieri,  ab  eo  qui  ratione  utitur. 
Potest  etiam  in  illis  considerari  quasdam  malitia  formalis,  quatenus 
fiunt  ab  aliquo  libere  contra  regulam  reetce  rationis :  haac  tamen  per 
se  non  est  mortifera,  ut  ostensum  est.  Unde  non  potest  in  istis  acti- 
bus  considerari  malitia  mortifera,  nisi  sint  contra  Legem  Divinam; 
ita  ut  Divina  Auctoritas  per  ilia  censeatur  contemni,  et  homo  a 
Deo  averti:  quo  fit  ut  prius  sit  actum  esse  prohibitum  Lege 
Divina,  quam  esse  formaliter  peccatum  mortale ;  cum  peccatum 
mortale  constituatur  per  Legis  Divinae  contemptum." — Ibid. 
n.  187. 

191.  I  next  turn  to  Lugo  :  — 

(<  Praeceptum  diligendi  Deum  est  omnino  de  Jure  Natures ;  et 
obligareti  secluso  quovis  Dei  Decreto;  ut  omnes  concedunt." — De 
Penitentid,  d.  7,  n.  250. 

Lugo  considers  it  as  conceded  by  all,  that  a  Precept 
of  the  Natural  Law  obliges,  apart  from  any  Decree  or 
Command  of  God  whatever. 

We  will  next  dwell  for  some  little  time  on  Lugo's 
remarks,  concerning  a  subject  similar  to  that  which 
Lessius  was  treating.  And  here  again  we  are  not 
concerned  with  the  conclusion  which  he  is  advocating, 
but  with  the  principles  which  he  takes  for  granted  as 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    443 

tending  to  that  conclusion.  Lugo  is  considering  this 
question.  Suppose  (per  possibile  vel  impossible)  that 
a  man  committed  murder,  or  did  any  other  act  which 
he  should  know  to  be  contrary  to  Right  Reason ;  but  in 
regard  to  which  he  should  be  invincibly  ignorant  or  in- 
advertent, that  it  is  prohibited  by  Almighty  God. 
Lugo  is  inquiring  whether,  in  such  a  case,  the  sin  would 
be  mortal,  i.e.  deserve  Eternal  Punishment;  and  whether 
it  would  be  such,  that  no  mere  man  could  pay  for  it 
condign  satisfaction. 

"Cum  dixerimus  cum  communi  thcologorum,  impotentiam 
satisfaciendi  pro  peccato  mortal!  provenire  in  homine  puro  ex 
Magnitudine  seu  Infinitate  Dei  Offensi,  consequens  videtur,  quod, 
ubi  non  interveniat  hsec  ratio  Offensae  Divinae,  non  sit  etiam 
ilia  omnimoda  incompensabilitas.  Cum  ergo  ille,  qui  non  sciret 
Deum  offendi  suo  peccato,(vel  quia  invincibiliter  ignorat  esseDeum, 
vel  quia  invincibiliter  existimat  Deum  nihil  curare  de  probitate  aut 
improbitate  hominum,)  hie  non  contraheret  in  suo  peccato  malitiam 
illam  Offensionis  Divinae." — De  Incamatione,  disp.  5,  n.  69. 

It  is  plain  that  the  consideration  of  this  question,  is 
eminently  calculated  to  exhibit  in  the  clearest  light  the 
doctrine  held,  whether  by  Lugo  himself  or  by  the 
various  theologians  whom  he  cites,  on  the  relation 
between  God  and  Moral  Truth.  The  following  are 
among  his  remarks  :  — 

"  De  hoc  dubio  in  hoc  sensu  theologi  antiqui  non  satis  distincte 
loquuntur.  Ex  recentioribus  vero  aliqui  illud  tetigerunt;  inter 
quos  P.  Salas,.tom.  ii.  in  1,  2,  tract.  13,  disp.  16,  sect.  22,  refert 
sententiam  recentiorum,  qui  dicunt,  eo  casu  illud  homicidium 
non  fore  peccatum  mortale.  Ipse  vero  in  hanc  sententiam  acriter 
invehitur,  appellans  earn  parum  tutam  et  valde  perniciosam :  quia 
ex  ea  sequitur,  de  facto  plurima  homicidia,  adulteria,  et  alia 
ejusmodi,  esse  solum  peccata  venialia;  quia  fiunt  cum  ignorantia, 
vel  saltern  inadvertentia  actuali,  inculpabili  Legis  Divina3 :  nee 
enim  homo  quoties  peccat,  recordatur  Dei  aut  Divinse  Legis. 

"Hanc  sententiam  Patris  Salas,ejus  auctoritate  ducti,docuemnt 
(ut  dixi)  aliqui  recentiores,  et  pro  ea  adducunt  plures  ex  anti- 
quioribus  et  recentioribus ;  sed  sine  sufficient  fundamento.  Nam 
ii  solum  dicunt,  illud  homicidium  adhuc  in  eo  casu  fore  malum 
moraliter,  et  peccatum ;  quod  quidem  verissimum  est,  cum  adhuc  in 
eo  casu  haberet  malitiam  moralem  per  oppositionem  cum  reguld 
rationis.  Nunc  autem  non  quaerimus  an  esset  peccatum, — sed  an 


444  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

absque  malitia  formal!  offensse  Divina?,  quam  tune  non  haberet, 
adhuc  haberet  illam  gravitatem,  ratione  cujus  nunc  theologi  tri- 
buunt  illi  infinitatem  quandam  et  incompensabilitatem." — De 
Incarnatione,  disp.  5,  rm.  71,  72. 

Lugo  speaks  of  it  as  most  true  (verissimum),  that 
the  mere  opposition  to  c  regula  rationis,'  with  invin- 
cible ignorance  or  forgetful  ness  of  God's  Law,  would 
fully  suffice  to  constitute  '  malitia  moralis '  and  c  pec- 
catum.' 

192.  Further,  Lugo  cites,  you  see,  as  holding  this 
precise  doctrine,  '  plures  ex  antiquioribus  et  recentio- 
ribus.' 

193.  Salas,  moreover,  as  here  cited  by  Lugo,  con- 
siders that  acts  would  be  even  mortally  sinful,  which 
should  offend  gravely  against  Eight  Keason,  and  which 
should  be  committed  in  invincible  ignorance  or  inad- 
vertence of  the  Divine  Prohibition.      And  in  n.   73, 
Lugo  further  quotes  Azor  and  Vega,  as   apparently 
holding  the  same  doctrine.     Nay,  Salas  feels  himself 
called   upon   to   'inveigh  severely7  against  any  more 
indulgent  opinion ;   representing  any  such  opinion  as 
4  parum  tuta,'  and  '  valde  perniciosa.' 

194.  Lugo   also  proceeds  to  cite  with  agreement 
Gregory  of  Ariminum  and  Gabriel ;  '  quateniis  dicunt, 
quod  si  per  impossibile  non  esset  Deus,  adhuc  homo 
peccare  posset:'  adding  however  his  own  opinion,  from 
which  he  does  not  think  they  would  dissent,  that  such 
sin  would  not  be  mortal. 

195.  Indeed,  whoever  will  read  the  whole  passage 
in  Lugo,  will  derive  from  it  the  impression,  that  the 
main  body  of  theologians  assumed,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
the  sinfalness  of  any  such  act ;  and  that  the  only  ques- 
tion which  they  even  thought  of  raising  was,  whether 
they  be  so  deeply  sinful,  as  to  merit  Eternal  Punish- 
ment.    There  are  only  two  theologians,  mentioned  by 
him  through  the  whole  course  of  his  argument,  who 
maintain  that  such  acts  are  not  sinful;  and  those  are 
the  very  two,  whom  alone  (as  we  shall  find)  Viva  is 
able  to  cite  for  the  same  purpose :    Zumel  and  Curiel. 
These  two  theologians  undoubtedly,  but  these  alone, 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    445 

are  represented  by  Lugo  as  holding  the  opinion,  that 
moral  obligation  implies  the  Command  of  a  Superior. 
'  Ratio  naturalist  they  say,  4  non  habet  vim  obligandi, 
nisi  ut  vicaria  Legislatoris.'  *  Qui  auctores,'  Lugo 
proceeds,  'licet  non  placeant  mihi  quatenus  dicunt  illud 
non  fore  peccatum  in  eo  casu  nee  malum  morale,1 — in 
the  case,  viz.  where  there  should  be  invincible  ignorance 
of  God, — *  placent  tamen  quateniis  dicunt  non  fore  .  .  . 
peccatum  mortals?  (n.  77.) 

196.  I  shall  next  adduce  Coninck,  a  scholastic  of 
great  name  ;   who  is  thus  quoted  textually  by  Lugo, 
in  the  same  disputation  of  the  "  De  Incarnatione  :"- 

"  Si  enim  furtum  v.  c.  nullo  modo  a  Deo  prohiberetur  sive 
displiceret  quantum  vis  pergeret,  non  minus  quam  modb  repugnaret 
justitia;  tamen  nullo  modo  mereretur  pcenam  aeternam,  et  con- 
sequenter  non  contraheret  omnem  malitiam  quam  modb  contrahit." 
—  Lugo  de  Incarnatione,  disp.  5.  n,  76. 

If  theft  were  not  prohibited  by  God,  it  would  not 
contract  all  the  badness  which  it  now  contracts  ;  there- 
fore, in  Coninck's  opinion,  it  would  contract  some. 

197.  Bellarmine  is  also  sufficiently  plain  :  — 

"  Actiones  qusedam  ita  sunt  per  se  atque  intrinsece  maloe,  ut 
deformitas  ab  eis  sit  omnino  inseparabilis ;  et  proliibita  sint  quia 
malse,  non  malae  quia  prohibitae;  ac  denique  nullo  modo  bene  fieri 
possint :  quales  sunt,  mentiri,  odisse  Deum,  et  alia  id  genus." — 
De  Amiss.  Grat.  lib.  ii.  c.  11,  n.  5. 

Again,— 

"Si  fingamus  Deum  non  esse  in  rerum  natura; — qui  leges 
justas  violabunt,  peccabunt  quidem  in  conscientid,  sed  nee  Deum 
offendent,  nee  ad  inieros  damnabuntur." — De  Summo  Pontifice,  1. 
iv.  c.  23,  n.  7. 

198.  F.   Compton    Carleton,    S.  J.,   whom   I  have 
already  quoted  in  a  note,   devotes  to  the  matter  an 
entire  Section,  which  shall  here  follow: — 

"  Multa  ideo  esse  peccata  quia  prohibentur,  nemini  dubium 
esse  potest;  ilia  nimirum,  quae  ex  se  sunt  indifferentia,  ac  proinde 
ideo  solum  sunt  illicita,  quia  lex  aliqua  vel  prseceptum  ea  fieri 
vetat.  Sic  Judaeis  olim  vetitum  erat  carnem  porcinam  comedere : 
sic  modo  in  Ecclesia  prohibitum  est  diebus  veneris  et  Tsabbati  vesci 
carnibus ;  quod  proinde  sine  dispensatione  aut  legitima  causa  facere 

G  G 


446  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

est  peccatum.  Quserimus  itaque  in  praesenti,  utrum  omnia  omnino 
peccata,  ideo  peccata  sint,  quia  hujusmodi  lege  prohibita;  ita  ut 
si  Lex  non  esset,  similiter  non  esset  malum  morale  nee  peccatum. 

"  Ratio  dubitandi  est;  hie  enira  loquendi  modus  SanctisPatribus 
frequens  est:  sic  enim  Sanctus  Augustinus  contra  Faustum,  lib.  22, 
cap.  27,  ait  peccatum  esse  '  dictum,  factum  vel  concupitum  contra 
Legem  Dei:'  item  de  peccatorum  meritis  et  remissione  1.  2,  c.  16. 
'Neque  peccatum  erit,'  inquit,  <si  non  divinitus  jubeatur  ut  non 
sit.'  Idem  insinuare  videtur  Sacra  Scriptura ;  sic  enim  ad  Rom. 
4.  v.  15,  dicitur :  '  Ubi  non  est  lex,  ibi  nee  prsevaricatio.'  Ergo  de 
essentia  omnis  peccati  videtur,  ut  sit  contra  Legem.  Quare 
Joannis  primae,  cap.  3,  v.  4,  peccatum  vocatur  'iniquitas'  grsece 
avoftta ;  quod  idem  sonat,  ac  deviatio  a  lege. 

"  Propter  haec  asserunt  nonnulli,  peccatum  omne  ideo  esse 
malum  quia  a  Deo  est  prohibitum.  Ita  Gerson  3,  p.  tract,  de  vita 
spiritual!,  lect.  1,  coroll.  10 ;  Sanctus  Bonaventura  in  2  dist.  34, 
dub.  4 ;  Okam  in  2,  Quodlib.  19,  ad  dubium  3  et  4 ;  et  Victoria, 
et  alii.  Sed  contra :  qusedam  enim  sunt  peccata  adeo  mala,  et  ex 
se  et  objecto  turpia,  (qualia  sunt  odium  Dei,  blasphemia,  et  alia 
hujusmodi),  ut  non  possint  non  esse  mala ;  sicque  independenter, 
imb  antecedenter,  ad  omnem  Prohibitionem :  quis  enim  non  videt, 
aeque  malum  ac  Deo  injuriosum  esse  Eum  odisse,  atque  Ejus 
Legem  contemnere :  Ergo  malitia  odii  Dei  non  dependet  &  Prohibi- 
tione  illius  actus;  sed  ante  omnem  Prohibitionem  et  Legem  hie 
actus  est  mains.  Quse  ratio  urget,  etiamsi  quis  hunc  et  similes 
actus  dicat  necessario  prohiberi  a  Deo  ;  de  quo  postea. 

"  Lorca  ergo  hie,  d.  10 ;  Salas  1.  2,  q.  18,  tr.  7,  d.  3,  sect.  1 ;  et 
alii  nonnulli  dicunt,  omne  peccatum  esse  malum  quia  prohibitum, 
non  actu  illo  Voluntatis  Divinse  de  quo  prior  sententia,  sed  lege, 
ut  aiunt,  judicante ;  seu  quia  est  contra  Legem  JEternam,  Actum 
scilicet  Intellect  us  Divini,  necessario  in  eo  existentem,  quo  judicat 
hsec  et  hujusmodi  esse  mala.  Sed  contra :  non  enim  ideo  pec- 
catum, odium  Dei  exempli  gratia,  est  malum  quia  cognoscitur 
seu  judicatur  a  Deo  esse  malum;  sed  e  contra:  ideo  judicatur  esse 
malum)  quia  est  malum.  Deinde  Lex  ^Eterna  juxta  S.  Augustinum 
contra  Faustum  supra,  6  Est  Ratio  vel  Yoluntas  Dei,  ordinem 
naturalem  conservari  jubens,  perturbari  vetans/  Ergo  hujusmodi 
actus  necessarius  Intellectus  Divini  non  est  lex  proprie  dicta,  sed 
Lex  est  Actus  Voluntatis,  quo  libere  aliquid  prsecipit  aut  prohibet. 
Eodem  modo  impugnatur  id  quod  dicunt  alii ;  ideo  scilicet  pec- 
catum esse  malum.,  quia  Deus  habet  Voluntatem,  qua  sibi  de  objecto 
illo  displicet:  prius  enim  est  malum,  quam  Deus  illud  aversetur\ 
unde  etiamsi  homo  tendat  solum  in  illud  objectum,  et  non  prout 
displicet  Deo,  adhuc  actus  erit  malus.  Deinde  quis  non  videt 
longe  gravius  esse  et  recta?  rationi  mag\s  dissonum,  Deum  odisse, 
quam  aliquid  facere  quod  ei  novit  displwere. 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    447 

"  Breviter  itaque  existimo.  Licet  omnia  mala  aliquo  modo  sint 
contra  legem,  quia  scilicet  sunt  contra  dictamen  rectae  rationis ;  non 
tamen  propterea  proprib  dici  possunt  esse  contra  Legem,  nee  mala 
semper  quia  prohibita.  Ita  Scotus  in  34,  q.  l,ar.  2 ;  Durandus  in 
1,  dist.  47,  q.  4;  Suarez  lib.  2,  de  legibus,  c.  6,  n.  11 ;  Vasquez 
hie  d.  97,  c.  3;  Lessius  de  Perfectionibus  Divinis,  c.  13.  n.  186; 
Tannerus,  disp.  4,  q.  1,  dub.  4;  et  alii  passim. 

"  Prima  Conclusionis  pars  probatur.  Per  conformitatem  siqui- 
dem  aut  difformitatem  ad  rectam  Rationem,  judicant  omnes  quid 
bonum  sit,  quid  malum,  sicut  (juodammodo  per  legem :  de  qua 
proinde  locutus  videtur  Apostol.  ad  Rom.  2,  v.  4,  dum  dicit ; 
'Cum  enim  gentes  quae  Legem  non  habent,  naturaliter  ea  quae 
Legis  sunt  faciunt,  ipsi  sibi  sunt  lex.'  Id  est  ipsorum  natura,  seu 
ratio,  iis  est  lex,  non  scripta,  sed  nata,  vel  a  natura  omnibus  insita 
et  in  scripta. 

"  Secundaetiam  pars  probatur:  dictamen siquidem rectae  Ratio- 
nis non  est  proprie  lex;  cum  Deus  hoc  perfectissime  habeat,  Quern 
tamen  S.  Thomas  hie  q.  93,  ar.  4.  et  alii  affirmant  legem  proprie 
dictam  non  habere. 

"  Tertia  tandem  pars,  quod  scilicet  omnia  mala  non  ideo  mala 
sint  quia  prohibita  :  Probatur  primo :  Jam  enim  ostendimus,  odium 
Dei  ex  .se,  et  independenter  ab  omni  Prohibitione  et  Lege,  esse 
malum,  et  ration!  difforme ;  imb  multb  magis,  quam  sit  Legi  a  Deo 
lata  non  obedire.  Secundo :  nam  S.  Augustinus  lib.  1,  de 
Libero  Arbitrio,  cap.  3,  approbat  illud  commune,  'aliqua'  scilicet 
'mala  esse  quia  prohibita,  alia  prohibita  quia  mala/  Tandem 
sicut  ad  hoc  ut  actus  aliquis  sit  bonus,  nullo  alio  est  opus,  quam 
ut  feratur  in  objectum  bonum,  propositum  ut  bonum,  absque  ulla 
notitia  Legis  ^Eternas,  sive  consulentis  sive  approbantis ;  ita  et  ut 
actus  sit  malus,  sufficit  quod  feratur  in  objectum  malum,  sine 
ulla  legis,  vel  judicantis,  vel  prohibentis,  cognitione. 

"  Dices  :  '  peccare  in  Physicis  est  deviare  a  regula  ;  sic  artifex 
peccat  deviando  a  regulis  artis:  ergo  et  peccare  in  moral ibus  erit 
deviare  a  regulis  moris.'  Respondetur,  peccare  esse  deviare  k 
regula,  non  formali,  sed  fundamental! ;  seu  facere  id,  quod  est 
materialiter  contra  legem,  et  regulas,  vel  artis  vel  moris,  seu 
quod  per  hujusmodi  regulas  argui  et  reprobari  potest. 

"  Per  haec  responsio  patet  ad  testimonia  supra-  num.  2  al lata. 
Apostolus  enim  vel  loquitur  de  peculiari  ilia  transgressione,  quaa 
proveniebat  Judaeis  ex  cognitione  special!  legis  scriptic,  a  Deo 
ipsis  immediate  traditae ;  ratione  cujus,  peculiaris  malitia,  turn  ob 
perfectiorem  cogm'tionem  turn  ob  ingratitudinem,  in  actus  eorum 
peccaminosos  refundebatur.  Vel  loquitur  de  lege  improprie  dicta 
seu  dictamine  rectae  rationis,  de  quo  suprk.  Non  tamen  res  sunt 
males,  quia  recta  Ratio  hoc  dictat,  sed  ideb  hoc  dictat  ratio  quia  sunt 
malce:  ut  ostensum  est  Tertio  intelligi  potest  de  lege  funda- 


* 
448  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

mentali,  seu  ipsa  natura  rational! ;  in  ordine  ad  quam,  in  materia 
de  actibus  humanis  dixi  desumendam  esse  bonitatem  et  malitiam 
actuum  moralium.  Quarto  forte  loquitur  de  Lege  JEterna,  seu 
judicante:  qua  tamen  non  est  ratio  a  priori  malitice,  sed  a  poste- 
riori sol  urn,  vel  concomitanter,  et  tanquam  a  regula  vel  indicio. 
Quibus  etiam  de  causis  peccatum  dicitur  avopiot,.*  Et  eodem  modo 
explicari  potest  Sanctus  Augustinus  et  alii  Patres,  dum  peccatum 
dicunt  esse  contra  Legem. 

((  Ut  vero  in  re  hac  per  se  obscura  clarius  procedamus,  varise 
legis  acceptiones  semper  prse  oculis  habendse.  Primo  itaque  lex 
sumitur  pro  Lege  Sterna,  seu  judicante  ut  vocant ;  qua?  est  Actus 
necessarius  Divini  Intellects,  quo  ab  seterno  judicat  vel  indicat 
hoc  esse  bonum  et  amplectendum,  illud  malum  et  fugiendum. 
Secundo  pro  ipsa  natura  rationali,  qua?  est  quaadam  regula,  in 
ordine  ad  quam  dignoscimus,  quid  bonum  sit,  quid  malum;  secun- 
dum  convenientiam  scilicet  vel  disconvenientiam,  quam  res  aliqua 
cum  tali  natura  habet.  Ha?c  tamen  soliim  vocatur  lex  seu  regula 
fundamental  is.  Tertio  lex  pro  ipsis  rebus  pra?ceptis  vel  prohibitis 
accipitur;  sicut  fides  subinde  pro  rebus  creditis.  Quarto  pro 
dictamine  recta?  rationis,  prout  hie  et  mine  judicat,  quid  amplec- 
tendum  sit,  quid  fugiendum. 

"  Quinto  denique  et  propriissime  sumitur  lex,  prolibera  volun- 
tate  superioris,  legitime  intimata ;  qualis  fuit  Lex  scripta,  Judseis 
tradita ;  et  aliae  hujusmodi.  De  hac  itaque  Lege  seu  Voluntate  in 
prsesenti  est  sermo:  quam  Voluntatem,  etsi  secundum  communem 
Theologorum  sententiam,  de  facto  Deus  hominibus  manifestaverit, 
—  (vel  initio  primis  pareritibus,  vel  per  revelationes  aut  effectus 
quosdam  externos,  per  quos  hominibus  ostendit  Se  esse  et  Re- 
muneratorem  esse,  tarn  bonorum  quam  malorum,  quod  est  habere 
Voluntatem,  qua  mala  prohibet,  et  non  vult  ea  fieri ;  vel  tandem 
hanc  voluntatem  unicuique  intimat  per  lumen  ipsum  rationis  hoc 
dictantis:)  —  esto  inquam  haac  ita  sint,  dicimus  tamen  non  omnia 
ideb  esse  mala,  quia  Deus  ea  per  hanc  Voluntatem  prohibet ;  sed  e 
contra :  in  iis  quse  sunt  intrinsece  mala,  ideb  ea  Deus  prohibet,  quia 
sunt  mala" —  Cursus  Theologicus,  torn.  i.  disp.  101,  sect.  n.  1-12. 

199.  I  shall  confine  my  citations  to  those  theo- 
logians, on  whose  doctrine  no  possible  doubt  can  be 
raised.  And  I  will  proceed  next  to  the  Augustinian 
Berti. 

"  Quidquid  prohibet  Lex  Natura?,  est  natura  sua  et  intrinsece 
malum ;  et  quidquid  prsecipit,  est  natura  sua  et  intrinsece  bonum : 
quod  sane  ipsa  Naturalis  Legis  notio  manifeste  declarat.  At  Deus 

*  The  passages  of  St.  Paul  and  St.  John  will  be  of  course  considered 
in  our  Second  Book,  where  we  are  to  treat  the  subject  theologically. 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    449 

non  potest  imperare  quod  suapte  natura  malum  cst;  ut  odium, 
mendacium,  blasphemiam :  neque  potest  prohibere  quod  intrinscc6 
suaque  natura  bonum  est;  ut  justitiam,  pietatem,  religionein.  Si 
enim  ilia  praecipere,  hoec  prohibere  posset,  posset  etiam  agere 
qua)  cum  summa  jEquitate  ac  Sapientia,  atque  cum  essentiA, 
creaturae  rationalis  repugnant;  atque  ita  poterit  mentiri,  poterit 
ad  peccatum  impellere.  .  .  .  Precepta  Legis  Naturalis,  alia  sunt 
affirmativa,  quae  justa  opera  imponunt;  alia  negativa,  quae  prohi- 
bent  perversa  et  iniqua.  Atqui  Deus  non  potest  dispensare  in  iis 
qua?  recta  sunt ;  alias  discinderet  Legein  jEternam :  .  . .  neque  in  iis 
quae  sunt  inhonesta  et  iniqua ;  alias  permitteret  ut  peccaremus  im- 
pune." — De  Theologicis  Disciplinis,  1.  20,  c.  5,  prop.  3. 

You  see,  according  to  Berti's  doctrine,  if  (per  im- 
possibile)  God  were  to  dispense  in  the  Natural  Law,  we 
should  nevertheless  sin  (peccaremus)  in  violating  the 
duties  which  it  prescribes.  And,  in  order  to  prove  that 
God  cannot  dispense  in  it,  Berti  urges  as  a  4  reductio 
ad  absurdum,'  that  on  that  hypothesis  such  sin  would 
be  committed  with  impunity.  According  to  Berti  then, 
there  may  imaginably  be  real  sin,  without  God's  Pro- 
hibition. 

200.  Lastly,  we  will  take  a  specimen  from  the 
Scotists.  Frassen  treats  the  subject  as  follows : — 

"  Dices  secundo  :  '  Lex  Naturalis  non  facit  obligationem,  sed 
'  supponit :  Ergo  obligatio  non  est  ejus  effectus.  Antecedens  patet 
'  ex  dictis  ;  nam  Lex  Naturalis  in  hoc  a  Lege  Positiva  distinguitur, 
'quod  ilia  prohibet  aliquid,  quia  malum  est;  haec  vero  prohibet 
( aliquid,  quod  sit  malum  quia  est  prohibitum.  Et  idem  est  cum 
'  proportione  de  imperio  et  praecepto  faciendi  bonum  quia  bonum 
<  est.' 

"  Respondeo,  cum  Suarez,  lib.  ii.  cap.  9,  hanc  objectionem 
nostrse  assertionis  esse  confirmativam :  nam,  inquit,  si  Lex  haec 
prohibet  aliquid  quia  malum,  propriam  et  specialem  necessitatem 
inducit  vitandi  illud ;  quia  hoc  iritrinsecum  est  prohibition!,  ut 
vitetur  quod  prohibitum  est.  Probat  etiam  hoec  objectio,  aliquid 
hanc  Legein  supponere,  quod  pertinet  ad  intnnsecum  debitum 
natures;  siquidem  unaquaeque  res  quodammodo  sibi  debet,  ut 
nihil  f'aciat  suse  naturae  dissentaneiun.  Ultra  verb  hoc  debitum 
etiam  Lex  Naturalis  addit  specialem  obligationem,  moralem,  quam 
jurisperiti  obligationem  naturalem  appellant." — De  Legibus,  disp. 
2}  art.  2,  q.  2,  concl.  prima. 

He  fully  admits  then  the  truth  of  what  is  urged 
in  the  objection;  viz.  that  the  Natural  Law  supposes 


450  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

an  obligation  which  already  exists.  In  other  words, 
according  to  Frassen,  there  is  real  moral  obligation 
anterior  to  the  Natural  Law;  anterior,  that  is,  to  the 
Divine  Command. 

Elsewhere  he  states  the  same  thing  directly. 

"  Deus  in  Lege  Natural!  aliquam  obligationem  ex  parte  rerum 
supponit,  quse  videtur  essentialis  ipsis  rebus,  quia  honestae  sunt  et 
bonse  ex  naturd  rei.  Nam,  ut  supra  diximus,  hoc  est  discrimen 
inter  Legem  Naturalem  et  Positivam,  quod  Lex  Naturalis  prsecipit 
ea,  qua  per  se  honesta  sunt  et  bona ;  prohibet  autem,  quce  per  se 
mala  sunt" — Ibid.  4.  art.  3.  q.  1. 

201.  We  have  now  therefore  collected,  sufficiently 
for  our  purpose,  the  judgment  of  theologians;  though 
we  might  most  easily  have  continued  them  indefinitely. 
Certainly  (to  say  the  very  least)  it  is  most  permissible 
that  any  Catholic  may  reject  a  proposition,  which  has 
such  extremely  strong  testimony  against  it.  I  refer  of 
course  to  the  proposition,  that  moral  obligation  implies 
the  Command  of  a  Superior. 

It  will  have  been  observed  however,  that  the  quo- 
tations from  Lessius,  and  the  chief  of  those  from  Lugo, 
occur  in  arguments,  put  forth  by  those  writers  under 
somewhat  questionable  circumstances.  For  they  are 
directed  towards  a  conclusion,  which  bears  some  con- 
siderable resemblance  to  the  proposition,  condemned  by 
Alexander  VIII.  after  their  time,  on  the  subject  of 
Philosophical  Sin.  And  still  more,  in  looking  at  that 
proposition  itself,  it  might  be  at  first  sight  supposed  by 
unwary  readers,  that  the  principle  of  independent  mo- 
rality is  therein  censured.  I  will  treat  the  matter 
directly,  in  reference  to  the  proposition  itself;  and  will 
introduce  incidentally  what  it  is  necessary  to  say,  on 
Lessius  and  Lugo. 

The  condemned  proposition  is  the  following : — 

"  Peccatum  philosophicum  sen  morale  est 
actus  humanus  disconveniens  naturae  rational! 
et  rectse  ration! :  theologicum  vero  et  mortale 
est  transgressio  libera  Divinse  Legis.  Philosophi- 
cum, quantiimvis  grave,  in  illo,  qui  Deum  vel 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    451 

ignorat,  vel  de  Deo  actu  non  cogitat,  est  grave 
peccatum,  sed  non  est  offensa  Dei,  neque  aeternft 
poena  dignum." — Denzinger,  p.  344. 

Now  there  is  no  fact  more  undoubtedly  certain  in 
all  Theology,  than  that  the  first  sentence  of  this  pro- 
position, which  defines  the  term  '  Philosophical  oin,' 
was  never  imagined  to  fall  under  the  Church's  censure. 
Nothing  is  more  common,  in  the  case  of  condemned 
propositions,  than  such  a  procedure  as  the  following. 
A  statement  is  selected  from  some  unsound  theologian, 
which  contains  the  recital  of  an  undoubted  premiss ; 
and  also  of  some  false  conclusion,  which  he  sophistically 
endeavours  to  build  upon  that  premiss.  The  Church 
condemns  the  whole  statement,  proutjacet:  not  meaning 
of  course  to  throw  the  slightest  discredit  on  the  un- 
doubted premiss;  but  intending  to  brand  (firstly)  the 
conclusion  itself,  and  (secondly)  the  allegation,  that 
such  a  conclusion  can  follow  from  such  a  premiss.  I 
repeat,  there  is  no  fact  more  certain  in  all  Theology, 
than  that  this  is  the  case  here. 

Indeed  there  is  a  special  reason  in  this  instance,  for 
inserting  the  first  sentence  as  well  as  the  second ;  viz. 
that  unless  it  be  so  inserted,  the  very  meaning  of  the 
second  sentence  is  wholly  unintelligible.  The  faithful 
would  have  had  no  way  of  knowing  what  the  con- 
demned writer  means  by  '  Peccatum  Philosophicum,' 
unless  the  former  sentence  had  been  inserted,  in  which 
he  explains  such  meaning.  It  was  absolutely  necessary 
that  the  earlier  sentence  should  be  retained,  if  the 
faithful  were  to  understand  what  is  the  real  assertion 
contained  in  the  latter. 

The  necessity  then  of  retaining  that  earlier  sentence 
is  most  manifest ;  and  its  retention  therefore  is  no  kind 
of  presumption,  that  its  contents  were  intended  to  fall 
under  the  Pope's  condemnation.  Nor  indeed  did  I  ever 
hear  of  any  theologian  who  thought  that  it  was  so  in- 
tended. The  doctrine  that  the  mere  repugnancy  to 
right  Reason  suffices  to  constitute  a  sin,  has  never  (I  say) 
been  attacked  by  any  Catholic  writer  of  name  on  this 


452  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

ground  ;  on  the  ground  of  the  condemned  proposition 
on  Philosophical  Sin.*  It  never  has  been  :  and  most 
certainly  it  never  would  be  with  reason ;  as  I  will  now 
proceed  to  shew. 

One  consideration  strikes  us  on  the  very  surface. 
It  was  but  a  short  time  before  this  censure,  that  the 
Church  condemned  those  other  two  propositions,  which 
were  cited  at  the  beginning  of  this  Section.  Those 
were  then  censured,  who  refused  to  admit  that  certain 
definite  offences  are  sinful  intrinsecally,  apart  from 
the  Divine  Prohibition.  It  would  be  strange  indeed,  if 
only  eleven  years  afterwards,  the  whole  notion,  that 
anything  whatever  could  be  sinful  intrinsecally  apart 
from  the  Divine  Prohibition,  had  been  condemned  in 
one  sweeping  decree.  In  addition  to  the  inherent 
impossibility  of  such  a  supposition,  we  will  adduce 
three  arguments  ;  any  one  of  which  will  amply  suffice 
to  shew,  that  the  case  is  very  far  otherwise. 

(1.)  The  Pontiff,  Alexander  VIII.,  expressly  declares 
in  his  decree,  that  the  proposition  before  us  was  a  new 
proposition.f  Now  no  one  (I  believe)  of  any  opinions 
whatever  has  so  much  as  suggested  the  notion,  that 
the  intrinsic  '  malitia '  of  immorality,  irrespectively  of 
God's  Will,  was  a  new  doctrine  in  the  time  of  Alexander 
VIII.  We  have  seen  on  the  other  hand  that  Suarez 
considers  it  as  St.  Thomas's,  and  as  the  common  senti- 
ment of  theologians.  Lugo  again  represents  k<  plures  ex 
antiquioribus  et  recentioribus,"  up  to  his  own  time,  as 
undoubtedly  maintaining  it.  And  Dmowski  tells  us, 
that  those  Protestants  who  object  to  it,  are  so  far  from 
calling  it  new,  that  they  clamour  against  it  as  an  in- 
vention of  the  Catholic  scholastics.  J 

*  For  I  do  not  consider  '  quelques  lecteurs  bienveillants'  of  F.  Chastel 
(see  postea  n.  207)  to  be  '  Catholic  writers  of  name '  or  '  theologians.' 

•J"  The  decree  is  given  by  Viva.  '  Sanctissiinus  D.N.  Alexander  Papa 
Octavus  non  sine  magno  animi  sui  moerore  audivit,  duas  theses  seu 
propositiones,  unam  denuo  et  in  majorem  fidelium  perniciem  suscitari,  al- 
teram  de  novo  erumpereS  It  is  this  second  which  concerns  Philosophical 
Sin. 

|  '  Pufendorfius tanquam  inventum  scholasticorum  respuit  differ- 

entiam  istam  moralium  actionum,  scilicet :  .  .  .  .  quasdam  esse  prohibitas 
ouia  malae  et  quasdam  malas  quia  prohibitse.' 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    453 

(2.)  There  was  at  one  time  a  great  controversy 
raised  against  the  Jesuits,  by  many  who  maintained, 
that  certain  Jesuit  doctrines  lead  by  necessary  con- 
sequence to  this  condemned  proposition.  Against 
which  of  the  Jesuit  doctrines  was  this  charge  adduced  ? 
Against  the  doctrine,  that  morality  is  intrinsecally  obli- 
gatory apart  from  God's  Commandment?  So  far  was 
this  from  being  the  case,  that  on  the  contrary  the 
independent  existence  of  morality  was  for  the  most 
part  admitted  on  both  sides  as  a  first  principle  in  the 
dispute.  The  Jesuit  propositions  attacked  had  reference 
to  the  kind  or  degree  of  advertence  required  in  mortal 
sin.  Every  one  knows  this  well,  who  is  at  all  acquainted 
with  the  controversies  of  that  time  ;  but  one  quotation 
will  put  it  beyond  question.  No  one  will  doubt  that 
F.  Buffier,  whom  we  have  seen  so  earnestly  contending 
for  first  truths,  regarded  the  first  principles  of  morality 
as  contained  in  the  class.  Now  this  same  F.  Buffier 
was  accused  of  holding,  by  implication  at  least,  the  error 
of  Philosophical  Sin.  In  regard  to  which  statement  of 
his  was  this  charge  made  ?  in  regard  to  any  statement 
concerning  the  independent  character  of  morality  ? 
Nothing  of  the  kind  :  the  statements  to  which  excep- 
tion was  taken,  had  not  the  most  distant  relation  to 
any  such  subject.  So  far  as  Philosophical  Sin  is  con- 
cerned, the  following  was  the  precise  disavowal  ex- 
acted from  him  ;  as  related  by  Serry,  in  his  history  of 
the  congregation  "  De  Auxiliis  :'' — 

"  Secundum  hsec  nuperrime  pronunciavit  Illustrissimus  Rotho- 
magensium  Archiepiscopus,  dum  P.  Buffierum  Jesuitam,  a  quo 
idem  ille  Peccati  Philosophici  insanus  error  sparse  per  Nonnan- 
niam  libello  recmus  fuerat,  solenni  decreto  damnavit;  jussitque 
ut  scripto  publico  hisce  duabus  propositionibus,  inter  multas  alias, 
subscriberet,  in  obsequentis  ac  poenitentis  animi  ficlem.  1.  Quod 
spectat  ad  Peccatum  Philosophicum,  damno  quod  Summus  Pon- 
tifex  Alexander  VIII.  Decreto  suo  damnavit  24  Augusti  1690. 
Ipse  autem  privation  agnosco  (ut  Jesuita  jam  public^  agnoverunt 
in  sententia  sua,  publico  scripto  edita,  super  Peccato  Philosophico,) 
non  esse  necessarium  actu  attendere  animum  ad  malitiam  actionis, 
ut  peccato  imputetur.  2.  Obcascati  et  indurati  peccatores,  qui 
csedes,  adulteria,  et  alia  scelera,  sine  ullo  conscientise  stimulo 


454  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

perpetrant,  ne  minimi  quidem  cogitantes  hujusmodi  sceleribus 
offendi  a  se  Deum,  aut  lisec  contraria  esse  Legi  Natural!,  nihilo- 
minus  merentur  poenas  inferorum :  nee  quod  actu  non  attendant 
ad  malitiam  actionis,  ideo  peccati  mortalis  rei  non  sunt."  (lib.  iii. 
c.  48.)* 

You  see  the  whole  charge  against  him,  so  far  as 
Philosophical  Sin  is  concerned,  was  his  maintaining  the 
necessity  of  'advertentia  ad  malitiam,'  in  order  to 
constitute  mortal  sin. 

(3.)  Thirdly,  consider  how  absolutely  atrocious  is 
the  statement  contained  in  the  condemned  proposition. 
The  condemned  writer  by  no  means  confines  his  state- 
ment to  invincible  ignorance  or  invincible  inadvertence. 
No  :  according  to  him,  any  sinner  in  the  world,  whose 
will  is  so  utterly  alienated  from  his  True  End,  that 
in  committing  the  greatest  enormities  he  forgets  his 
Creator  altogether, —  such  a  sinner  is  ipso  facto  exempt 
from  the  guilt  and  from  the  penalties  of  mortal  sin. 
Can  any  one  credit,  that  the  Pontiff,  having  so  frightful 
a  proposition  to  censure,  not  content  with  smiting  it, 
should  travel  out  of  his  way  to  pronounce  a  judgment 
on  a  question  most  totally  distinct  ;  a  question  which 
no  one  on  either  side  of  the  existing  controversy  had  (I 
believe)  so  much  as  raised  ? 

Lugo  and  Lessius  were  very  far  indeed  from  holding 
so  extreme  a  position.  At  the  same  time  I  must  frankly 
profess,  that  I  do  regard  the  doctrine  on  advertence, 
held  by  them  and  by  some  other  Jesuits,  as  leading 
by  necessary  consequence  to  this  condemned  propo- 
sition.f  I  hope  therefore  to  argue  against  that  doc- 
trine, on  this  very  ground  as  well  as  on  others,  in  the 
appropriate  part  of  our  theological  course. 

Serry,  in  the  passage  immediately  preceding  that 
already  quoted,  confirms  what  I  have  said  in  the  amplest 
manner  ;  declaring  that  the  whole  doctrine  of  Philoso- 
phical Sin,  both  in  its  first  inventor  and  his  followers, 
turned  wholly  on  the  question  of  advertence  as  on  a 
hinge. 

*  I  believe  that  F.  Buffier  refused  subscription  to  these  two  propo- 
sitions. 

f  Which  was  condemned,  however,  after  their  death. 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    455 

"Nemo  quippe  est  qui  non  vidcat,  errorem  bunc  ab  Alex- 
andro  proscriptum,  eo  ut  monui  principio  veluti  cardine  niti,  quo 
largi  illi  ac  liberales  Gratiarum  bufficientium  distributores  iabu- 
lantur,  nullum  re  ipsa  veri  nominis  peccatum  admitti,  nullam- 
que  Deo  offensam  inferri  aeterna  pojnfi  plectendam,  nisi  prawd 
illustratione  animus  perfundatur,  internaque  excitatione  pulsetur 
humana  voluntas.  Imino  non  alio  ilium  argumento  muniebat,  in 
dictatis  scriptis,  Professor  Theologus  Divionensis,  a  quo  in 
publicam  Thesium  lucem  editus  est;  nee  alio  principio  nitebantur 
illi  ipsi,  quos  assertionis  sua  magistros  ac  duces  proferebat." 

Finally,  the  only  commentators  on  condemned  pro- 
positions with  whom  I  am  acquainted,  are  these  three  ; 
Van  Ranst,  Milante^  Viva.  Now  all  these  agree,  in 
either  implying  or  expressly  declaring,  that  our  doc- 
trine of  independent  morality  is  not  in  any  way  alluded 
to  by  this  condemnation. 

Thus  Van  Ranst  :  — 

"  Hac  in  propositione  duo  expendenda  sunt.  Primb  supponit 
ilia,  dari  posse  ignorantiarn  Dei  invincibilem,  proindeque  a  peccato 
excusantem.  Secundo  requirit  ad  theologice  peccandum  actu- 
alem  de  Deo  cogitationem.  Primum  liquet  ex  verbis  istis,  '  philo- 
sophicum,  quantumvis  grave,  in  illo  qui  Deum  ignorat:'  alterum 
in  sequentibus,  *  vel  de  Deo  actu  non  cogitat.' 

"  Dari  non  posse  ignorantiam  invincibilem  Dei,  asserit  hoec 
stupenda  moles  universi,  certatim  prsedicans,  Dei  notitiam  homini 
esse  insitam,  ingenitam,  implantatam,  inseminatam.  Hoec  est  vis 
Vera3  Divinitatis,  inquit  Doctorum  Aquila  (tr.  106  in  Joan.),  ut 
creaturse  rationali,  jam  ratione  utenti,  non  omnino  ac  penitus 
possit  abscondi.  Adeoque  nequit  dari  ignorantia  Dei  invincibilis, 
et  consequenter  inculpabilis.  Hinc  dicitur  Ps.  Ixxviii.  '  Effunde 
iram  tuam  in  Gentes,  quae  te  non  noverunt;'  et  tamen  cognoscere 
potuerunt.  Ruit  igitur  Peccatum  Pliilosophicum,  quod  in  pra- 
fatd  potissimum  ignorantid  fundabatur. 

"  CiEterum  fuerunt  nonnulli,  qui  ipsum  Doctorem  Angelicum, 
hujus  erroris  (ut  vidimus)  prajdebellatorem,  in  illius  patronum 
vocare  non  sunt  veriti ;  ob  ilia,  quse  habet  2,  2,  q.  20,  art.  3,  in 
corp.  '  Si  posset  esse  conversio  ad  bonum  commutabile  sine  aver- 
sione  a  Deo,  quamvis  esset  inordinata,  non  esset  peccatum  mortale.' 
Sed  quis  hie  non  videat,  D.  Thomam  (ut  alia  ad  textum  loci 
opportuna  prseteream)  loqui  hypothetice?  in  hypothesi  scilicet, 
quod  detur  ignorantia  Dei  invincibilis?  In  tali  enim  suppositione, 
peccatum  non  esset  theologicurn  (cum  ignorantia  invincibilis  a  pec- 
cato excuset)  sed  mete  philosophicum. 

"  'Bene  est,'  inquiebant  Peccati  Philosophici  defensores:  '  theo- 


456  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

*  logi  nostri  defendunt  hanc  propositionem  dumtaxat  de  Peccato 
(  Philosophico,  si,  vel  quando,  Existentia  Dei  invincibiliter  ignora- 
'  retur,  adeoque  in  hypothesi  jam  allegata;  proinde  nos  Alexan- 
'  drina  non  involvit  condemnation 

"  Sed  quantus  hie  error,  et  csecitas  !  Certe  Alexander  VIII. 
non  feriit  propositionem  conditionatam,  sed  absolutam ;  non  feriit 
phantasma,  sed  rem  ipsam.  Sic  et  fulmen  Apostolicum  non  fuit 
vibratum  in  phantasma  Jansenii  (ut  filii  iniquitatis  volebant),  sed 
in  hseresim  Jansenianam  revera  talem.  En  verba  Alexandri  VIII. 
(  Peccatum  Philosophicum,  quantumvis  grave,  in  illo  qui  Deum 
vel  ignorat '  (ecce  ignorantia  absoluta  non  conditionata) '  vel  de  eo 
actu  non  cogitat,  est  grave  peccatum,  sed  non  est  offensa  Dei/  &c. 

"  Superest  consideranda  actualis  de  Deo  cogitatio:  quam  famosi 
istius  Peccati  Philosophic!  assertores  ad  theologice  peccandum 
requiri  sustinebant. 

"  Sane  illam  non  requiri,  sed  vere,formaliter,  et  theologice  peccare 
eum,  qui  de  Deo  actu  non  cogitat,  luce  meridiana  clarius  ex  Sacris 
patet  Oraculis.  '  Exacerbavit  Dominum  peccator,'  Ps.  ix.  Sed 
cur  exacerbavit?  Fuitne  semper  in  illo  actualis  de  Deo  cogi- 
tatio ?  Semperne  fuit  Deus  in  conspectu  ejus,  alioquin  non  pec- 
caturi?  Minime  vero ;  imo  hoc  ipsum  ei  jure  merito  exprobratur 
et  peccato  vertitur,  qubd  de  Deo  non  cogitdrit,  seu  Deum  ocnlis  suis 
non  prsefixerit.  f  Non  est  Deus  in  conspectu  ejus.'  Eodem  Ps.  v.  26. 

"  Deinde :  si  ad  theologice  peccandum  semper  actualis  de 
Deo,  aut  de  peccati,  quod  Deum  infinite  offendit,  malitia  cogitatio 
requireretur,  nonne  innumeri  Athei,  Machiavellopolitici,  et  consue- 
tudinarii,  in  criminum  voraginem,  sine  ulld  Dei  vel  malitia  con- 
sideratione,  se  pracipit  antes,  apeccatis  eximerentur? 

"  Solida  docet  Theologia,  ad  peccatum  requiri  et  sufficere,  quod 
quis  potuerit  et  debuerit  de  Deo  cogitare,  vel  reflectere  ad  Deum, 
aut  ad  gravitatem  peccati  infinitam  involventis  malitiam ;  quod- 
que  ad  ilia  omnia  non  reflexerit. 

"  Sed  ecce  errorem,  quasi  suis  exortum  temporibus,  formalis- 
sime  damnatum  ab  Angelico  1,  2,  q.  74,  a.  7,  ad.  2.  '  Ratio 
superior,'  inquit,  seu  mens  ( dicitur  consentire  in  peccatum,  sive 
cogitet  de  Lege  ^Eterna  '  (quse  Deus  est)  f  sive  non.'' ': 

In  like  manner  Milante  : — 

((  Ex  tarn  infami  confixo  dogmate,  a  theologica  culpa  eximitur, 
qui,  actu  non  cogitans  de  Deo,  Ejus  praecepta  conculcat.  Qua- 
propter,  dubio  procul  nemo  felicius  faciliusque  Veneri  et  sensui 
indulget,  quam  perditissimus  quisque  homo,  qui,  assuetus  peccata 
peccatis  addere,  certe  nee  de  Deo  actu  cogitat,  nee  Deum  pertimes- 
cit,  cum  peccat  obduratus  in  malo 

"  Qucestio  igitur  est  in  prcesenti  de  sold  ignorantia  Juris  Na- 
turae, prsesertim  de  ignorantia  Dei ;  an  hcec  possibilis  sit  in  facto  ? 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    457 

an,  cum  possibilis  sit,  sit  quoque  invincibilis  dicenda  ?  et  iterum  an 
peccans  cum  hac  ignorantia  de  Deo,  vel  Deum  non  advertens 
Ej usque  injuriam  non  respiciens  in  actu  pravo,  committal  pcc- 
catum  philosophicum  ita  sejunctum  a  theologico,  ut  ex  illius,  non 
vero  ex  istius,  deformitate  reus  sit  judicandus  ?  Quo  ex  momento, 
dum  ejus  peccatum  ex  pracfato  modo  operandi  est  duntaxat  phi- 
losopliicum,  qui  illud  committit  non  est  dignus  seternA,  poena,  quia 
Deum  suo  actu  peccaminoso  non  offendit.  In  hoc  quidem,  ut 
nuper  indigitavi,  cardo  dijficultatis  est  situs" 

Next,  let  us  see  Viva's  statement : — 

"  Quod  vero  attinet  ad  doctorum  sententias  de  Peccato  Phi- 
losopliico:  certum  in  primis  est,  Alexandrum  VIII.  in  hac  thesi 
noluisse  damnare,  qua  in  antiquis  et  gravibus  theologis  de  hoc 
peccato  scripta  legimus ;  aliter  non  diceret,  thesim  hanc  de  novo 

erupisse.     Docuerunt  autem  plurimi  primae  notae  scriptores 

absolute  esse  simpliciter  impossibile  (sive  metaphysice,  sive  saltern 
moral iter,)  peccatum  pure  philosophicum.  Addendo  tamen,  veluti 
hypothetice  ac  speculative,  quod  si  per  impossibile  quis  haberet 
invincibilem  Dei  ignorantiam,  aut  de  Deo  actu  invincibiliter  nul- 
latenus,  ne  implicite  quidem,  cogitaret,  dum  advertit  furtum  v.  g. 
esse  rationi  dissonum,  in  tali  casu  peccitum  non  foret  Dei  offensa, 
nee  peccatum  theologicum,  sed  pure  philosophicum ;  eo  quod  im- 
possibile sit  Deum  otfendi,  nisi  aliquo  modo  cognoscatur 

Et  in  hoc  duntaxat  sensu  hypothetico,  nonnulli  Societatis  Pro- 
fessores,  vestigiis  tantorum  virorum  inhserentes,  idipsum  in  suis 
thesibus  propugnarunt ;  rejiciendo  semper  absolute,  cum  iisdem 
autoribus,  saltern  moralem  possibilitatem  Peccati  Philosophic!." 
—  Viva,  n.  3. 

Viva  tells  us,  you  see,  that,  according  to  '  plurimi 
primse  notae  scriptores,'  if  a  man  could  be  invincibly 
ignorant  or  inadvertent  of  God's  Prohibition,  he  might 
nevertheless  advert  to  the  fact  that  theft,  e.g.  is  contrary 
to  Reason ;  and  that,  committing  theft  with  sucli  ad- 
vertence, he  would  really  sin :  yet  that  such  sin  would 
be  philosophical  and  not  theological.  And  Viva  further 
says,  *  It  is  certain  that  Alexander  VIII.  never  intended 
'to  condemn'  this  opinion. 

202.  This  leads  me  to  Viva's  own  statement, 
on  the  relation  between  God  and  moral  obligation. 
He  undoubtedly  does  hold  that  moral  obligation  is 
entirely  derived  from  God's  Necessary  Command. 
And  the  following  extracts,  from  his  work  on  the 


458  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

"Theses  Damnatae,"  will  shew  his  mode  of  treating 
the  question. 

"  Diversimode  est  dissonum  mendacium  Deo,  et  homini ;  esto 
in  utroque  sit  moraliter  malum,  per  difformitatem  cum  Divina 
Vbluntate,  Quse  est  Prima  Regula  morum.  Etenim  Deo  ita  est 
dissonum,  ut  etiam  sit  metaphysice  impossibile ;  quia  Deus  a 
propria  Natura,  quse  essentialiter  est  Cumulus  omnium  Perfec- 
tionum,  determinatur,  sicut  ad  amandum  Semetipsum,  ita  ad  odio 
habendum  quod  est  intrinsece  malum,  seu  quod  argueret  imper- 
fectionem  in  Divina  Voluntate,  si  ab  ilia  amaretur;  ut  est  men- 
dacium, odium  Dei,  perjurium,  et  similia :  et  idcirco,  ut  hsec  sint 
illicita  Deo,  non  debent  a  lege  superiore  ipsi  vetari,  sed  sufficit, 
quod  essentialiter  sint  contra  ipsius  Dei  Voluntatem,  metaphysice 
determinatam  ad  bonum." — De  Peccato  Philosophico,  n.  11. 

"  Quamvis  cognitio  explicite  attingens  peccatum  ut  dissonum 
naturae  rationali,  non  eatenus  attingat  explicite  illud  ut  trans- 
gressivum  Divinse  Legis, — nihilominus  repugnat,  quod  peccatum 
sub  illo  priori  conceptu  attingatur,  quin  simul  attingatur  implicit^ 
sub  hoc  secundo,  quantum  satis  est  ad  quemdam  contemptum 
Divinse  Legis,  atque  adeo  ad  offensam  Dei.  Ergo  metaphysice 
repugnat  peccatum  mortale  pure  philosophic-urn,  quod  Divinam 
Amicitiam  non  dissolvat,  nee  sit  Dei  offensa.  Antecedens  probatur ; 
quia  prsecise  per  hoc  quod  peccatum  attingatur  explicite  ut  dis- 
conveniens  naturae  rationali  et  Recta?  Rationi,  attingitur  implicite 
ut  illicitum,  atque  adeo  ut  prohibitum  et  nullatenus  patrandum. 
Ergo  etiam  attingitur  implicite  ut  oppositum  Divinse  Yoluntati 
illud  prohibenti;  atque  adeo  ut  contemptivumDivinae  Prohibitions, 
et  ut  Dei  offensa.  Probatur  haec  consequentia,  quia  quoties 
peccatum  apparet  ut  prohibitum  ita  ut  nullatenus  liceat,  apparet 
ut  prohibitum  ab  ea  voluntate,  quse  unice  potest  illud  prohibere : 
atqui  sola  Dei  Lex  et  Voluntas  potest  peccatum  prohibere,  ita  ut 
nullatenus  liceat,  quibuscumque  creaturis  illud  suadentibus  aut  prce- 
cipientibus ;  ergo  quoties  peccatum  apparet  ut  omnino  prohibi- 
tum, apparet  etiam  oppositum  Divinse  Voluntati  illud  prohibenti, 
atque  adeo  contemptivum  Divina?  Legis.  Quod  autem  confusa 
ista  et  implicita  advertentia  ad  Divinam  Prohibitionem  sufficiatad 
contrahendum  reatum  odii  Divini,  atque  adeo  dissolvendam  Divi- 
nam Amicitiam, — ex  eo  patet,  quia  sicut,  in  omnium  sententia, 
qui  invincibiliter  in  sylvis  enutritus  nunquam  audivit  de  poense 
a3ternitate,  aut  ad  ilium  non  advertit  dum  peccat,  si  vere  advertit 
ad  Dei  offensam,  adhuc  sit  reus  posnse  seternse,  per  hoc  precise 
quod  consentiendo  in  culpam  implicite  consentiat  in  poenam  illi 
annexam  natura  sua,  etiamsi  non  habeat  claram  notitiam  de 
seternitate  poense  debita  ; — ita  qui  in  sylvis  enutritus  invincibiliter 
nunquam  audivit  de  Dei  Existentia,  aut  ad  ilium  non  advertit 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    459 

dum  peccat,  si  vere  advertit  ad  dissonantiam  culpac  cum  naturfi 
rational!  ct  cum  Rationis  dictamine,  atque  adeo  ad  prohibitionem 
sibifactam  ab  aliquo  Superiore  itaut  nullatcnus  possit  ea  operatic 
sibi  licere  quibuscumque  creaturis  ad  illain  impellentibus,  adlmc 
fit  reus  odii  Divini ;  per  hoc  precise,  quod  consentiendo  in  opera- 
tionem  illam  sibi  interdictam,  implicite  consentiat  in  violationem 
Legis  probibentis,  atque  adeo  in  contemptum  talis  Voluntatis; 
etiamsi  careat  clara  notitia,  quod  Lex  seu  Voluntas  illam  prohi- 
bens  sit  Voluntas  Divina,  unde  Deus  contemnatur :  et  consequenter 
metaphysice  repugnat  peccatum  pure  philosophicum,  quod  non 
sit  Dei  ofFensa,  nee  Ejus  Amicitiam  reseindat" — Ibid.  n.  9. 

Viva,  I  should  add,  expressly  states  (as  indeed  we 
have  seen  already)  that  this  view  of  his  is  only  one  oat 
of  those  held  in  the  Catholic  Schools ;  and  that  the 
contradictory  doctrine  is  maintained  by  *  plurimi  prinue 
nota3  scriptores.' — (See  nn.  3  and  12.) 

"  Illud  solum  ad  qusestionem  speculativam  spectat :  num  ea, 
quse  sunt  mala  ab  intrinseco,  formaliter  habeant  rationem  peccati, 
seu  mali  moraliter  ac  inhonesti,  per  oppositionem  cum  Lege  pro- 
hibente,  an  vero  per  disconvenientiam  cum  natura  rational i  ? 
Qu&  in  re  communius  docent,  per  disconvenientiam  cum  natura 
rational!  esse  tantum  fundamentatiter  peccata,  et  habere  solam 
prohibenditatem,  seu  exigentiam  ut  prohibeantur ;  formalem  vero 
peccati  rationem  habere,  per  violationem  Legis  prohibentis :  ut 
proinde  carerent  malitid  formali,  si  nonprohiberentur;  sive  possibile 
sit  ea  positive  non  prohiberi  a  Deo,  sive  impossibile ;  quod  verius 
censeo  cum  Suar.  lib.  ii.  de  Leg.  c.  G,  contra  Okamum,  et  alios. 
Quinimmo  arbitrior  esse  metaphysice,  nedum  moraliter,  im- 
possibile, quod  homo  Deum,  saltern  ut  Supremum  Legislatorem, 
ignoret,  aut  de  Illo  actu  non  cogitet,  dum  ponit  operationem, 
quam  advertit  esse  natura3  rational!  disconvenienteui." — In  Props. 
48  et  49  Innocent  XL,  n.  1. 

You  will  see  from  these  extracts  that,  according  to 
Viva,  the  source  of  moral  obligation  is  simply  God's 
necessary  Command.  In  other  words  (to  take  his  own 
instances),  we  are  morally  obliged  to  avoid  lying  and 
perjury,  for  this  reason  and  for  no  other  whatever ;  viz. 
that  God  by  the  necessity  of  His  Nature  forbids  such 
acts.  Of  late  years  several  Catholic  philosophers  seem 
to  have  adopted  this  view.  In  regard  to  the  theolo- 
gians known  by  Viva  himself,  there  are  only  two  (I 
think)  whom  he  quotes  by  name  as  favourable  to  his 
position,  viz.  Curiel  and  Zumel ;  neither  of  them  cer- 


460  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

tainly  being  very  eminent  names :  and  this,  though  Viva 
himself  is  about  the  latest  in  date  of  the  great  scholastic 
writers.  At  the  same  time  he  calls  his  own  the  most 
common  opinion  ;*  while  frankly  admitting  that  the 
other  doctrine  (which  I  have  followed  throughout)  is 
held  by  'plurimi  primae  notae  scriptores.'f 

We  have  argued  at  some  length  against  Viva's 
doctrine,  in  the  second  and  third  Sections  of  the  first 
chapter.  Yet  it  may  be  worth  while  briefly  to  criticise 
Viva's  own  reasoning  in  its  behalf. 

God  is  necessitated  to  prohibit  lying  and  perjury  ; 
or,  in  other  words,  He  is  not  free  to  withhold  that  pro- 
hibition. So  far  Viva  agrees  with  Suarez  and  the  great 
body  of  theologians.  Why  is  God  not  free  to  withhold 
that  Prohibition  ?  Of  course  'because  to  do  so  would 
be  repugnant  to  His  Essential  Sanctity.'  Why  would 
it  be  thus  repugnant?  'Because  lying  and  perjury 
are  intrinsecally  evil.'  But  why  are  lying  and  perjury 
intrinsecally  evil  ?  If  you  say  c  simply  because  God 
has  prohibited  themj  then  Viva's  argument  comes  to 
this ;  *  God  is  not  free  to  withhold  the  Prohibition  of 
i  such  acts,  simply  because  He  has  in  fact  prohibited 
'  them :'  than  which  a  more  absurd  statement  cannot 
be  imagined.  Viva  then  must  admit,  that  lying  and 
perjury  are  intrinsecally  evil,  for  some  reason  wholly 
distinct  from  God's  Prohibition ;  but  then  this  is  pre- 
cisely the  logical  contradictory  to  his  original  assertion. 
Whatever  is  intrinsecally  evil,  we  are  morally  obliged 
on  that  ground  to  avoid.  If  then  lying  and  perjury 
are  intrinsecally  evil,  for  reasons  wholly  independent 
of  God's  Prohibition; — then  we  are  morally  obliged  to 
avoid  them,  for  reasons  wholly  independent  of  God's 
Prohibition.  And  this  is  the  thesis  which  Viva  ex- 
pressly denies. 

Indeed  if  we  examine  his  language  with  any  care, 
we  shall  soon  see  how  false  is  his  position.  No  abler 

*  "De  Peccato  Philosophico,"  n.  8.  This  statement  however  comes  to 
very  little  ;  it  is  so  very  common  a  tendency  of  theologians,  to  regard  their 
own  opinion  as  the  most  common. 

t  Ibid.  n.  3. 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    461 

or  subtler  theologian  can  easily  be  found,  among  the 
whole  body  of  scholastics ;  and  yet  see  how  vaguely 
and  confusedly  he  speaks.  Does  he,  or  does  he  not,  hold 
that  lying  and  perjury  are  intrinsecally  evil,  apart  from 
God's  Prohibition  ?  No  consistent  answer  can  possibly 
be  given.  In  the  last  extract,  he  says  that  they  are 
KQiformally  evil ;  l  carerent  mali  fid  formally  si  non  pro- 
hiberentur  :'  yet  in  that  very  passage  he  calls  them 
'mala  ab  intrinseco  ;'  and  he  says  in  the  first  of  the 
three  extracts,  that  they  are  'intrinsece  mala/  What 
distinction  of  ideas  can  possibly  be  imagined,  answering 
to  this  distinction  of  words,  between  'formaliter  mala' 
on  the  one  hand,  and  '  intrinsece  mala '  on  the  other 
hand  ?  He  says  that,  apart  from  God's  Prohibition, 
such  acts  are  so  intrinsecally  evil,  that  they  are  '  illicita 
Deo;'  and  that  the  not  detesting  them  would  be 
repugnant  to  His  Sanctity.  (First  Extract.)  If  they 
are  'unlawful  to  God,'  I  suppose  they  are  unlawful 
to  us;  if  the  not  detesting  them  would  be  repugnant 
to  sanctity  in  the  Creator,  so  would  it  also  be  in  the 
creature.  If  then  certain  acts,  apart  altogether  from 
God's  Prohibition,  are  '  unlawful  to  us,'  and  '  repugnant 
to  sanctity,'  what  imaginable  sense  can  there  be  in 
denying,  that  they  are  'formaliter  mail?"1 

Then,  Viva's  second  extract  simply  takes  for 
granted  the  whole  question  at  issue.  He  assumes  that 
nothing  can  be  morally  evil,  until  it  is  prohibited  ; 
and  then  proves  (easily  enough)  that,  on  such  an 

*  "  Recentiores  alii,  vi  argument!  oppressi,  dicunt,  omne  peccatum  quod 
jure  naturali  est  peccatum,  prius  natura  esse  malum,  quateniis  contra 
naturam  rationalem  est ;  et  hac  ratione  esse  peccatum  sed  non  culpam : 
culpam  autem  esse  ratione  Positivi  Prcecepti  Dei  vetantis  talc  opus :  ita 
tamen  ut  non  possit  Deus  non  vetare  peccatum  illud,  ut  sit  culpa. . .  . 

"  Haec  tamen  sententia  facile  impugnari  potest.  Nam  ....  malitia 
latius  patet  quam  peccatum,  et  peccatum  quam  culpa  :  sed  malitia  in  quovis 
actu  facit  peccatum  ;  in  actu  autem  libero  facit  culpam.  Ergo,  si  ante  Dei 
Prohibitionem,  supponamus  malitiam  in  actu  libero  contra  naturalem  ra- 
tionem,  ut  necessarid  fatendum  est,  debet  etiam  supponi  hoc  ipso  culpa 

moralis. 

***** 

"Adde  etiam,  quod  Odium  [quod  a  Deo  concipitur]  supponit  malum  in 
actione  humand  ac  proinde  culpam.  Ncque  euim  culpa  ideb  est  culpa  quia 
Deus  eum  Odio  habeat ;  sed  potiiis,  quia  est  culpa,  Deus  earn  Ooio  pro- 
sequitur."— Vasquez  in  lm  2*,  d.  96,  n.  8. 

H  H 


462  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

hypothesis,  the  Prohibitor  must  be  of  Infinite  Authority. 
4  Quoties,'  he  says,  '  peccatum  apparet  ita  prohibitum 
'  ut  nullatenus  liceat,  apparet  prohibitum  ab  Ea  Vo- 
4  Imitate,  Quae  unice  potest  illud  prohibere.'  But  his 
opponents  maintain,  that  many  things  are  so  morally 
evil,  'ut  nullatenus  liceant,'  without  reference  to  any 
Prohibition  whatever  :  to  this  allegation,  which  alone 
concerns  him,  he  does  not,  throughout  the  extract,  so 
much  as  allude. 

No  one  has  a  more  grateful  sense  than  myself,  of 
the  most  important  services  conferred  by  Viva  on 
Theology  ;  no  one  more  highly  appreciates  his  rare 
mental  gifts.  But  it  will  happen  now  and  then  to  the 
best  theologians,  that  they  incautiously  admit  some 
statement,  the  full  bearing  and  consequences  of  which 
they  have  by  no  means  duly  considered. 

With  Viva  I  close  my  extracts  from  theological 
writers ;  which  I  could  have  indefinitely  increased 
indeed,  but  that  there  seemed  no  reason  for  doing  so. 
Further  quotations  however  have  been  made  from 
them  in  the  seventh  Section,  on  the  question  of  dispen- 
sation from  the  Natural  Law ;  quotations  which  will 
place  their  meaning  (if  possible)  in  even  a  clearer  light. 

203.  From  theologians  we  pass  to  philosophers  :  and 
of  these  the  first  whom  I  will  bring  before  you  shall  be 
Cardinal  Gerdil.  No  writer  possesses  greater  authority 
than  Gerdil,  on  these  theologico-philosophical  questions ; 
and  it  will  be  well  therefore  to  see  in  full  his  whole 
judgment  on  the  matter. 

(f  I.  Principe. 

ts  II  y  a  entre  le  juste  et  1'injuste,  Fhonnete  et  le  deshonnete, 
une  difference  immuable  et  necessaire  :  en  sorte  qu'il  est  autant 
impossible  que  le  juste  devienne  injuste,  ou  que  Phonnete  devienne 
deshonnete,  qu'il  est  impossible  que  la  partie  devienne  plus  grande 
que  le  tout,  ou  que  deux  choses  egales  a  une  troisieme  ne  soient  pas 
dgales  entr'elles. 

"  Explication. 

"  II  est  juste  et  honnete,  de  preferer  Pamour  de  Dieu  a  Famour 
de  la  creature ;  il  est  injuste  et  deshonnete,  de  preferer  Pamour 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    463 

de  la  creature  k  1'amour  de  Dieu.  II  est  juste  et  honnete  de 
conserver  sa  patrie,  quand  on  le  pcut ;  il  est  injuste  et  deslionnete 
de  Ja  trahir.  Or  je  dis,  que  la  preference  de  Dieu  a  la  creature 
porte  avec  soi  un  caractere  de  justice  et  d'honnetet6  immuable  et 
necessaire ;  qu'au  contraire,  la  preference  de  la  creature  a.  Dieu 
porte  avec  soi  un  caractere  d'injustice  et  de  turpitude  immuable 
et  necessaire  :  que  les  efforts  qu'on  fait  pour  conserver  sa  patrie 
portent  aussi  avec  eux  ce  caractere  de  justice  et  d'honn£tete ;  et 
qu'au  contraire  la  trahison  de  sa  patrie  porte  avec  soi  un  caractere 
immuable  et  necessaire  d'injustice  et  de  turpitude. 

"  Preuve. 

((  Les  rapports  de  perfection  sont  autant  immuables,  que  les 
rapports  de  quantite1 :  or  est-il  que  c'est  un  rapport  de  perfection, 
qu'un  £tre  plus  parfait  est  preferable  a  un  etre  moiris  parfait ; 
parceque  le  plus  de  realite  et  de  perfection  dans  I'e'tre  plus 
parfait,  est  preferable  a  la  privation  ou  negation  de  ce  plus  de 
realite  et  de  perfection  dans  1'etre  moins  parfait :  et  cela  a  cause 
que  Petre  est  preferable  au  neant.  Done  ce  rapport  de  perfection 
fait,  que  Dieu  est  immuablement  et  ne'cessairement  preferable  a  la 
creature ;  que  la  conservation  de  la  patrie  est  preferable  a  sa 
destruction.  D'un  autre  cote  il  y  a  rapport  de  convenance  entre 
la  preference  et  ce  qui  est  preferable,  et  un  rapport  de  discon- 
venance  entre  la  preference  et  ce  qui  n'estpas  preferable  :  done 
le  juste  et  1'honnete  etant  fonde  sur  ses  rapports  immuables  de 
perfection  et  de  convenance,  il  est  autant  impossible  que  le  juste 
est  1'honnete  devienne  injuste  et  des/ionnete,  qu'il  est  impossible  que  la 
partie  devienne  plus  grande  que  le  tout,  &c. 

"  De  Ik  il  suit,  que  comme  nous  concevons  clairement  qu'il  ne 
depend  pas  d'une  institution  libre  de  la  Volonte'  de  Dieu,  de  faire 
que  le  tout  soit  phis  grand  que  sa  partie,  ou  au  contraire,  parce 
que  Dieu  contenant  emmemment  toutes  les  realites  des  quantites 
et  leurs  rapports,  ce  rapport  se  trouve  fonde  dans  ^Essence  /m- 
muable  et  Necessaire  de  Dieu  meme;  de  meme  nous  concevons 
clairement,  qu'il  ne  depend  pas  d'une  institution  libre  de  Dieu, 
d'imposer  k  une  creature  raisonnable  1'obligation  de  preferer  ce 
qui  est  preferable  k  ce  qui  ne  Test  pas,  ou  au  contraire;  parce 
que  Dieu  contenant  tous  les  rapports  de  perfection,  par  k-squels 
chaque  chose  est  d'autant  plus  preferable  a  Tautre  qu'elle 
participe  plus  de  la  plenitude  de  Petre,  et  Dieu  s'aimant  lui- 
meme  invinciblement,  et  chaque  chose  k  proportion  qu'elle  a 
plus  de  rapport  k  Lui  de  qui  seul  vient  tout  1'etre,  et  par  conse- 
quent toute  Pamabilite, — ces  rapports  de  perfection  sow*  fondcs 
dans  ^essence  meme  de  Dieu :  (A)  et  la  preference  qu'on  doit  a  ce 
qui  est  preferable,  est  fondee  sur  la  Saintete  meme  de  Dieu,  qui 


464  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

consiste  en  ce  que  Dieu  aime  et  veut,  que  chaque  chose  soit 
aimee  ou  preferee,  a  proportion  qu'elle  est  aimable  et  preferable. 
Or  cet  ordre,  dans  lequel  Dieu  connoit  et  aime  toute  chose  a 

Eroportion  qu'elle  est  plus  ou  moins  aimable,  est  ce  qu'on  appelle 
i  Loi  Eternelle,  qui  n'est  autre  que  Sa  Sagesse  et  Sa  Saintete. 
En  un  mot  Dieu  connoit  necessairement  et  immuablement  tout 
1'ordre,  et  tous  les  degres  de  perfection  ;  Son  Amour,  ou  Sa  Yolonte 
suit  necessairement  1'ordre  de  Ses  Connoissances ;  done  il  y  a 
un  certain  ordre  que  la  Yolonte  de  Dieu  suit  necessairement  et 
immuablement ;  et  c'est  cet  ordre  qu'on  appelle  la  Loi  Eternelle. 
Et  c'est  en  ce  sens  que  David,  parlant  a  Dieu,  dit:  Lex  tua 
Yeritas.  Yotre  Loi  est  verite  ;  les  rapports  de  perfection,  qui  ne 
sont  pas  moins  verites  immuables  que  les  rapports  ou  verites 
mathe'matiques,  sont  Yotre  Loi ;  parce  que  Yotre  Amour  suit 
necessairement  1'ordre  de  Yotre  Connoissance,  et  que  Fordre  de 
Yotre  Connoissance  est  exactement  conforme  a  V ordre  des  choses 
elles-memes. 

"  De  1&  il  suit,  que  c'est  pour  n'avoir  pas  assez  bien  medite 
cette  matiere,  ni  assez  bien  medite  par  consequent  le  fbndement 
du  Droit  Naturel,  que  Pufendorff(Droit  de  la  Nature,  et  des  Gens, 
lib.  i.  ch.  2,  §  6)  ne  craint  pas  d'avancer,  qu'il  lui  semble,  que 
'  ceux  qui  admettent  pour  fondement  de  la  moralite  des  actions 
'  humaines  je  ne  sais  quelle  regie  eternelle,  independante  de  Vlnsti- 
( tution  Divine,  associent  a  Dieu  manifestement  un  principe  exterieur 
'  coeternel,  qu'il  a  du  suivre  necessairement  dans  la  determination 
'  des  qualites  essentielles  et  distinctives  de  chaque  chose.  (B.) 
'  D'ailleurs  on  convient  generalement,  que  Dieu  a  cree  1'homme, 
'  comme  tout  lereste  du  monde,  avec  une  Yolonte  souverainement 
f  Libre ;  d'ou  il  s'ensuit,  qu'il  dependoit  absolument  de  Son  bon 
'  Plaisir  de  donner  a  Phomme,  en  le  creant,  telle  nature  qu'il 
( jugeroit  a  propos.  Comment  done  les  actions  humaines  pour- 
f  roient-elles  avoir  quelque  propriete  qui  resultat  d'une  necessite 
'  interne  et  absolue,  independamment  de  ^Institution  Divine,  et  du 
(  bon  Plaisir  de  cet  Etre  Souverain  ? ' 

<{  On  voit  premierement,  que  quoique  nous  disions,  que 
Dieu  a  du  suivre  necessairement  1'ordre  et  la  Loi  Eternelle,  cette 
Loi  Eternelle  n'est  pas  un  principe  exterieur  qu'on  associe  a  Dieu ; 
cette  Loi  Eternelle  resulte  de  la  perfection  rneme  de  PEtre  Divin, 
qui  connoit  les  choses  idles  quelles  sont,  et  dont  1' Amour  est 
essentiellement  conforme  a  V ordre  des  Ses  Connoissances.  Et  certaine- 
ment,  sans  cette  Loi  Eternelle,  comment  pourroit-on  assurer,  que 
Dieu  ne  peut  mentir,  qu'il  ne  peut  tromper  les  hommes  ?  S .  Paul  et 
1'Ecriture  associent  done  a  Dieu  un  principe  exterieur,  en  assurant 
que  Dieu  ne  peut  mentir  ?  * 

*  " Devoirs,"  &c.  liv.  i.  chap.  ii.  sec.  8,  note  1.     "Dieu  Iui-m6me,  qui  n'a 
esoin  de  nous,  est  sujet  a  la  glorieuse  necessite  de  ne  pouvoir  rien  prescrire 


CATHOLIC  AUTHOBITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    465 

"  On  voit  en  second  lieu,  que  la  raison  que  Pauteur  apporte 
pour  soutenir  son  opinion,  vient  aussi  de  ce  qu'il  n'avoit  pas  assez 
bien  medite  les  raisonnements  metaphysiques.  II  est  vrai,  qu'on 
convient  generalement,  que  Dieu  a  cree  Phomme,  comme  tout 
le  reste  du  monde,  avec  une  Volonte  souverainement  Libre :  mais 
aussi  on  convient  generalement,  que  suppose  que  Dieu  se  soit 
librement  determine  &  creer  le  monde,  il  ne  Lui  a  pas  did  libre  de 
la  cre'er  d'une  maniere  indigne  de  Soi,  ou  qui  ne  fut  pas  conforuie 
&  cet  ordre,  ou  &  cette  Loi  Eternelle,  fondee  sur  Sa  Sagesse  et  sur 
Sa  Saintete.  Ce  que  Pauteur  ajoute,  est  encore  plus  frivole; 
qu'il  dependoit  du  bon  Plaisir  de  Dieu,  de  donner  &  1'homme  en  le 
creant  telle  nature  qu'Il  jugeroit  &  propos.  Je  crois  que  Pauteur 
a  voulu  dire,  que  Dieu,  au  lieu  de  creer  un  homme,  pouvoit  creer 
un  oiseau,  ou  un  animal  de  toute  autre  nature,  &  qui  on  auroit 
donne  le  noin  d'homme;  et  alors  ce  qu'il  dit  est  tout-a-fait  hors 
de  propos.  Mais  suppose  que  Dieu  ait  voulu  creer  librement 
une  nature  telle  que  celle  que  nous  appellons  homme ;  II  n'a  pas 
certainement  pu  lui  donner  une  autre  nature,  ni  lui  donner  par 
une  institution  libre  une  autre  loi  naturelle.  II  ne  pouvoit  faire 
que  Vhomme  connut  avec  Evidence,  que  la  partie  fut  plus  grande  que 
le  tout,  ou  que  la  creature  fut  preferable  au  Crdateur ;  et  par  con- 
sequent il  ne  pouvoit  faire  que  Vhomme  jugeat  de  devoir  pre'fe'rer  la 
creature  au  Crdateur,  et  que  sa  preference  ensuite  de  ce  jugement  fut 
juste  et  honnete. 

"  De  Ik  il  suit,  que  c'est  une  bien  miserable  objection  que 
celle  que  Pauteur  et  plusieurs  autres  tirent  du  physique  des 
actions  humaines,  pour  prouver  qu'elles  sont  de  leur  nature 
indifferentes,  et  que  les  betes  les  font  sans  peche.  Je  ne  crois 
pas  qu'il  y  aie  jamais  eu  au  monde  un  homme  si  peu  sense,  qui 
voulut  que  le  mouvement  physique,  ou  Pacte  exterieur,  par  lequel 
on  tue  un  homme  ou  qu'on  lui  vole  son  bien,  fut  un  peche. 
Quand  on  dit  que  les  actions  de  l'homme  sont  souvent  honnetes 
ou  deshonnetes  par  elles-memes,  on  Pen  tend  du  consentement  de 
la  volonte,  et  de  la  preference  qu'elle  donne  &  un  motif  plutot 
qu'a  un  autre.  Or  on  eut  raison  d'assurer,  que  certains  consente- 
ments  ou  preferences  de  la  volonte  sont  dereglees  de  leur  nature ; 
comme  quand  elle  pref£re  la  creature  au  Createur,  &c.  C'est 
done  bien  mal  a  propos,  que  Pufendorff  reprend  Grotius  (ibid, 
p.  32)  pour  avoir  mis  au  rang  '  des  choses,  auxquelles  la  Puis- 
sance Divine  ne  s^tend  point,  a  cause  qu'elles  impliquent  contra- 
diction, la  malice  de  certaines  actions  humaines;  qui  sont  essen- 


centre  les  regies  inviolables  de  1'ordre,  qui  ne  sont  autre  chose  qu'une 
emanation  de  Ses  Perfections  Infinies,  une  suite  de  la  nature  des  choses 
dont  il  est  lui-meme  1'Auteur  ;  de  sorte  qu'Il  Se  dementiroit,  s'll  agissoit 
autrement."  (Author's  note.)  (C.) 


466  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

tiellement  mauvaises,  en  sorte  qu'il  n'est  pas  au  Pouvoir  de  Dieu 
meme  de  faire  quelles  ne  soient  pas  telles.' 

"II.  Principe. 

"  On  peut  appeller  Loi  Naturelle  la  connoissance  qu'on  a  de  la 
difference  du  juste  et  de  1'injuste,  de  1'honnete  et  du  deshonnete. 

ff  Explication. 

"La  meme  lumiere,  qui  nous  fait  connoitre  qu'une  action  est 
juste  ou  injuste,  honnete  ou  deshonnete,  nous  fait  aussi  connoitre 
que  nous  devons  faire  ce  qui  est  juste,  et  nous  abstenir  de  ce  qui 
est  injuste;  c'est-a-dire,  que  des  que  nous  connoissons  qu'une  pre- 
ference est  juste  ou  injuste,  nous  ne  pouvons  ignorer  notre  devoir 
par  rapport  a  cette  preference.  Done  cette  connoissance  de  la 
difference  du  juste  et  de  1'injuste,  peut  et  doit  servir  de  regie  aux 
actions  humaines ;  on  peut  done  lui  donner  le  nom  de  loi.  Or 
cette  loi  est  assurement  naturelle,*  et  non  positive :  parce  qu'elle  ne 
depend  pas  de  Pinstitution  libre  et  positive  d'un  legislateur ;  mais 
qu'elle  estfondee  sur  la  connoissance  de  certains  rapports  naturels  ou 
essentiels  des  choses  memes.  On  pourroit  disputer  si  on  doit  donner 
le  nom  de  loi  a  une  regie,  quand  on  ne  sait  pas  qu'elle  ait  etd  donne'e 
par  un  Ugidateur  Ugitime;  mais  ce  seroit  une  dispute  de  nom:  il 
suffit  que  cette  regie  puisse  imposer  une  veritable  obligation  de  la 
suivre  (D).  Or  la  connoissance  du  juste  et  de  1'injuste  impose  a 
tous  les  hommes  une  vraie  obligation  de  faire  ce  qui  est  juste,  et 
de  s'abstenir  de  ce  qui  est  injuste,  sans  attendre  la  connoissance 
explicite  de  la  volonte  d'un  Ugislateur.  Ceux  qui  ne  veulent  pas 
que  la  connoissance  du  juste  et  de  1'injuste  suffise  pour  imposer 
une  obligation  proprement  dite,  sont  fort  embarrasses  de  trouver  le 
fondement  de  Fobligation  ou  sont  les  hommes,  d'obeir  a  la  Loi 

Naturelle." 

****** 

"  J'ai  dit  que  la  connoissance  des  verites  fondees  sur  les 
rapports  de  perfection  impose  un  veritable  devoir,  et  par  conse- 
quent une  obligation  de  s'y  conformer.  Pour  eclaircir  cette  ques- 
tion qui  regarde  le  fondement  de  Pobligation,  et  qui  est  fort  subtile 
et  fort  delicate,  il  faut  dire  deux  rnots  du  sentiment  oppose. 
Plusieurs  celebres  auteurs  entre  les  Protestants,  outre  Pufen- 

*  "  C'est  ainsi  que  Ciceron  definit  la  loi  naturelle  :  '  Lex  est  ratio  insita 
in  naturS,,  quae  jubet  ea  quae  facienda  sunt,  prohibetque  contraria.'  Fausse 
est  par  consequent  la  maxime  de  M.  Hobbes  ('Fond  de  la  Politiq.'  ch.  12, 
ar.  1)  congue  en  ces  termes  :  '  Mais  entre  les  opinions  qui  disposent  a  la 

*  sedition,  1'une  des  principalles  est  celle-ci,  qu'il  appartient  a  chaque  par- 

*  ticulier  de  juger  ou  de  ce  qui  est  bien,  ou  de  ce  qui  est  mal,'  &c.     Voyez 
le  reste  de  1'article.    La  confutation  en  est  aisee."    (Author's  note.) 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    467 

dorff  et  Barbeyrac,  pretendent  qu'il  n'y  a  point  do  veritable 
obligation  de  faire  ou  d'omettre  une  action,  sans  la  volontt  on  la 
loi  (Tun  Ugislateur  Ugitime,  qui  la  commande  on  qui  la  detende. 
Or  pour  faire  une  loi  parfaite  qui  impose  une  obligation  parfuite, 
ils  veulent  que  cette  loi  ait  deux  parties ;  Pune  qui  enseigne  ce 
que  Pon  doit  faire,  Pautre  qui  menace  de  la  peine  qu'on  encourra 
si  on  ose  la  violer. 

"  1.  De  1&  il  s'ensuivroit,  qu'on  ne  seroit  oblige*  d'obe*ir 
h  la  loi  que  par  la  crainte  des  peines  ;  puisque  sans  cette  crainte 
qui  repond  &  la  partie  coactive  de  la  loi,  ou  sans  la  partie  coactive 
dont  Faction  ne  tend  qu'a  inspirer  la  crainte,  il  n'y  a  point  de  loi 
parfaite. 

"  2.  Je  dois  remarquer  une  contradiction,  dans  laquelle  ils 
tombent  a  ce  sujet.  Ils  avouent  qu'un  Prince,  depouille  de  son 
autorite,  peut  faire  une  loi  qui  oblige :  cependant  la  loi  d'un  tel 
Prince  ne  peut  contenir  que  la  partie  directive ;  car  dans  cette 
supposition  la  partie  coactive  ne  sauroit  avoir  d'effet. 

"  3.  Mais  si  la  loi  d'un  Prince  depouille  de  son  autorite*,  qui 
ne  conserve  que  la  partie  directive,  ne  laisse  pas  que  d'imposer 
une  veritable  obligation ;  si  les  gens  de  bien,  independamment  de 
la  crainte,  se  croient  obliges  de  s'y  soumettre  ;—  sur  quoi  est  fondee 
cette  obligation,  si  non  sur  les  lumieres  naturelles  de  la  Raison, 
qui  font  voir  le  rapport  de  convenance  qu'il  y  a  eu  ce  qu'un  sujet 
obeisse  k  son  superieur  ? 

"  D'ailleurs  dans  la  societe  civile  il  peut  arriver,  qu'un 
homme  aime  mieux  subir  la  peine  infligee  par  la  loi,  une  amende 
pecuniaire  par  exemple,  que  d'observer  cette  loi ;  il  peut  me  me 
quelquefois,  comme  il  arrive  aux  coritrebandiers,  si  bien  prendre 
ses  mesures,  qu'il  ne  sera  pas  decouvert,  ou  qu'il  ne  craindra 
aucunement  d'etre  pris.  Alors  la  partie  coactive  de  la  loi  n'a 
aucune  force  par  rapport  a  cet  homme.  Est-il  done  absous  de 
1'obligation  de  s'y  soumettre  ?  C'est  ce  qu'on  n'oseroit  dire. 
C'est  done  en  virtu  de  la  partie  directive;  c'est  done  parce 
qu'il  juge  qu'il  est  juste  de  se  soumettre  &  une  loi  legitime, 
meme  sans  y  etre  force;  et  il  juge  que  cela  est  juste,  &  cause  de 
ce  rapport  de  convenance  qu'il  y  decouvre,  c'est-a-dire  en  d'autres 
termes,  k  cause  de  la  conformite  de  cet  acte  avec  les  lumieres  de 
sa  raison.  Puis  done  que  cette  conformite,  &c.,  est  la  regie  ou  le 
fondement  de  1'obligation  oil  Ton  se  reconnoit  d'obeir  &  un 
superieur,  on  ne  sauroit  douter  que  cette  conformit^  ne  soit  le 
premier  fondement  de  toute  obligation;  car  il  est  clair,  que  ce 
n'est  qu'en  virtu  de  ^obligation  gtntrale  de  se  conformer  aux 
lumikres  de  la  droite  Raison,  qu'on  vient  k  connoitre  Pobligation 
particuliere  d'obeir  a  un  superieur.  Car  la  connoissance  de  cette 
obligation  particuliere  suppose  necessairement  ces  deux  con- 
noissances  plus  generales :  Pune,  que  c'est  une  chose  conforme  a 


468  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

la  droite  Raison  et  convenable,  de  se  soumettre  h  un  superieur ; 
Pautre,  quon  doitfaire  ce  quon  connoit  conforme  a  la  droite  Raison. 
Ces  deux  connoissances  sont  comme  les  deux  premisses  d'un 
syllogisme,  dont  la  connoissance  de  1'obligation  de  se  soumettre  a 
la  loi  d'un  superieur  est  une  consequence  necessaire.  (E) 

"  Un  sujet  obeit  a  son  Prince  legitime  depouille  de  son  autorite, 
qui  ne  sauroit  lui  faire  du  mal.  Un  autre  obeit  a  un  brigand, 
entre  les  mains  de  qu'il  est  tombe,  par  la  crainte  des  supplices, 
quoique  ce  brigand  n'ait  aucune  superiorite  legitime  sur  lui. 
Dans  le  premier  cas  il  y  a  une  obligation  d'obeir ;  dans  le  second 
il  n'y  en  a  point,  des  qu'on  peut  desobeir  en  cachette,  pour  ne 
pas  s'exposer  a  la  mort.  Qu'on  en  donne  d'autre  raison  que  celle 
que  nous  avons  dit.  Cela  fait  voir,  que  1'autorite  d'infliger  des 
peines  n'accompagne  pas  toujours  la  superiorite  legitime.  Ce 
sont  done  les  lumieres  de  la  Raison,  qui  font  connoitre  la  su- 
periorite legitime,  et  1'obligation  de  s'y  soumettre. 

"  Quand  on  connoit  une  verite  fonde  sur  les  rapports  de  per- 
fection, par  ex.  que  la  vie  de  son  ami  est  preferable  a  celle 
d'une  bete,  on  connoit  aussi  le  rapport  de  convenance  qu'il  y  a  a 
preferer  la  vie  de  cet  ami  a  celle  de  la  bete.  Or  ce  rapport  de 
convenance  est  aussi  une  verite,  qu'on  exprime  en  ces  termes:  fil 
convient,  ou  il  faut,  preferer  la  vie  d'un  ami  a  celle  d'une  bete  ; 
quand  on  voit  un  ami  pret  a  etre  dechire  par  une  bete  qui  s'est 
jetee  sur  lui,  il  ne  faut  pas  balancer  a  conserver  la  vie  de  cet 
ami  au  depens  de  celle  de  la  bete,  si  on  peut  la  tuer.'  La  con- 
noissance de  cette  vdritd  fait  done  naitre  dans  V esprit  un  jugement 
aussi  certain  de  ce  qu'il  faut  faire  en  cette  occasion,  que  la  connois- 
sance d'une  vdritd  de  gdometrie  fait  naitre  un  jugement  certain  de  ce 
qu'il  faut  affirmer  ou  nier.  Or  comme  le  jugement  certain  en 
fait  de  speculation  est  la  regie  de  ce  qu'on  doit  affirmer  ou  nier, — 
le  jugement  certain  en  fait  d'action,  c'est-a-dire  de  ce  qu'il  faut 
faire  ou  ne  pas  faire,  est  la  regie  de  ces  memes  actions.  Or 
comme  on  appelle  verite  ou  faussete,  ce  qui  est  conforme  ou 
contraire  a  la  regie  en  fait  de  speculation, — on  appelle  bon  ou 
mauvais,  ce  qui  est  conforme  ou  oppose  a  la  regie  des  actions ; 
la  lumiere  la  plus  simple  de  la  verite  fait  connoitre,  que  chaque 
chose,  pour  etre  dans  1'ordre  et  n'etre  pas  fautive,  doit  etre  con- 
forme  a  sa  regie.  L'esprit  ne  peut  done  connoitre  la  regie  de  ses 
actions,  sans  connoitre  aussi  qu'il  doit  les  y  conformer.  ( Est  autem 
vitium  primum  animse  rational  is  voluntas  ea  faciendi,  qua?  vetat 
summa  et  intima  veritas,'  dit  S.  Augustin.  (Lib.  de  vera  Relig., 
cap.  19.)  Ce  fondement  de  1'obligation  est  si  naturel,  que  les 
paiens  memes,  qui  avoient  aussi  bien  que  les  modernes  1'idee  de 
1'obligation  (puisque  tout  le  monde  sait  ce  que  Jest  que  P obligation, 
quoique  tout  le  monde  ne  connoisse  peut  etre  pas  les  fondements,) 
n'en  ont  pas  pense  autrement.  Quoiqu'un  crime  put  etre  eternelle- 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    469 

ment  cache  aux  dieux  et  aux  hommes,  on  ne  devroit  pas  le 
commettre,  disoient-ils ;  car  en  evitant  tout  autre  chatiment,  ou 
ne  pourroit  eviter  les  reproches  de  la  conscience.  Or  ce  reproche 
de  la  conscience  ne  consiste  qu'en  ce  que  lesprit  connoit  qifil 
manque  a  ce  qu'il  doit,  lorsqu'il  agit  contre  ce  qu'il  connoit  etre  la 
regie  de  ses  actions.  C'est  done  sur  la  conformite  &  cette  regie 
qu'est  fondee  Pobligation.  (F.)  C'est  en  ce  sens,  que  S.  Paul  dit 
(Ep.  ad  Rom.)  '  Qui  sine  lege  peccaverunt,  sine  lege  peribunt.' 
Comment  done  le  traducteur  de  Pufendorff  a-t-il  pu  pretendre, 
pour  excuser  en  quelque  maniere  Ferreur  que  nous  avons  combattu 
ci-dessus,  que  quoique  independamment  de  la  Volonte'  de  Dieu  il  ne 
soit  pas  aussi  beau*  de  manquer  a  sa  parole,  que  de  la  tenir,  &c., 
cela  ne  suffit  pas  pour  imposer  une  obligation  proprement  aussi 
nomme'e  ? 

"III.    Principe. 

"La  connoissance  du juste  et  de  Pinjuste  ne  depend  pas  d'une 
connoissance  explicite  de  la  Volonte  de  Dieu:  en  sorte  qu'on  ne 
puisse  juger  qu'une  chose  est  juste  et  honn6te,  que  parce  qu'on 
sait  que  Dieu  la  commande ;  et  qu'au  contraire  elle  n'est  injuste 
et  deshonnete,  que  parce  qu'on  sait  que  Dieu  la  defend. 

"  Explication. 

"Le  traducteur  de  Pufendorff  (lib.  ii.  c.  2,  §  6,  n.  1)  avoue 
qu'il  y  a  des  actes  qui  par  eux-memes  ne  conviennent  a  Dieu  en 
aucune  maniere ;  c'est-k-dire,  dont  II  ne  sauroit  etre  susceptible 
sans  deroger  &  Ses  Perfections,  et  sans  se  contredire  Lui-meme*:  et 
je  crois  que  c'est  une  verite,  dont  on  ne  sauroit  douter,  pour  peu 
qu'on  ait  de  bon  sens  et  de  religion.  Or  ce  qui  nous  porte  & 
ne  pas  attribuer  &  Dieu  ces  sortes  d' actes,  c'est  par  ce  que  nous 
les  connoissons  manifestement  contraires  aux  notions  communes  que 
nous  avons  de  la  Bontd,  et  de  la  Justice,  fyc.,  que  nous  savons  etre  des 
attributs  de  la  Divinite'.  Done  il  y  a  des  choses  que  nous  con- 
noissons par  elles-memes  honnetes  et  ddshonnetes,  justes  et  injustes, 
inddpendamment  d  yune  connoissance  explicite  de  la  Volonte'  de  Dieu. 
C'est  ce  que  S.  Paul  explique  clairement.  (Ep.  ad  Rom.  cap.  ii.); 
'  Quum  enim  gentes  quse  legem  non  habent,  naturaliter  ea  quae 
legis  sunt  faciunt,  ejusmodi  legem  non  habentes,  ipsi  sibi  sunt 
lex :  qui  ostendunt  opus  legis  scriptum  in  cordibus  suis ;  testi- 
monium  reddente  illis  conscientia  ipsorum,  et  inter  se  invicein 
cogitationibus  accusantibus  et  defendentibus.'  De  1^,  suit  le 

*  Pufendorff  (" Devoirs,"  &c.  liv.  i.  chap.  ii.  §  1)  dit :  "  L'ordre  et  la  beaute 
de  la  societe  humaine  demandoit  necessairement,  qu'il  y  eut  quelque  rdgle, 
a  laquelle  on  fut  tenu  de  se  conformer."  Lors  done,  qu'on  connoit  une 
regie  qui  dirige  les  actions  d'une  maniere  conforme  £  cet  ordre,  et  a  cette 
beauttj,  pourquoi  cette  regie  ne  sera-t-elle  pas  une  loi,  comme  1'auteur  la 
nomme  meme  au  §  2  ?  (Author^  note.) 


470  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

"  IV.  Principe. 

"  Au  contraire,  sans  une  expresse  revelation,  on  ne  pent  con- 
noitre,  qu'une  telle  action  soit  commandee  ou  defendue  par  Dieu, 
que  parce  qu'on  sait  qiielle  est  de  soi  bonne,  ou  mauvaise. 

<f  Explication. 

"  Le  traducteur  de  Pufendorff,  qui  (malgrd  le  passage  de 
I'Apotre  que  nous  avons  cite  ci-dessus)  ne  reconnoit  pour  fond e- 
ment  de  I  'obligation  que  la  Volonte'  de  Dieu ;  dit,  que  cette  Volonte 
se  decouvre  &  nous  par  la  convenance  de  telles  ou  telles  actions 
avec  la  nature  humaine.  Mais  comme  il  n'explique  point  en 
quoi  il  fait  consister  cette  convenance,  on  est  en  droit  de  lui  re- 
pondre,  que  ce  qu'il  avance  ne  signifie  rien.  II  ne  sauroit  sim- 
plement  entendre,  par  cette  convenance,  les  actions  qui  peuvent 
tourner  a  Favantage  et  au  bonheur  de  1'homme;  puisque  son 
auteur  avoue  qu'il  y  en  a  plusieurs  qui  ne  sont  pas  moralement 
bonnes :  comme  on  peut  le  prouver  par  la  connoissance  des  arts, 
qui  n'est  pas  moralement  bonne,  (car  on  n'est  pas  d'autant  plus 
honnete  liomme  qu'on  est  grand  geometre)  et  qui  pourtant  con- 
tribue  infiniment  a  Pavantage  de  la  societe.  Qu'est-ce  done  que 
c'est  cette  convenance  avec  la  nature  humaine  ?  On  ne  peut 
Pexpliquer  autrement,  si  non  que  la  nature  humaine  etant  une 
nature  raisonnable,  elle  connoit,  entre  les  choses  qui  se  presentent, 
entre  les  fins  qu'elle  se  peut  proposer  en  agissant,  entre  les  motifs 
qui  la  meuvent,  certains  rapports  de  perfection,  par  lesquels  elle 
connoit  qu'une  telle  action  est  preferable  a  une  autre  action,  et 
qu'il  y  a  un  rapport  de  convenance  a  preferer  ce  qui  est  pre- 
fe'rable.  Mais  alors  c'est  Pidee  de  Pordre  qui  est  la  regie  de  nos 
actions,  et  qui  suffit  pour  obliger  meme  a  agir  ceux  que  Von  suppose 
n'avoir  aucune  ide'e  de  Dieu.  (G)  Nous  avons  done  une  idee  du 
juste  et  de  Pinjuste,  de  Phonnete  et  du  deshonnete,  inddpendam- 
ment  de  la  connoissance  explicite  de  la  VolonU  de  Dieu.  Ce  n'est 
que  par  cette  idee,  que  nous  jugeons,  que  c'est  la  Volonte  de 
Dieu  qu'on  fasse  du  bien  a  ceux  qui  nous  en  font ;  sans  cette  idee, 
comment  les  paiens,  qui  n'avoient  aucune  expresse  revelation  de 
la  Volonte  de  Dieu,  auroient-ils  pu  dormer  de  si  beaux  preceptes 
de  morale;  distinguer  Putile  de  Phonnete;  enseigner  qu'on  doit 
'  omnem  cruciatum  perferre,  intolerabili  dolore  lacerari,  potius 
quam  officium  prodere  aut  fidem ; '  et  reconnoitre  que  cela  etoit 
conforme  a  la  Volonte  de  PEtre  Souverain,  essentiellement  Juste, 
Bon,  et  Saint  ?  II  faut  done  convenir  qu'il  j  a  des  choses,  qui 
sont  f  malse,  quia  prohibitae : '  et  qu'il  y  en  a  d'autres,  qui  sont 
*  prohibits,  quia  malse.' " — Morale  Chretienne  de  Card.  Gerdil, 
pp.  44-49,  51-57,  vol.  ii.  of  the  Roman  edition  of  his  works. 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    471 

The  more  carefully  you  study  this  passage,  the  more 
undeniable  you  will  find  it,  that  Gerdil's  doctrine,  on 
the  relation  between  God  and  Moral  Truth,  is  the  very 
doctrine  which  we  ourselves  follow. 

Thus  (1.)  in  the  passages  which  we  have  marked 
with  the  letters  D  and  G,  he  expressly  states  that  there 
may  be  real  moral  obligation,  which  in  no  way  springs 
from  the  command  of  a  legitimate  superior ;  nay  that 
those  are  morally  obliged  by  it,  whom  we  may  'suppose 
to  have  no  idea  of  God  at  all.' 

Then  (2.)  in  that  passage,  which  we  have  marked 
at  its  conclusion  with  the  letter  E,  he  argues  against  a 
certain  position,  which  he  ascribes  to  various  Protestant 
authors :  viz.  that  '  there  can  be  no  true  obligation, 
without  the  will  or  law  of  a  legitimate  superior.'  You 
see,  he  ignores  the  very  existence  of  any  Catholics  who 
hold  this  position  ;  and  he  ascribes  it  to  none  except 
Protestants. 

His  reasoning  against  it  is  very  forcible.  He  says 
to  his  opponents  :  '  Either  you  hold  that  the  mere  com- 
'mand  of  a  legitimate  superior  suffices  to  constitute 
'  obligation  ;  or  else  you  say  that  there  is  no  obligation, 
'  except  where  the  superior  adds  to  his  command  the 
'  threat  of  punishment  on  those  who  disobey.  If  you 
'choose  the  latter  alternative,  various  monstrous  con- 
'  sequences  will  result ;  and  indeed  you  will  not  se- 
'riously  cleave  to  this  alternative.  But  if  you  take 
'the  former  alternative,  observe  the  principle  which 
'you  assume.  Why  are  you  under  the  moral  obli- 
gation of  obeying  a  legitimate  superior?  Because 
4  right  Reason  declares  that  such  obligation  exists. 
'  The  particular  obligation  then  of  obeying  a  legitimate 
'  superior,  is  but  the  result  of  a  more  general  obliga- 
'  tion  ;  the  obligation  viz.  of  conforming  your  conduct 
'to  the  declarations  of  right  Reason.  Independently 
'  therefore  of  any  command  issued  by  a  superior,  there 
'exists  an  antecedent  obligation,  of  conforming  your- 
*  selves  to  the  declarations  of  right  reason.7 

Again :  in  the  earlier  passage  which  we  have  marked 
B,  he   refutes   a   charge   brought   by   the   Protestant 


472  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Pufendorff,  against  those  who  admit,  as  the  foundation 
of  morality,    a   certain  Eternal  Rule  independent   of 
Divine    Institution.       He    considers    this   charge    of 
Pufendorff  as   a    charge    brought    against    the    very 
doctrine  which  he  (Gerdil)  himself  holds. 

(3.)  In  the  passage  marked  D,  Gerdil  says  that  a 
*  knowledge  of  the  difference  between  just  and  unjust 
may  and  ought  to  serve  as  a  Rule  of  human  actions' 
He  adds,  that  whether  such  a  Rule  should  or  should 
not  be  called  a  Law,  is  a  mere  question  of  words:  and 
he  himself  throughout  gives  to  it  that  name.  For 
myself,  I  have  avoided  doing  so  ;  that  I  may  exactly 
conform  to  that  mode  of  expression,  which  Suarez 
regards  as  technically  correct. 

(4.)  In  the  passage,  which  we  have  marked  A  at 
its  conclusion,  Gerdil  has  spoken  of  certain  '  rapports 
de  perfection,'  which  are  c  autant  immuables  que  ceux 
de  quantite.'  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  these  *  rap- 
ports,'— whatever  else  they  include, — include  the  in- 
trinsic moral  preferableness  of  this  act  over  that ;  and 
in  fact  the  whole  body  of  Moral  Truth.  The  author 
proceeds  to  say  of  these  '  rapports,'  that  God  '  contains 
'them  all;'  and  that  they  all  '  have  their  foundation  in 
Gods  very  Essence.''  He  holds  then  that  Moral  Truth 
is  identical  with  God. 

(5.)  We  are  now  able  to  understand  the  meaning  of 
his  note,  which  we  have  marked  C  ;  and  which  is  per- 
haps the  only  part  of  the  whole  passage  presenting  any 
kind  of  difficulty.  I  am  not  meaning  that  this  note 
can  possibly  bear  any  sense  adverse  to  ours  ;  but  merely 
that  it  is  somewhat  difficult  to  understand  it  at  all.  I 
take  its  sense  to  be  the  following. 

It  is  One  Perfection  of  God,  that  all  Moral  Truth 
is  identical  with  Him  ;  it  is  a  Second  (viz.  Wisdom  or 
Omniscience,)  that  in  Himself  He  sees  this  Truth;  it 
is  a  Third,  (viz.  Sanctity,)  that  He  approves  it.  This 
being  understood,  let  us  proceed  to  the  fact  of  creation. 
God  freely  endues  every  rational  creature  with  that 
nature,  and  places  him  under  those  circumstances,  which 
to  Him,  in  His  Providence,  may  seem  good.  From  this 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    473 

nature  and  these  circumstances,  certain  moral  obliga- 
tions and  preferablenesses  necessarily  arise,  according 
to  the  principles  of  Moral  Truth.  (See  n.  45,  p.  104.) 
(1.)  These  obligations  and  preferablenesses  are  the  4in 
violable  rules  of  order,'  spoken  of  by  Gerdil.  (2.)  They 
are  an  emanation  from  God's  Infinite  Perfections ;  being 
in  fact  the  application  to  particular  cases  of  those  moral 
principles,  which  are  identical  with  God  and  His  Per- 
fections. (3.)  They  result  necessarily  from  that  nature 
of  various  creatures,  whereof  God  is  the  Free  Author. 
(4.)  God  would  falsify  Himself,  if  He  issued  any  Com- 
mand at  variance  with  those  obligations  and  preferable- 
nesses,  which  are  the  necessary  results  of  His  own  Free 
Appointment. 

On  the  whole  then,  nothing  can  be  more  certain, 
than  that  Gerdil  holds  that  very  doctrine  which  we 
ourselves  follow,  on  the  relation  between  God  and 
Moral  Truth.  For  he  says,  (1)  that  Moral  Truth  is 
equally  necessary  with  Mathematical  ;  (2)  that  it 
possesses  obligatory  force,  independently  of  any  Com- 
mand given  by  a  Superior  ;  and  (3)  that  it  is  identical 
with  the  Essence  of  God.  These  are  the  very  points 
for  which  we  have  been  throughout  contending.* 

This  whole  passage  of  Gerdil's  is  so  profound  and 
so  pregnant,  that  I  am  sure  you  will  not  grudge  the 
length  of  time  which  we  have  devoted  to  its  examination. 

204.  I  will  next  give  specimens  of  the  treatment 
which  this  question  receives,  in  the  philosophical  com- 
pendia, or  other  school  treatises,  now  in  use  among 

*  Gerdil  fully  agrees  with  us,  I  say,  as  to  the  relation  between  God  and 
Moral  Truth.  For,  as  we  shall  have  to  urge  in  the  text  a  little  later,  ho 
regards  the  idea  of  'moral  obligation,'  not  merely  as  not  containing  the 
idea  of  God's  Command,  but  as  not  containing  the  idea  of  any  relation  to 
Him  at  all :  he  says  expressly  (G)  that  the  Natural  Rule  '  suffices  to  oblige 


even  those  whom  one  supposes  to  have  no  idea  of  God' 
the  character  of  this  idea  itself': 
appears  on  the  surface  at  least,  to  hold  a  doctrine  different  from  that  which 


At  the  same  time,  on  the  character  of  this  idea  itself1  moral  goodness,'  he 


we  advocate.     It  would  appear  from  his  language,  that  he  inclines  to  the 
theory,  mentioned  in  a  previous  note,  (see  p.  98)  which  would  explain 


'moral  goodness'  as  the ' preferring  what  is  preferable  ;'  or  'preferring  the 
'plus  £tre'  to  the  '  moins  6tre.' '  I  am  convinced  however,  as  I  there  im- 
plied, that  this  theory,  when  put  into  any  definite  and  intelligible  shape, 

rvor>/\m£ia     i/l^kffc'f  i/*ol      Tiri^Vi     rvni*ci   •     TMT       •fVio'f    *  m/M*al      rrrkrvrlnoca  *    ia     a     *  aim  nil* 


becomes  identical  with  ours ;  viz.  that  *  moral  goodness '  is  a  '  simple 
idea.' 


474  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Catholics.  Of  these,  no  one  enjoys  a  higher  reputa- 
tion, than  the  "  Pnelectiones  Philosophies  "  used  at  S. 
Sulpice ;  from  which  I  have  already,  in  my  notes,  made 
one  or  two  extracts.  Nothing  can  be  clearer  or  more 
convincing,  than  the  statements  which  we  here  find  : — 

ff  Thesis  Secunda — Discrimen  boni  et  mail  a  Voluntate  Dei, 
sive  Liber  a  sive  Necessarid,  non  est  repetendum. 

"  Prob.  prima  pars,  nempe  discrimen  istud  a  Liberd  Dei 
Voluntate  repeti  non  posse. —  Yel  enim  bonum  est  Deo  aliquid 
Tit  bonum  jubenti  obtemperare,  malum  vero  illi  resistere;  vel 
non.  Si  prius:  ergo  ante  Dei  Liberum  Decretum  boni  et  inali 
discrimen  instituens,  jam  bonum  et  malum  existebat ;  quod  ad- 
versariorum  hypothesi  prorsus  opponitur.  Si  posterius:  ergo 
bonum  et  malum  etiam  nunc  nullatenus  discriminantur.  Posito 
enim  quod  malum  non  sit  decreto  divino  resistere,  malum  igitur 
non  erit  agere  quod  prohibet  ut  malum;  porro  quod  sine  malo 
effici  potest,  malum  dici  nequit.  Ergo,  &c. 

"  Prob.  secunda  pars,  nempe  discrimen  boni  et  mali  a  Voluntate 
Dei  Necessarid  desumi  non  posse.  —  Etenim  Voluntas  Dei 
Necessaria  nihil  efficit,  nisi  juxta  Lumen  Idearum  Divinarum. 
Non  potuit  igitur  Deus  boni  et  mali  discrimen  statuere  per  suam 
Voluntatem  Necessariam,  nisi  illud  discrimen  jam  in  suis  ideis 
intellexisset.  Porro  quidquid  Deus  intelligit,  eo  ipso  realitatem 
habet ;  alioquin  veritate  carerent  Conceptus  Divini.  Ergo  Actus 
Voluntatis  Necessarian,  quo  Deus  discrimen  boni  et  mali  deter- 
minavisse  diceretur,  hoc  discrimen  jam  existens  supponeret.  Ergo," 
&c.— N.  1492,  pp.  75,  76  of  vol.  iii. 

205.  The  present  professor  of  Moral  Philosophy  at 
the  Roman  College,  is  Solimani ;  whose  authority  is 
very  highly  thought  of.  No  words  can  be  clearer,  no 
arguments  more  forcible,  than  those  which  he  adduces 
on  this  matter  :  — 

"Extare  aliquod  principium,  ex  quo  in  hominem  obligatio 
descendat,  ita  facile  demonstratur :  si  nullnm  est  principium,  ex 
quo  in  hominem  obligatio  derivetur,  homoplenam  habet  libertatem 
moralem.  Atqui  hoc  dici  nequit.  Etenim  si  homo  plena  polleret 
libertate  morali,  nullum  existeret  inter  actiones  humanas  morale 
discrimen ;  nullus  esset  moralis  ordo  in  humanis  actionibus  ex 
rationis  prsescripto  servandus  :  quamobrem,  quidquid  homo  ageret, 
nunquam  esset  laudandus,  nunquam  culpandus,  nunquam  pra3mio, 
nunquam  posna,  dignus  censendus.  Jam  vero  id  communi  homi- 
num  sensui  plane  repugnat.  Omnes  enim  inter  humanas  actiones 
morale  agnoscunt  discrimen;  omnes  contendunt  esse  ordinem 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    475 

quemdam  moralem  in  iisdcm  scrvandum.  Nemo  est,  vel  inter 
eos  qui  cupiditatibus  indulgere  solent,  qui  non  maxime  laudet 
hominem  corpori  animum  pra3ferentem,  pravis  aiiimi  motibus 
fraBiia  injicientem,  animo  excolendo  ac  perficiendo  intendentem, 
moclum  denique  atque  ordinem  in  dictis  factisque  suis  omnibus 
perpetuo  servantem ;  qui  non  culpet  eum,  qui  contrariam  huic 
vivendi  rationem  tenet.  Atque  hoec  quidem  laudare  aut  culpare 
homines  consueverunt,  non  modo  in  aliis,  sed  etiam  in  seipsis  licet 
inviti ;  internd  saltern  ilia  natures  voce,  quam  nullus  coinpescere 
penitus  posset. 

"  Conjice,  inquit  Genevensis  philosophus,  conjice  oculos  in 
omnes  late  populos,  versa  omnes  historias.  In  tarn  ingenti  religi- 
onum  plan&  crudelium  atque  absurdarum  multitudine,  in  tanta 
morum  atque  ingeniorum  varietate,  easdem  ubique  justitise  atque 
honestatis  ideas,  eadem  ubique  morum  principia,  easdem  ubique 
boni  et  mali  notiones,  sine  dnbio  deprehendes.  Vana  Ethnicorum 
superstitio  infandos  peperit  Deos,  qui,  scelestorum  more,  ineritam 
apud  nos  subituri  fuissent  poenam,  quique  in  exemplum  supremse 
cujusdam  felicitatis  non  aliud  pra3  se  ferebant,  quam  flagitia 
omnigena  admittenda,  pravasque  omnes  cupiditates  explendas. 
At  vitium,  sacra  licet  instructum  auctoritate,  ex  seternis  coeli 
sedibus  nequaquam  ad  nos  descendebat ;  nam  instinctus  quidam 
moralis  illud  ab  humanis  pectoribus  usque  repulsabat.  Homines 
eo  ipso  tempore,  quo  effhenatam  Jovis  libidinem  celebrabant, 
prceclaram  Xenocratis  pudicitiam  admirabantur.  Sancta  naturaB 
vox,  ipso  Deorum  exemplo  validior,  hominum  obsequia  in  terris 
sibi  vindicabat,  culpamque,  una  cum  iis  qui  ilia  inh'ciebantur,  in 
supernas  coeli  regiones  relegasse  quodammodo  videbatur.  Est 
igitur  in  intimis  animi  nostri  recessibus  innata  quccdam  justitice 
ac  virtutis  norma,  ex  qua,  contra  ipsa,  quibus  imbuti  sumus, 
pra3Judicia,  turn  nostras,  turn  aliorum  actiones,  rectas  vel  pravas 
esse  decernimus. 

"Cum  igitur  inter  humanas  actiones  aliquod  agnoscendum 
sit  morale  discrimen,  atque  homines  plena  careant  libertate 
morali, — agnoscendum  quoque  est  aliquod  principium,  ex  quo  ad 
eos  profluit  obligatio. 

" Hit jusmodi principium,  spectato  natures  ordine,  quemlibet  Volun" 
tatis  Dicince  prcecipientis  actum  antecedit.  Id  vero  hac  ratione 
ostendi  posse  arbitramur.  Principium  obligationis  non  est  aliud, 
quam  norma  qucedam,  obligandi  vi  prcedita.  At  vero  admittenda 
est  hiijusmodi  norma,  qua  quovis  Voluntatis  Divines  prcecipientis 
Actu  prior  sit  Etenim  qusedam  sunt  sudpte  naturd  moraliter 
bona;  quaBdam  vero  ita  moraliter  mala,  ut  bona  fieri  nullo  modo 
possint.  Atqui  rerum  natura  quovis  Rationis  ac  Voluntatis  Divinas 
actu  priores  sunt.  Neque  enim  res  ideb  tales  sunt,  quia  Deus 
cognoscit  ac  vult  eas  tales  esse ;  sed  contra  Deus  ideo  cognoscit  ac 


476  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

vult  res  esse  tales,  quia  tales  sudpte  naturd  sunt.  Ita  circulus 
non  ideo  radios  habet  inter  se  sequales,  quia  Deus  cognoscit 
ac  vult  in  circulo  earn  radiorum  aequalitatem ;  sed  contra  Deus 
ideo  cognoscit  ac  vult  illam  circuli  proprietatem,  quia  in  intimd 
circuli  naturd  necessario  ilia  Continetur.  Hinc  est  quod  Deus 
rebus  quidem  existentiam  dare  aut  recusare  pro  arbitrio  potest ; 
intimam  autem  naturam  mutare  nequit.  Quse  igitur,  in  genere 
morum,  bona  sunt  vel  mala,  sudpte  naturd  ea  talia  sunt,  ante 
quemlibet  Rationis  ac  Voluntatis  Divines  Actum.  Jam  vero  nihil 
est  bonum  aut  malum  in  genere  morum,  nisi  comparate  ad  aliquam 
normam,  quce  obligandi  virtute  sit  prcedita.  Nam  bonum  morale 
positum  est  in  conformitate  cum  norma  quadam  vere  obligante, 
malum  autem  morale  in  discrepantia  ab  eadem.  Normam,  inquam, 
vere  obligantem:  siquidem  quaacumque  alia  norma,  quantumvis 
sapiens  atque  honesta,  bonum  malumve  morale  metiri  nequit. 
Neque  enim  ideo  bene  agimus,  quia  consilium  hominis  pruden- 
tissimi  sequimur ;  neque,  si  non  sequimur,  idcirco  in  aliquam 
incidimus  culpam.  Nullum  igitur  bonum  aut  malum  morale 
concipi  animo  potest,  quin  simul  concipiatur  norma  obligandi  vi 
prcedita,  ad  quam  illud  necessario  refertur.  Atqui  nos  facile 
apprehendimus  bonum  malumque  in  genere  morum  suapte  natura 
tale,  ante  querncumque  Rationis  ac  Yoluntatis  Divinaa  Actum. 
Ergo  admittenda  est  aliqua  norma  virtute  obligandi  instructa,  quas 
omnem  Voluntatis  DivincB  prcecipientis  Actum  re  ipsd  prcecedat. 

"  Et  sane  antequam  Deus  quidquam  homini  praecipiat,  plenum 
profecto  habet  ac  perfectum  prsecipiendi  jus  ;  hujusmodi  enim  jus 
in  ipso  Creatoris  Providentissimi  Attribute  intime  continetur: 
ratio  autem  Creatoris  quocumque  prascipiendi  Actu  natura  prior 
est.  Atqui  pleno  illi  ac  perfecto  prsecipiendi  juri,  quo  pollet 
Deus,  plenum  a3que  ac  perfectum  obtemperandi  officium  neces- 
sario respondet  in  homirie.  Ha3c  enim  duo,  scilicet  jus  prseci- 
piendi  atque  obtemperandi  officium,  inter  se  cosequantur,  atque 
ita  sunt  invicem  connexa,  ut  alter um  sine  altero  intelligi  nullo 
pacto  possit.  Igitur  non  modo  illud  Dei  jus,  sed  etiam  hoc 
hominis  officium,  quocumque  Divino  Prcecepto  naturd prius  est.  Re- 
vera  quemadmodum  jus  illud  in  Attributo  Creatoris,  ita  officium 
hoc  in  ipsd  creaturce  conditione,  quse  quovis  Dei  Praacepto  per  se 
anterior  est,  intime  continetur.  Porro  hoc  officium,  quo  omnes 
homines  ad  parendum  Deo  perfecte  obstringuntur,  quid  qtiaaso 
aliud  est,  quam  vera  qucedam  ac  proprie  dicta  obligatio  ?  Igitur 
ante  quodvis  Dei  Prseceptum,  verd  concipitur  esse  obligato,  ac 
proinde  aliqua  etiam  verce  obligationis  effectrix  norma.  Sane  si 
antequam  Deus  quidpiam  nobis  prceciperet,  verd  nos  obligatione,  ad 
Ejus  Prcecepta  implenda,  minime  teneremur,  omnem  Illi  obedientiam 
jure  optimo  recusare  possemus ;  quemadmodum  omnem  homini  cui- 
libet  obedientiam  abnuere  meritb  possumus?  si}  antequam  is  aliquid 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    477 

jubeat,  verd  nos  obligatione  adjussa  ejus  facessenda  nequaquam  06- 
stringimur.n — Vol.  i.  pp.  175-178. 

206.  Dmowski  is  another  Roman  writer  and  one 
who  enjoys  a  great  name.  His  remarks  on  the  ques- 
tion before  us  shall  here  follow  : — 

"  Inter  antiques,  Epicure!  caeterique,  de  quibus  Tullius,  omnia 
voluptate  vel  utilitate  dimetientes,  boni  et  mali  moralis,  honesti 
et  inhonesti,  naturale  discrimen  sustulerunt.  Eorum  vestigia 
premunt  plerique  recentiores  impii ;  inter  quos  Spinosa,  et  Hob- 
besius,  (tarn  in  libro  de  Give  quam  in  Leviathan,)  ab  opinionibus 
arbitrariis  hominum,  vel  ab  arbitraria  legum  civilium  constitu- 
tione,  hoc  discriraen  repetii  Pufendorfius,  quern  sequuntur  Coc- 
cejus  et  ex  parte  Heineccius,  arbitratur  discrimen  hoc  a  liberd 
Dei  Voluntate  et  Lege  Positivd  pendere ;  ita  ut  tanquam  invention 
scholasticorum  respuat  differentiam  istam  moralium  actionura, 
scilicet,  quasdam  esse  praceptas  quia  sunt  bonce,  quasdam  ver6 
bonas  quia  prseceptse ;  et  item,  quasdam  esse  prohibitas  quia  malce, 
quasdam  vero  malas  quia  prohibita3.  Adversus  hos  omnes  gene- 
ratim  probabimus,  dari  intrinsecum  discrimen  inter  bonum  et 
malum  morale ;  quasdam  morales  actiones  esse  bonas  et  honestas, 
alias  malas  et  turpes,  citra  omnem  reflexionem  ad  ullam  legem 
humanam,  vel  etiam  Positivam  Divinam  a  Liberd  Dei  Voluntate 
manantem. 

"Ad  pleniorem  quaestionis  intelligentiam  advertendum  est, 
hypothesim  istam,  in  qua  statuitur,  aliquot  actiones  esse  ita  mo- 
raliter  bonas,  aliquas  ita  malas,  ut  etiamsi  per  impossibile  Deut 
illas  non  praciperet  has  non  vetaret,  adhuc  remanerent  tales,  con- 
venientes  scilicet  vel  repugnantes  naturali  rationi, —  esse  abstrac- 
tionem  mentalem,  prascindentem  a  Deo,  minime  autem  exclu- 
dentem  eum,  supponentemque  rationalem  naturam  sicuti  est 
conformatam.  Cum  absurdum  prorsus  videatur,  exclusa  omni 
absoluta  ac  immutabili  realitate  et  ordine  ej usque  fundamento, 
velle  adhuc  disputare  de  convenientia  et  discrepantia  aliquarum 
realitatum  et  ordinis,  easque  admittere ;  praesertim  quod  nee  con- 
cipi  valeant  humani  actus  ut  proprie  morales,  ante  ipsam  quoque 
rationem  spectatam  velut  naturalem  eorum  normam. 

"  Assertio,  sic  explicata,  pluribus  evincitur  argumentis.  Prim6, 
ex  supposita  doctorum  distinctione,  inter  actiones  prohibitas  quia 
malae,  et  malas  quia  prohibitae;  quse  distinctio  communi  sensu 
probatur,  cum  etiamsi  Divinam  aut  humanam  legem  cogitatione 
removeamus,  adhuc  unicuique  turpe  ac  malum  videri  debeat,  a  ra- 
tionis  reguld  rectoque  ordine  declinare,  honestum  ac  bonum  utrique 
suas  actiones  contbrmare;  bonum  enim  est  unicuique  enti,  juxta 
exigentiam  suse  naturae  agere;  et  in  homine  omnia  ordinantur 

I  I 


478  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

sub  ratione,  tanquam  sub  naturali  et  nobiliori  eorum  principio  dis- 
cernente.  2°.  Sublato  omni  intrinseco  discrimine  inter  bonum  et 
malum  morale,  tollitur  fundamentum  legis  humanse  vel  Positives 
Divina.  Quid  enim?  Estne  ex  se  bonum  iisdem  legibus  subjici 
et  malum  reluctari,  vel  neutrum  eorum  ?  Si  primum,  ergo  ante 
conceptum  harum  legum  datur  aliquid  ex  se  bonum  et  malum; 
si  alterum,  ergo  leges  illse,  utpote  indifferentes,  nullam  speciem 
boni  vel  mali  moralis  determinabunt  3°.  Plura  sunt  practica 
rationis  principia,  (e.g.  ( Deus  est  amandus/  f  nemo  Isedendus,'  &c.) 
qua  ex  sui  naturd  animum  ad  assensum  cogunt,  vimque  rationali- 
tati  inferunt;  non  secus  ac  ilia  theoretica,  e.g. '  idem  nequit  simul 
esse  et  non  esse/  totum  est  majus  sud  partej  &c.  Ergo  sicut  ex 
his,  ante  omnem  conventionem  et  pactionem,  qusedam  naturaliter 
vera  dimanant  judicia,  ita  ex  illis  qusedam  actiones  naturaliter  ac 
per  se  bonce  et  honesta,  iisdemque  oppositse  malse  et  inhonestse. 
4°.  Ut  arguit  S.  Thomas,  secundum  naturalem  ordinem  corpus 
hominis  est  propter  animam,  et  inferiores  virtutes  animae  propter 
rationem ;  est  igitur  naturaliter  rectum,  quod  sic  procuretur  ab 
homine  corpus  et  inferiores  vires  animse,  ut  ex  hoc  et  actus  ra- 
tionis et  bonum  ipsius  minime  impediatur ;  si  autem  secus  acci- 
deret,  erit  naturaliter  peccatum :  vinolentise  igitur,  comessationes,  et 
alia  inordinata,  quse  liberum  judicium  rationis  esse  non  sinunt,  sunt 
naturaliter  mala.  Deinde,  cum  homo  naturaliter  ordinetur  in  De.um 
sicut  in  Finem,  hinc  ea,  quse  ducunt  in  cognitionem  et  amorem 
Dei,  sunt  naturaliter  recta ;  quse  vero  e  contrario  se  habent,  sunt 
naturaliter  homini  mala.  Patet  igitur,  quod  bonum  et  malum  in 
humanis  actibus  non  solum  sunt  secundum  legis  positionem,  sed  etiam 
secundum  naturalem  ordinem.  5°.  Denique,  si  omne  discrimen 
boni  moralis  a  malo  penderet  a  sola  Positiv&  Divina  Voluntate  et 
lege,  potuisset  Deus  facere  ut  cuncta  quse  mine  sunt  moraliter 
bona  essent  mala,  et  vicissim  :  ideoque  potuisset  efficere  ut  bonum 
esset  Ipsum  odio  habere,  proximum  Isedere,  &c. ;  malum  vero 
Ipsum  diligere,  proximo  benefacere,  &c. ;  quod  evidentissimam 
involvit  absurditatem,  redditque  impossibile  medium  cognoscendi 
(excepta  divina  revelatione),  quid  Deus  revera  naturaliter  prse- 
cepit  et  quid  prohibuit." — Vol.  iii.  pp.  67,  8,  9. 

This  passage,  at  first  reading,  might  appear  some- 
what in  favour  of  that  opinion,  which  makes  God's 
Necessary  Will  the  source  of  all  moral  obligation.  But 
a  careful  study  of  it  will  quite  destroy  this  impression. 
For  instance,  in  the  first  italicized  passage  of  the  second 
paragraph,  he  declares  that  certain  evil  actions  would 
remain  evil,  even  though  '  per  impossibile '  God  did  not 
forbid  them.  In  the  first  italicized  passage  of  the 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    479 

third  paragraph  he  adds,  that  though  in  thought  we 
remove  from  the  matter  all  law  whether  Divine  or 
human,  it  still  should  appear  to  every  one  base  and 
evil  to  depart  from  the  rule  of  Reason  and  from  right 
order. 

207.  I  next  come  to  the  Lyons  course  of  philosophy. 
The  following  passage  seems  to  shew,  that  in  this  work 
also,  an  intrinsic  obligation  is  attributed   to  morality, 
over   and   above   that  obligation,  which  results  from 
God's  Necessary  Command  of  it.     The  words  are  as 
follows  :  — 

"  Obligatio  nascitur,  turn  a  Voluntate  Divina  summ£  Perfecta, 
Cui  voluntas  humana  admodum  imperfecta  et  debilis,  omnem  debet 
subjectionem  exhibere ;  turn  a  naturd  ordinis,  qui  cum  sit  intrinsece 
bonus  utpot£  necessarius  entibus,  ab  omni  intelligent!;!  debet  amari; 
turn  etiam,"  &c. — Ethica  Generalis,  dissert,  v.  vol.  iii. 

The  Divine  Command,  you  see,  is  given  as  part,  but 
only  part,  of  the  source  from  which  moral  obligation 
springs.  Even  without  reference  to  this  Divine  Com- 
mand, every  intelligence  (or  intelligent  being)  ought 
to  love  (or  is  under  the  obligation  of  loving)  what  is 
intrinsecally  good. 

208.  Noget-Lacoudre,   like  Dmowski,   professedly 
only  opposes  the  opinion,  that  the  obligation  of  morality 
springs  from  God's  Free  Will.    But  he  also,  as  Dmowski, 
in  fact  extends  his  statements  to  God's  Necessary  Will 
also  :  — 

"Discrimen  inter  bonum  et  malum  morale  repetendum  non 
est  a  Voluntate  Positiv&  et  Libera  Dei  tantummodo. 

"  Probatur.  Ilia  enim  regula  moralis  rejicienda  est,  quae  1°. 
contradicit  notioni  quam  habemus  boni  et  mali  moralis ;  2°.  quse 
nullam  obligationem  potest  parere :  atqui  tails  est  regula,  quae  dis- 
crimen  inter  bonum  et  malum  morale  repetit  ex  Voluntate  Positiva 
et  Libera  Dei  tantum ;  nullo  autem  modo  ex  essentid  reruns 

"  1°.  quidem  regula  ha3c  contradicit  notioni  quam  habemus 
boni  et  mali  moralis.  Quisque  enim  existimat  plurimos  actus,  quos 
agnoscunt  tanquam  bonos  et  malos  moraliter,  tales  esse  ex  essentid 
rerum ;  eorumdem  actuum  bonitatem  aut  malitiam  ab  omni  volun- 
tate  liberd  esse  independentem  ideoque  immutabilem.  Sic  existi- 
mant  quicumque  recto  animi  sensui  vim  non  mferunt,  bonum  esse 
suum  cuique  tribuere ;  animum  beneficiorum  memorem  servare ; 
&c. ;  nee  unquam  hos  actus  malos  fieri  posse.  Erg6,  &c. 


480  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

"  2°.  Regula  haec  nullam  obligationem  parere  potest.  Si  enim 
tollitur  discrimen  ex  essentia  rerum  profluens,  tune  Deo  jubenti 
parere  non  teneor  quia  bona  est  res  quam  ille  imperat ;  sed  tan- 
tummodo  quia  Deus  vult :  atqui  sola  Voluntas  Dei  non  potest 
parere  obligationem.  Nulla  enim  adesse  potest  obligatio,  quin  adsit 
officium  implendum  :  atqui  tune  nullum  adest  officium  implendum: 
omne  enim  officium  implicat  ideam  actus  boni,  seu  rectae  rationi 
consentanei ;  non  verb  solummodb  imperium  voluntatis,  guantumvis 
potentis.  Si  enim  non  adest  nisi  imperium  voluntatis  summe 
potentis,  nulla  vero  notio  recti;  —  sane  prudentice  non  erit  non 
parere  jubenti ;  securitatique  et  utilitati  SUCK  non  sapienter  consulet, 
qui  imperium  voluntatis  istius  summi  potentis  detrectabit :  at  si 
imprudently  reus  ille  merito  dicitur,  nunquam  tamen  recti  et  aqui 
violator  erit.  Nullum  jus  sola  violentia  parere  potest.  Ergo, 
&c."— Vol.  iii.  p.  112,  113.  Thesis  6. 

One  sentence  in  this  passage  is  very  remarkable  and 
important :  '  Sola  Voluntas  Dei  non  potest  parere  obli- 
gationem/ To  unfold  more  fully  its  meaning,  take  this 
conclusion  :  '  I  am  bound  to  obey  the  Pope  in  spirituals, 
because  God  commands  it.'  The  premisses  stated  in 
full  are  as  follows  :  — 

Major.  I  am  bound  to  obey  whatever  God  com- 
mands. 

Minor.  God  commands  me  to  obey  the  Pope. 

Conclusion.  I  am  bound  to  obey  the  Pope. 

The  major  premiss  is  very  far  from  a  merely  analyti- 
cal proposition.  (See  n.  23,  p.  52.)  It  is  a  synthetical 
proposition,  and  a  most  important  one ;  intued  however 
with  extreme  clearness,  so  soon  as  the  idea  of  a  Holy 
Creator  is  unfolded  before  my  mind.  Now  it  is  plain, 
that  the  minor  premiss,  by  itself,  would  not  suffice  to 
establish  the  conclusion ;  or,  in  other  words,  no  obli- 
gation could  result  from  the  mere  fact  of  God  giving 
me  a  Command,  unless  my  reason  at  once  supplied  the 
major  premiss  as  above  expressed. 

What  I  am  here  however  concerned  to  point  out,  is 
that  this  statement  of  Lacoudre  applies  to  God's  Neces- 
sary Will,  no  less  than  to  His  Free  Will. 

That  Lacoudre  indeed  does  not  attribute  the  origin 
of  moral  obligation  to  God's  Will  in  any  sense,  is 
equally  clear  from  the  title  which  he  gives  to  his  next 
thesis :  *  Discrimen  inter  bonum  et  malum  morale 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    481 

repetendum  est  ex  essentid  rerum*     Not  from  God's 
Will,  you  see,  but  from  the  essence  of  things. 

209.  But  no  writer  of  the  present  day  has  entered 
more  fully  upon  the  subject  than  F.  Chastel,  S.J.  His 
statements  and  arguments  are  as  follow  : — 

"  Le  bien  et  le  mal  sont  fondes  sur  la  nature,  sur  Fessence 
immuable  des  choses ;  et  Dieu,  loin  de  decider  arbitraireraent  le 
bien  et  le  mal,  est  au  contraire  ntcessitd  par  Sa  Perfection  m£me  a 
ddfendre  Fun  et  a  vouloir  Fautre.  Par  consequent,  il  n'est  pas 
besoin  d'une  revelation,  pour  connaitre  la  Volonte'  de  Dieu  sur  ce 
point ;  ni  pour  savoir  ce  qui  est  bien  et  ce  qui  est  mal  en  virtu  de 
la  Loi  Naturelle.  Cette  loi  primordiale,  gravee  dans  le  coeur  de 
chacun  de  nous,  est  promulguee  par  la  voix  de  la  raison  et  de  la 
conscience.  Tel  a  6te  dans  tous  les  temps  1'enseignement  Chretien. 
Saint  Paul  (Rom.  ii.)  affirme  que  les  pai'ens  eux-memes  portent 
cette  loi  ecrite  dans  le  coeur,  et  qu'un  tribunal  irrecusable  est 
e"leve  dans  leur  conscience.  f  Comment  done  les  Gentils,'  demande 
Saint  Jean  Chrysostome,  ( peuvent-ils  dire ;  Nous  n'avons  point  de 
loi  posee  par  elle-meme  dans  la  conscience,  et  Dieu  ne  Fa  pas 
gravee  dans  notre  coeur  ?  C'est  de  cette  loi  que  les  premiers  hommes 
ont  tir^  leurs  lois,  qu'ils  ont  invente  les  arts  et  les  autres  choses.' 
(Homil.  ad  Pop.  Antioch.  12,  c.  4.)  'Cette  loi,'  dit  Saint  Ambrose, 
*  ne  nous  est  point  enseignee  du  dehors,  elle  est  nee  en  nous-memes; 
nous  ne  la  tirons  point  des  livres  ;  chacun  de  nous  la  puise  dans  la 
source  feconde  de  la  nature.' — Apud  Suarez,  ibid.  c.  5. 

"  Dans  la  Loi  Naturelle,  telle  que  la  manifestent  la  conscience 
et  la  raison,  il  faut  distinguer  deux  choses :  1°.  le  caractere  du 
bien  et  mal,  c'est-^-dire,  ce  qui  est  conforme  ou  contraire  a  la 
nature  des  etres  et  a  leurs  rapports  essentiels ;  2°.  FIntervention 
ndcessaire  du  Maitre  de  la  nature,  Qui  veut  le  bien  et  defend  le  maL 
D'abord  I' exigence  de  la  nature,  ensuite  le  Prdcepte  Divin ;  deux 
choses  distinctes,  dont  Vune  est  logiquement  ante'rieure  a  Fautre. 
Pour  que  Dieu  ordonne  ou  defende,  il  faut  concevoir  quelque 
chose  k  ordonner  et  a  defendre.  Le  bien  n'est  pas  tel  parce  qu'il 
plait  a  Dieu,  mais  il  plait  a  Dieu  parce  qu'il  est  bien ;  de  memo  le 
mal  n'est  defendu  de  Dieu,  que  parce  qu'il  est  mal. 

"A  part  le  Pre'cepte  Divin,  il  y  a  done  toujours  bien  et  mal 
essentiels,  il  y  a  ^exigence  de  la  nature.  Or  on  demande  si, 
abstraction  faite  de  Dieu  et  de  Sa  Volontd,  la  seule  exigence  de  la 
nature  suffit  pour  creer  un  devoir,  pour  constituer  une  obligation 
morale :  en  d'autres  termes,  s'il  y  a  une  loi  morale  inddpendamment 
de  toute  Loi  Divine ;  ou  encore  jusqu'a  quel  point  la  morale  est 
ind^pendante  de  la  religion.  Cette  question  delicate  a  e*te*  trop 
souvent  et  trop  vivement  souleve*e,  pmir  n'avoir  pas  besoin  d'une 
solution  complete. 


482  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

"  Avouons  d'abord,  que  ce  qui  fait  la  principale  force  de  la 
Loi  Naturelle,  est  sans  contredit  ^Intervention  de  Dieu.  La 
Majeste  de  la  Volonte  Divine  s'imposant  a  la  conscience,  et 
montrant  a  Phomme  une  sanction  inevitable  et  clairement  deter- 
minee,  agira  toujours  bien  plus  fortement  sur  nous,  que  la  simple 
consideration  de  la  nature.  Neanmoins  il  faut  voir  si  cette  seule 
consideration  de  la  nature  n'impose  point  par  elle-meme  une 
obligation  quelconque. 

"  Yoici  la  reponse  de  Suarez Anterieurement  a  la 

Prescription  et  a  la  Volonte  Divine,  il  y  a  lien  etmal  moral;  il  y  a 
done  obligation  morale,  non  aussi  forte  mais  reelle,  de  faire  ce  qui 
est  bien  et  d'eviter  ce  qui  est  mal.  Cela  est  si  vrai,  que  cette  loi 
est  la  raison  meme  de  notre  soumission  a  la  Volonte'  Divine.  Car 
enfin,  si  Dieu  ordonne  ou  defende,  il  faut  qu'il  y  ait  en  nous  une 
raison  anterieure  d 'accepter  Sa  Volontd  et  de  la  suivre. 

"  On  demandera,  quelle  est  la  force  de  cette  obligation  et  quelle 
est  sa  sanction?  La  raison  nous  dit,  que  tout  etre,  ou  du  moins 
tout  etre  raisonnable,  doit  agir  conformement  a  sa  nature  et  aux 
rapports  essentiels  qui  le  lient  aux  autres  etres ;  sous  peine,  en 
allant  contre  sa  nature,  de  marcher  a  la  contradiction,  au  desordre, 
a  la  destruction ;  voila  la  loi.  Or  qui  va  a  la  destruction  et  a  la 
soufFrance,  doit  la  trouver :  voila  la  sanction.* 

"Maintenant,  cette  obligation  morale,  simple  resultat  de  la 
nature  des  etres,  F  appellerez-vous  une  loi,  ou  lui  refuserez-vous 
ce  nom,  sons  prdtexte  que  toute  loi  dmane  d^un  supdrieur?  Pen 
importe.  Suarez  vous  dira  qu'elle  n'est  pas  une  loi  proprement 
dite ;  bien  que  d' autres  thdologiens  lui  donnent  ce  nom,  en  distinguant 
deux  especes  de  loi,  celle  qui  indique,  qui  determine  le  devoir, 
et  celle  qui  I' impose  comme  expression  d'une  volontd  supe'rieure. 
(Suarez,  ibid.  n.  3.)  Mais  cette  dispute  de  mots  n'empeche  pas 
qu'il  y  ait  toujours  obligation  morale,  devoir  reel,  quand  on  ferait 
abstraction  de  Dieu  et  de  la  religion.  Cette  verite  n'a  point 
echappe  au  puissant  genie  de  Leibnitz.  '  II  est  tres-vrai/  dit-il, 

*  "  Quelques  lecteurs  bienveillants  ont  paru  craindre  que  nous  ne  soyons 
tombe  ici  dans  1'erreur  du  Peche  Philosophique  :  nous  devons  les  rassurer. 
La  doctrine  condamnee  du  Pech6  Philosophique  consistait  a  dire,  que  Ton 
pouvait  pecher  contre  la  nature  et  contre  la  raison,  sans  offenser  Dieu  en 
meme  temps  et  sans  violer  son  commandement  (voir  la  2e  prop,  condamnee 
par  Alex.  VIII.,  Aout,  1690).  Or,  nous  ne  disons  et  ne  pensons  rien  de 
semblable.  L'obligation  fondee  sur  la  nature  ou  la  raison,  et  celle  que  fonde 
la  Loi  Divine,  sont  deux  obligations  distinctes  ;  elles  ne  sont  pas  separees. 

"  D'autres  auraient  pr6fere  du  moins  que  nous  eussions  evite  cette  diffi- 
cile question,  qui  n'etait  pas  necessaire  a  notre  these.  Ces  personnes  n'ont 
pas  lu,  sans  doute,  tout  ce  que  les  rationalistes  et  les  traditionalistes  ont 
ecrit  depuis  vingt  ans  sur  les  rapports  de  la  morale  et  de  la  religion,  et  les 
excbs  deplorables  ou  Von  Jest  porte  des  deux  cotes.  Or,  notre  these  etait 
de  resoudre  le  plus  completement  possible  cette  importante  question,  et  de 
montrer  la  verite  entre  ces  erreurs  opposees"  (Author's  note.) 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    483 

( que  Dicu  est  par  sa  Nature  supdrieur  de  tous  les  homines.  Ce- 
pendant,  cette  pensee,  que  tout  droit  nait  de  la  Volonte  d'un 
Supcrieur,  ne  laisse  pas  de  clwquer  et  d'etre/mute,  queltjue  adouciss*- 
ment  qrfon  apporte  pour  Pexcuser.  Car  Grotius  a  judicieusement 
remarqud,  qu'il  y  aurait  quelque  obligation  naturelle,  (juand  imine 
on  accorderaity  ce  qui  ne  so  peut,  qiiil  n'y  a  point  de  Divinitd ; 
ou  en  faisant  abstraction  pour  un  moment  de  son  existence.'— 
Penstes^  t.  xi.  p.  306. 

"  Dieu,  a  t'on  dit,  est  la  source  de  la  morale ;  done  elle  repose 
sur  lui.  Oui,  Dieu  est  la  Source  de  tous  les  etres,  de  toutes  les 
verites,  des  vdritds  morales  comme  des  vtritls  matJie'matujues ;  cepen- 
dant,  ne  peut-on  prouver  les  verites  mathematiques,  sans  recourir 
au  dogme  de  1'Existence  de  Dieu?" — Pp.  40-45. 

210.  The  quotations  which  I  have  now  brought  to- 
gether, are  most  abundantly  sufficient,  as  every  one 
must  admit,  for  the  purpose  for  which  I  have  made 
them.  They  are  most  abundantly  sufficient  to  shew, 
that  any  Catholic  has  the  fullest  liberty  of  denying  that 
all  moral  obligation  springs  from  God's  Command,  if 
such  denial  appears  to  him  borne  out  by  reason  and 
argument. 

We  are  next  to  enquire,  how  far  we  are  in  accord- 
ance with  Catholic  authorities,  in  saying  that  the 
idea  of  moral  goodness  does  not  contain  that  of  any 
relation  to  God ;  not  merely  that  it  does  not  contain 
the  idea  of  God's  Command,  but  not  of  any  relation  to 
Him.  Let  us  consider,  in  this  point  of  view,  the  various 
extracts  which  we  have  made  from  theologians  and 
philosophers. 

And  first  for  theologians.  There  can  be  no  pos- 
sible doubt  on  the  doctrine  of  Lessius,  Bellarmine,  Lugo, 
and  the  two  theologians  whom  Lugo  quotes ;  viz. 
Gabriel  and  Gregory  of  Ariminum.  (See  n.  190-194, 
p.  443,  4.)  These  all  agree  in  stating,  that  even  if 
God  did  not  exist,  there  might  be  real  sin.  And  Lessius 
explains  how  sin  would  exist ;  viz.  i  quatenus  actus 
aliqui  fiunt  libere  contra  regulam  rectee  Rationis.'  It 
is  absolutely  undeniable,  then,  that  these  theologians 
regard  the  idea  of  '  moral  evil,'  as  not  containing  the 
idea  of  any  relation  to  God  whatever. 

The  same  assertion  is  equally  certain,  in  regard  to 


484  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

Salas,  Azor,  Vega,  and  the  '  plures  ex  antiquioribus  et 
recentioribus '  whom  Lugo  cites.  All  these  theologians 
hold  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  men  might  really  and 
formally  sin,  even  though  they  were  invincibly  ignorant 
of  God's  Existence;  they  only  differ  from  each  other 
on  the  question,  whether  such  sin  could  be  mortal. 
But  if  men  are  able  to  sin  without  knowledge  of  God, 
it  is  plain  that  the  idea  of  sin  does  not  in  itself  include 
the  idea  of  God.  All  these  theologians,  therefore,  hold 
the  doctrine  which  I  follow  ;  viz.  that  the  idea  of  moral 
evil  does  not  include  that  of  any  relation  to  Almighty 
God. 

I  should  add  indeed,  to  prevent  misconception,  that 
all  these  theologians  make  a  much  greater  severance 
between  God  and  Moral  Truth,  than  I  can  think  legiti- 
mate and  true.  The  first  of  the  two  classes  hold  that 
there  might  be  moral  evil,  even  though  (per  impossi- 
bile)  God  did  not  exist :  whereas  to  me  it  seems,  that  if 
(per  inipossibile)  there  were  no  Necessary  Being,  neither 
would  there  be  any  necessary  Truth ;  Mathematical, 
Moral,  nor  any  other.  The  second  of  the  two  classes 
hold  that  there  might  be  a  real  knowledge  of  moral 
evil,  even  if  God  were  invincibly  and  totally  unknown  : 
whereas  to  me  it  seems,  that  the  knowledge  of  any  truth 
as  necessary,  is  a  real  knowledge,  so  far  as  it  goes,  (how- 
ever dim  and  imperfect)  of  the  One  Necessary  Being. 
(Seen.  34,  p.  75.) 

It  is  absolutely  certain  however,  that  all  these  authors 
consider  the  idea  '  morally  evil '  to  be  totally  inde- 
pendent of  the  idea  '  God.'  Any  other  Catholic  then 
has  the  fullest  liberty  of  holding  the  same,  if  such  ap- 
pear to  him  the  dictate  of  Reason.  There  is  no  need 
consequently  in  strictness  to  proceed  further  :  yet  a 
very  few  words  will  suffice  to  shew,  that  the  other 
theologians  also,  whom  I  have  cited  in  this  Section,  un- 
doubtedly go  to  the  same  extent. 

It  will  have  been  observed,  that  they  all  (when 
denying  that  moral  evil  is  exclusively  based  on  God's 
Prohibition,)  use  such  expressions  as  the  following. 
They  say  that  those  acts,  which  are  forbidden  by  the 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.   485 

Natural  Law,  are  also  evil  4ex  natura  sua;'  'ex  se  ;' 
'  secundum  se  ; '  c  propter  disconvenientiam  cum  rectA 
Ratione  ;'  and  use  other  phrases  to  the  same  effect.  It 
is  plain  then,  that  they  are  not  contrasting  God's  Pro- 
hibition on  the  one  hand,  with  some  other  relation  to 
God  on  the  other  hand  :  no ;  they  are  contrasting  that 
evil  which  is  occasioned  by  God's  Intervention  on  the 
one  hand,  with  that  evil  which  is  intrinsic  to  the  very 
nature  of  the  act  on  the  other  hand.  They  are  saying, 
that  not  all  the  moral  evil  of  such  acts  comes  through 
God's  extrinsic  Intervention  ;  but  that  there  is  true 
moral  evil  intrinsic  to  the  very  acts  themselves. 

This  is  surely  conclusive.  Yet  it  so  happens,  that  we 
can  confirm  our  statement  by  other  extracts,  in  the  case 
of  each  single  theologian  in  the  number.  Thus  Suarez 
in  a  different  treatise  (the  *de  Peccatis')  treats  very 
briefly  the  question, c  whether  sin  can  exist,  where  there 
is  invincible  ignorance  of  God.'  He  will  not  decide 
whether  such  ignorance  is  possible;  but,  supposing  it, 
he  says  that  there  might  nevertheless  be  real  sin  and  real 
defection  from  our  True  End.  This  is  the  passage  :— 

"Actus  peccati  ex  deformitate  ad  rectam  Rationem  proprie 
dicitur  actus  malus ;  peccatum  ver6  dicitur,  ex  carenti&  rectitudinis 
ad  Ultimum  Finem.  .... 

"  Sed  contra.  f  Nam  si'quis  cognosceret  actuin  aliquem  esse 
( contra  rectam  Rationem,  ut  tamen  invincibiliter  ignoi  aret  Deum, 
'  ille  peccaret  contra  rectam  Rationem,  et  tamen  niliil  inordinatum 
f  ageret  contra  Ultimum  Finem/  " 

He  supposes  then  an  opponent  to  object  against 
him  as  follows.  '  You  will  not  deny  that  there  may  be 
4  real  sin  in  a  man  invincibly  ignorant  of  God.  Yet  in 
4  his  case  you  cannot  allege  that  there  is  any  thing  in- 
'ordinatum  contra  Ultimum  Finem;  because  to  him 
cthe  Ultimus  Finis  is  invincibly  unknown.'  Does 
Suarez  then  reply,  that  there  can  not  be  real  sin  in 
one  invincibly  ignorant  of  God  ?  This  would  be  by 
far  the  easiest  mode  of  freeing  himself  from  the  diffi- 
culty, if  he  would  adopt  it  consistently  with  his  principles. 
But  his  answer  is  most  different. 

"Respondeo:    quidquid  sit  an  talis  ignorantia  sit  possibilis, 


486  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

tamen  ilia  posita,  actus  mains  etiam  careret  illo  ordine  quern 
habere  debet  ad  Ultimum  Finem.  Et  hoc  non  pendet  ex 
cognitione  vel  voluntate  operantis ;  quia  intrinsece  et  essentialiter 
convenit  hoc  actui  malo  ut  malus  est :  sicut  e  contra  actus  virtutis, 
ratione  suse  honestatis,  habet  rectitudinem  debitam  ad  Ultimum 
Finem ;  licet  ab  operante  non  referatur  vel  etiam  non  cognos- 
catur.;' — De  Peccatis,  disp.  sec.  1,  nn.  7,  8. 

You  see,  in  this  last  sentence  again  he  implies,  that 
a  man  may  act  '  propter  bonum  honestum,'  who  is 
ignorant  of  God  the  Ultimus  Finis.  Hence,  in  Suarez's 
judgment,  a  man  may  know  'bonum  honestum/  who 
does  not  know  God ;  and  hence  again  the  idea  *  bonum 
honestum  '  does  not  include  the  idea  '  God.7 

Vasquez  again  says  expressly, 

e  Integra  ratio  culpse  et  peccati  moralis  in  oppositione  cum 
virtute  et  natura  rationali  recte  intelligitur.' — In  lm  2se,  disp. 
96,  n.  6. 

Father  Compton  Carleton: — 

ff  In  hoc  omnes  [theologi]  conspirant,  peccatum  scilicet  aliquod 
(furtum  e.  g.  vel  homicidium)  cum  invincibili  Dei  ignorantid,  non 
contracturum  specialem  malitiam  injurise  contra  Deum,  ingratitu- 
dinis,  inobedientise,  .  .  . 

"  Conveniunt  insuper  omnes,  peccatum  quodvis,  hoc  modo  com- 
missum,  Deo  displicere  ....  Prseterea  cum  peccatum  illud  sit 
malum,  meretur  a  Deo  .  .  .  puniri." 

Carleton  regards  all  theologians  as  agreeing,  that 
there  could  be  real  sin,  though  there  were  invincible 
ignorance  of  God ;  and  he  proceeds  to  represent  them 
as  differing  from  each  other  only  on  the  question, 
whether  such  sin  would  be  mortal. 

Berti,  in  like  manner,  though  denying  most  earnestly 
that  there  can  be  invincible  ignorance  of  God,  yet  holds 
that  if  there  were  such  ignorance,  there  might  never- 
theless be  real  sin. 

<f  Data  invincibili  Dei  ignoratione, .  .  admitteretur  Peccatum 
Philosophicum.  Posset  enim  ignorans  Deum  adversus  rectam 
rationem  delinquere" — 1.  21,  c.  9.  n.  13. 

In  the  following  number  he  further  states,  that  such 
sin  would  be  displeasing  to  God,  and  would  be  justly 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    487 

punished  by  Him ;  though  he  maintains  that  it  could 
not  properly  be  called  an  offence  against  Him. 

Lastly,  Frassen  shews  no  less  clearly  his  real  opinion, 
than  do  the  other  theologians  whom  I  have  cited.  He 
is  adducing  arguments  which  prove  God's  Existence ; 
and,  among  others,  he  urges,  that  if  (per  impossibile) 
God  did  not  exist,  there  would  be  no  sure  punishment 
for  sin,  nor  any  sure  reward  of  virtue.  It  is  plain,  of 
course,  that  if  the  idea  of  moral  good  and  evil  depended 
on  the  idea  of  God,  the  hypothesis  of  God's  non-existence 
would  imply  the  non-existence  of  moral  good  or  evil : 
we  see  therefore,  how  very  far  removed  is  Frassen 
from  any  such  opinion.  These  are  his  words: — 

"  Ex  negatione  Supremi  Numinis,  virtutis  pcreat  praemium, 
.  .  .  et  ad  exercenda  quseque  vitia  improbis  laxentur  habense. 
.  .  .  Ex  ea  doctrina  quse  negat  Deum  esse,  sequitur  nullum  esse 
omnium  criminum  Ultorem  .  .  Adde  quod  si  nullus  Deus  existeret, 
nullum  pariter  foret  premium  virtutis.'' — Tract  1,  disp.  1,  n.  1, 
q.  4,  concl.  3. 

It  is  quite  certain  then,  that  all  those  theologians 
whom  we  cited  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  Section,  are 
equally  available  for  our  present  purpose.  We  cited 
them  originally  as  testifying,  that  the  idea  '  morally 
evil '  by  no  means  implies  God's  Prohibition ;  but  they 
all  go  further  than  this,  as  we  now  find:  they  deny 
that  the  idea  c  morally  evil '  contains  the  idea  of  any 
relation  towards  God. 

I  say,  all  those  '  theologians ; '  for  I  have  not  been 
able  to  find  any  passage  from  S.  Ignatius'  c  Spiritual 
Exercises,'  bearing  on  our  later  subject.  Nor  indeed 
is  this  at  all  wonderful.  Rather,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
somewhat  remarkable,  that  in  a  work,  which  does  not 
profess  to  be  either  philosophical  or  theological,  there 
should  be  an  incidental  statement  so  much  to  our  point, 
as  the  one  which  we  were  able  to  quote  on  our  earlier 
controversy:  see  n.  187,  p.  432.  It  should  be  added 
also,  that  the  remark  made  at  the  beginning  of  this 
number,  is  eminently  applicable  to  the  passage  which 
we  quoted  from  the  *  Exercises.'  There  is  no  kind  of 
hint  that  the  4  foeditas  et  nequitia,'  which  is  independent 


488  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

of  God's  Prohibition,  contains  the  idea  of  some  other 
relation  to  Him ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  evil  acts  are  said 
to  possess  it,  c  ex  naturd  sud.'  And  Father  Roothaan 
interprets  the  Saint  as  signifying  by  his  phrase,  'ration! 
natural!  contraria.' 

211.  The  same  general  remark  applies  to  the  cita- 
tions from  Catholic  philosophers,  which  we  have  brought 
together  in  this  Section.  Evil  actions,  says  Dmowski, 
do  not  derive  their  whole  malitia  from  God's  Pro- 
hibition ;  they  are  '  naturaliter  homini  mala :'  good 
actions  are  '  naturaliter  ac  per  se  bonse  et  honestse :' 
the  good  and  evil  in  human  acts  is  'non  solum  secundum 
legis  positionem  sed  etiam  secundum  naturalem  ordi- 
nem.'  Noget-Lacoudre,  in  like  manner,  says  that  many 
good  and  bad  acts  '  tales  esse  ex  essentid  rerum.'  And 
Father  Chastel,  that  c  le  bien  et  le  mal  sont  fondes  sur 
V essence  immuable  des  choses.'  These  writers  state,  as 
we  have  seen,  that  the  attribute  'morally  evil'  is  by 
no  means  synonymous  with  the  attribute  '  prohibited 
by  God.'  But  in  saying  this,  they  are  not  contrasting 
' prohibited  by  God'  with  some  other  relation  to  God  : 
as  e.g.  'detested  by  God;'  '  intued  as  evil  by  God;' 
'separating  from  God;'  or  the  like.  Their  language 
shews  that  this  is  not  at  all  their  meaning.  Their 
meaning  is,  that  the  term  '  morally  evil  '  does  not  in 
itself  imply  any  relation  to  God ;  but  that  in  many  cases 
it  expresses  an  attribute,  which  appertains  to  acts  '  ex 
naturd  sua"1  and  ^secundum  ordinem  naturce.' 

Two  or  three  of  them  speak  so  plainly,  as  to  render 
misconception  impossible.  Thus  Gerdil,  as  we  have 
seen,  holds  that  there  may  be  a  real  knowledge  of 
moral  obligation,  in  those  whom  we  may  suppose  to 
have  no  knowledge  of  God  at  all.  He  cannot  therefore 
regard  the  term  '  moral  obligation '  as  expressing  any 
relation  to  God  ;  since  he  considers  that  men  may  know 
it,  who  have  no  idea  of  God. 

The  '  Praelectiones  Philosophic^ '  contain  the  fol- 
lowing excellent  remarks  on  this  matter  :— 

'Nonnullij  qui  nobiscum  sentiunt  circa  fundamentum  obliga- 


CATHOLIC  AUTHORITY  ON  INDEPENDENT  MORALITY.    489 

tionis  moralis,  exinde  concludunt  hanc  obligationem  eandem, 
remanere,  etiam  in  hypothec  impossibili  quod  Deus  non  essei.  .  .  . 
( Si  autem  obligationem  moralem  in  se  spectemus,  hanc  anni- 
hilari,  si  per  impossible  Deus  non  existeret,  tenendum  est,  In 
Essentid  enim  Divind  .  .  .  continentur  relationes  essentiales  neces- 
saria  rerum ;  ideoque  ab  Ea  pendet  discrimen  inter  bonum  et 
malum  morale.  Si  igitur  Deus  per  impossibile  existere  cessaret, 
eo  ipso  nil  bonum  aut  malum,  quemadmodum  nil  verum  autfalsumt 
jam  dici  deberet.'  (n.  1557.) 

It  is  impossible  to  express  more  clearly  the  very 
doctrine  which  I  follow,  and  which  I  have  expressed 
in  n.  34.  The  following  passage  from  Solimam  seems 
also  to  contain  the  same  doctrine  ;  though  I  admit  that 
it  is  not  quite  so  clearly  expressed  :— 

*  Prim  a  fronte  non  satis  apparet,  qua  ratione  Natura  Divina 
sit  norma  humanarum  actionum.  Id  ut  clare  percipiatur,  adver- 
tendum  est,  in  Natura  Divina  intelligente  existere  ideas  arche- 
typas  eorum  omnium,  quse  sunt  vel  esse  possunt  Porro  quem- 
admodum ipsae  res,  ita  quoque  rerum  idea?,  varias  habent  inter  se 
relationes,  qua?  eas  invicem  nectunt,  atque  immensum  quendam 
ordinem  constituunt  Hujusmodi  ordo  unus  revera  in  re  est  et  sim- 
plex: nihilominusdividi  cogitando  potest,in  duos  peculiares  ordines, 
quorum  alter  spectat  intimas  rerum  naturas,  et  s  metaphysicus  ' 
appellatur;  alter  spectat  liberas  naturarum  intelligentium  actiones, 
et  appellatur  '  moralis '  .  .  .  .  Porro  qua?vis  natura  intelligens, 
quum  libere  agit,  nulli  suce  relationi  adversari  debet.  Ex  his  patet, 
ordinem  moralem  necessario  profluere  k  metaphysico.  Quare 
immutabilis  et  ceternus  est  seque  ac  metaphysicus.  Et  sane  uterque 
in  Immutdbili  atque  ^Etemd  Dei  Natura  consistit,  atque  ab  Eadem 
reipsa  non  differt.  Jam  vero  Natura  Divina  eatenus  est  norma 
humanarum  actionum,  quatenus  continet  ac  exhibet  ordinem 
moralem:''— Vol.  i.  p.  182. 

212.  I  have  not  in  this  Section  entered  at  all  upon  a 
direct  theological  consideration  of  those  philosophical 
conclusions,  which  have  been  established  (I  hope)  in 
the  three  first  Sections.  Such  consideration  entirely 
appertains  to  the  Second  Book ;  and  in  the  course 
of  that  Book  I  hope  to  shew,  that  Theology  presents 
us  with  strong  additional  reasons  of  its  own  for  adopting 
many  of  those  conclusions.  But  in  this  Section  my 
purpose  has  been  entirely  negative.  The  state  of  the 
case  is  this. 


490  PHILOSOPHICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

I  have  advocated  strongly,  as  a  philosophical  con- 
clusion, that  moral  obligation  exists  quite  independently 
of  the  Divine  Command.  Many  Catholics  however,  as 
I  find,  are  strongly  prepossessed  against  this  conclusion, 
and  are  unwilling  to  consider  fairly  the  arguments 
urged  in  its  support,  from  their  impression  that  theo- 
logians, as  a  body,  are  opposed  to  it.  I  have  therefore 
thought  it  very  important,  even  in  the  present  Book,  to 
shew,  how  vast  a  body  of  theologians  are  here  in 
accordance. 

Again,  I  have  advocated,  as  a  philosophical  con- 
clusion, not  only  that  the  term  '  morally  evil '  does  not 
signify  ''prohibited  by  God/  but  that  it  does  not  express 
any  relation  to  God  whatever.  And,  though  I  have  not 
heard  the  objection  made,  many  Catholics  may  possibly 
think  that  this  view  at  all  events  is  opposed  to  theo- 
logical authority.  Since  therefore  a  very  few  additional 
words  enabled  me  to  remove  any  such  other  impression 
also,  I  thought  it  better  to  add  those  few  words. 

This  is  all  that  I  have  attempted  in  the  present 
Section:  and  every  reader,  I  think,  will  be  ready  to 
admit,  that  so  much  as  this  has  been  satisfactorily 
accomplished. 


CORRIGENDA  (see  Preface). 


P.  113.  In  the  volume,  as  it  originally  stood,  the  investigation* 
of  the  earlier  Sections  were  far  more  confined  to  the  question  of  strict 
obligation;  and  did  not  extend  to  Moral  Truth  in  general,  as  they 
now  do.  This  will  explain  the  language  of  the  first  paragraph. 

P.  117.  The  reference  to  n.  24  should  now  be  to  n.  48*,  p.  112; 
and  that  to  n.  30  should  be  to  n.  19,  p.  43. 

P.  122.  The  reference  to  n.  17  should  now  be  to  n.  29,  p. 
64-67. 

P.  142.  The  reference  in  the  first  note  should  not  be  to  the 
Appendix,  which  has  now  indeed  been  incorporated ;  but  to  n.  34, 
p.  74,  5. 

P.  151.  The  reference  to  n.  25  should  now  be  to  n.  49*,  p.  107*. 

P.  153.  The  reference  to  n.  21,  and  (in  the  note)  to  the  Appendix, 
should  now  be  to  n.  34,  p.  74,  5. 

P.  159.  The  reference  ton.  9  should  now  be  to  n.  13,  p.  34  ;  and 
that  to  n.  10  should  now  be  to  n.  14,  p.  36. 

P.  162,  line  2.  I  was  mistaken  in  thinking,  that  Suarez  regards 
these  truths  as  immediate  '  dictamiiia  rationis;'  I  think  that  he  holds 
them  to  be  inferences.  Still,  of  course,  he  does  consider  that  there 
are  certain  immediate  'dictamina  rationis*  on  morality,  from  which 
the  rest  are  deducible. 

P.  163.  The  reference  to  n.  27  should  now  be  to  n.  186,  p.  431. 

P.  169.  The  reference  to  n.  25  should  now  be  to  n.  49*,  p.  107*. 

P.  190.  The  first  paragraph  of  n.  87  should  now  be  omitted. 

P.  424.  What  are  here  spoken  of  as  'judgments  of  experience,'  I 
have  now  called  *  judgments  of  consciousness  !' 

P.  425.  The  reference  to  n.  6  should  now  be  to  n.  9,  p.  18. 
„       The  reference  to  n.  13  should  now  be  to  n.  18,  p.  42. 


London:—  Printod  by  G.  BARCLAY,  Castle  St.  Leicester  8q.